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Introduction
This study is an attempt to speak about the awakening of private antitrust enforcement in 
Europe, especially in the context of the recent modernisation and decentralisation of EC 
competition law enforcement. In particular, we examine the role of courts in the application 
o f the EC competition rules and view that role in the broader system o f antitrust enforcement. 
At the same time, since competition law in Europe is also Community law, we also view 
private enforcement from the point o f view of general Community law and its effectiveness. 
The application of EC competition law by civil courts, though not particularly developed, has 
not been a recent phenomenon. Indeed, the very first preliminary reference made by a 
national court to Luxembourg under the old Article 177 EEC was a competition case where 
EC competition law arose in the context o f private litigation.1 Of course, the mere 
application o f the competition rules by national courts cannot be said to amount to a system 
o f private antitrust enforcement. The very term “enforcement” signifies an instrumental role 
o f  private actions in the sense that the private litigants become themselves actors in 
enhancing the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the competition enforcement system. It 
is only very recently that private antitrust enforcement appears for the first time as a real 
enforcement mechanism and thus as a meaningful complement to public enforcement. This 
has come as a consequence of the modernisation and decentralisation reforms that have 
produced a new enforcement system for the 2 1* century. But it has also come as a 
consequence of ground-breaking rulings by the Court of Justice, which has extended the 
scope of remedies available to individuals by Community law to cover also individual civil 
liability.
Modernisation and the advent of Regulation 1/2003 did not themselves energise private 
enforcement but rather offered the appropriate impetus and overall conditions for the matter 
to be addressed both at the Community and national levels. What in 1999 seemed distant and 
utopic, in 2006 appears a reality that private firms, public authorities and the legal profession 
will have to take seriously into account. The publication in December 2005 o f the Green 
Paper on damages actions by the European Commission concludes a long period of reflection 
and announces a new stage of development for private antitrust enforcement that is currently 
difficult to predict.
1 Case 13/61, Kleding\>erkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij 
tot voortzetting van de zaken der Firma IViUem van Rijn, (1962] ECR 45.
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This study also has the ambition to view in this context the case of arbitration. Arbitration 
presents itself as a form of private justice, alternative to state justice, and its functions and 
ambitions with reference to the application of EC competition law are not different to those 
o f state courts. Indeed, arbitrators constitute the “natural judge” of most business disputes, 
especially in the international context and as such they are certainly heavily implicated in any 
discourse o f private antitrust enforcement.2 It would be o f course an overstatement to speak 
of arbitration as a fomm of private antitrust enforcement. Indeed, arbitrators do nothing more 
than to resolve disputes before them and, especially in the context o f international 
commercial arbitration, have no forum and do not purport to serve any particular national or 
supranational public interest. However, this does not mean that arbitrators are immune from 
competition law in the exercise o f  their functions. On the contrary, in the last twenty years a 
new balance has taken form in the relationship between arbitration and competition law, built 
more on common interest, mutual respect, persuasiveness and pragmatic deference than on 
conflicts and hard law duties. As a  result, the institution o f  arbitration is strengthened and the 
array of matters that can be submitted to arbitration is broadened. At the same time, the 
arbitrators assume greater responsibilities in areas affected by the competition rules and this 
serves in an indirect yet undeniable manner the overall effectiveness and respectability of the 
EC competition rules themselves. 1
1 See L. Idot, Droit communautaire de la concurrence, he nouveau système communautaire de mise en 
œuvre des articles 81 et 82 CE (Paris/Brussels, 2004), p. 81.
A. EC PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
1. A Delimitation of EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Definitions and Modalities
a. Definition
A preliminary question is to define private enforcement. If private enforcement were to be 
given a rather broad meaning, i.e., if it meant enforcement of the EC antitrust rules through the 
initiative or intervention of private parties, then one could argue that such a definition seems to 
cover cases of private parties acting also as complainants to competition enforcement agencies. 
This has been termed as “privately triggered public enforcement”.3 Indeed, if the criterion is so 
general, the conclusion is that already there is a developed system of private enforcement at the 
central level of EC competition law enforcement, i.e. at the Commission level. Complainants in 
EC competition cases, as a result more of the Community Courts’ jurisprudence than of EC 
legislation, enjoy a rather elaborately defined legal status and are also accepted as players in the 
antitrust enforcement. However, this is not how private antitrust enforcement should be 
conceived.
Therefore, that concept can be further delimited: Any private parties involved in the enforcement 
of antitrust rules must do so as litigants in a litigation as against the perceived offenders of those 
rules. However, even so, such delimitation would not avoid including cases, where private 
parties participate in an already on-going litigation, which takes place primarily between an 
administrative authority’ and a defendant. In such cases private parties may join such litigation as 
interveners, if they can prove a direct and legitimate interest. This could be the case at the 
Community level, e.g. a third party intervention at the Community Courts level, or at the 
national level depending on national procedural rules, e.g. a third party intervention in review 
proceedings following a decision o f a national antitrust authority. Such intervention cannot make 
this litigation private antitrust enforcement. The characteristic element of the latter is that it leads 
to some sort of civil sanction as against the offender damages, restitution, injunctions, voidness 
of a contractual relationship, non-invocability of certain claims based for example on contract or 
on unfair competition law.4 Therefore, the mere intervention of a private party' in a public
3 See Komninos, “Introduction”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Low Annual 
2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. xxiii.
4 The European Commission appears now to accept these forms of civil litigation as “private enforcement”, 
although it has so far concentrated only on energising damages actions. See Commission MEMO/05/489, 
European Commission Green Paper on Damages for Breach o f EC Treaty Antitrust Rules -  Frequently Asked
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enforcement litigation, does not turn the latter into a private enforcement one, although such 
intervention may be beneficial to the effectiveness of public enforcement (for example because 
of the pooling of public and private resources in the detection of a cartel).5 
As a consequence, a more appropriate definition of private enforcement would refer to a 
litigation, in which private parties advance independent civil claims or counter-claims based on 
the EC competition provisions. Such a definition would basically cover civil litigation, but it 
would be broad enough to encompass third party civil claims attached to civil and/or 
administrative public enforcement proceedings. This is not affected by the fact that a national 
antitrust authority, or, indeed, the EC Commission may intervene as amicus curiae in civil 
proceedings between private parties. The litigation in such cases will retain basically the 
characteristics of private enforcement, but with some additional elements of public 
enforcement.6
b. The Modalities of EC Private Antitrust Enforcement
In order to proceed to the specifics o f private antitrust enforcement one must also first examine 
the modalities of the application of EC competition law by civil courts.
A first differentiation can be made between shield and sword litigation. EC competition law may 
be pleaded in a civil litigation as a shield. This might be so in contractual liability cases, where 
the plaintiff claims specific performance of the contract or alleges its breach by the defendant
Questions, accompanying the Green Paper on damages actions, under the title “What does the Green Paper deal 
with?”.
5 Even such intervention in public enforcement cases may be relevant for private enforcement, when the 
latter follows in time and relies on the former, if for example facts established in a public enforcement litigation 
are used by the parties in a subsequent civil litigation.
0 Note that the Commission has never proceeded in such categorisations either as to private antitrust 
enforcement as such or as to the role of courts. This may create some confusion, since national courts may be 
assigned different roles in the Member States (sometimes difficult to distinguish) and there are, indeed, various 
instances in which the proceedings even before a national civil court cannot be said to constitute “private 
enforcement”. See Recital 21 o f the new Reg. 1/2003 (cited below ), where reference is made to “courts of the 
Member States that apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, whether applying these rules in law'suits between 
private parties, acting as public enforcers or as review courts”, and para. 2 of the Notice on co-operation 
between the Commission and national courts (cited below), using similar terminology. This insistence on the 
organic rather than on the functional criterion has been criticised as confusing, since it fails to distinguish among 
the different functions of courts (see Idot, supra (2004c), p. 80; Blaise and Idot, “Chronique concurrence (1er 
janvier 2002 - 31 mars 2003) : Règlement 1/2003 du 16 décembre 2002”, 39 RTDE 287 (2003), p. 331; Idot, 
“2004: L’an 1 du nouveau droit de la concurrence?”, (2004-1) Europe 3, p. 4X Schurmans, “Le rôle du juge 
dans la mise en œuvre du droit européen de la concurrence”, in: Nihoul (Ed.), La décentralisation de 
l'application du droit de la concurrence, Un rôle accru pour le practicien? (Bruxelles/Louvain-la-Neuve, 
2004), p. 93. On another occasion, we have stressed that the terms “authority” and “court” used in the new Reg. 
1/2003 (e.g. Arts. 5, 6, 15, 35) should be treated in dépendait! y of the terms “court” or “tribunal” used in Art. 
234 EC. See further Komrunos, “Article 234 EC and National Competition Authorities in the Era of 
Decentralisation”, 29 ELRev, 106 (2004), p. 112.
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and claims damages, while the latter raises the nullity of the contract or o f parts thereof.7 
Another instance is unfair competition actions against ‘free riders”, when EC competition law is 
pleaded in defence. These kinds o f  civil litigation ("shield litigation”) cannot directly account for 
active private enforcement of competition law, although litigation tactics may in certain 
circumstances elevate shield litigation to a very powerful and pro-active instrument in 
competition law enforcement.8 Thus, prospective plaintiffs, instead of filing a suit themselves 
against a monopolist that excludes them from the market through foreclosure, may decide to 
encourage the monopolist's contracting parties to breach their contracts and agree to support and 
indemnify them in case of an action brought by the monopolist. In this case the competition 
provisions will be pleaded as a defence by the defendants, though in essence the whole 
mechanism will have been instigated by a third party in a pro-active way.
Cases where competition law, in particular Article 81(2) EC, has been raised as a shield by 
defendants have been numerous before national courts. Their contribution towards the 
development o f a more effective system of private enforcement varies from very significant to 
minimal.9 In most cases the competition mies are not invoked by the victim of a restraint but by 
participants therein. They are pleaded not because and whenever competition is endangered, but 
only incidentally. In addition, they are often applied when competition has already been harmed 
and the compensatory and deterrent function of such litigation is minimal.10 
There is no doubt that from a private enforcement perspective, more significant arc the cases, 
where competition law is pleaded as a sword.11 Usually one party puts forward a claim for 
injunction, damages, restitution or interim measures that intends to compensate and/or to put an 
end to the harm caused by the infringement of the EC competition mies.12 While injunctions 
(usually o f  an interlocutory' nature) are often granted by EU Member State courts, damages
7 In reality the situation will be a bit more complicated, since the plaintilT will most likely counter-plead the 
compensating qualities of the agreement that make it lawful under Art. 81(3) EC.
* The Commission considers such cases as falling into “private enforcement”. See Commission XXXIVth 
Report on Competition Policy' -  2004 (Brussels/Luxembouig, 2005), para. 114, which refers to the national 
judgments that were communicated by Member States pursuant to Art. 15(2) Reg. 1/2003 (see infra). “The 
overwhelming majority of those judgments (29) resulted from private enforcement action, in most cases aimed 
at the annulment of an agreement on the ground of its incompatibility with the EU competition rules”.
9 See Basedow, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competitiort Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 
2003), p. 32.
10 See Jacobs and Deisenhofer, “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC 
Competition Rules: A Community Perspective”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law 
Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 190.
11 See also Baudenbacher, “Panel Discussion: Administrative Antitrust Authorities: Adjudicative and 
Investigatory Functions”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2002, Annual Proceedings o f 
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2003), p. 441.
12 Another possibility is to file an action for the declaration of the nullity of anti-competitive agreement 
(action en nullité). This type of actions is rare in practice.
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claims have been rare in Europe as opposed to the US. Yet, damages awards are thought of as 
the most important limb of private antitrust enforcement.
A second differentiation can be made between litigation, where EC competition law 
constitutes the main or the subsidiary issue (a titre principal and a titre incident). This 
categorisation found favour quite early in theory and practice, although, as we argue, it is not 
successful and, indeed, it has lately been abandoned. EC competition law is applied as the 
main or principal issue of the dispute (a titre principal) usually before specialised courts 
(competition tribunals), that are entrusted with the application of national and Community 
competition rules in a given EU Member State,13 or before ordinary - administrative or civil - 
courts exercising a judicial review over decisions o f  national competition authorities.14 
However, EC competition law may be the main issue even of a civil proceeding before an 
ordinary civil court.15 Thus, in legal systems recognising the possibility o f declaratory 
actions,16 the main issue o f the litigation is the applicability or non-applicability of the 
competition provisions and not the civil consequences thereof. These declaratory’ actions may 
be, indeed, preferable on occasions by market players, if  the latter only intend to use the 
courts’ substantive law findings that enjoy res judicata effect, instead of pursuing civil 
sanctions. Such may be an action by a distributor against two suppliers when the former 
requests the court to declare the illegality of a market-sharing arrangement between the latter, 
in view o f its violation o f Article 81 EC.
Secondly, the EC competition rules may constitute a subsidiary or preliminary issue in a civil 
proceeding before a civil court. This is so in the vast majority of cases. Thus, where 
competition law is pleaded as a shield, in order for a civil court or arbitrator to examine the 
validity or nullity o f an agreement and its legal consequences (main issue), it has to deal with
13 Such is e g. the case of the United Kingdom (CAT - Competition Appeals Tribunal).
14 E g . in Greece and in Italy judicial review of the national competition authorities’ decisions has been 
entrusted to the administrative courts, while in France and in Germany judicial review is exercised by civil 
courts.
15 See loannou, “The National Judge and Community Competition Law”, 4 RUDE 423 (1984) [in Greek], 
p. 431.
16 In some continental legal systems civil actions are classified, based on the form of judicial relief sought, 
into actions for performance, declaratory and constitutive actions. The first, which are most often, require the 
defendant to specifically perform an obligation or to pay money. The second are more limited in scope and seek 
an authoritative affirmation by the court as to the existence or non-existence of a legal relationship. Constitutive 
actions, on their part, do not confine themselves to the determination of a legal situation, but also create, modify, 
abolish or otherwise vary a legal relationship. See e.g. Kerameus, “Civil Procedure in Greece”, 2 South.LRev. 
175 (1976) = in: Kerameus (Ed.), Studia luridica I  (Thessaloniki, 1980), p. 221. Of these three types of actions 
only the first and the second one are relevant to EC competition law disputes. Constitutive actions could be a 
theoretical possibility' only if exemptions of Art. 81(3) EC under the previous authorisation system were to be 
given by civil courts. Such a system of “judicial authorisation” has never, however, been proposed or introduced 
in Europe.
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the preliminary issue whether the prohibition o f Article 81 EC applies to the agreement in 
question.17 The same is true, when competition law is pleaded as a sword, in case o f damages 
claims or claims for an injunction, pursuant to an antitrust violation. The liability for damages 
and the right to the injunction will be the main issue o f the proceedings, whereas the actual 
violation o f Article 81 or 82 EC will be the preliminary issue.18
In the past, a part of the theory and o f the Community and national jurisprudence had adopted 
a distinction between competition authorities enforcing EC competition law à  titre principal 
and civil courts adjudicating à titre incident. This distinction was first implied by the Court of 
Justice in the Bosch case.19 The competence of national civil courts to apply the EC 
competition rules as a preliminary' issue was, according to the Court, a consequence of the 
direct effect of Articles 81 (exception made for its third paragraph) and 82 EC. On the other 
hand, the competence of competition authorities or courts to apply these rules as a main issue 
derived from Article 84 EC in conjunction with Article 9 of Regulation 17.20 The distinction 
between application of the competition rules à titre principal and à titre incident has been 
criticised as not practical and has now been abandoned by a substantial part of the literature,21
17 See Ioannou, supra (1984), p. 432; Favre, “Le droit communautaire de la concurrence devant les 
juridictions nationales : L’expcrience française”, in: Pérez van Kappel (Ed.), Decentralised Application o/EC 
Competition Law: National Experience and Reform (Köln, 2001), p. 78.
18 See Ioannou, supra ( 1984), p. 432.
19 Bosch, op.cit., at 51-52.
30 See Ioannou, supra (1984), p. 432.
21 See e.g. Ioannou, supra (1984), p. 444. See also already Deringer, “The Distribution of Powers in the 
Enforcement o f the Rules of Competition under the Rome Treaty”, 1 CMLRev. 30 (1963*1964), p. 38, who 
makes no distinction as between main and subsidiary' issue. However, many authors continue to distinguish 
between national competition authorities that apply the competition rules as a main issue and national civil and 
criminal courts that apply those rules as a subsidiary issue. See e.g. Herbert, “Rapports entre les procédures 
devant la Commission des CE et les juridictions nationales”, 42 Riv.Dir.Ind. 1-461 ( 1993), p. M63; Gustafsson, 
“Some Legal Implications Facing the Realisation of the Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC 
Antitrust Procedure and the Role of National Courts in a Post-White Paper Era”, 27(2) LIEI 159 (2000), p. 160, 
fn. 6; C. Gavalda and G. Parlcani, Droit des affaires de l 'Union européenne (Paris, 2002), p. 275; Scufii, “Le 
sezioni specializzatte di diritto industriale per cooperazione comunitaria ed applicazione decentrata delle regole 
di conconenza”, (2003) 11 Diritto Industriale 213, p. 218, fn. 21; idem, “I riflessi ordinamentali ed organizzativi 
del rcgolamento comunitario n. 1/2003 sulla concorrenza”, 21II Corriere Giuridico 123 (2004), p. 213, fii. 1. It 
is noteworthy that this distinction has created problems to some national courts, which have misinterpreted it. 
This has been the case in Spain, where the Supreme Court in the GAMPS A judgment of 30-12-93 essentially 
denied the direct effect of Arts. 81 and 82 EC, unless these provisions had already been applied à titre principal 
by the European Commission or the Spanish authorities. On this judgment and on the erroneous - if  not curious - 
application o f the main-subsidiary issue dichotomy, see Navarro Varona and Rating, “Spain”, in: Behrens (Ed.), 
EC Competition Rules in National Courts, Vol. V, Spain, Portugal and Greece (Baden-Baden, 2000), p. 67 et 
seq. It should be mentioned that this judgment represented one of the most flagrant violations of Community 
law by a national Supreme Court and has been considered by commentators as one of the paradigm cases, in 
which the Commission should have sued a Member State for violation of EC law on behalf of one of its organs 
(see e.g. Tridimas, “Knocking on Heaven's Door Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure”, 40 CMLRev. 9 (2003)). The situation seems to have been remedied by a 2000 judgment 
of the same court (Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Civil), 2-6-00, n° 540/2000, CC v. Distribuidora Industrial SA) 
and very recently the Madrid Commercial Court clearly applied à titre principal Article 82 EC and found that 
the Spanish company Telefónica had to pay damages for abusing its dominant position (Juzgado de lo Mercantil
15

independent civil claims or counter-claims based on the EC competition provisions, to return to 
our definition above. In addition, the sanctions imposed are of private nature and essentially 
function as remedies for the victim of the anti-competitive conduct.26 It is encouraging that this 
clear distinction is recognised by the recent Green Paper of the Commission on damages actions. 
Indeed, the Green Paper distinguishes public from private enforcement on the basis of 
remedial outcomes and sanctions, i.e. fines as opposed to civil damages.27 
A final categorisation that is, indeed, of great practical importance and that also refers to the 
relationship between private and public enforcement, is between “stand-alone” and “follow-on” 
civil antitrust claims.
The typical representative of a stand-alone case is where a third party sues for damages against 
the perpetrators of an anti-competitive act, while there has been no interference yet by a public 
authority, in w hich case the plaintiff will have the sometimes dire task to prove that there has 
been an infringement of the competition rules. Raising a competition law point by way of 
defence or counter-claim to a breach of contract or intellectual property or an unfair competition 
law action qualifies again as stand-alone litigation, if there has been no intervention of a public 
authority. In this case, again the party that raises the competition law problem will have to prove 
the infringement.
A follow-on civil action, on the other hand, takes place when there is already an infringement 
decision by a public authority that condemns a particular anti-competitive conduct.28 While, in 
principle private enforcement remains independent of public enforcement, it may well be that 
the existence of a public decision eases the burden imposed on the plaintiff to prove the 
infringement or is considered binding as to its findings. This is stipulated expressly by some 
national competition laws, notably by UK and German law, or it may be a judicial rule of an
36 This, notwithstanding the fact that a specific remedy may not only aim at compensating or protecting the 
victim but also at “punishing” the perpetrator of the anti-competitive act, as is the case with punitive damages, 
which, in any case, are awarded to the former. Of course, remedies in the context of private enforcement 
refiexively serve also the public interest of maintaining effective competition in the market
37 See para. 3 of the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Green Paper (both cited below): 
“Private enforcement and public enforcement are the two pillars of enforcement of EC antitrust rules. Private 
enforcement differs from public enforcement, whereby the public authorities (the Commission at EU level and 
the national competition authorities at the Member State level) investigate suspected violations o f competition 
law and can impose certain measures and sanctions such as fines on infringing undertakings. Fines are paid into 
the public budget and the activities of the public enforcer are paid for by the state. Private enforcement actions 
arc paid for by the individual bringing the action, and that individual can recoup the money paid out as part of 
the aw'ard of compensation if the action is successful.”
58 A civil suit brought follow ing another civil suit that was successful cannot, however, be seen as a follow- 
on action, since there was no public authority decision w ith erga omnes declaratory effect. The successful suit 
would have led basically to a judgment with a res judicata effect limited to the specific litigants and to the 
specific object of the dispute. Of course, if the tw o cases are similar, it might be that the burden on the plaintiff 
to prove an infringement in the second action is practically -  if not psychologically - slightly lighter.
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estoppel or abuse of process nature that serves the principle of procedural economy. There arc, 
however, legal systems where the existence of an infringement decision by a public authority 
does not confer any benefit upon the follow-on civil plaintiff, other than a psychological one. 
The Commission's Green Paper on damages actions aims at considering whether this needs to 
be changed, so that infringement decisions taken by a  public authority in Europe be made 
binding as to the finding o f  the infringement over all follow-on civil proceedings, thus 
substantially improving the position of plaintiffs.29
2. Public and Private A ntitrust Enforcement and the Objectives of EC Competition 
Law
a. Enforcement Objectives
The pairing of public and private enforcement of legal rules is not unique to the antitrust 
laws. It certainly predates those laws and expresses more fundamental ideas about the 
relationship between the state and private individuals and their respective roles in the 
implementation of the law as such.
From a purely competition law perspective, antitrust enforcement pursues three 
systematically different, yet substantively interconnected, objectives.30 The first one is 
injunctive, i.e. to bring the infringement of the law to an end, which may entail not only 
negative measures, in the sense o f an order to abstain from the delinquent conduct, but also 
positive ones to ensure that that conduct ceases in the future. The second objective is 
restorative or compensatory, i.e. to remedy the injury caused by the anti-competitive conduct. 
The third one is punitive,31 i.e. to punish the perpetrator o f the illegal acts in question and also 
to deter him and others from future transgressions. Ideally, these three basic objectives can be 
pursued inside an enforcement system that combines both public and private elements.
Private actions, in particular, may well - directly or indirectly - pursue all three objectives. 
The injunctive objective is served with cease and desist orders and negative or positive 
injunctions ordered by the civil courts and may, indeed, go further than public enforcement. 
For example, it may be easier to obtain a preliminary injunction from a national judge than 
from the European Commission, while the latter, unlike the former, cannot issue orders
29 On the Commission's Green Paper see below.
30 See C. Harding and J. Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, A Study o f Legal Control o f  Economic 
Delinquency> (Oxford, 2003), p. 229 etseq.
31 The term “punitive” is used here in its generic sense and does not necessarily correspond to criminal law-.
imposing positive measures to undertakings in Article 81 EC cases.32 Private enforcement 
primarily serves the restorative‘Compensator.' objective, while the role of public enforcement 
here can only be minimal.33 Private actions ensure compensation for those harmed by anti­
competitive conduct. Finally, as for the punitive objective, while public enforcement is 
undoubtedly predominant, here again private actions may nevertheless supplement the 
retributive and deterrent effect o f the public sanctions by attaching punitive elements to the 
civil nature of the remedies sought.34 35Ibis is the case in legal systems that provide for 
punitive antitrust damages.
b. The Complementarity between Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement
While it is sometimes said, especially by public enforcement officials, that private enforcement, 
cannot as such make a substantial contribution to the effectiveness of competition law- 
enforcement,33 mainstream antitrust scholarship argues that the ideal antitrust enforcement 
model should combine both public and private elements. Each of the two systems aims at
32 See infra.
33 It is not correct to exclude any role for public enforcement in this area. There are cases where the public 
agency enforcing the competition rules may take into account the injury to specific victims of an anti­
competitive practice and impose on the perpetrator the obligation to compensate those persons. Indeed, the 
public agency may pursue this informally, for example through an informal settlement (see infra for examples). 
In addition, some competition regimes also provide for a role for the public authority in claiming damages, 
acting on behalf of the victims. This is the case in French law, for example (Art. L442-6 Code de commerce). 
For a proposal to confer powers to antitrust authorities to award civil damages to victims of anti-competitive 
behaviour see Igartua Arregui, “Should the Competition Authorities Be Authorized to Intervene in Competition- 
related Problems, when they Are Handled in Court? If so, what Should Form the Basis of their Powers of 
Intervention? National Report from Spain”, LIDC Questions 2001/2002, in: http://www.ligue.org, p. 5.
34 On the deterrent effect of damages awards see e.g. Mestmdckcr, “The EC Commission’s Modernization 
of Competition Policy: A Challenge to the Community’s Constitutional Order”, I EBOR 401 (2000), p. 422; A. 
Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law, Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford, 2004), p. 1192; Erhnctsfl, 
“Finnland”, in: Behrens (Ed ), EC Competition Rules in National Courts, Vol. VI, Denmark, Sweden. Finland 
and Austria (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 214. It should again be stressed that the term “punitive” in this context is 
used in its generic sense, so the punitive element in damages awards does not make them criminal in nature. US 
treble damages awards have always been considered as civil not only inside but also outside the United States. 
On the question of characterisation of such awards see further Zekoil and Rahlf, “US-amerikanische Antitrust- 
Treble-Damages-Urteile und deutscher ordre public”, 54 JZ 384 (1999), pp. 384-385.
35 See e.g. Paulwebcr, “The End of a Success Story?: The European Commission’s White Paper on the 
Modernisation of the European Competition Law: A Comparative Study about the Role of the Notification of 
Restrictive Practices within the European Competition and the American Antitrust Law”, 23(2) World 
Competition 3 (2000), p. 45; Wils, “Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?”, 26 
World Competition 473 (2003); Fingleton, “De-monopolising Ireland”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2003, if hat Is an Abuse o f a Dominant Position? (Oxford/Portland, 2006), 
pp. 60-61. For an earlier view, doubtful of the strengths of private antitrust enforcement, see Jacobs, “Civil 
Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law”, in: The Art o f  Governance, Festschrift zu Ehren von Eric Stein, Michigan 
Law Review' Association (Baden-Baden, 1987), p. 230 et seq. The former Advocate General apparently, 
however, no longer views negatively private antitrust enforcement.
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different aspects of the same phenomenon; they are complementary and both are necessary 
for the effectiveness o f the whole competition law enforcement.36
The advantages of private antitrust enforcement have long been stressed in the United States, 
where studies estimate its ratio to public antitrust suits at between 10 to 1 and 20 to l.37 The 
primary function o f the private action is clearly compensatory'. The victims of anti­
competitive practices can only make up for their losses before a civil court and public 
enforcement cannot have any direct bearing there.38 At the same time, however, private 
action, apart from its compensatory function, furthers the overall deterrent effect of the law. 
Thus, economic agents themselves become instrumental in implementing the regulatory' 
policy on competition39 and the general level of compliance with the law is raised.40 Indeed, 
the private litigant in US antitrust has been considered a ‘‘private attomey-gcncraT.41 A 
further advantage is that the weaknesses of public enforcement, most notably the 
‘‘enforcement gap” generated by the perceived inability o f public enforcement to deal with all 
attention-worthy cases, are counter-balanced.42
From a  Community competition law perspective, however, there are additional arguments in 
favour o f a system of antitrust enforcement that combines strong elements of private 
enforcement. First o f all, the civil action constitutes in Europe the only complete means 
(complaints apart) for private parties and individuals to exercise the rights guaranteed by the
36 See Noiberg, “Competition Policy of the European Commission: In the Interest of Consumers?“, Speech 
Made at Leuven (20 June 2003), in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/compctition/ speeches, p. 28; Behrens, 
“Comments on Josef Drexi. Choosing between Supranational and International Law Principles of Enforcement'', 
in: Drexi (Ed.), The Future o f Transnational Antitrust - From Comparative to Common Competition Law 
(Beme/The Haguc/London/New York, 2003), pp. 344-345.
3 See C.A. Jones, Private Enforcement o f Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (Oxford, 1999).
38 It might, however, make sense for the victim of anti-competitive conduct to seize the public enforcer in 
cases where he seeks injunctive relief.
39 See Canivet, “The Responsibility of the Judiciary in the Implementation of Competition Policy”, in: 
Judicial Enforcement o f  Competition Law, Committee on Competition Law and Policy, OECD (Paris, 1997), p. 
21; Jenny, “Un économiste à la Cour”, 1/2005 Concurrences 5, p. 8.
40 See K.L. Ritter, D.W. Braun and F. Rawlinson, European Competition Law: A Practitioner’s Guide (The 
Uague/London/Boston, 2000), pp. 925-926. See also Bôge and Ost, “Up and Running, or Is it? Private 
Enforcement -  The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives”, 27 ECLR 197 (2006), who also stress that 
civil antitrust proceedings contribute to further developing antitrust law.
41 Per J. Jerome Franck in Associated Industries o f  New York State. Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,704 (2d Cir. 
1943).
42 On the general advantages o f private antitrust enforcement see e g. Collins and Sunshine, “Is Private 
Enforcement Effective Antitrust Policy?”, in: Slot & McDonnell (Eds.), Procedure and Enforcement in EC and 
US Competition Law, Proceedings o f  the Leiden Europa Instituut Seminar on User-friendly Competition Ixtw 
(London, 1993), pp. 50-52, Roach and Trebilcock, “Private Enforcement of Competition Law s”, 34 Osgoode 
Hall Law Review (1996) 461, p. 471 et seq.; Yeoung, “Private Enforcement of Competition Law”, in: 
McCrudden (Ed.), Regulation and Deregulation, Policy and Practice in the Utilities and Financial Sen'ices 
Industries (Oxford, 1999), pp. 40-43. See also Commission MEMO/05/489, op.cit., under the title “What in the 
Commission’s view are the advantages of private actions for damages?”.
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Treaty competition provisions, which form part of the Community’s economic constitution.43 
Pursuant to the Court o f Justice’s long-standing case law, Articles 81 and 82 enjoy direct 
effect and grant individuals actionable rights, which national courts must protect.44 45Secondly, 
when citizens pursue their Community rights in the national courts, apart from serving their 
personal interests, they also indirectly act in the Community interest and become ‘the 
principal ‘guardians’ of the legal integrity of Community law within Europe”.43 The exercise 
o f those rights thus becomes a question of general Community law, which confers its benefits 
closer to the citizen.46 This constitutional element of private EC antitrust enforcement means 
that the conditions and limitations of private actions in the US cannot be uncritically 
transcribed to the European context without encroaching on individual Community rights.47 
The European Commission recently embarked upon an ambitious project to further private 
antitrust enforcement in Europe. In this task it has received the full support of the European 
Court of Justice, which in 2001 delivered a landmark ruling in Courage v. Crehan that set the 
basis for a system of individual civil liability for breach of the EC competition rules.48 
According to former Commissioner Monti, in a system combining private and public 
enforcement, victims of anti-compctitive practices, including consumers, must have the 
opportunity to avail themselves o f effective remedies in the form o f decentralised private 
enforcement, so as to protect their rights and obtain compensatory damages for losses suffered.49
43 See also Jones, “Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check”, 27 
World Competition 13(2004), pp. 14-16.
u  BRT v. SABA\{(1), op.cit., para. 16.
45 See J.H.H. Weilcr, The Constitution o f  Europe, ‘Do the New Clothes have an Emperor? ‘ and Other 
Essays on European Integration (Cambridge, 1999), p. 20.
40 See Commission Press Release IP/05/1634; Commissioner Kroes, “Delivering Lisbon: The Role of 
Competition Policy”, Speech Delivered at the European Liberal Democrat City Forum (London, 14 September 
2005), in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches, p. 5, explicitly referring to the enhancement of 
private enforcement in terms of bringing the benefits of the Commission’s fight against competition offences 
“closer to the citizen”. On the principle of Community law enforcement close to the citizen (Biirgemahe) see 
infra.
47 See e.g. Jones, supra (1999), p. 81, who refers to the US limitations as to the class of prospective 
plaintiffs. Compensation of victims of anti-competitive practices cannot be as easily ignored in Europe as in the 
US. See infra.
48 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan, [2001] ECR 1-6297. On this ruling see Komninos, 
“New Prospects for Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law: Courage v. Crehan and the Community 
Right in damages”, 39 CMLRev. 447 (2002),
49 See former Commissioner Monti, “Opening Speech: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust 
Law”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private 
Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 3 etseq.\ idem, “A Reformed Competition Policy: 
Achievements and Challenges for the Future”, Speech Delivered at the Center for European Reform (Brussels, 
28 October 2004), in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ speeches, p. 4.
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His successor, Commissioner Kroes, pursued the project enthusiastically, and this led to the 
publication of a Green Paper in December 2005.50
It is interesting to note that the Commission does not stay only at the compensatory qualities 
o f  damages awards, but also stresses their contribution to the deterrent effect of the 
competition rules.51 Such references echo the “private attorney-general'’ function of the 
private litigant in US antitrust.
c. The Relevance of the Goals of EC Competition Law
The question of the relationship and balance between public and private antitrust enforcement 
in Europe must also be seen in the context of the more substantive question o f the goals o f  
EC competition law: is the goal the public interest in safeguarding effective competition in 
the common market or the private interest in protecting one’s economic freedom?52 
There is a widespread misunderstanding as to the interests protected by competition law in 
the contexts of public and private enforcement. Thus, some authors distinguish between 
public enforcement, which pursues the public interest of protecting the competition norms 
through administrative or criminal sanctions, and private enforcement, which pursues the 
private interest of the protection of competitors and consumers through civil “sanctions", 
most notably civil claims for damages.53 The European Commission has also at times 
followed a similar approach, with statements which seem to ignore the instrumental character 
o f civil claims. Indeed, the Commission has been reproached for insisting on distinguishing 
between public authorities, whose acts are guided by the public interest, and national courts,
50 Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach o f  the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 
final. The Green Paper is accompanied by a Staff Working Paper which sets out the various options more 
discursively: Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions fo r  Breach o f  
the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC(2005) 1732.
51 See Commission XXXVth Report on Competition Policy -  2005 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2006), para. 31: 
“Not only do actions for damages allow victims of infringements of EC antitrust law to obtain compensation, 
they also create an additional incentive for undertakings to respect the EC antitrust rules”.
52 On the bearing of private enforcement on the goals of antitrust, in the context of Greek competition law, 
see eg . V.G. Hatzopoulos, The Essential Facilities Doctrine in EU and Greek Competition Ijow 
(Athens/Komotini, 2002) [in Greek], p. 165 etseq. For an Italian point of view on the same issue see Toffoletto, 
“II risarcimento del danno”, in: Toffoletto & Toffoletti (Eds ), Antitrust: le sanzioni (Milano, 1996), pp. 123- 
124.
53 See e.g. Braakman, “The Application of the Modernised Rules Implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC 
Treaty in Injunction Proceedings: Problems and Possible Solutions”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust 
Lem and Policy 1999, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordltam Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2000), p. 161; 
Harding and Joshua, supra (2003), p. 239. Compare also Shaw, “Decentralization and Law' Enforcement in EC 
Competition Law”, 15 LS 128 (1995), pp. 158-159: “Private actions will generally be favoured where 
competition is seen primarily as a private, market-based matter, with competition policy being correspondingly 
limited in scope. They will tend to be discouraged where competition policy implies the existence of some 
element o f public interest in the maintenance of a particular type of trading structure”.
22
which decide disputes pertaining to the private interest.54 Such a distinction does not do 
justice to the role of civil courts when they enforce competition law in the context of private 
disputes between economic operators, since they in fact have to consider the economic public 
policy in their judgments when the dispute in question has a wider impact on the market. In 
this sense, private interest plays a complementary role to the public interest.55 
Thus, it is correctly recognised that the courts cannot simply confine themselves to 
considering the interests of the litigants, but must also have regard to the general interests of 
economic policy. This explains why courts in some jurisdictions must raise the competition 
law question even ex proprio motu and may not allow an anti-competitive agreement to be 
performed, even if the parties have not raised the issue of its legality.56 Likewise, the 
possibility for public competition authorities in the EC and in some national competition 
systems to intervene and submit observations in the course o f civil proceedings is partly due 
to the public policy/intercst nature of this kind o f  competition law-related litigation.57 Finally, 
laws that attach a punitive element to civil claims for damages, as is the case o f US antitrust, 
precisely prove that there is something more at stake than just the pursuit of private interest. 
The instrumental role o f private antitrust enforcement must not, however, be confused with 
the objectives of competition policy as such. The dominant and more correct view is that EC
54 See Mestmücker, supra (2000b), p. 423; idem, ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy; Constitutional 
Challenge or Administrative Convenience?”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law 
Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), pp. 233-234. See in this 
regard some Commission references to the role of national civil actions: Explanatory Memorandum o f the 
September 2000 Regulation proposal, p. 5 (“unlike national authorities or the Commission, which act in the 
public interest, the function of national courts is to protect the rights of individuals”); Commission Notice on the 
Co-operation between the Commission and the Courts o f  the EU Member States in the Application o f Articles 81 
and 82 EC, OJ [2004] C 101/54, para. 4 (“where a natural or legal person asks the national court to safeguard 
his individual rights, national courts play a specific role in the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC, which is 
different from the enforcement in the public interest by the Commission or by national competition 
authorities”); Commission Notice on the Handling o f Complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of 
the EC Treaty, OJ [2004] C 101/65, para. 27 (similar language). See also former Commissioner Monti, 
“Opening Statement: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001 ), p. 6. To be 
fair to the Commission, these are statements that echo judicial pronouncements, though not of the ECJ; compare 
in this regard case T-24/90, Automec Sri v. Commission (II), [1992] ECR 11-2223, para. 85: “...unlike the civil 
courts, whose task is to safeguard the individual rights of private persons in their relations inter se, an 
administrative authority must act in the public interest”. Commission officials have also made the distinction 
between public and private interest on numerous occasions.
ss See Bourgeois, “EC Competition Law and Member State Courts”, in: Hawk (Ed ), Antitrust in a Global 
Economy 1993, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York/Deventer, 1994), p. 
486; C. Lucas de Leyssac and G. Parleani, Droit du marché (Paris, 2002), p. 971.
56 See Canivet, supra (1997), p. 24. On the ex officio application of EC competition law by courts and 
arbitrators see the pertinent parts belowr.
57 See Rincazaux, ‘Les autorités de la concurrence doivent-elles être autorisées à intervenir dans les 
procédures relatives à des problèmes de concurrence, plus particulièrement lorsqu’elles sont menées devant les 
juridictions ordinaires ? Dans l'affirmative, quel devrait être le fondement de leur pouvoir d’intervention ? 
Rapport international”, L1DC Questions 2001/2002, in: http://www.ligue.org, p. 1.
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competition law aims at conditions o f effective competition (protecting the institution o f  
competition -  Institutiomschutztheorie),58 whereas economic freedom (protection of private 
rights -  Individucilschutztheorie) is but a reflexive subsidiary aim of protecting competition.59 
Protection of private rights cannot by itself set in motion the mechanisms for the protection o f  
free competition, since the law, as it stands, is indifferent to harm caused to a specific person, 
unless that harm is the consequence of a certain practice whose object or effect is the 
distortion-prevention-restriction of effective competition in the market. The law therefore 
does not require that a specific agreement or concerted practice should actually cause harm to  
a person, in order to prohibit it; it is sufficient if the object of the agreement or practice is to  
restrict competition in the public interest sense. Equally, an agreement or practice might 
cause harm to certain persons but still not be considered anti-competitive, because it may not 
affect appreciably competition in the maikct {de minimis).
The existence of private actions and, in particular the availability of damages to the victim o f  
anti-compctitive practices, is perfectly consistent with the public interest that is inherent in 
competition norms, notwithstanding the confusion in some authors, who see the private
58 In a recent brochure for the general pubic, the Commission refers to the goals of competition policy in the 
following terms. “The Community’s competition policy pursues a precise goal, which is to defend and develop 
effective competition in the common market. Competition is a basic mechanism of the market economy 
involving supply (producers, traders) and demand (intermediate customers, consumers). Suppliers olTcr goods or 
services on the market in an endeavour to meet demand. Demand seeks the best ratio between quality' and price 
for the products it requires. The most efficient response emerges as a result of a contest between suppliers” 
(European Commission, Competition Policy in Europe and the Citizen (Luxembourg, 2000), p. 7 (emphasis in 
the original)). For a more succinct definition of the objective of Art. 81(1) EC, see also para. 13 of the 
Commission's Notice on Art. 81(3) EC (cited infra): “the objective ... is to protect competition on the market as 
a means of enhancing consumer w elfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources”. See also para. 4 o f  
the DG-COMP Discussion Paper on Application of Article 82 o f the Treaty to Exclusionary abuses: “the 
objective of Article 82 is the protection of competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare 
and o f ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. Effective competition brings benefits to consumers, such as 
lour prices, high quality products, a wide selection of goods and services, and innovation”. On the aims of EC 
competition law see e.g. O. Odudu, The Boundaries o f EC Competition Law, The Scope o f Article 81 (Oxford, 
2006), pp. 10-21.
59 See the “dialogue” between the Presidents of the CFI and ECJ in the IMS Health interim measures cases. 
In case T-184/01 R, IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, [2001] ECR 11-3193, para. 145, the President of tire CFI 
stressed that the primary purpose of Article 82 EC was “to prevent the distortion of competition, and especially 
to safeguard the interests of consumers, rather than to protect the position of particular competitors”. On appeal, 
in case C-481/01 P(R), NDC Health Corporation and NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG v. IMS Health Inc., {2001] 
ECR 1-3401, para. 84, the President o f the Court of Justice corrected these grand statements. According to 
President Rodriguez Iglesias, such statements could not be accepted without reservation, since they “could be 
understood as excluding protection of the interests of competing undertakings from the aim pursued by Article 
82 EC, even though such interests cannot be separated from the maintenance of an effective competition 
structure”. See further Temple Lang, “European Community Competition Policy -  Howr Far Does It Benefit 
Consumers?”, 18 Bole tin Latinoamericano de competencia 128 (February 2004), in: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/intemational/others, p. 130. The combined purpose approach is also 
accepted under national competition laws. Under Greek competition law for example, the prevailing view is that 
both effective competition in the market and economic freedom are protected (see T. Liakopoulos, Industrial 
Property (Athens, 2000) [in Greek], pp. 15, 494-498).
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interest, which is the dominant motivation in a private suit, at variance with the public 
interest pursued by the competition norms.60
The Court o f Justice has solemnly recognised that private antitrust suits strengthen the 
working o f the Community competition rules and discourage practices that are liable to 
restrict or distort competition, thus making a significant contribution to maintaining effective 
competition in the Community.61 In other words, this is a case where the private interest 
contributes to the safeguarding o f the public interest, so no antinomy should exist. Thus, 
private suits do not alter the substance of EC competition law, which is the protection of the 
public interest, as that is expressed in the goal of maintaining effective competition in the 
market. Even if we suppose that in a given case a civil litigant's private interest might not be 
compatible with the public interest, as may be the case, for example, if  inefficient competitors 
allege the “anti-competitive nature” of certain practices that in reality enhance effective 
competition, such a private suit would fail, because the alleged harm would not have been 
caused by conduct prohibited or illegal under Articles 81 and 82 EC. Consequently the 
private interest can never contradict the public interest. Hence the complementarity and the 
"private attomey-generar function of the civil litigant.
In sum, an effective system of private enforcement does not alter the basic goal of the 
competition rules, which is to safeguard the public interest in maintaining a free and undistorted 
competition, and should by no means be thought of as antagonistic to the public enforcement 
model. Ideally the two models can work to complement each other.62 The Commission has
60 See e,g. in the framework of Greek competition law the rather extreme position of Schinas, “The Greek 
Experience of the Protection of Free Competition: Basic Directions”, in: Schinas (Ed.), Protection o f Free 
Competition, The Practice ofEPA/EA (Athens/Komotim, 1992) [in Greek], p. 28 et seq. The author, a former 
chairman of the Greek Competition Committee, excludes the possibility of private suits because of the public 
interest character of competition legislation, which is considered a lex specialis with regard to the Greek law of 
non-contractual liability. A similar position has been held in Spain by Alonso Soto, again a former public 
antitrust enforcer, who argues forcefully for the application of EC and national competition law exclusively by 
the competition authorities. This position might explain the long-standing and irritating failure of Spanish courts 
to comply with the direct effect of Arts. 81 and 82 EC before national civil courts (see infra). See further Creus 
and Fernandez Vicién, “Rapport espagnol”, in: ATTII congrès FIDE (Stockholm, 3-6 juin 1998), Vol. II, 
Application nationale du droit européen de la concurrence (Stockholm, 1999), p. 96 et seq. See also for a 
similar view held by Portuguese courts, though now apparently superseded, Ruiz, “Rapport portugais”, in: AT7/7 
congrès FIDE (Stockholm, 3-6 juin 1998), Vol. H, Application nationale du droit européen de la concurrence 
(Stockholm, 1999), p.238.
61 Courage, op.cit., para. 27.
6Î See e.g. Recital 7 Reg. 1/2003: “The role of the national courts here complements that of the competition 
authorities of the Member States”. Such complementary function was advocated by the majority of the 
participants in the 2001 Florence EU Competition Law Workshop that dealt with private enforcement See 
individual contributions and discussions in: Ehleimann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 
2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003); also Goyder, “Providing 
Support for National Judges in Dealing with Competition Cases”, in: Ehleimann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 200IX pp- 576-
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finally realised this by speaking of the two limbs of antitrust enforcement as complementary and 
serving the same aim ‘to  create and sustain a competitive economy”63 and by also stressing the 
public interest element in private actions for damages.64
3. The Independence of Private Antitrust Enforcement
a. Independence as Principle
Notwithstanding their substantive complementarity, private and public enforcement remain 
institutionally independent o f each other. The independence of the two models means that in 
principle there is no hierarchical relationship as between the former and the latter, or between 
the public authority and the “private attorney-general”. Introducing a rule o f primacy would 
be problematic because of the principles of separation of powers65 and judicial independence 
and also because it would undermine the role o f courts as enforcers o f equal standing.66 The 
fact that the Court o f Justice appears to have entrusted the Commission with a primacy over 
national proceedings and courts does not contradict our analysis here.67 This “primacy” is no t *0345
577. There are valid reasons to believe that such a mixed model may well be the system of tomorrow. See below 
on the new UK model introduced by the 2002 Enterprise Act.
03 See Green Paper, under section 1.1: “The antitrust rules in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty are enforced 
both by public and private enforcement. Both forms are part of a common enforcement system and serve the 
same aims: to deter anti-competitive practices forbidden by antitrust law and to protect firms and consumers 
from these practices and any damages caused by them. Private as well as public enforcement of antitrust law is 
an important tool to create and sustain a competitive economy.” See also the intervention by Emil Paulis at the 
ERA Conference on Private Enforcement in EC Competition Lawr: The Green Paper on Damages Actions 
(Brussels, 9 March 2006), recognising the “public role” of national courts.
04 See Commission Staff Working Paper, para. 52: “The right of private parties to bring an action for 
damages must be seen as being in the public interest.”
05 On the principle of separation of powers as between the Commission and national courts see Paulis, 
“Coherent Application o f EC Competition Rules in a System of Parallel Competences”, in. Ehlermann & 
Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust Policy 
(Oxford/Portland, 2001), pp. 419-422, who holds that this principle does not apply to the relationship between 
the Community legal order and national legal orders. See, however, the approach by Judge Edward, who 
contradicts this (Edw'ard, “Panel Three Discussion: Courts and Judges”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds ), 
European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o fE U  Competition Law (Oxford, 2001), p. 485). 
The former view' is very formalistic and does not do justice to the integrated nature of the Community legal 
order. Separation of powers obviously becomes a problem only for legal systems that entrust public enforcement 
decision-making to administrative authorities. When decision-making rests with the courts, as in Ireland or in 
the US, there is no problem of principle at stake.
00 It should be stressed that the US Department of Justice has never enjoyed any kind of “primacy” over 
private actions. See Jones, “A Newr Dawn for Private Competition Law Remedies in Europe? Reflections from 
the US”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective IMvate 
Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 99.
67 Case C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd. v. HB Ice Cream Ltd., [2000J ECR1-11369. See infra.
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one of the Commission, as competition authority, over civil courts, but rather of the 
Commission, as supranational Community organ, over national courts.68 
This principle is sometimes missed by public enforcement officials, who tend to take an 
expansive view of the ambit o f public enforcement.69 Such paternalistic attitudes ought to be 
resisted, however, not only because they blur the two distinct limbs of antitrust enforcement, 
but more importantly, because they demotivate market players from assuming their role as 
private attomeys-general, thus prejudicing the overall deterrent effect o f private action. They 
may also estrange national judges, who may not wish to get too much involved in an area in 
which they will always be under the scrutiny or dominance o f administrators.
A comparative analysis o f national competition laws confirms the independence o f private 
enforcement vis-à-vis public enforcement.70 This is not affected by the possible deference 
paid on occasion by civil courts to competition authorities’ decisions.71 Again, such an 
attitude does not indicate the primacy of public over private enforcement, or o f  administrative 
over civil proceedings, but may simply reflect the principle o f economy in legal proceedings, 
which may make it inappropriate to repeat parts of the procedure before a civil generalist 
court, if a specialist authority or court has already dealt with the same facts.72
68 In the pertinent part we argue that in reality Mastetfoods establishes no primacy of the Commission over 
national courts, but rather imposes duties on the latter to apply Community law in a consistent way under the 
final control of the Court of Justice through the Art. 234 EC procedure. See also Paulis and Gauer, “La réforme 
des règles d'application des articles 81 et 82 du Traité”, 11 JdT (Eut.) 65 (2003), p. 69; contra Kjolbye, 39 
CMLRev. 175 (2002), p. 181, who seems to be seeing Mastetfoods as establishing a primacy of the Commission 
over national court proceedings.
69 Compare the language used by former Commissioner Monti to describe the amicus curiae mechanism: 
“These means of interactions are intended to allow the Commission ... to draw courts’ attention to important 
issues relating to the application of EU antitrust rules and contribute to the coherence o f their rulings” (see 
Monti, ‘EU Competition Policy after May 2004”, Speech Delivered at the Fordham Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy (New York, 24 October 2003), in: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches, p. 5, emphasis added). Certainly such statements do not make 
much for the independence of private enforcement.
70 See e.g. on the Austrian legal system Eilmansberger and Thyri, “Austria”, in: Cahill (Ed.), The 
Modernisation o f  EU Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union, FIDE 2004 National Reports 
(Cambridge, 2004), p. 51. According to these authors, it is doubtful whether a civil court could suspend 
proceedings until the Austrian Cartel Court issues a decision. This would probably not qualify as a “prejudicial 
preliminary question of law” under s. 190 of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure. On French law, see Idot, 
“France”, in: Cahill (Ed.), The Modernisation o f EU Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union, 
FIDE 2004 National Reports (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 179-180.
71 See, for example, with reference to Italian law*, Scufii, “Established Principles and New' Perspectives in 
the Italian Antitrust Case Law”, in: Raffaelli (Ed.), Antitrust between EC Law and National Law, Treviso 16-17 
May 2002 (Bruxelles/Milano, 2003), pp. 277-278, clearly distinguishing the question of autonomy and 
independence of private enforcement from the question of the occasional de facto deference paid to decisions of 
the Italian competition authority by civil courts.
72 With regard to the UK, see Marsden and Smith, “United Kingdom”, in: Cahill (Ed.), The Modernisation 
o f EU Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union, FIDE 2004 National Reports (Cambridge, 2004), 
speaking of a certain precedence of public over private enforcement “as a matter of practicality”. A good 
example is Iberian UK v.BPB Industries pic  (Ch.), ([1996] 2 CMLR 601) where the English High Court held 
that if  parties have disputed an issue before the Commission and have had a reasonable opportunity to challenge
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b. The Commission Green Paper and National Competition Laws on the Independence 
of Private Enforcement
The Commission's recent Green Paper is somewhat unclear as to the relationship between 
private and public enforcement. On the one hand, the Commission clearly sees private 
enforcement as in principle independent,73 so that potential plaintiffs do not need to wait for a  
condemnation of anti-competitive conduct in a public enforcement action before seizing civ il 
courts. The Commission has made clear that it is ‘'keen to see increased private enforcement 
of the full range o f  competition infringements under EC law and not just additional 
enforcement in cases already dealt with by the public authorities (so called ‘'follow-on 
actions”)’’.74 In other words, the aim of the Green Paper is also to facilitate “stand-alone” 
actions in cases which public enforcement agencies could not or did not wish to deal with. 
This certainly shows that, at least as a matter of principle, private enforcement is seen a s  
independent o f public enforcement.75
On the other hand, however, the Green Paper aims at introducing a binding effect or at least a  
rebuttable presumption for infringement decisions o f competition authorities of the E U  *3
the Commission’s decision, they are estopped from pleading that issue anew and contradicting the  
Commission’s view in civil proceedings. See further Goyder, “Reliance on Commission Decisions in National 
Courts”, in: Andenas & Jacobs (Eds.), European Community Law in the English Courts (Oxford, 1998), pp. 179 
et seq.\ Peretz, “Should Competition Authorities Be Authorized to Intervene in National Competition 
Proceedings, Especially in the Courts? If they Should, then in what Circumstances and to What Extent Should 
this Be the Case? National Report from the United Kingdom”, LIDC Questions 2001/2002, in: 
http://www.ligue.org, p. 6, See also British Leyland v. Wyatt, [1979] 3 CMLR 79, where the High Court treated 
a non-appealed Commission decision as having the same effect as a judgment by the Court of Justice; compare 
contra Merson v. Rover Group Ltd., 22 May 1992, not reported, cited in the Iberian case, where the court cam e 
to the conclusion that it was not bound by the outcome of European competition proceedings. This whole issue 
has now been revisited in England by the Crehan line of cases (see infra). Some national competition laws also 
contain provisions with the aim of avoiding such a duplication of proceedings. Thus, under Art. 18 of the Greek 
L.703/1977 the judgments of the administrative courts that review the Competition Committee decisions have 
tire force of erga omrns res judicata before the civil courts. The judgments of the latter, on the other hand, enjoy 
res judicata effect only inter partes and do not bind the Competition Committee.
3 See e.g. Commissioner Kroes, “More Private Antitrust Enforcement through Better Access to Damages: 
An Invitation for an Open Debate”, Opening Speech at tire Conference ‘Private Enforcement in EC Competition 
law: Tile Green Paper on Damages Actions’ (Brussels, 9 March 2006), in:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches, p, 4: “Private actions should not be dependent on public 
enforcement. We need a system that allows private actions to stand on their own two feet”. See also para. 3 o f  
the Commission Staff Working Paper which refers to private and public enforcement as “the two pillars o f  
enforcement of EC antitrust rules”, thus viewing both as of an equal footing.
74 Commission MEMO/05/489, op.cit., under the title “What types of infringement does the Commission 
think private damage actions should enforce?”.
' Compare T1EVI V/i Report on Competition Policy— 2005, o p .c i tpara. 31, which stresses that actions for 
damages should be “an autonomous means of enforcement”. See also De Smijter, Stropp and Woods, “Green 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules”, (2006-1) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 
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Member States. Thus, the finding o f a competition law infringement will either bind civil 
courts or reverse the burden o f proof as to the existence of illegal behaviour, i.e. anti­
competitive conduct.76 In those cases, the main task o f  the civil courts will be to decide 
whether the plaintiffs have suffered harm and to award damages. However, while these 
proposals create an initial impression of public enforcement “primacy”, in reality they are 
merely meant as an incentive to encourage follow-on civil actions by making it easier for the 
victims of anti-competitive practices to rely on findings by the competition authorities rather 
than having to prove a competition law infringement anew. These proposals do not aspire to 
give decisions by public enforcement agencies a binding effect over all kinds o f parallel civil 
proceedings. Thus, it is not proposed that findings of national competition authorities should 
have a bearing on civil litigation w hen, for example, the litigants raise the nullity o f  a contract 
or when the parties seek a remedy other than damages. If the binding effect o f national 
authorities’ decisions were to be extended to such cases, then one could indeed speak of a 
principle o f primacy of public over private antitrust enforcement. In such a case the courts 
would be deprived of the possibility to apply and decide the substantive competition law 
norms, therefore the aim of involving civil judges in antitrust enforcement in Europe would 
be seriously impaired.
The same can be said of those national competition laws that have recently been amended 
with the aim of facilitating follow-on civil actions for damages by conferring a binding effect 
on final decisions by public authorities declaring that there has been an infringement of 
competition law. Thus, section 58A of the UK Competition Act, as subsequently amended, 
confers a binding effect on decisions of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (CAT) on appeal from the OFT, and the European Commission but this 
provision clearly specifies that it “applies to proceedings before the court in which damages 
or any other sum of money is claimed in respect of an infringement”.77 In other words, the 
UK Act docs not provide for a general principle of law that makes findings by the public 
authority binding on all kinds of civil proceedings. What section 58A of the UK Act really 
refers to is follow-on civil actions for damages, and the aim is to facilitate such actions from
70 Green Paper, Question C, Option 8.
77 This is clearer if one reads para. 87 of the Explanatory Notes to the Enterprise Act 2002, in: 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en2002/2002en40.htin: “Section 20: Findings of infringements. 
Subsection (1) inserts a new section 58A in CA 1998. The new section provides that certain decisions of the 
OFT or the CAT regarding an infringement of competition law are to bind the courts for the purpose o f a 
subsequent claim fo r  damages” (emphasis added).
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an evidentiary point of view.78 This does not mean that such binding effect extends to  
concurrent civil proceedings, in which for example the nullity o f an agreement arises in th e  
context of claims based on contract. ;
Similarly, section 33(4) o f  the recently amended German Competition Act (7. GWB-Novelie), 
which goes even further in conferring a binding effect on all Commission, Bundeskartellamt, 
and even other Member States’ national competition authorities’ decisions, is confined to  
follow-on civil litigation, basically aiming at facilitating damages claims against convicted 
infringers.79 Indeed, a German court has recently confirmed that this provision does not entail 
a duty for civil courts to stay proceedings and await the adoption o f a contemplated 
infringement decision by a competition authority or its finality. Instead, the civil court has 
power to adjudicate on the merits, since it enjoys parallel competence to deal with an action 
for damages based on the competition law violation concerned. The German court, a fter 
distinguishing the spirit o f s. 33(4) GWB, which is to facilitate follow-on claims, specifically 
stressed that the administrative proceeding leading to fines has in principle no priority o r  
primacy over the concurrent civil proceeding.80 This mling is fully compatible with th e  
principle of independence o f private enforcement.
c. Practical Problems in the Interrelationship between Public and Private Enforcement: 
Settlements, Leniency, Amount of Fines and Damages
The principle of independence of private antitrust enforcement has many serious practical 
consequences. Courts are not bound in the least by the administrative practice of antitrust 
authorities with regard to their discretion as to whether or not to settle a case or offer certain 
companies immunity with a view to obtaining useful information in their pursuit of a cartel. 
Thus, a possible decision by the Commission or national competition authorities to accept 
commitments by companies, instead of proceeding to a finding of infringement, and to close 
the administrative proceedings by rendering the commitments binding on those companies, 
does not bind national civil courts as to the applicability or non-applicability of Articles 81
78 See Rodger, “Private Enforcement and the Enterprise Act: An Exemplary System of Awarding 
Damages?”, 24 ECLR 103 (2003), pp. 108-109.
79 See Hempel, “Privater Rechtsschutz im deutschen Kartellrecht nach der 7. GWB-Novelle”, 55 WuW 362 
(2004), p. 371; Moch, “Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung -  Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven”, 56 WuW 39 
(2006), p. 41.
80 OLG Düsseldorf, 3.5.06, VI-W (Kart) 6/06 -  Zementkartell, 56 WuW 913 (2006).
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and 82 EC, and the courts remain free to decide whether or not there has been an 
infringement of Community competition law,81
Equally, national civil courts are not bound by administrative leniency schemes.82 Immunity 
from administrative fines is totally unconnected with civil litigation claims. The recent de­
trebling o f  antitrust damages for corporate amnesty applicants in the US does not call the 
above principle into question, because de-trebling will take place only if  the amnesty 
beneficiary assists the plaintiff in his private action. Thus, the 2004 Antitrust Criminal 
Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act only limits the damages recoverable from a corporate 
amnesty applicant to the harm actually inflicted by the applicant’s conduct, i.e. to single and 
not treble damages, if that person also co-operates with private plaintiffs in their damage 
actions against the remaining cartel members. An appropriate level of co-operation as defined 
by the Act involves: (a) providing a full account of all facts relevant to the civil action; (b) 
furnishing all documents relevant to the civil action; and (c) making oneself available for 
interviews, depositions and testimonies in connection with the civil action.83 This shows that 
the US rule which governs the interface between the US leniency policy and private 
enforcement is not one-sided, but rather aims at protecting the effectiveness of both elements. 
In Europe, the rather under-developed state of private enforcement was not considered to 
deter companies from applying for leniency, so until very recently no case had been made for 
imposing limitations on private actions in cases of leniency applications.84 The Green Paper 
for the first time attempts to address this question and moves to the US direction. The policy 
options considered include the non-discoverability of leniency applications85 and the 
possibility to lessen the civil liability o f  a leniency applicant.
81 Art. 9 and Recital 13 Reg, 1/2003. See infra. National courts cannot undermine the effectiveness of the 
Commission commitments decision or interfere with the exercise of the Commission's discretion in that 
decision, though they can choose to proceed to their own analysis as to the overall legality or illegality of the 
practice in question, thus leading to a judgment with inter partes res judicata effect, while the Commission's 
commitments remaining binding erga omnes.
82 In the EU, see Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction o f Fines in Cartel Cases, OJ 
[2002] C 45/3.
83 The new Act also limits the recovery of damages from amnesty applicants to damages attributable to the 
defendant, i.e. it eliminates joint and several liability for successful amnesty applicants. For critical comments 
see Yon, 1 Concurrences 102 (2004), pp. 106-107,
84 See further Idol, “Une question d’actualité en droit de la concurrence : Programmes de clémence et 
internationalisation”, in: Droit et actualité, Études offertes à Jacques Bégttin (Paris, 2005), pp. 378-379; Prieto 
and Roda, “Quelles évolutions pour la clémence dims l’Union européenne ?”, 3/2005 Concurrences 12, p. 14. 
On the EC state of affairs see also former Commissioner Monti, “Priorities for EU Competition Policy”, in: 
Hellenic Competition Committee (Ed.), EU Competition Law and Policy, Developments and Priorities, Athens 
Conference. April 19lh 2002 (Athens, 2002), p. 12.
85 We deal below with this question. See the chapter on the co-operation between the Commission and 
national courts.
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The particular question o f reducing die civil liability o f successful leniency applicants is q u i te  
complex and goes to the core o f the relationship o f public with private enforcement. T h e  
Green Paper on damages examines two options. One would be to grant a  successful le n ien cy  
applicant the option to claim a rebate on any damages claim facing him, in return for h e lp in g  
claimants bring damages claims against all cartel members.86 87The claims against the o th e r
8*7infringers, jointly and severally liable for the entire harm, would remain unchanged. 
Another option would be to remove joint and several liability for the successful len ien cy  
applicant and limit his liability to the share of the harm corresponding to his share in t h e  
cartelised market.88
As with the US case, we see that the EC proposals do not call into question the independence 
o f  private enforcement but rather aim at ensuring that the effectiveness o f the L eniency 
Notice is not compromised. Victims of anti-competitive practices will still be compensated 
fully: indeed, if the first option o f the Green Paper is preferred, they will be better off, as th e  
leniency beneficiary will be under a duty to assist plaintiffs bring a  damages claim against t h e  
other cartel members.
Finally, the imposing of an administrative fine by the Commission or a national com petition 
authority on an undertaking has no significance in a civil trial centred on the same facts a n d  
undertakings. In other words, the non bis in idem principle does not apply as betw een 
administrative and private enforcement.89 Conversely, private damages awards that p recede 
administrative (public) proceedings should, in principle, have no bearing on the possible 
fines. Taking into account such damages awards as attenuating circumstances for th e  
imposition of administrative fines would not further the overall deterrent effect o f E C  
competition law enforcement.90
86 Option 29 of the Green Paper.
87 If  there was a system of double damages for horizontal cartels, this rebate would de-double the award f o r  
the leniency applicant, thus restoring single damages as the content of the claim which he faces.
88 Option 30 of the Green Paper.
89 See Temple Lang, “EEC Competition Actions in Member States’ Courts - Claims for Damages, 
Declarations and injunctions for Breach of Community Antitrust Law”, in: Hawk (Ed.), Antitrust and T rade  
Policies o f the European Economic Community 1983, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate L a w  
Institute (New York, 1984), p. 265; Jones and Sharpston, “Beyond Delimitis: Pluralism, Illusions, and N arrow  
Constructionism in Community Antitrust Litigation”, 3 Columbia JEL 85 (1996-97), p. 91.
90 See, however, Commission Decision 1999/60/EC of 21 October 1998 (Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel), O J  
[ 1999] L 24/1, para. 172, where the Commission took into account as an “extenuating circumstance”, justifying 
the considerable reduction of a fine, the payment of substantial damages by one o f the addressees o f th e  
Commission Decision to a victim o f the anti-competitive conduct. This case has been rightly criticised by S . 
Mail-Fouilleul, Les sanctions de la violation du droit communautaire de la concurrence (Paris, 2002), p. 4 8 2 , 
fn. 3016. In another case, the Commission reduced the administrative fine imposed on an undertaking because 
the latter offered and paid extra-judicially substantial financial compensations to third parties identified in th e  
Statement of Objections as victims (Commission Decision 2003/675/EC of 30 October 2002 (PO Video Gam es, 
PO Nintendo Distribution and Omega-Nintendo), OJ [2003] L 255/33, paras. 440-441). See further V an
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Haasteren and Peña Castcllot, “Commission Fines Nintendo and Seven of its European Distributors for 
Colluding to Prevent Parallel Trade in Nintendo Products”, (2003-1) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 50, p. 
53. The Commission should not be criticised as much in this case because it took into account not damages 
awarded by final judgment but rather extrajudicial compensations. In joined cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T- 
244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01, Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. E t al. v. Commission, [2004] ECR II-l 181, 
para. 348, one of the applicants had argued that the Commission had failed to consider as an attenuating 
circumstance the fact that it had concluded civil law settlements in the US and Canada. The Court rejected the 
argument because the settlements in question had no impact on the infringement committed in the EEA. This 
may mean that, according to the CFI, civil damages awards and settlements in the EU may be an appropriate 
attenuating circumstance in the imposition of administrative fines. Such an approach should be resisted however 
and should be limited only to exceptional circumstances of settlements or of compensatory sums paid of the 
pcipetrators own motion.
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B. THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW SPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF EC 
COMPETITION LAW BY NATIONAL COURTS
1. The Old Administrative Authorisation and Notification System
a. The “Foundational” Public Enforcement System
The past forty years of competition law enforcement, based on the old Regulation 17 o f  
1962,91 were characterised by a centralised model where the Commission enjoyed a de fa c to , 
and in some instances, notably the granting of individual exemptions under Article 81(3) E C , 
a de iure enforcement monopoly, while the role of the national legal systems (with one or tw o  
notable exceptions) and courts was marginal. It is true that the Treaty o f Rome, w h ile  
recognising in Article 85 EC the Commission’s role in ensuring ‘"the application o f th e  
principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82”, did not dictate such a degree o f centralisation.92 
Indeed, the degree of centralisation created by Regulation 17 departed from the Community 
standard, according to which Community law is to be enforced primarily by national 
administrative authorities (administration communautaire indirecte)93 and by national courts 
(juges communautaires de droit commun)94 However, when Regulation 17 was enacted,
91 Council Regulation No. 17 o f  6 February 1962 - First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 o f  the  
Treaty’, JO [ 1962] L 13/204.
92 See D.J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, 
1998), pp. 349 and 386; Ehlennann, “The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural 
Revolution”, 37 CMLRev. 537 (2000), pp. 538-540.
93 See Gerber and Cassinis, “The ‘Modernisation’ of European Community Competition Law: Achieving 
Consistency in Enforcement — Parts I + II”, 27 ECLR 10 + 51 (2006), p. 10. On this Community transformation 
o f national administrative authorities see in general Dubcy, “Administration indirecte et fédéralisme d'exécution 
en Europe”, 39 CDE 87 (2003), p. 87 et seq. See also Temple Lang, “The Duties of National Authorities under 
Community Constitutional Law”, 23 ELRev. 109 (1998); Kakouris, “Special Administrative Courts o f th e  
Member States and the Court o f the European Communities”, in: Kakouris (Ed.), Perspectives, D ro it 
Communautaire Européen, Théorie Générale du Droit, Domaine Méta-juridique (Athènes/Komotini, 1998), p . 
513; Chiti, “L’organismo di diritto pubblico e la nozione comunitaria di pubblica amministrazione”, in: 
Anmiario J999-2000 dell Associazione italiana dei professori di diritto amnünistrativo (Milano, 2001), pp. 37- 
38; V.I. Karageorgou, Administrative Procedure under the Influence o f European Integration 
(Athens/Thessaloniki, 2005) [in Greek], p. 14; Svdow, “Europäisierte Verwaltungsverfahren”, 45 JuS 97 (2005), 
p. 97.
94 See inter alia Ehlermann, “Ein Plädoyer für die dezentrale Kontrolle der Anwendung d es  
Gemeinschaftsrechts durch die Mitgliedstaaten”, in: Capotorti, Ehlermann et a í  (Eds.), Du Droit International 
au Droit de l'Intégration, Liber Amicontm Pierre Pescatore (Baden-Baden, 1987), pp. 217 et seq:, O. Dubos, 
Les juridictions nationales, juge communautaire, Contribution à l'étude des transformations de la fonction  
juridictionnelle dans les États-membres de l "Union européenne (Paris, 2001). On this dédoublement fonctionnel 
as to national authorities and courts see in general R. Lecouit, L  "Europe des juges (Bruxelles, 1976), pp. 8-9; P. 
V. Pavlopoulos, Guarantees o f  the Judicial Protection in European Community Law (Athens/Komotini, 1993) 
[in Greek], p. 69; D. Simon, Le système juridique communautaire (Paris, 2001), pp. 163-164, 1 6 7 ; 
Anagnostopoulou-Yiannakou, “The National Judge as a Factor o f the Community Justice”, in: Frangakis (Ed.), 
The Court o f Justice o f  the European Communities after 50 Years o f  Operation (Athens/Komotini, 2004) [in
centralisation was a conscious choice with a view to constructing a European competition law 
enforcement system.95 The centralised system o f enforcement performed in a sense a 
“pedagogical” function.96 Throughout the long ensuing period, therefore, the Commission 
was the basic public enforcement authority for EC competition law purposes.97 National 
competition authorities started to enter the field only recently, and sometimes reluctantly, 
since at least with regard to Article 81 EC, their hands were tied by their inability to apply 
Article 81(3) EC and to grant individual exemptions to restrictive agreements. In addition, 
most national authorities were not until recently empowered by national law to apply Articles 
81 and 82 EC.
National courts, on the other hand, did have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce Articles 81(1) 
and 82 EC, since these provisions were recognised as (horizontally) directly effective by the 
Court o f Justice,98 but under the exemption monopoly they could not grant individual 
exemptions. Nevertheless, during these past forty years the role of national courts in EC 
competition enforcement has not been particularly strong and private enforcement in Europe
Greek], p. 74; Radermacher, “Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Staatshaftung für höchstrichtcrlichc Entscheidungen”, 23 
NVwZ 1415 (2004), p. 1416; Canivet, “Les réseaux déjugés au sein del’Union européenne : Raisons, nécessités 
et réalisations”, in: Mot & Poillot-Peruzzetto (Eds.), Intemormativiîè et réseaux dautorités, L ’ordre 
communautaire et les nouvelles formes de relations (Toulouse, 24 Octobre 2003), Petites Affiches, 5-10-2004, 
No. 199,45, p. 46. See case T-51 /89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, [ 1990] ECR11-309, para. 42: “when 
applying Article 86 [now 82] ... the national courts are acting as Community courts of general jurisdiction” 
Compare, however, AG Léger’s Opinion in case C-224/01, Gerhard Köhler v. Austria, [2003] ECR 1-10239, 
para. 66, who sees the dédoublement fonctionnel more symbolically than literally: “That expression must not be 
understood literally, but symbolically: where a national court is called upon to apply Community law, it is in its 
capacity as an organ of a Member State, and not as a Community organ, as a result of dual functions.”
95 See Gerber, supra (1998), See also the comprehensive historical exposé made by Tesauro, “Some 
Reflections on the Commission’s White Paper on the Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy”, in: Ehlermann & 
Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy 
(Oxford/Portland, 2001 ), p. 259 et seq.
90 See Tesauro, “Modernisation and Decentralisation of EC Competition Law'”, in: Rivas & Horspool 
(Eds.), Modernisation and Decentralisation o f  EC Competition Law (The Hague/London/Boston, 2000), pp. 1- 
3; Pons, “Nouveaux enjeux et réformes de la politique européenne de la concurrence”, Petites Affiches, 5-11- 
2001, No. 220,21, p. 25.
97 See Venit, “Slouching towards Bethlehem: The Rule of Reason and Notification in EEC Antitrust Law”, 
10 BCIntTComp.LRev. 17 (1987), p. 19; Reynolds, “From Co-operation to Integration: The Relationship 
between National and European Competition Law through Judicial Review'”, in: O'KeefTe & Bavasso (Eds ), 
Liber Amicorum in Honour o f Lord Slynn o f Hadley, Vol. I, Judicial Review in European Union Law (The 
Hague/London/Boston, 2000), pp. 570-571, speaking of the Commission as “the privileged forum for 
competition disputes”. On the initial view of EC competition law as Brussels-based see the groundbreaking 
article of Fonester and Norall, “The Laicization of Community Law” Self-help and the Rule of Reason: How- 
Competition Law'Is and Could Be Applied”, 21 CMLRev. 11 (1984), p. 41 et seq. The authors had argued for a 
more active role of national courts in competition enforcement, notwithstanding the then Commission monopoly 
to grant exemptions. A system of co-operation between the Commission and national courts should ensure 
consistency and would limit the risk of conflicts. On the centrality of DG IV in competition law enforcement in 
Europe from a political science point of view see Wilks and McGow-an, “Competition Policy in the European 
Union: Creating a Federal Agency?”, in: Doem & Wilks (Eds.), Comparative Competition Policy, National 
Institutions in a Global Market (Oxford, 1996), p. 245 et seq.
98 According to the European Courts’ case law- Arts. 81(1) and 82 EC enjoy direct effect and grant 
individuals actionable rights which national courts must protect (BRI v. SABA\i (1), op.cit., para. 16).
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is certainly far more underdeveloped than in the U S." This is because the whole institutional 
system o f antitrust enforcement in Europe has been fundamentally different because o f the 
overwhelmingly central role of public enforcement The foundational model of EC 
competition law centres on administrative decision-making.9 100 In the words of Former 
Advocate General Tesauro the administrative enforcement model in Europe “is proving to be 
very effective and to some extent an alternative to judicial enforcement. While the protection 
o f private complainants is not the objective of the administrative intervention, the outcome o f  
an antitrust case conducted by the competition authority can be largely equivalent to a judge 
ruling”.101 To these one should add the fact that administrative authorities and certainly the 
Commission have extensive investigatory powers and the procedure before them entails no 
costs for a complainant.102
This unprecedented success and the dominant enforcement role acquired by the Commission 
started being more o f a burden for itself in the last two decades and soon it became obvious 
that the high degree of centralisation of the 1960s was no longer appropriate for the 21st 
century. As a result, the Commission was now prepared to relinquish some of its powers 
through the adoption of a modernised enforcement model that is decentralised and relies 
heavily also upon national courts and competition authorities.103 *
b. Competence of Civil Courts to Apply Articles 81(1),(2) and 82 EC
During the first years of EC competition law enforcement the direct effect of the Treaty 
competition provisions and the competence of national (civil) courts to apply the latter was 
not taken as granted. The centralised administrative model introduced by Regulation 17 o f  
1962 did not certainly help in that respect. It was essentially the Court of Justice that affirmed
99 See Jones and Sharpston, supra (1996-97), p. 87.
100 See Gerber, supra (1998), p. 386. According to that author “the lack of private suits for enforcement in 
Community courts and their rarity in Member State courts means that the Commission makes most decisions 
regarding objectives to be pursued, conduct to be challenged, resources to be used and the arguments to be 
employed in justifying decisions”. See also in this direction Ehlermann, supra (2000a), p. 553; Capelli, “La 
riforma della disciplina della concorrenza nell’Unione Europea: Impatto sul sistema giudiziario italiano”, (2000) 
Il Diritto dell’Economia 561, p. 566; Birk, “Die Konkuirentenklage im EG-Wettbewerbsrecht”, 14 EWS 159 
(2003), pp. 159-160; D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (Oxford, 2003), p. 460.
101 Tesauro, “Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules in Italy: The Procedural Issues”, in: Ehlermann & 
Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001, Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law 
(Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 278.
102 See also Jacobs, “Panel Discussion: EEC Enforcement Policy and Practice”, 54 Antitrust LJ 611 (1985), 
p. 618 et seq.\ Venit, supra (1987), p. 19.
103 In explaining the modernisation initiative of the Commission, former Commissioner Monti stressed the
particularly negative consequences o f the Commission’s being virtually the sole enforcer of Community
competition law in an enlarged Union. See Monti, supra (2001 ), p. 5.
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in a line o f judgments the direct effect of these provisions and the competence o f national 
courts to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC, though not of the third paragraph of the former, which, 
under the administrative authorisation system of Regulation 17, was reserved to the 
Commission's sole jurisdiction.104
Thus, the Court interpreted Article 9(3) of Regulation 17/1962 in such a way, so that national 
courts dealing with private law disputes were not to be considered as “authorities of the 
Member States” in the sense o f being devoid o f their jurisdiction to apply Articles 81(1) and 
82 EC, when the Commission initiated an administrative proceeding. This jurisdiction of 
national courts resulted of the direct effect of those provisions and could not be limited by 
Regulation 17.105 However, the Court progressively curtailed the powers of national courts, 
when the latter applied Articles 81(1) and 82 EC in parallel with the European 
Commission.106 While national courts could continue their proceedings and rule on the 
agreement or the conduct at issue if  the latter manifestly fell or did not fall under the 
prohibitions of Articles 81(1) and 82 EC, their competence seemed weaker in cases of 
doubt.107 Initially, the Court of Justice “invited'1 national courts to suspend their proceedings, 
in order to avoid an eventual conflict with the Commission’s decision. While it is true that at 
this point, i.e. so long as the Commission had not yet reached its decision, the national court
Art. 9( 1 ) Reg. 17.
los ß ß j  v (7), op.cit., paras. 12-20, overruling case 43/69, Brauerei A. Bilger Söhne GmbH v.
Heintich Jehle and Marta Jehle, [1970] ECR 127, para. 9. See further C. Grynfogel, Droit communautaire de ¡a 
concurrence (Paris, 1997), p. 52; J. Schapira, G. Le Tallcc, J.-B. Blaise and L. Idot, Droit européen des affaires, 
Vol. I (Paris, 1999), pp. 334-335. This case law has not lost all its value under Ihe new system of enforcement, 
since the provision of Art. 9(3) Reg. 17/1962 is retained by Art. 11(6) of the new Reg. 1/2003 (see infra.) 
Whether national civil (and criminal) courts were excluded from the language of Art. 9(3) Reg. 17 wras not 
always clear. See e.g. P.K. Mailänder, Zuständigkeit und Entscheidungsfreiheit nationaler Gerichte im Efl’G- 
Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden, 1965), p. 23 et seq. The Court in BRT v. S.4BAM (I) distinguished between national 
courts, where the EC competition issue arose in disputes governed by private law', and courts “especially 
entrusted with the task of applying domestic legislation on competition or that of ensuring the legality of that 
application by the administrative authorities” (paras. 14,15, 19). Only the latter were affected by the letter and 
spirit of Art. 9(3) Reg, 17 according to the Court.
m  Under the previous system of enforcement, parallel proceedings in this sense refer to a case pending 
simultaneously before a civil court and before the Commission, when the latter had either been seized through 
an application for negative clearance or a complaint, or had initiated an ex officio proceeding. If there was no 
proceeding pending before the Commission, the national court was unfettered in its competence to applv Aits.
81(1 ),(2) and 82 EC.
107 Delimitis, op.cit., paras. 50-52. Compare also the exact letter of the Court’s judgment in case C-250/92, 
Gottrup-Klim ea Growareforeninger v. Dansk Landbrugs Growareselskab AmbA, [1994] ECR 1-5641, para. 
58: “If the conditions for application of Article 85(1) [now 81(1)] are clearly not satisfied so that there is 
scarcely any risk of the Commission taking a different decision, the national court may continue the proceedings 
and rule on the agreement in issue” (emphasis added). How'ever, the ECJ’s case law' indicates that while the 
competence of national courts remained unfettered only if the conduct in question seemed manifestly legal or 
illegal pursuant to Art. 81(1 ) or 82 EC, a stay of proceedings was “invited” even in case of slight doubt. See, in 
this sense, Korah, “The Judgment in Delimitis. A  Milestone Tow ards a realistic Assessment of the Effects of an 
Agreement - Or a Dump Squib?”, 8 Tul.Eur.Civ.LFonun 17 (1993), p. 44.
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was not, strictly speaking, under a Community law duty to suspend,108 nevertheless, the C o u r t 
o f Justice gradually used a more stringent language, thus, in essence leading to re su lts  
comparable to those pertaining to a duty to stay proceedings.109 This was so, in order to a v o id  
conflicting decisions, which would be against the principle of legal certainty.110 
In the recent Masterfoods case, which we analyse below, the Court went even further in  
subjecting national courts to a fully-fledged duty’, based on Article 10 EC, not to ta k e  
decisions ''running counter to” decisions of the Commission, in case the Commission h a s  
already reached such a decision on the case in question.111
c. Competence of Civil Courts to Apply Article 81(3) EC
Contrary to Article 81(1) EC, which had been recognised as directly effective, under th e  
notification and prior authorisation system the Commission had exclusive competence fo r  
Article 81(3) EC. Its exemption monopoly was introduced by Article 9(1) o f Regulation 17. 
Notification of restrictive agreements to the Commission, while not obligatory but secured 
full immunity from administrative fines. The European Court of Justice had also initially
108 See Jones and Shaipston, supra (1996-97), p. 96, stressing that there is no ‘"unconditional obligation to  
stay national court proceedings while waiting for the Commission to act”. According to these authors, “th e  
national court, in the performance of its duty to decide the case, is entitled to formulate a considered, 
discretionary judgment about what the Commission is likely to do”.
109 Compare BRT v. SABAM (I), op.cit,, para. 21: “[the] court may, if it considers it necessary for reasons o f  
legal certainty, stay the proceedings”) and case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, [1991] 
ECR 1-935, paras. 47 and 52 in ßne: “Account should here be taken of the risk of national courts taking 
decisions which conflict with those taken or envisaged by the Commission in the implementation of Articles 
85(1) [now 81(1)] and 86 [now 82], and also of Article 85(3) [now 81(3)]. Such conflicting decisions would be  
contrary to the general principle of legal certainty and must, therefore, be avoided when national courts give 
decisions on agreements or practices which may subsequently be the subject of a decision by the Commission... 
A stay o f proceedings or the adoption of interim measures should ... be envisaged where there is a risk o f  
conflicting decisions in the context of the application of Articles 85(1) and 86 [now 81(1) and 82]” (emphasis 
added). On the early less absolutist language of the Court in this context see Meade, “Decentralisation in the 
Implementation of EEC Competition Law - A Challenge for the Lawyers”, 37 NILQ 101 (1986), p. 105; 
Merola, “La cooperazione tra giudici nazionali e Commissione nell’applicazione dclle norme comunitarie 
antitrust”, 116II Foroltaliano IV-418 (1993), pp. 421-422.
110 On legal certainty in this context see Basedow', “Rechtssicherheit im europäischen Wirtschaftsrecht - Ein 
allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz im Lichte der wettbewerbsrechtlichen Rechtsprechung”, 4 ZEuP 570 (1996), p. 
582. Usually national courts have proved ready to suspend their proceedings in expectation o f a Commission 
decision. In England such a stay of proceedings may take place at any stage of the Commission proceedings, 
while the court may sometimes prefer not to suspend and proceed to preparatory steps for the eventual trial for 
so long as these steps do not prejudge the Commission’s decision (see A {TV Europe v. BMG Records (UK) Ltd. 
et at., [1997] EuLR 100). See further on the attitude o f English courts with references to case law’ Cutting, 
“Competition Law in the United Kingdom”, in: Vogelaar, Stuyck & Reeken (Eds.), Competition Law in the EU, 
its Member States and Switzerland, Vol. II, United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark and Greece (The Hague/Deventer, 2002), pp. 32-33.
M1 Among other commentaries see in particular Malferrari, “Neues zur Kompetenz Verteilung zwischen 
Kommission und nationaler Gerichtsbarkeit auf dem Gebiet des Wettbewerbs und zum Verhältnis zwischen der 
Nichtigkeitsklage und dem Vorabentscheidungsverfahren: Anmerkungen zum Urteil des EuGH in der 
Rechtssache Masterfoods, 36 EuR 605 (2001), pp. 608-610; Kjolbye, 39 CMLRev. 175 (2002), p. 177 et seq.
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conferred provisional civil validity to all agreements notified to the Commission,112 but later 
it limited provisional validity only to so-called “old” agreements, i.e. agreements in existence 
before Regulation 17 came into force.113
This split in competences, i.e. between the concurrent competence of the Commission and 
national courts to apply the first paragraph of Article 81 EC and the exclusive competence of 
the Commission to apply its third paragraph created a rather complicated state o f affairs in 
which the national courts were essentially blocked by the Commission exemption monopoly. 
The role o f national courts was less problematic and their tasks were evident, in case the 
Commission had already decided whether an agreement fulfilled the conditions of Article 
81(3) EC or not, thus respectively granting or denying an individual exemption. If the 
agreement in question had been granted an individual exemption of constitutive nature, the 
national court was bound by that the exemption, which was incorporated into an erga omnes 
Community formal legal act that bound the court fully.114 If  the Commission had considered 
that the agreement could not be saved by Article 81(3) EC, the national court under Delimitis 
and ultimately Masterfoods would be bound not to contradict the Commission. This duty 
derived not only from the Commission exemption monopoly but also from Articles 10 and 85 
EC (Commission central role in EC competition law enforcement) and from the general 
principle of legal certainty.
There was a view, aiming at giving the courts a  free hand and, thus, at increasing the 
possibilities of private enforcement, according to which a court should be able to depart from 
the terms o f an individual exemption, if the underlying circumstances had changed.115 A 
variation of that view is that at least the courts should be able to review the conduct of an 
undertaking following an exemption.116 However, such views neglected the binding and 
constitutive nature of the Community act in question and the exclusive competence of the
112 The ECJ did so in Bosch, op.cit
113 Case 48/72, Brasserie de Haecht v. Oscar Wilkin and Marie Janssen (II), [1973] ECR 77.
114 See further Herbert, supra (1993), p. 1-468; Lang, “Giudice nazionale e Commissione delle Comunità 
europee: Coesistenza di competenze in materia di concorrenza e strumenti di coordinamento”, 32 
Riv.Dir.Int.Priv.Proc. (1996) 239, p. 246; M. Tavassi and M. Scuffi, Diritto processuale antitrust, Tutela 
giurisdizionale della concorrenza (Milano, 1998), p. 49; C.S. Kerse, EC Antitrust Procedure (London, 1998), p. 
20; Kamann and Horstkotte, “Kommission versus nationale Gerichte - Kooperation oder Konfrontation im 
Kartellvcrfahren: Das Masterfoods-JJiteil des EuGH im Licht dcr geplanten Kartellverfahrensverordnung”, 51 
WuW 458 (2001 ),p. 460.
115 See Jones and Sharpston, supra (1996-97), pp. 102-104.
116 See Vaughan, “EC Competition Law in National Proceedings”, in Slynn & Pappas (Eds.), Procedural 
Aspects o f  EC Competition Law (Maastricht, 1995), p. 30. It is not entirely clear if that author’s view is only that 
a national court could review compliance with an exemption granted or whether the court could even 
“withdraw” the benefit of an exemption.
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Commission to produce, amend, and revoke an exemption.117 Therefore, even if* 
circumstances had changed, the issue could only be raised before the Commission, th e  
national court having no other choice but to enforce the exemption or to seize the Court o f  
Justice through an Article 234 EC reference.118 r u
Article 9(1) of Regulation 17 became more of a problem, when the Commission had not y e t  
reached a conclusion in regard of Article 81(3) EC. This meant that the only likely solution, 
the suspension o f national proceedings, would leave the agreement in question in a ‘Tw il ig h t 
zone between validity and nullity’’ until the Commission’s decision.119 However, in  
Delimitis120 - and even earlier - it had been accepted that the Commission monopoly shou ld  
not stand in the way o f national courts, if it was clear that Article 81(3) EC could not save th e  
agreement in question. Thus, national courts could apply that provision negatively, though 
not positively}21 In other words, they could not grant an individual exemption themselves, 
but they could conclude that an exemption was unlikely, thus considering the agreement in  
question null under Article 81(2) EC.122 The same unfettered powers had the national court, i f  
the agreement had not been notified to the Commission, or if the notification had been  
withdrawn.123
117 See in this sense P.M. Taylor, EC and UK Competition Law and Compliance: A Practical Guide  
(London, 1999), p. 267. Compare also the Commission’s Article-by-aiticle Explanatoiy Memorandum o f th e  
September 2000 regulation proposal, under Art. 10.
118 The national court could seize the ECJ with a preliminary reference, if it had doubts as to the legality an d  
validity of the exemption Decision. See Beneyto, “Transforming Competition Law through Subsidiarity?”, V( 1) 
Collected Courses o f the Academy o f  European Law 267 (1994), p. 294.
119 Sec Venit, “Brave New World: The Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement under Articles 
81 and 82 o f the EC Treaty”, 40 CMLRev. 545 (2003), p. 554.
120 Delimitis, op.cit., para. 50 et seq.
121 O f course, the national court could take the view that Art. 81(1) EC did not apply in the first place and, 
thus, decide the case accordingly. See for an example Cass.com., 1-7-03, SA Sapod Audic v. SA E co  
Entballages, 14(l)Contr.Conc.Consomm. 24 (2004).
122 Problems could theoretically arise, if  the Commission were to take subsequently the opposite view and 
exempt the agreement. In such a case there would be a conflict between a court judgment and the Commission 
exemption decision. According to Marenco, “The Uneasy Enforcement of Article 85 EEC as between 
Community and National Levels”, in: Hawk (Ed.), Antitrust in a Global Economy 1993, Annual Proceedings o f  
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New Yoik/Deventer, 1994), pp. 619-620, if the national judgment was 
final and no longer subject to appeal, thus constituting res judicata, the parties benefiting from the exemption 
could institute new proceedings, for example for restitution of damages paid. According to that author, the res  
judicata principle in this case could not pre-empt the precedence due to EC law. On this question see further 
below.
123 No exemption could be granted in the absence of notification (unless Art. 4(2) Reg. 17 applied), 
therefore, in case of withdrawal of the notification the full competence of the courts to decide a case on the basis 
of Art. 81(1) and (2) EC was restored. See e.g. the rejection o f two complaints by the Commission in the 
Inntrepreneur saga, where it was thought that follow ing the withdrawal by Inntrepreneur of the notification o f  
its standard leases, there was no longer a Commission interest to deal w'ith the complaints, since the full 
competence of UK courts to decide the cases was restored. See further Van Eips, “The ‘Old’ Inntrepreneur 
Standard UK Pub Leases”, (1998-2) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 51.
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If the agreement infringed Article 81(1) EC and had not been notified, the national judge had 
no other option but to declare the agreement void. This was an unsatisfactory and unjust 
characteristic of the old system o f enforcement.124 Naturally, the parties could always notify 
the agreement after the beginning of the national proceedings. However, in such a case the 
eventual exemption would be effective from the date o f notification, which meant that the 
national court could consider the agreement void up to that date and draw civil consequences 
from that nullity in that period.125 If the agreement came to be notified to and exempted by 
the Commission subsequent to the national court’s judgment, then two conflicting decisions 
would be in existence and the national judgment would still enjoy res judicata effect. But this 
was a purely theoretical hypothesis, since the party relying upon Article 81(3) EC would 
most likely have rushed to notify the agreement before the end of the civil proceedings in 
order to seize the Commission and thus block the national proceedings.
On the other hand, in case the national judge was of the opinion that, in the light of the 
Commission’s rules and decision-making practices, the agreement was likely to be the 
subject of an exemption decision, he should stay the proceedings and/or adopt interim 
measures pursuant to his national procedural law.126 The Court’s elliptical pronouncement in 
this point seemed to leave no other space to the national court for a direct or indirect positive 
application of Article 81(3) EC.127 *
124 See ldot and Van de Walle de Ghelke, “Le besoin de sécurité juridique : Notifications et exemptions”, 
37 CDE 160 (2001), p. 185; D. T. Keeling, Intellectual Property Rights in EU Law, Vol. I, Free Movement and 
Competition Law (Oxford, 2003), p. 301.
25 Compare, for example, the facts of MTV Europe, op.cit. See also Jones and Shaipston, supra (1996-97), 
p. 101; Mail-Fouillcul, supra (2002), pp. 30-31.
126 Delimitis, op.cit., para. 52. Again it is our submission that the language of that paragraph seemed to go 
further than a mere option for the national court to stay proceedings. See contra Jones and Shaipston, supra 
(1996-97), p. 98, arguing that national courts should be extremely reluctant to stay proceedings, unless they took 
the view that an exemption was probable, rather than merely possible. This should particularly be the case, 
according to these authors, when an Art. 81 EC case combined elements of Art. 82 EC and national law 
elements, which are not subject to the Commission's exclusive powers.
127 The Commission had followed a more liberal approach in its submissions in Case 47/76, Alexis de Notre 
and Martine de Notre, née de Clercq v. N V Brouwerij Concordia, [1977] ECR 65, at 85 and 89, though the
Court did not adjudicate on this. The Commission had accepted even the possibility of a positive application of 
Art. 81(3) EC by national courts, recognising that a national judgment upholding the validity of an agreement 
did not amount to the granting of an exemption in the sense of Art. 81(3) EC, since the judgment would not have 
erga omnes effects and would not be binding on itself. See also the Commission's submissions in cases 253/78 
and 1/79 to 3/79, Procureur de la République v. Giry and Guerlain et al., [1980] ECR 2327, at 2345. The 
Commission returned to this view in a draft notice on co-operation with national courts that was distributed 
informally in 1990. According to this text, an agreement, whose validity wras adjudicated before national courts 
and which had received a comfort letter from the Commission, would enjoy a “relative validity” as between the 
parties (see further Beneyto, supra (1994), pp. 297-298). In addition, see Kon, “Article 85, Para. 3: A Case for 
Application by National Courts”, 19 CMLRev. 541 (1982) p. 547 et seq.\ Steindorff, “Article 85, Para. 3: No 
Case for Application by National Courts”, 20 CMLRev. 125 (1983); Greaves, “Concurrent Jurisdiction in EEC 
Competition Lawr: When Should a National Court Stay Proceedings?”, 8 ECLR 256 (1987), p. 258; Gastinel, 
“Plaidoyer pour la reconnaissance de l'effet direct à l’article 85, paragraphe 3, du Traité de Rome”, D. 1996.53, 
p. 55. The Delimitis judgment put an end to this debate and accepted the possibility only o f a negative
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Finally, under the old system, national courts could control whether any likely conditions 
accompanying the exemption had been fulfilled by the addressee of the exemption.128 If th e y  
had not, then the courts could draw the appropriate conclusions.129 This meant that th e  
exemption would be considered not valid, thus, the agreement in question would no longer b e  
exempted and would fall under the nullity of Article 81(2) EC. National courts would then b e  
able to draw the civil consequences therefrom.130
Notwithstanding these possibilities for national courts, it is true that their competences h ad  
been severely impaired as a result of the Commission’s exemption monopoly, and, thus, b y  
implication any talk of the development of a more efficient system o f private antitrust 
enforcement in Europe had proved wishful thinking.131 The problematic state of affairs th a t 
the Commission exemption monopoly had created with regard to national courts, had, indeed, 
led some authors to the view that this exclusive competence, based on secondary law, that is , 
on Article 9(1) of Regulation 17, was incompatible with the direct effect o f Article 81 o f th e  
Treaty. Therefore, this specific provision of Regulation 17 should have been considered 
invalid.132
application of that provision by courts. See, however, V.C. Korah, Cases and Materials on EC Competition L a w  
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 161-162, who alludes to a possibility of indirect positive application o f Art. 81(3) EC by  
courts enforcing a restrictive agreement that would likely receive an exemption. According to that author the 
problem, rather, was the need under Art. 10 EC to avoid possibly conflicting decisions, a risk that in this case  
would not exist, since the Commission would in any case grant an individual exemption. See also in th is  
direction L. Ortiz Blanco, European Community Competition Procedure (Oxford, 1996), pp. 24-25; U. Caspar, 
Wettbewerbliche Gesamtwürdingung von Vereinbarungen im Rahmen von Art. 81 Abs. 1 E G V  
(Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, 2001), p. 234, fn. 14.
138 National courts, however, could not control the fulfillment of obligations. The latter could only be  
monitored by the Commission and the only sanction attached to their breach was of administrative nature: th e  
Commission could impose a fine pursuant to Art. 15(2Xb) Reg. 17/1962 or it could revoke or amend th e  
exemption Decision according to Art. 8(3Xb) Reg. 17/1962.
See Jones and Sharpston, supra (1996-97), pp. 103-104.
130 This has happened in the Global One case in Germany, where the exemption (Commission Decision 
96/547/EC of 17 July 1996 (Phoenix/Global One), OS [1996] L 239/57, para. 74 and Art. 1) was subject to a  
suspensive condition that was not fullfilled. When the parties prematurely enforced their agreement, the national 
court awarded damages as a result o f  the ensuing breach of Art 81(1) EC (OLG Düsseldorf, 16-6-98, British 
Telecommunications pic and 114G Interkom GmbH & Co. v. Deutsche Telekom AG and ATLAS Deutschland, 
48 WuW (1998) 713).
131 See Cooke, “Centralised Subsidiarity: The Reform of Competition Law Enforcement”, 10 DEL 4 (2001),
p. 5.
133 See e.g. loannou, supra (1984), pp. 434,446,451; Siragusa, “Future Competition Law - Working Paper 
V”, in: Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 1997: The Objectives o f Competition 
Policy (Oxford, 1998), p. 551, fn. 24. See in this context the preliminary reference to the ECJ made by the 
Kammergericht Berlin in 1997 in case C-34/97, RUE Energie Aktiengesellschaft and Stadt Nordhorn v. 
Bundeskartellamt, OJ [1997] C 94/7, regarding the compatibility' with the Treaty of Art. 9 Reg. 17/1962. The 
argument was that this provision could be incompatible with the “indivisible whole” of Art. 81 EC, since 
national competition authorities and national courts could apply Art. 81(1) but not A rt 81(3) EC. The case never 
reached, however, the stage of hearing, because it was withdrawn by the German court and, as a result, was 
removed from the ECJ register. See further Ehlermann, “Cooperation Between Competition Authorities within 
the European Union”, in: Raffaelli (Ed.), Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law, Treviso 15-16 May 1997 
(Bruxelles/Milano, 1998), pp. 477-481; Wolf, “Entwicklungstendenzen im Verhältnis des nationalen zum
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As for the provision in Article 4(2) o f Regulation 17 which excluded certain agreements from 
the obligation to notify, it has had a rather limited impact on the competence o f national 
courts. In any case, this provision did not mean that a limited system o f legal exception was 
recognised, but only that the Commission exemption, whether or not following a  voluntary 
notification,* 133 applied to those agreements from the date o f their entry into force, and not 
from that o f their notification. Regulation 1216/1999 extended the scope of application of 
Article 4(2) o f Regulation 17, thus making it possible for vertical agreements to be exempted 
retroactively, without the need for precautionary notification.134 This means that if a 
restrictive agreement became an issue in an on-going civil litigation, companies could notify 
it at any time to the Commission, which could then exempt these retroactively from the date 
of their entry into force. A problem might have arisen, if  the agreement was not notified on 
time to the Commission or if the Commission had not exempted it ex officio before the end of 
the civil proceedings. In such a  case the national court would have no other option but to 
declare the restrictive clauses void.
In any event, this amendment went in the right direction from the point o f view o f eliminating 
bureaucracy but had no particular positive consequences for private antitrust enforcement, in 
the sense that national courts still lacked competence to apply Article 81(3) EC.
d. The Case of Block Exemptions
The competence of the national judge was resurrected, if an agreement subject to Article 
81(1) EC was, nevertheless, exempted through a block exemption regulation. Thus, national 
courts did have the power to establish whether an agreement fell under a directly applicable 
block exemption regulation and the duty to safeguard the rights deriving therefrom.135 Under 
the old system o f enforcement, if  an agreement w as caught by Article 81(1) EC and did not 
benefit from a block exemption, it might still be saved through an individual exemption under
europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht”, in: Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1997, Referate des 25. FI 11’-Seminars 
(Köln/Berlin/Bonn/Milnchen, 1998), p. 3 et seq.\ Miram, “Die dezentrale Anwendung durch das 
Bundcskartcllamt: Länderbericht Deutschland”, in: Pérez van Kappel (Ed.), Decentralised Application o f EC 
Competition Law: National Experience and Reform (Köln, 2001 ), pp. 19-20.
133 There has never been a Commission decision exempting a non-notified agreement on the basis of Art. 
4(2) Reg. 17. See Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, supra (2000), p. 819, fn. 133.
134 Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ [2000] C 291/1, paras. 63-65.
135 Case 63/75,5.4 Fonderies Roubaix IVattrelos v. Société Nouvelle des Fonderies A. Roux and Société des 
Fonderies JOT, [1976] ECR 111, para. 11; case 59/77, Établissements A. De Bloos SPRL v. Société en 
Commandite par Actions Bouyer, [1977] ECR 2359, para. 17; Delimitis, op.cit., para. 46.
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Article 81(3) EC; but it should have been or, at worst, be notified to the Commission.136 I f  n o  
individual exemption was possible, the court could only declare it null.137 
While until recently the Commission produced its block exemption regulations following a  
legalistic approach, using, apart from black lists, also white lists o f clauses, which should b e  
inserted by the parties into their contracts in order to benefit from the exemption, th is  
severely criticised practice has now been reversed.138 Starting with the vertical restraints 
block exemption regulation139 the Commission is now using a more economic approach 
based on market shares and on the economic power o f  the parties rather than on the legal 
content o f their agreements. These “new generation” block exemption regulations,140 and, in  
particular, the fact that they employ market shares, confer new responsibilities on the national 
judges, who now have to define the market and to determine the position therein o f a n  
undertaking.141 This new responsibility, by itself, may, indeed, in a  sense hinder private 
enforcement, since a further obstacle adds to the already existing ones with regard to th e  
judge's non-privileged position in the application o f competition law.142 However, the n e w  
economic analysis is something that the Commission, national competition authorities an d  
national courts will have to get accustomed with. Moreover, the more critical and economics- 
averse instances that entail the withdrawal o f a  block exemption have always remained th e
136 Unless the amended Art. 4(2) Reg. 17 applied, again with the limitations described above.
137 See supra.
138 For criticism see among others Venit, supra (1987), pp. 36-37.
139 Commission Regulation 2790/1999 o f 22 December 1999 on the Application o f Article 81(3) o f the  
Treaty to Categories o f  Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, OJ [1999] L 336/21. This Regulation 
replaced exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing, and franchising agreements old block exemptions. It is  
wider in effect but it does not apply to vertical agreements falling under the scope of application technology 
transfers block exemption Regulation. Whether one or the other Regulation applies may sometimes be a fine 
issue, depending more on the economic context of the contractual framework, than on the contract itself. See 
further Subiotto and Amato, “Preliminary Analysis of the Commission’s Reform Concerning Vertical 
Restraints”, 23(2) World Competition 5 (2000), p. 10, fn. 26.
140 These are currently the following: Commission Regulation 2658/2000 o f  29 November 2000 on the  
Application o f  Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to Categories o f Specialisation Agreements, OJ [2000] L 304/7; 
Commission Regulation 2659/2000 o f  29 November 2000 on the Application o f  Article 81(3) o f  the Treaty to  
Categories o f  Research and Development Agreements, OJ [2000] L 304/3; Commission Regulation 1400/2002 
of 31 July 2002 on the Application o f  Article 81(3) o f  the Treaty to Categories o f Vertical Agreements and  
Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector, OJ [2002] L 203/30; Commission Regulation 358/20Ô3 o f  2 7  
February 2003 on the Application o f  Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to Certain Categories o f Agreements, Decisions 
and Concerted Practices in the Insurance Sector, OJ [2003] L 53/8; Commission Regulation 772/2004 o f 2 7  
April 2004 on the Application ofArticle 81(3) o f  the Treatv to Categories o f Technology Transfer Agreements, 
OJ [2004] L 123/11.
141 See Lesguillons, “Retrait du bénéfice de l’application du règlement d’exemption restrictions verticales 
par les autorités compétentes des États-membres”, (1999) RDA1/IBLJ 509, p. 517; idem, “Comment vont 
s’organiser les décisions de retrait d’exemption?”, 4 Contr. & Impr. (Eut.) 592 (1999), p. 602.
142 See, however, Vogelaar, “Modernisation of EC Competition Law, Economy and Horizontal Cooperation 
between Undertakings”, 37 Intereconomics 19 (2002), p. 22. It is noteworthy that some of the opponents o f  
modernisation and of the decentralisation of EC competition law enforcement to the level of courts rcly exactly 
upon the new economic approach o f the new generation regulations, notices and guidelines, in order to stress the 
courts’ inability to deal with such technical issues. See infra.
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prerogative of the Commission and, after the entry into force of the new system of 
enforcement, that of national competition authorities.143
e. The Case of Comfort Letters
One very familiar figure o f the previous administrative authorisation system was the so-called 
comfort letters, which constituted the Commission’s early response to the heavy burden 
resulting from the notification o f thousands of agreements, which made it impossible to issue 
formal exemption or prohibition decisions. These administrative letters indicated whether the 
Commission took a positive or negative view o f a notified agreement, but strictly speaking 
they could not bind national courts. This was certainly a serious weakness, which was 
criticised by the practitioners’ side as a fundamental flaw in the administrative authorisation 
system and its enforcement by the Commission.
Although comfort letters were non-binding as a result o f the fact that they lay outside the 
scope of Regulation 17/1962144 and were usually not published, they nevertheless used to 
offer all the substantive qualities o f  a negative clearance or an individual exemption decision. 
According to the Court of Justice, a comfort letter did not bind a national court, but could be 
taken into account as a factual element.145 This statement, however, requires some further 
exploration. While a comfort letter resembling a  negative clearance could be taken into 
account in a meaningful way by the national courts,146 the same was not true for comfort 
letters resembling an individual exemption, i.e. administrative letters, where the Commission 
stated that the agreement in question seemed to fall under Article 81(1) EC, yet it was likely 
that it would get exempted under Article 81(3) EC. In this specific case it was not evident 
how a national court could take into account such a statement, since it was deprived of the
143 See infra. Even under the old system national competition authorities could withdraw the benefit of Reg. 
2790/1999 in case of vertical agreements.
144 See Waelbroeck, “New Forms of Settlement of Antitrust Cases and Procedural Safeguards: Is Regulation 
17 Falling into Abeyance?” 11 ELRev. 268 (1986), p. 275.
145 Case 31/80, \ T  L ’Oréal and SA L ’Oréal v. P\BA "De Nieuwe A \IC K ’\  |1980] ECR 3775, para. 11; 
case T-241/97, Stork Amsterdam BV  v. Commission, (2000) ECR 11-309, para. 84. Compare also European 
Commission, XXIXth Report on Competition Policy - ¡999 (Brussels/Luxcmbourg, 2000), para. 25. See, 
however, V.C. Korah and D. O'Sullivan, Distribution Agreements under the EC Competition Rules 
(Oxford/Poitland, 2002), p. 74, who suggest that the Delimitis principles on the obligation of national courts to 
avoid conflicting decisions may mean that Commission comfort letters were binding on the former. However, 
this statement is contradicted by the pozi-Delimitis case law of the Court of Justice that confirmed the earlier 
rulings on the non-binding nature of such administrative letters.
146 See Ritter, “Automec II: Ein Beitrag des Gerichtshofs zur Subsidiarität?”, in: Schwerpunkte des 
Kartellrechts ¡991/92, lerwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungspraxis, Referate des 20. FlW-Seminars ¡992 und der 
H. Brüsseler Informationstagung ¡992 (Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, 1993), p. 19.
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competence to apply positively Article 81(3) EC either directly or indirectly.147 The o n ly  
meaningful wav out of this conundrum would have been for the national court to s ta y  
proceedings, in order for the parties to seize the Commission anew and request a fo rm a l 
individual exemption decision.148
Apart from these cases and contrary to formal individual exemption decisions, the national 
courts were always free to depart from the terms of a  comfort letter, i f  the underlying: 
circumstances had changed. In general, national courts, though not formally bound, have in  
the majority of cases paid deference to Commission comfort letters,149 although occasionally 
there have been instances, where national courts did not take into account comfort letters o r  
encountered difficulties in ascertaining their exact meaning and impact on the facts o f th e  
case.150
As with comfort letters, national courts could not be bound by the non-opposition o f th e  
Commission to a notified agreement under the opposition procedure of some of the o ld e r  
generation block exemption regulations and most recently of the previous one on technology 
transfers.151 Such non-opposition of the Commission might have had the function o f  a n
147 See above on the similar discussion with regard to the national courts’ competence to apply Art. 8 1 (3 ) 
EC in a negative or positive way. No problem arose with regard to “discomfort letters” that stated that Art. 8 1 (3 ) 
EC would probably not save the agreement in question. The judge would in such cases negativly apply A rt. 
81(3) EC and declare the agreement’s nullity.
48 See in this sense Siragusa, “Notifications of Agreements in the EEC -  To Notify or not to Notify”, in: 
Hawk (Ed.), United States and Common Market Antitrust Policies 1986, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham  
Corporate Law Institute (New York, 1987), p. 260; Ritter, supra (1993), p. 19; A. Jones and B. Sufrin, E C  
Competition Law, Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford, 2001), p. 966; G. Tritton, R. Davis, M. Edenborough, J. 
Graham, S. Malynicz and A. Roughton, Intellectual Property in Europe (London, 2002), pp. 890, 932; K orah 
and O’Sullivan, supra (2002), p. 75. However, the authors, who accept the possibility for national courts to  
positively apply in an indirect way Art. 81 (3) EC and to enforce a restrictive agreement that would likely receive 
an exemption, accept that the judge should proceed in a similar way in case of a comfort letter. See e.g. Caspar, 
supra (2001), p. 234, fn. 14.
149 See Idot and Van de Walle de Ghelke, supra (2001), p. 181; Favre, supra (2001b), p. 80, with references 
to cases, where French courts have treated comfort letters as presumptions of conformity or non-conformity 
with Community competition law. For a French example see CA Paris, 9-12-92, Ste Michel Swiss v. S td  
Montagne Diffusion, Juris-Data n° 023825, with a comment by Idot, (1993-2) Europe 14. The Commission h as  
also stated that there have not been any decisions by a national authority or court going against a comfort letter 
(see Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EU Competition Policy, COM(96) 721, January 1997, 
para. 190).
1M See e.g. Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd. v. Mason (QB), [1993] 2 CMLR 293. In that case the English court 
ignored the comfort letter that was stating that the notified agreement appeared to fulfill the requirements for a n  
individual exemption, to which the Commission would soon proceed. The court noted that it could, nevertheless, 
not grant such an individual exemption, since this fell under the Commission’s exclusive competence. Instead, it 
opted for closing the discussion by arguing that the defendants had a real prospect of succeeding in their 
contention that part of the agreement was void under Art. 81(2) EC. See further Stevens, “The ‘Comfort Letter’: 
Old Problems, New' Developments”, 15 ECLR 81 (1994), p. 86, and for other examples Mail-Fouilleul, supra 
(2002), p. 53, fn. 334.
151 Art 4 of Commission Regulation 240/1996 o f 31 January 1996 on the Application o f  Article 85(1) o f  the  
Treaty to Certain Categories o f Technology Transfer Agreements, OJ [1996] L 31/2. The Commission had 
recognised that the opposition procedure had not been a success in practice (see para. 90 of the Commission
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exemption, but it lay outside the procedural framework of Regulation 17, and, therefore, 
resembled the comfort letter.152 In such cases the national court could check whether the 
agreement in question fell under Regulation 240/1996 and whether it had been duly notified. 
It could even decide on the legality o f clauses that could not be exempted under Articles 1 
and 2 of that Regulation and that were not mentioned in the “black list” o f Article 3, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Commission had not rejected such notified clauses under the 
opposition procedure. On the other hand, if the Commission rejected the specific clauses, 
then such a decision of the Commission would have been a prohibition decision and, thus, 
national courts would be bound not to contradict it.153
Finally, national courts were and are still not bound by a Commission decision not to 
investigate a complaint. Indeed, the Commission sometimes decides not to go through the 
complaint, exactly because the same facts are before a national court.154 A decision rejecting 
a complaint has the same legal status with comfort letters and does not bind the national 
courts, which, however, may take into account the assessments of the Commission made in 
those decisions as facts,155 On the other hand, if the Commission, as a result of the complaint, 
reaches a formal decision as to the applicability or non-applicability o f an antitrust 
prohibition, then again, following Masterfoods, such a decision should not be contradicted by 
the national courts.
f. Competence of Civil Courts in Merger Cases?
While at first sight the enforcement o f competition law in mergers appears to fall under the 
exclusive competence of the Commission or of the national competition authorities based on 
the “one-stop shop” principle, one cannot exclude that a merger might also be examined by a
Evaluation Report on the Transfer o f  Technology Block exemption Regulation N° 240/96, Doc. 
COMP/REG.240/96).
152 See Siragusa, supra (1987), p. 264 et s e q D. Anagnostopoulou and E. KJeftodimou, Know-how 
Licensing Contracts in Community Law (Athcns/Komolini, 1992) [in Greek], pp. 165-166; Beneyto, supra 
(1994), p. 294.
153 See above. If an agreement had been notified to the Commission under the non-opposition procedure of 
Reg. 240/1996 and the relevant period, in which the Commission had to act, had not yet expired, then the 
national court should have considered staying proceedings until the expiry of that period. See Tritton, Davis, 
Edenborough, Graham, Malynicz and Roughton, supra (2002), p. 935.
154 Thus, in Automec //the complaint to the Commission had been made, while there was a civil case on 
appeal pending before the Italian courts (case T-24/90, op.cit., paras. 3,4, 9,13, 94).
155 Case T-575/93, Casper Koelman v. Commission, [1996] ECR II-l, paras. 41-43, commented by Idot, 
(\996-3) Europe 9, pp. 9-10.
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national court.156 Since the exclusive competence of the administrative authorities is based o n  
Council Regulation 139/2004,157 the direct effect of Articles 81 and 82 EC cannot be set a s id e  
by secondary legislation. y
According to the case law o f the Court o f Justice, national courts are competent to a p p ly  
Articles 81 and 82 EC, even if there is no procedural regulation dealing with th e i r  
implementation. In such a case the legal basis for the application o f these provisions will b e  
Articles 84 and 85 EC.
The Court has, however, made a distinction between Article 81 EC and Article 82 EC.158 T h e  
former provision is different from die latter, because it contains a prohibition and a n  
exception rule, if we accept the correct view that Article 83 EC left it to the Community 
legislator to decide on which system of competition enforcement to opt for, i.e. f o r  
administrative authorisation or for legal exception.159 Article 81(1) EC became directly 
effective only as a result of the adoption o f the implementing legislation of Regulation 
17/1962, which had adopted the prior administrative authorisation system. Then Regulation 
1/2003 de facto extended this direct effect to the third paragraph of that provision by adopting 
the legal exception system. However both the old and the new Merger Regulations expressly 
disapply the implementing Regulations to concentrations as defined therein.160 This m eans 
that, on the one hand, Community dimension mergers fall exclusively within th e  
Commission’s competence under the Merger Regulation, and there can be no role whatsoever 
for national courts, because simply the Commission will have applied that Regulation and n o t 
Article 81 EC.161 On the other hand, national courts will be able to apply Article 81 EC to  
non-Community dimension mergers, as far as these produce inter-state trade effects in th e
156 For the view that Reg. 4064/1989 had not affected the direct effect of Arts. 81 and 82 EC see e g. G. 
Rounis, Competition or Cooperation? The Limits o f  Firms’ Activity within the Community A rea  
(Athens/Komotini, 1992) [ in Greek], p. 252 et seq.\ R. Lane, EC Competition Law (Dorchester, 2000), pp. 273- 
274.
15 Council Regulation 139/2004 o f  20 January 2004 on the Control o f  Concentrations between 
Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ [2004] L 24/1, repealing Council Regulation 40644989 o f  21 
December 1989 on the Control o f  Concentrations between Undertakings, OJ [1989] L 395/1, Corrigendum O J 
[1990] L 257/14, as had been amended by Reg. 1310/1997, OJ [1997] L 180/1, Corrigendum OJ [1998] L 
40/17.
,!8 On Art. 81 EC see case 13/61, Bosch, op.cit., [1962] ECR 45, at 51-52, and cases 209/84 to 214/84, 
Criminal proceedings against Lucas Asjes etal.y [1986] ECR 1425, paras. 58-69. On Art. 82 EC see case 66/86, 
Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro GmbH v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbeverbs 
e l \ [1989] ECR 803, paras. 32-33.
159 See infra on this fundamental question.
lö° See Art. 22(1) Reg. 4064/1989 disapplying Reg. 17 and Art. 21(1) Reg. 139/2004 disapplving Reg. 
1/2003.
101 If the Commission had applied Art. 81 EC, then according to the Bosch principles, the competence o f  
national courts to apply that provision and the Commission’s hypothetical Decision would have been 
“resurrected”.
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sense of Article 81(1) EC.162 The question arises whether it must first be necessary for a 
national competition authority to have already rendered a decision applying that provision to 
the concentration in question, or whether the national court can directly apply Article 81 EC 
as a whole. In our view, since Article 21(1) of the new Merger Regulation provides that it 
will be the only set of rules generally applicable to mergers w ithout making a distinction as to 
Community or non-Community dimension ones,163 it means that the implementing 
Regulations do not apply to any concentration w hatsoever. This resuscitates the enforcement 
procedures o f Articles 84 and 85 EC, as far as sub-threshold mergers are concerned, which 
means that it will be necessary for a national competition authority' to have already applied 
Article 81 EC to a non-Community merger on the basis o f Article 84 EC, before a national 
court can apply the former provision to the facts o f the case in question.164 
Article 82 EC, on the other hand, has always been considered as fully directly applicable by 
national courts, since it is not subject to any conditions and is not capable of exemptions by 
means of a balancing of interests. This cannot be affected by secondary Community 
legislation, such as the Merger Regulation.165 The application of that provision to mergers has 
been recognised in the Court’s Continental Can ruling,166 where it was accepted that the 
Treaty applied to structural abuses through a merger, “if  an undertaking in a dominant 
position strengthens its position in such a way that the degree o f dominance reached 
substantially fetters competition, i.e. that only undertakings remain in the market whose 
behaviour depends on the dominant one”.167 Therefore, Article 82 EC continues being 
applicable by national courts to concentrations that may fall thereunder.168
162 Note the difference of the two criteria, i.e. the Community dimension of the Merger Regulation and the 
inter-state trade effect of Arts. 81 and 82 EC. For the possibility to apply Art. 81 EC to a merger see cases 
142/84 and 156/84, British-American Tobacco Company Ltd, and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc, v. Commission, 
[1987] ECR 4487, paras. 36-39, where the Court confirmed that this provision might apply to the acquisition by 
an undertaking of a minority shareholding in another.
103 Art. 21(1) Reg. 139/2004 refers to the Art. 3 definition of a “concentration”.
164 See the interesting and far-reaching views made by Lane, supra (2000), p. 274. See further Basedow, 
“Gemeinschaflsrechtliche Grenzen der Ministererlaubnis in der Fusionskontrolle: Zum Verhältnis des § 42 
GWB zu den Art. 81 und 82 EG”, 14 EuZW 44 (2003), pp. 49-50.
165 See with respect to Art. 82 EC, Esteva Mosso and Ryan, “Article 82: Abuse of a Dominant Position”, in: 
Faull & Nikpay (Eds.), The EC Law o f Competition (Oxford, 1999), p. 187, fn. 232.
166 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission, [1972] 
ECR 215, paras. 20-26.
107 However, Art. 82 EC cannot apply to situations, where a merger creates - and not just strengthens - a 
dominant position (case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, [1999] ECR 11-753, para. 155). See further on this 
issue Esteva Mosso and Ryan, supra (1999), pp. 186-187.
168 See Bourgeois and Langeheine, “Jurisdictional Issues: EEC Merger Regulation - Member State Laws 
and Articles 85-86”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Mergers and Joint Ventures 1990, Annual Proceedings o f the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York/ London, 1991), p. 607; Bernini, “Jurisdictional Issues: EEC 
Merger Regulation - Member State Laws and Articles 85-86”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Mergers and Joint
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National courts may, in addition, deal with the civil consequences of the prohibition o f  a  
merger. Likewise, they may deal with the civil consequences of a merger that has been p u t  
into effect without having been notified to the Commission or before having been declared  
compatible with the common market by a Commission decision. According to Article 7(1) o f  
the Merger Regulation such transactions must be suspended until the Commission e i th e r  
clears the merger pursuant to Articles 6(l)(b), 8(1) or 8(2), or fails to take a  decision w ith in  
the deadlines prescribed by Article 10. If during this period the concentration goes on, th e n  
the validity of all relevant agreements that pertain to the merger will be conditional upon th e  
prohibition or clearance o f  the merger by the Commission. In the first of these tw o  
hypotheses these contracts will be null. The nullity' involved and other civil consequences 
will be governed by national law.169 The breach of a condition to which an authorisation 
decision is subject, is similar to the situation above.170
2, The Advent of M odernisation and the Passage to a Legal Exception System 
a. The 1999 White Paper and the Reasons tha t Lay behind it
At the end of April 1999, the Commission embarked on its most important policy change in  
EC competition law enforcement for the last 40 years by publishing its White Paper on th e  
modernisation of die EC competition law procedural framework.171 This was the first episode 
in a saga that was certain to lead to a “legal and cultural revolution” in EC antitrust.172 T h e
Ventures 1990, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York/ London, 1991), p p . 
623-624.
169 See Liakopoulos, supra (2000), p. 576; Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, supra (2000), pp. 519-520, 5 2 7 ; 
Bos and Struijlaart, “The Netherlands“, in: Maitland-Walker (Ed.), Competition Laws o f  Europe (London, 
2003), p. 336, fn. 1. Compare the Global One case in Germany: OLG Düsseldorf, 16-6-98, B ritish  
Telecommunications and MAG Interkom v. Deutsche Telekom and ATLAS Deutschland, op.cit., 48 W uW  
(1998) 713. In that case the national court awarded damages for breach of Art. 81(1) EC, because parties h a d  
enforced their agreement before the conditions in the Commission exemption had been fulfilled.
170 Though not the breach of an obligation, which has only consequences of administrative nature. On th e  
difference between conditions and obligations and on the legal consequences of their breach, see below.
171 Commission White Paper o f  28 April 1999 on Modernisation o f the Rules Implementing Articles 85 a n d  
86 o f  the EC Treaty1, Commission Programme No 99/027, COM(1999) 101 final, OJ [1999] C 132/1.
172 See Ehlermann, supra (2000a), p. 537 et seq.\ Nivarra, “II ‘Iibro bianco sulla modemizzazione d e lle  
norme per Tapplicazione degli articoli 85 e 86 del Trattato CE’: Quale future per il diritto europeo d e lla  
concorrenza?”, 3 Eur. & Dir.Priv. 1001 (2000), p. 1009; former Commissioner Monti, “The EU Gets N e w  
Competition Powers for the 21st Century“, in: Competition Policy Newsletter, Special Edition 2004, p. 1. For a  
retrospective see also Venit, supra (2003), p. 545 etseq.; Bloom, “The Great Reformer Mario Monti's Legacy 
in Article 81 and Cartel Policy”, 1 Competition Policy International 55 (2005), p. 56 et seq. There has been a n  
abundant literature that dealt with most aspects o f  modernisation. Among others see in particular th e  
contributions by various authors in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: 
The Modernisation o f EU Competition Law (Oxford, 2001), as well as those in: Hawk (Ed ), International
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White Paper set out to propose a  system of antitrust enforcement in the EU for the 21" 
century, thus marking the end o f the “venerable” Regulation 17/1962.173 which, as has rightly 
been pointed out, had existed for so long that it was almost impossible to imagine any other 
state of affairs.174 The basic parameters of this proposed system were the abolition of 
notification and exemption procedures, and the decentralisation o f EC competition 
enforcement by making Article 81(3) EC directly applicable by national competition 
authorities and national courts. Such decentralisation would extend the possible enforcers of 
EC competition law, while relieving the Commission o f most of the bureaucracy involved in 
the current system and allowing it to concentrate on the most serious infringements of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC.175
The Commission's modernisation plans startled observers o f competition law enforcement in 
Europe, since until very recently it had adamantly defended its Article 81(3) EC exemption 
monopoly, and had praised the benefits of the exemption monopoly and notification system 
as late as in 1995 and 1996.176 While, the notification and administrative authorisation system
Antitrust Law and Policy 1999, Annual Proceedings o f the Fonlham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 
2000), and in: Rivas & Horspool (Eds.), Modernisation and Decentralisation o f EC Competition Law (The 
Hague/London/Boston, 2000). See also Beilis, “Le ‘Livre blanc’ sur la modernisation des règles d’application 
des articles 81 et 82 du Traité CE: Un pas décisif vers le démantèlement d’un particularisme européen”, 8 JdT 
(Eut.) 129 (2000); Paulweber, supra (2000), p. 3 et s e q Weyer, “Nach der Reform: Gestaltung der 
Wettbewerbspolitik durch die Kommission?: Zur Anwendung des Art. 81 EGV durch Kommission, nationale 
Gerichte und EuGH in einem System der gesetzlichen Ausnahme”, 164 ZUR 611 (2000).
173 The Commission had always been reluctant to consider amending Reg, 17, because it feared opening a 
“Pandora's Box”. The basic fear was that the Council might be tempted to weaken the Commission's ability to 
enforce the antitrust laws through uninvited amendments. See e.g. McCullough, “The Continuing Search for 
Greater Certainty: Suggestions for Improving US and EEC Antitrust Clearance Procedures”, 6 Nw.Jlnt’lL & 
Bus. 803 (1984), p. 886. For a retrospective analysis of Regulation 17 from a historical perspective see 
Ilambloch, “Die Entstehung der Verordnung 17 von 1962 im Rahmen der EWG-Wettbewerbspolitik”, 37 EuR 
877 (2002).
114 See Doherty, “Community Exemptions in National Law”, 15 ECLR 315 (1994). See also the views of 
the then Director General Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, “Developments in Community Competition Law 
Procedures”, 1(1) EC Competition Policy' Newsletter! (1994), who stressed: “Regulation N° 17 contains all the 
basic procedural rules for Community competition policy. If and when it is revised, it will only be revised once 
for the foreseeable future”. He took the view that the time for a general amendment of Reg. 17 had not yet 
come. See further Ehlermann, “1st die Veromung Nr. 17 noch zeitgemäß?”, 43 WuW 997 (1993); idem, 
“Community Competition Lawr Procedures”, in Slynn & Pappas (Eds,), Procedural Aspects o f EC Competition 
Law (Maastricht, 1995), p, 10.
175 See e.g. Rocca, “L'Europa della concorrenza di fronte alle sfide del nuovo millennio: Le riforme 
necessarie in materia antitrust”, in: Raffaelli (Ed.), Antitrust between EC Law and National Law, Treviso 13-14 
May 1999 (Bruxclles/Milano, 2000), p. 49.
170 See Van Miert, “Sviluppi e prospettive dell’applicazione decentrata del diritto della concorrenza 
europeo”, in: Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato (Ed.), La tutela della concorrenza: Regole, 
istituzioni e rapporti intemazionali (Roma, 1995), pp. 141 et seq. Four years before the publication o f the White 
Paper the then Commissioner argued that the conditions were not yet ripe for an elimination of the notification 
system; national competition authorities had not yet acquired sufficient experience, national competition laws 
were not sufficiently harmonised, and national “exemption decisions” would have to be horizontally recognised 
throughout Europe, which was politically difficult. Compare also the Commission’s Green Paper on Vertical 
Restraints in EU Competition Policy>, COM(96) 721, January' 1997, para. 28: “The notification system has been 
successful in providing the Commission with information about the many types of vertical arrangements. It
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produced serious discontent,177 especially because it stood in the way o f  a more econom ic- 
based approach, particularly in the vertical agreements area,178 the conventional wisdom u n til 
1999 was that the Commission would not really take the initiative to abandon that system. In  
fact the Commission seems to have started to debate internally the possibility' o f introducing a  
legal exception in 1997, immediately after the publication of the Green Paper on vertical 
agreements and its lukewarm reception by most commentators.179
Indeed, the treatment of vertical agreements under a more economic-based approach is  
inextricably connected with the modernisation drive.180 This problem had always b een  
particularly representative o f the EC competition law system's cardinal weakness, th e  
bifurcation between the first and third paragraphs o f Article 81 EC. The broad way in w h ich  
the Commission applied Article 81(1) EC to every' agreement that restricted commercial 
freedom, and the legalistic approach it followed when applying both the first and the th ird  
paragraphs of Article 81 EC, were seen as - intentionally or unintentionally - inherent 
features of the ancien régime. While the theory of ordoliberalism offers a partial explanation, 
it was also commonplace to explain the very broad interpretation o f competition restrictions 
under Article 81(1) EC in terms of the Commission’s exemption monopoly. According to th is  
line of thinking, the Commission’s central role in EC competition enforcement, coupled w ith  
its monopoly to enforce Article 81(3) EC, and the need for uniform application of Article 81
provided the basic material for the Commission to decide on the need for and scope of block exemptions. These 
block exemptions provide basic legal certainty for the vast bulk o f  vertical agreements in the EU as well as the  
advantages of a one-stop-shop. Comfort letters have successfully dealt with any mass problem for cases no t 
already covered by block exemptions.” It is also interesting to read para. 185 of the Green Paper. “The 
notification system provides lite Commission with a steady source of information about transactions, including 
vertical agreements. A substantial portion of the Commission’s decisions are triggered by notifications. T his 
indicates that many contractual provisions deserving careful scrutiny have been brought to the Commission's 
attention through notifications. They also provide the basic material for the Commission to determine the  
necessity and scope of block exemptions.”
177 See e.g. Siragusa, “Rethinking Article 85: Problems and Challenges in the Design and Enforcement o f  
the EC Competition Rules”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 1997, Annual Proceedings 
o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New Yoik, 1998), p. 273 et seq.
178 See e g. Whish, “Panel Three Discussion: Future Competition Law”, in: Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 1997: The Objectives o f Competition Policy (Oxford, 1998), p. 461.
79 Hie 1997 Florence workshop gave the first indications that “Brussels wras up to something new”. See, in  
particular, Schaub, “Panel Three Discussion: Future Competition Law”, in: Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 1997: The Objectives o f Competition Policy (Oxford, 1998), p. 474; Faull, 
“Panel Three Discussion: Future Competition Law”, in: Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds ), European Competition 
Law Annual 1997: The Objectives o f  Competition Policy (Oxford, 1998), p. 488.
180 See also in this direction Gentile, “La svolta di inizio millennio del diritto comunitario della concorrenza 
: Il nuovo approccio economico, la semplificazione delle norme, la cooperazione intemazionale e la modifica 
del Regolamento 17/62”, 5 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 557 (2000), p. 574. It is not by chance that the Former Director 
General Ehlermann was already considering in 1995 the possibility to decentralise the application of Art. 81(3) 
EC with reference to vertical agreements not only to NCAs but also to national courts; see Ehleimann, “B 
dibattito sulla sussidiarietà nel diritto della concorrenza”, in: Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato 
(Ed.), La tutela della concorrenza: Regole, istituzioni e rapporti intemazionali (Roma, 1995), p. 19.
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EC in all Member States required giving a broad interpretation to the first paragraph of 
Article 81 EC, thus ensuring that the decision as to whether a given restriction was to be 
accepted, is taken in a uniform manner by the Commission.181
This explains the Commission's hesitations over the introduction of a more economic 
approach or a “rule of reason” in Article 81(1) EC (as opposed to Article 81(3)), since the 
“rule of reason” would have led to an indirect transfer o f competences from the Commission 
to national competition authorities and courts.182 It was also feared that this might lead to the 
re-nationalisation of competition enforcement in Europe, since agreements benefiting from a 
“rule of reason” would be granted a negative clearance under Article 81 (1) EC rather than an 
exemption under 81(3) EC, thus inviting the application of stricter national competition 
law.183 It seems the Commission thought that the passage from a legalistic to a more 
economic approach necessitated a radical overhaul of the procedural rules, moving from 
notification and exemption to a system of legal exception and self-assessment.
It should be stressed that the objective of modernisation was not merely to decentralise the 
enforcement of Article 81(3) EC as such to national competition authorities (NCAs) or 
courts, in the sense that these would authorise restrictive agreements as the Commission had 
previously done. The reforms went much further: they abolish the authorisation system 
altogether, thus making Article 81 EC a unitary norm, applicable as a whole by the same 
enforcer or in the same forum. The decision to adopt a more radical approach, instead of 
merely decentralising the administrative authorisation system to NCA level, may also be the 
result o f the problems posed by the principle of territoriality governing the effects o f national 
authorities’ decisions. It was considered not feasible politically to establish a system which 
would give Europe-wide effect to exemptions granted nationally, so the only option was to 
abolish the administrative authorisation system altogether.184 In addition, the Commission
181 See e g. Van Houtte, “A Standard of Reason in EEC Antitrust Law: Some Comments on the Application 
of Parts 1 and 3 of Article 85”, 4 Nw.JInt’lL & Bus. 497 (1982-1983), p. 509; McCullough, supra (1984), p. 
892; Waclbroeck, “Antitrust Analysis under Article 85(1) and Article 85(3)”, in: Hawk (Ed.), North American 
and Common Market Antitrust and Trade Laws 1987, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordltam Corporate Law 
Institute (New York, 1988), pp. 693, 696; Todino, “Le norme comunitarie di concorrenza nei poteri 
dell’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato”, 12 Dir.Comm.Int. 751 (1998), p. 753; Vetouden, 
“Vertical Agreements and Artide 81(3) EC: The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis”, 71 Antitrust LJ 525 
(2003), p. 532 et seq.
182 See e.g. I.E. Soufleros, Franchising Contracts in Greek Law and in Community Competition Law 
(Athcns/Komotini, 1989) [in Greek], p. 232 et seq:, D’Attorre, “Una ‘ragionevole’ concorrenza: D ruolo della 
‘rule of reason’ dopo la riforma del diritto antitrust comunitario”, 31 Giurispr.Comm. 1-80 (2004), p. 1-92 et seq.
183 See Soufleros, supra (1989), pp. 234-235. Negative clearances were of merely declaratory nature and 
had not been interpreted to constitute “positive measures” in the Walt Wilhem sense. See below.
184 See Paulis, “Panel Three Discussion: Decentralisation of Enforcement of Community Law”, in: 
Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds ), European Competition Law Annual 1996 (The Hague/Boston/London, 1997), p.
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was hesitant to decentralise such an important tool of competition policy-making, as the 
individual exemption decision was, since that might lead to NCAs following erratic 
approaches thus leading to a re-nationalisation of competition law enforcement. It was 
therefore felt better to abolish the exemption system altogether.
Another parameter that may explain the Commission's rather sudden change o f heart is 
“institutional-political”. During the years preceding the publication o f the White Paper, the 
Commission and the then DG-IV in particular, had to deal with a serious threat, namely the 
German-sponsored proposal to establish a  European Cartel Office independent o f the 
Commission.185 It is true that the proposal failed in the course of the negotiations leading to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, but meanwhile it had aroused defensive sentiments in Brussels. 
From this perspective, the White Paper and the modernisation initiative can be seen as an 
attempt by the Commission to regain the initiative and continue playing the guiding role in 
competition law developments in Europe.
b. Modernisation and Decentralisation between Substance and Procedure
The projected reforms were known as the modernisation of EC competition law, At this 
point, some caution is called for; it is more correct to speak o f the modernisation of EC 
competition enforcement, rather than law. Indeed, it was not the direct aim of the White Paper 
or of Regulation 1/2003 to affect substantive competition law as such. Furthermore, if 
reference is made to the modernisation of EC competition law as a whole, then it is clear that 
the reform of the old Regulation 17 is only a part of a much more ambitious agenda which 
has been pursued ever since the Commission published its Green Paper on vertical restraints, 
followed by the vertical agreements block exemption Regulation. The Commission has also 
published other “new generation” block exemptions, following a more economic approach 
and using market shares, a new de minimis Notice, a reformed Leniency Notice and 
Guidelines on horizontal and vertical restraints. Last but not least, the Council recently
100, speaking before the White Paper, but certainly indicating that the Commission was slowly starting to think 
about adopting the system of legal exception.
185 On this, now obsolete, debate, see Ehlermann, “Reflections on a European Cartel Office”, 32 CMLRev. 
471 (1995); idem, “Decision Making at the Centre * Working Paper II”, in: Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 1996 (The Hague/Boston/London, 1997), p. 36 et seq.\ Auteri, “Il dibattito 
su una Autorità antitrust europea”, 2 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 518 (1997): Carbone and Munari, “Commissione 
Europa o Autorità indipendente per l’applicazione delle nonne comunitarie antitrust?”, 2 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 
533 (1997); Moavero Milanesi, “Spunti intorno all’idea di un’autorità indipendente comunitaria per la tutela 
della concorrenza”, 2 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 543 (1997); Rocca, ‘Concorrenza: Ipotesi di creazione di 
un’autorità comunitaria indipendente”, 2 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 549 (1997).
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adopted a new Merger Regulation, following the publication by the Commission of a Green 
Paper.
Admittedly, however, substance and procedure have been intermingled in EC competition 
law from the outset, with the result that procedural matters have a direct bearing on substance 
and vice versa.186 As described above, one of the main reasons for the Commission's broad 
reading of Article 81(1) EC was precisely its exemption monopoly under Article 81(3) EC. 
By the same token, abolishing the notification and prior authorisation system would possibly 
also have a certain impact on the substance o f EC competition law. The first signs are that the 
area of that impact might well be the substantive relationship between the first and third 
paragraphs of Article 81 EC.
With Article 81 EC being enforced as a unitary norm by Community and national enforcers 
alike, one might argue that any debate as to the bifurcation of antitrust analysis under the first 
and third paragraphs of Article 81 EC would have only theoretical importance. It might even 
be submitted that it will no longer matter if  Article 81(1) EC is interpreted in such a way that 
it catches almost all agreements restricting economic freedom without any economic analysis 
at all, since such an analysis of pro- and anti-competitive effects will follow immediately 
under Article 81(3) EC, which will now be applied by the same enforcer and in the same 
forum.187 Alternatively, Article 81(1) might be applied in such a way as to take all 
efficiencies and other pro-compctitive qualities of an otherwise restrictive agreement into 
account already at this stage, thus rendering Article 81(3) EC superfluous.188 
Such a simplistic approach, however, ought to be resisted. One question of the utmost 
practical importance is the burden of proof: while in Article 81(1) EC it is borne by the 
Commission, in Article 81(3) EC it is borne by the undertakings.189 If Article 81(1) were to
186 See e g. Gerber, supra (1998), p. 334 et seq.\ Garcia Cachafeiro, “El giro noiteamericano del derccho 
antitrust comunitario: El aiticulo 1 de la Sherman Act”, 256 Revista de Derecho Mercantil 597 (2005), p. 603.
187 This seems to be the position of V.C. Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and 
Practice (Oxford/ Portland, 2000), pp. 189, 361; Gavalda and Parleani, supra (2002), pp. 333-334, 359; A. 
Albors-Llorens, EC Competition Law and Policy (Cullompton/Portland, 2002), p. 72; Korah and O'Sullivan, 
supra (2002), p. 120; Gyselen, “The Substantive Legality Test under Article 81-3 EC Treaty - Revisited in Light 
of the Commission’s Modernization Initiative”, in: Von Bogdandy, Mavroidis & Menv (Eds.), European 
Integration and International Co-ordination, Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour o f Claus- 
Dieter Ehlermann (The Hague/London/New York, 2002), p. 197; Goyder, supra (2003), pp. 94-95; Venit, supra 
(2003), p. 577. See also Alexiadis and Sullivan, “Vertical Restraints: New Directions in EU Policy”, in: The 
European Antitrust Review 2004, Global Competition Review Special Report (London, 2003), p. 69. It is 
interesting to note that the legal exception system in French competition law resulted in a certain attenuation of 
the prohibition-exemption dichotomy, with the equivalent of Art. 81(3) EC being rarely applied or invoked, 
while the French competition authority has followed a more global approach based on the rule of reason.
188 See Toffoletti, "Riforma del diritto antitrust comunitario: Giudizio di esenzione e diritti dei singoli”, 29 
Giurisprudenza Commerciale 417/1 (2002), p. 430/1.
189 See now Art. 2 Reg. 1/2003.
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be given an unqualified meaning, the burden of proof would fall entirely on the parties to the 
agreement, which would have to prove its pro-competitive effect and its other economic 
countervailing qualities. On the other hand, if  almost all balancing were to take place in 
Article 81(1) EC, the Commission would be inappropriately burdened. Thus the current 
division between the two paragraphs reflects a fine balance and apportionment o f the burden 
of proof which it would be unwise to tilt.
In addition, as rightly pointed out, the Treaty itself requires a two-stage reasoning under the 
two paragraphs.190 More importantly, if  Article 81(1) EC is given too broad a meaning and all 
economic analysis is conducted only under Article 81(3) EC, there is a risk that the objective 
and the function of Article 81 EC as a whole will be compromised, since potentially idle 
agreements, which would have escaped the application o f Article 81(1) EC, if  a narrower 
meaning were adopted, might not satisfy the two positive and two negative cumulative 
conditions o f Article 81(3) EC, and end up being prohibited.191 While Article 81(3) EC 
corresponds in large measure to the US ‘'rule o f reason”, it is a not very flexible norm. It docs 
not allow for a  full benefit but only for a surplus to consumers whereby at least some part of 
the cost savings must be passed on to the consumers. Thus the effect of the second negative 
requirement for an agreement not to eliminate competition is that an agreement which creates 
a monopoly will be prohibited, even if the monopoly is socially desirable because it leads to 
efficiencies.192 It should therefore not be excluded that certain agreements which promote 
competition or efficiency may escape Article 81 ( 1 ) EC altogether under a reasonableness test, 
thus being spared the more inflexible competition analysis of Article 81(3) EC.
The reform should therefore not affect the analysis mechanism under Article 81 EC. Perhaps 
having the modernisation discussions then taking place in mind, the Court o f First Instance 
gave an important ruling in 2001 that clarified the distinction between the first and third 
paragraphs o f Article 81 EC. In Métropole Télévision, the CFI, though admitting that an 
economic-based approach is to a certain degree called for under Article 81(1) EC, took the 
view that the balancing of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects, along with the full
190 See Idot, “A French Point of View on the Radical Decentralisation of the Implementation of Article 
81(1) and (3)”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation 
o f EU Competition Law (Oxford, 2001 ), p. 336.
191 See Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: Unspoken 
Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options”, 20 ECLR 420 (1999), p. 423; D.N. 
Tzouganatos, Exclusive and Selective Distribution Agreements in Free and Unfair Competition Law (Athens, 
2001) [in Greek], pp. 171-172. See also Veroudcn, supra (2002), p. 573, who refers particularly to vertical 
agreements, w'hich normally lead to at least some efficiency benefits.
192 See further on this GilTord and Kudrle, “European Union Competition Law and Policy : I low Much 
Latitude for Convergence with the United States?”, 48 Antitrust Bull. 727 (2003), pp. 772 et seq.
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examination of the economic efficiencies accruing from an agreement, should only take place 
under Article 81(3) EC, as the only provision that could accommodate a "rule of reason” 
test.193 The CFI admitted that Article 81(1) EC was not an inflexible rule, and in fact the 
Court of Justice's case law has long made it clear that an agreement must be examined in its 
legal and economic context, which already entails the need for a certain degree of economic 
analysis at that stage.194 However, according to the CFI, this economic analysis should be 
seen more in the context of “reasonableness” rather than as a full-fledged balancing of pro- 
and anti-competitive effects. That balancing, together with the full examination o f the 
economic efficiencies accruing from an agreement takes place only in the third paragraph of 
Article 81 EC. This lends full support to the Commission's objectives, especially in view of 
the abolition of the Commission exemption monopoly, and this approach was indeed 
followed in the Commission Notice on Article 81(3) EC, which is one of the soft law 
instruments accompanying the new enforcement Regulation.195
c. The “Legal and Cultural Revolution” of the 1999 White Paper
aa. Is Subsidiarity Relevant?
Decentralisation of Community competition law enforcement did not start with the 
Commission’s recent modernisation initiative. The Commission had already published two 
Notices in the 1990's, one on co-operation with national courts in 1993196 and another on co-
|lJ3 Case T-l 12/99, Métropole Télévision (M6) et al. v. Commission, [2001] ECR 11-2459, paras. 72-77. 
Compare also case T-328/03, 02 (Germany) GmbH Co. OIIG v. Commission, [2006] ECR II-, para. 69. 
Some commentators had argued long ago that Art. 81( 1 ) EC in any case could not accommodate a rule of reason 
approach. See e g. Whish and Sufrin, “Article 85 and the Rule of Reason“, 7 YEL 1 (1987), p. 23.
!°J Also under the Art. 81(1) EC assessment of agreements falls the application of the ancillary restraints 
concept, w hich covers restrictions of competition that are directly related, necessary and proportionate to the 
implementation of a main non-restrictive transaction (see paras. 28-29 of the Commission's Notice on Art, 81(3) 
EC, cited below), On the Art. 81(1) EC case law see in general Korah and O'Sullivan, supra (2002), p. 80 et 
seq.
m  Compare in this respect para. 57 of the White Paper and para. 11 of the recent Notice on Art. 81(3) EC, 
which are in full accordance with the CFI's position. See further Vogelaar, supra (2002), p. 21; D. Hildebrand, 
Economic Analyses o f  Vertical Agreements -  A Se lf Assessment (The Hague, 2005), pp. 25, 45-47. On the 
question whether Art. 81(3) EC would allow the taking into account of non-competition concerns based on the 
public interest see Komninos, “Resolution of Conflicts in the Integrated Article 81 EC“, in: Ehlermann & 
Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2004, The Relationship Between Competition Law and the 
(Liberal) Professions (Oxford/Portland, 2006), p. 451 et seq.
100 Commission Notice on Cooperation betw een National Courts anti the Commission in Applying Articles 
85 and 86 o f the EEC Treaty, OJ [1993] C 39/5. The Notice came in the aftermath of the Delimitis and Au tome c 
II judgments by the ECJ and of the CFI respectively. See Ehlermann, “Anwendung des 
Gemcinschaftskartellrechts durch Behörden und Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten“, in: Randelzhofer, Scholz & 
Wilke (Eds.), Gedächttüsschrift für Eberhard Grabitz (München, 1995), pp. 50-51.
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operation with national competition authorities in 1997,197 which indicated an intention to 
move from centralised to decentralised enforcement o f the Treaty competition rules. Such 
decentralisation gradually became possible, because the raison d 'être o f centralisation, the 
uniform application of EC competition law in the common market, was no longer an 
imperative objective for the Community and for the Commission in particular.198 Member 
States’ adoption o f competition laws, most of which replicate the Treaty rules,199 the 
attainment of a satisfactory degree of “competition culture” in Europe200 and an increasing 
sensitivity with regard to the principle o f  subsidiarity, all help to explain this shift in the 
dominant approach. However, these instruments were meant to function under the previous 
system of enforcement, established by Regulation 17/1962.
At this point an important clarification is needed. While many commentators view the 
decentralisation o f EC competition law enforcement as a whole in light of the principle of 
subsidiarity,201 which is also a principle o f primary Community law (Article 5(2) EC), we
197 Commission Notice on Cooperation between National Competition Authorities and the Commission in 
Handling Cases Falling within the Scope o f Articles 85 or 86 o f the EC Treaty, OJ [1997] C 3 13/3. That Notice 
was the result of a long process starting in 1993 with the creation o f a Working Group composed by 
representatives of the Commission and of national competition authorities with the task to make proposals for a 
more effective application of Arts. 81 and 82 EC by these authorities. The Working Group produced a report, 
known as the Dubois Report, which formed the basis of a draft notice published in OJ [1996] C 262/7. See 
further Gaeta, “La comunicazione sulla cooperazione tra la Commissione europea e le autorità antitrust 
nazionali7’, 38 Riv.Dir.Eur. 563 (1998), p, 569 et seq.
198 Or, at least less extreme measures - than absolute centralisation - were now thought to be suitable in 
order to attain this objective.
199 It is interesting to note that already before Reg. 1/2003 came into force, some of these newly introduced 
national competition laws contained convergence clauses that made clear that the application of national law 
should be compatible with the application of Community law' by the Commission and by the European Courts. 
This is the case of s. 60 of the UK Competition Act 1998 (see Middleton, “Harmonisation with Community 
Law: The Euro Clause”, in: Rodger & MacCulloch (Eds.), The UK Competition Act, A New Era fo r  UK 
Competition Law (Oxford/Portland, 2000)) and Art. 1(4) of the Italian Competition Act (see Munari, “La legge 
10 ottobre 1990 n. 287 e il diritto comunitario della concorrenza”, 8 Contr. & Impr. 602 (1992), p. 625 et seq.). 
Compare now also s. 23 of the newly amended German Competition Act (7. GWB Novelle). That significant 
regard should be given to the application of EC competition law is also stressed in the Explanatory 
Memorandum preceding the Greek Competition Act (L. 703/1977) and in the parliamentary debates leading to 
the adoption of the old Belgian Act o f 5 August 1991 on the Protection of Economic Competition (see Platteau, 
“Competition Law in Belgium”, in: Vogelaar, Stuyck & Reeken (Eds.), Competition Law in the EU, its Member 
States and Switzerland, Voi. I, EC, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland 
(The Hague/Deventer, 2000), p. 499). Reference is also made to the Explanatory Memorandum of the Dutch 
Competition Act of 1997, which assumes that Dutch competition law should be neither stricter nor more lenient 
than the EC competition rules (see Van Reeken and Noe, “Competition Law in The Netherlands”, in: Vogelaar, 
Stuyck &. Reeken (Eds.), Competition Law in the EU, its Member States and Switzerland, Voi. I, EC, France, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland (The Hague/Deventer, 2000), p. 429).
200 On the attainment of a “competition culture” in Europe, see e.g. Tesauro, “The Relationship between the 
European Commission and the Competition Authorities of the EC Member Countries”, in: Baudenbacher (Ed.), 
Neueste Entwicklungen im europäischen und internationalen Kartellrecht, Sechstes St. Galler internationales 
Kartellrechtsforum 1999 (Basel/Genf/Milnchen, 2000), p. 156; Tizzano, “Intervento”, in: Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato (Ed.), Concorrenza e autorità antitrust, Un bilancio a IO anni dalla Legge, Atti del 
convegno Roma 9-10 ottobre 2000 (Roma, 2001 ), p. 209.
201 See e.g. Ritter, supra (1993), pp. 17-18; Di Via, “L’applicazione del principio di sussidiarietà nel diritto 
della concorrenza italiano e comunitario”, 1 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 71 (1996), p. 76; Hinton, “European
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prefer to avoid speaking about subsidiarity in this context, for two main reasons. Firstly, in its 
strictly legislative sense subsidian tv docs not apply to the EC competition mies at all, since 
they concern a matter for which the Community has exclusive competence when the inter­
state trade effect criterion is satisfied,202 According to Advocate General Jacobs’s Opinion in 
Tremblay, "where Community competition law is applied by national authorities it is clearly 
not a case of subsidiarity in the sense that the national authorities apply national law”.203 A 
second point to be made is that decentralisation is connected solely with "practicality and 
efficiency” and thus its aim is rather different from that of subsidiarity.204 In addition, 
decentralisation as such implies a delegation of competences from the ccntral-Community to 
the national level. This means that the organ delegating its competences reserves the power to 
revoke them in appropriate cases.205 *On the other hand, subsidiarity in the sense of Article 
5(2) EC refers to the allocation o f competences between Community and national organs, 
w hich is defined pursuant to criteria contained in that Treaty provision itself and operates in
an objective and automatic way without any "concession” made by the one or the other
206organ.
Community Competition Law, Subsidiarity , and the National Courts”, 11 BYU JPub.L 301 (1997), pp. 311-312; 
Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, supra (2000), p. 66; Savy, “La leale cooperazione nella disciplina antitrust e nel 
nuovo  ̂Regolamento CE n. 1/2003 del Consiglio”, 5 Dir.Pubbl.Comp.Eur. 913 (2003), pp. 914-915.
202 See e g. Stuyck, “Competition Law in the EC and in the Member States”, in: Due, Lutter & Schwarze 
(Eds.), Festschrift fiir Ulrich Everling, Vol. II (Baden-Baden, 1995), p. 1515; Temple Lang, “Rapport general”, 
in: .VI ’III congrès FIDE (Stockholm, 3-6 juin 1998), Vol. II, Application nationale du droit européen de la 
concurrence (Stockholm, 1999), p. 280; E. Putman, Contentieux économique (Paris, 1998), p. 386; Idol, in: 
(2001-7/8) Rev.Conc.Consomin. 24.
203 Case C-91/95, Roger Tremblay, Harry Kestenberg and Syndicat des Exploitants de Lieux de loisirs 
(SELL) v. Commission, (1996] ECR 1-5547. The AG thought it “more appropriate to refer to decentralization 
rather than subsidiarity”, though he recognised that “in practice however the distinction may be less clear, since 
national authorities may be applying both Community and national competition rules” (para. 20 of the Opinion).
2W See Louis, “Ensuring Compliance and Implementation by Member States”, in: Buxbaum, Hertig et al. 
(Eds.), European Economic and Business Law, Legal anti Economic Analyses on Integration and 
Harmonization (Berlin/New York, 1996), p. 49.
203 Ibis is exactly the case under the new Regulation, according to which (Art. 11(6)) the Commission can 
al wavs initiate proceedings, thus relieving NCAs o f their competence. See infra.
ÎOd See Tizzano, “L'applicazione decentrata degli articoli 85 e 86 del Trattato CE in Italia”, in: Autorità 
garante della concorrenza e del mercato (Ed.), La tutela della concorrenza: Regole, istituzioni e rapporti 
intemazionali (Roma, 1995), p. 116; Mavroidis and Neven, “The White Paper: A Whiter Shade of Pale of 
Interests, and Interests”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), pp. 208, 210-211. See also Rodger, 
“Interrelationship with Community Competition Law Enforcement”, in: Rodger & MacCulloch (Eds ), The UK 
Competition Act, A New Era for UK Competition Law (Oxford/Portland, 2000), p. 68, who clearly distinguishes 
between decentralisation and subsidiarity and would have preferred a system based on subsidiarity that would 
have allowed for greater scope to national competition law s.
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The term “subsidiarity” can therefore only be used in a general and non-technical sense,207 
and Commission references to that principle should only be viewed in that sense, although it 
is difficult to detect coherence in Commission officials’ views as to this issue. Indeed, the 
Commission recently seems to have preferred to speak of “bringing the application of 
Community competition rales closer to citizens and undertakings” (Biirgernâh)20* This 
objective is also enshrined in Article 1(2) TEU, which refers to decisions taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen.209 In that sense the aims of the decentralisation of EC competition 
enforcement are quite similar to the aims behind subsidiarity,210 although technically 
speaking, Article 5(2) EC does not apply to EC competition law enforcement as such.211
bb. The Compatibility of the New System with the Treaty
After this excursus, some explanation should be given as to the White Paper's revolutionary 
qualities. These derive from its advocacy o f what was previously unthinkable: passing from a 
system of administrative prior authorisation to one of legal exception.212 In an administrative 
authorisation system the basic prohibition of Article 81(1) EC can be lifted only by the act of 
a public authority, which is constitutive in nature. In a legal exception system, on the other
207 See Ti2 zano, supra (1995), p. 115; Canenbley, “Decentralisation of Enforcement of Community Law - 
Working Paper IV”, in: Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 1996 (The 
Hague/Boston/London, 1997), p. 146; Kunzlik, “Globalization and Hybridization in Antitrust Enforcement: 
European ‘Borrowings’ from the US Approach”, 48 Antitrust Bull. 319 (2003), pp. 328-329. See Idot, “Lcs 
regies applicables aux entreprises”, 8 RAE/LEA (1998) 114, p. 115, describing subsidiarity in this context as 
“administrative”; Ehlermann, “1110 Evolution in Relations between the EC Commission and National Antitrust 
Authorities”, in: Antitrust fra diritto nazionale e diritto comuni tario, Atti del II convegno di Treviso (5-6 Maggio 
¡995) (Milano, 1996), p. 58, distinuishing between “subsidiarity in the legislative process” and “subsidiarity in 
the area of implementation”; Lucas de Leyssac and Parleani, supra (2002), p. 57, distinguishing between these 
two facets of “subsidiarity”.
206 See e.g. Schaub, “Die Reform der Europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik", in: Baudenbacher (Ed.), Neueste 
Entwicklungen im europäischen und internationalen Kartellrecht, Achtes St. Galler Internationales 
Kartellrechtsforum 2001 (Basel/Genf/Mtlnchen, 2002), p. 7; Tizzano, supra (2001), p. 210; Schaub, 
“Developments of European Competition Law”, in: Hellenic Competition Committee (Ed.), EU Competition 
Law and Policy, Developments and Priorities, Athens Conference, April 19th 2002 (Athens, 2002), p. 104. On 
the general principle of the close-to-the-citizen application of Community law' {Bürgemäh) see e.g. Callies, 
“Europa als Wertgemeinschaft -  Integration und Identität durch europäisches Verfassungsrecht?”, 59 JZ 1033 
(2004), p. 1035.
2W See Schröter, in: Schröter, Jakob & Mederer (Eds.), Kommentar zum Europäischen IVettbewerbsrecht 
(Baden-Baden, 2003), p. 48.
210 See Tesauro, supra (2000b), p. 160.
211 See also Bourgeois, “Enforcement of EC Competition Law by National Authorities: Square Pegs in 
Round Holes”, in Gormley (Ed.), Current and Future Perspectives on EC Competition Law, A Tribute to 
Professor M R. Mok (London/The Hague/Boston, 1997), pp. 93-95, who stresses that even if the principle of 
subsidiarity does not apply to EC competition law enforcement and the EC is not required to leave it to Member 
States to apply that law, notably to exempt restrictive agreements (still subject to the Commission monopoly at 
the time), this does not exclude that the EC may lawfully delegate the exercise of such powers to the Member 
States. This is exactly what the new decentralised system of enforcement entails.
212 See Ehlermann, supra (2000a), p. 537 et seq.
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hand, the prohibition is applied to a specific agreement by virtue of the law itself, i.c. through 
the direct application of Article 81(3) EC, without the need for a prior administrative 
decision. In this case, a decision not to apply the prohibition is merely declaratory in nature. 
In other words, Article 81(3) EC would become a directly applicable provision. In 
consequence, agreements which fell under Article 81(1) EC but also fulfilled the conditions 
o f Article 81(3) EC would be considered lawful and fully enforceable without the need for 
any prior authorisation, be it administrative or judicial. On the other hand, agreements falling 
under the first paragraph of Article 81 EC without fulfilling the conditions of the third 
paragraph o f that provision, would be prohibited and void ab initio, again without the need of 
a prior administrative or judicial intervention.
The reform advocated by the White Paper gave rise to long, sometimes spirited but ultimately 
fruitful debates between competition lawyers in Europe and beyond. Most negative reactions, 
which came mainly from German commentators,* 2113 centred on the proposed reform's 
compatibility w ith the Treaty, the efficiency of the modernised system of enforcement, 
questions of legal security for undertakings, and the coherence of enforcement as betw een the 
Community and the national levels.
With regard to the debate on compatibility, an initial argument against the reforms was that 
by referring to a ‘"declaration” that Article 81(1) EC did not apply, the letter of Article 81(3) 
EC presupposed the intervention of an administrative authority.214 A legal exception system 
would therefore not be compatible with the Treaty of Rome. Opponents of the reform also 
stressed that Article 81(3) EC entails complex economic assessments, and therefore implies
313 See c.g. Mestmückcr, “Versuch einer kartellpolitischen Wende in der EU", 10 EuZW 523 (1999); 
Deringer, “Stellungnahme zum Weißbuch der Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der 
Vorschriften zur Anwendung der Art. 85 und 86 EG-Vertrag (Art. 81 und 82 EG)", 11 EuZW 5 (2000): 
Möschcl, “Sy stern Wechsel im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht?", 55 JZ 61 (2000); ident, “Guest Editorial: 
Change of Policy in European Competition Law?”, 37 CMLRev. 495 (2000); Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Gutachten von 1-7-00 über die Reform der europäischen 
Kartellpolitik, 50 WuW 1096 (2000), in English in:
http://www.bimvi.de/Homepage/download/english/doku480_E.pdf. See also Lever, “The German Monopolies 
Commission’s Report on Problems Consequent upon the Reform of the European Cartel Procedures”, 23 EC LR 
321 (2002).
211 See Mestmückcr, supra (1999), p. 525 et seq:, Wesseling, supra (1999), p. 425; Paulweber and Kögel,
“Das europäische Wettbewerbsrecht am Schweideweg: Die Reform Vorhaben der Kommission zur
Modernisierung des europäischen Kartellverfahrensrcchts in der Kritik”, 44 AG 500 (1999), p. 506; Deringer, 
supra (2000), p. 6; Möschei, supra (2000a), p. 62; Paulwebcr, supra (2000), p. 30; Wißmann, “Decentralised 
Enforcemcnt of EC Competition Law and the New Policy on Cartels: The Commission White Paper of 28m of 
April 1999”, 23(2) World Competition 123 (2000), p. 139; Mestmückcr, supra (2001), p. 229 et seq.: Stillfricd 
and Stockenhuber, “Der Entwurf einer neuen Verfahrensverordnung zum EG-Kartellrecht”, 15 WI31. 145 
(2001), p. 150; Meli, “II progetto di modemizzazione del sistema di controllo delle intese anticoncorrcnziali cd
il ruolo del giudice ordinario”, 4 Eur. & Dir.Priv. 117 (2002), p. 121.
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wide discretionary powers215 to which national courts in particular are not accustomed.216 
This line of argument called into question the direct effect of Article 81(3) EC,217 as being 
not clear, unambiguous or sufficiently unconditional, in order to meet the test o f the Court of 
Justice's case law.218 a
Another connected issue was the fate o f  block exemption regulations, which would continue 
to exist under the new system. However, according to opponents of the reform, block 
exemptions would not by the very' nature be compatible with a  legal exception system.219 At 
most these regulations would have the characteristics o f “block negative clearances” and be 
of a declaratory nature.220 Indeed, some authors go as far as arguing that block exemption
2,5 See Möschei, supra (2000a), p. 62; Odudu, “Article 81(3), Discretion and Direct Effect”, 23 ECLR 17
(2002), p. 21.
216 In this context reference has been made to ECJ judgments stressing this particularity of Art. 81(3) EC. 
See e.g. Delimitis, o p .c i tpara. 44: “It is for the Commission to adopt, subject to review by the Court of First 
Instance and the Court of Justice, individual decisions in accordance with the procedural rules in force and to 
adopt exemption regulations. The performance of that task necessarily entails complex economic assessments, 
in particular in order to assess whether an agreement falls under Article [81(3)]”. See further case T-131/99, 
Michael Hamilton Shaw and Timothy John Falla v. Commission, [2002] ECR II-, para. 38. On the judges’ 
perceived inability to deal with such complicated issues see e.g. P. Lässig, Dezentrale Anwendung des 
Europäischen Kartellrechts (Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, 1997), p. 35; Topel, “Kohärenz der dezentralen 
Anw'endung im System paralleler Kompetenzen”, in: Conference on the Reform o f  European Competition Im w  
in Freiburg i. B. (9 and 10 November 2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition, p. 3 et seq.\ Möschei, 
“Effizienter Wettbewerbsschutz in einer erweiterten Gemeinschaft durch Einbeziehung der nationalen 
Wettbewerbsbehörden und nationalen Gerichte?”, 51 WuW 147 (2001), p. 148; Bovis, “Transforming the 
Application of EC Competition Lawrs: The Case of Decentralisation”, 12 EBLR 98 (2001), p. 100; Pace, “La 
politica di decentramento del diritto antitrust CE come prinzipio organizzatore del regolamento 1/2003: Luci ed 
ombre del nuovo regolamento di applicazione degli artt. 81 e 82 TCE”, 14 Riv.It.Dir.Pubbl.Com. 147 (2004), p. 
178 et seq. See also Gustafsson, supra (2000), p. 175; Martinez Lage and Brokelmann, “Article 81(3) before 
National Courts: The CAAiPSA Doctrine of the Spanish Supreme Court and Articles 84 and 85 Revisited”, in: 
Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust 
Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), pp. 600, 608-612, supporting tire rather extreme position to exclude civil courts 
from applying competition law altogether in the absence of a pre-existing decision of a competition authority.
2 ̂ Mestmäcker, supra (1999), p. 526; Wißmann, supra (2000), p. 140; Mestmäcker, supra (2001), p. 23!. 
Mestmäcker also argued that if Art. 81(3) EC could not satisfy the conditions of direct effect, tying Art. 81(1) to 
81(3) EC - through the new Regulation - would deprive the former of the two provisions of direct effect (see 
idem, supra (2000), p. 417; Paulweber, supra (2000), p. 32). See also Caspar, supra (2001), p. 247, according to 
whom the problem with the application of Art. 81(3) EC by national courts is not its justiciability. Art, 81(3) EC 
is justiciable. However, according to that view, civil courts are not an appropriate forum because o f the policy 
character of this provision and of the balancing that it entails among competition and non-competition concerns. 
See, in particular, Odudu, supra (2002), p. 23.
218 Case 26/62, AT' Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belästigen, [1963] ECR 1, at 13. It is interesting to trace back the views of Deringer at the 
time when Reg. 17 entered into force. That author was of the opinion that Art. 81(3) of the Treaty' is a 
discretionary provision and not a legal exception, therefore, a declaration based on this rule is a normative 
activity, belonging within the realm of administration and not that of courts. He goes on to say, however, that 
“even if the Commission had not been given exclusive jurisdiction [by means of Reg. 17], the national courts 
could only apply Article [81(3)] i f  this power had been specifically conferred upon them” (see Deringcr, supra 
(1963-64), p. 34, fn. 4, emphasis added).
2,9 Mestmäcker, supra (1999), p. 526; Gentile, supra (2000), pp. 607-608; Wißmann, supra (2000), p. 142.
220 See e.g. Müller-Tautphaeus, “Das Weissbuch der Kommission zur Modernisierung der 
Anwendungsregeln zu Art. 81,82 EGV: Der Gegenwärtige Diskussionsstand”, 72 SZWR/RSDA 149 (2000), p. 
154; Bartosch, “Von der Freistellung zur Legalausnahme: Was geschieht mit der Rechtssicherheit?”, 50 WuW 
462 (2000), p. 467; Bechtold, “EG-Giuppenfreistellungsverordnungen: Eine Zwischenbilanz”, 12 EWS 49
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regulations have no binding effect because of their declarator)’ nature and also because they 
are secondary law whereas Article 81 (3) EC under the legal exception system necessitates no 
intermediary and is thus itself applicable irrespective of the relevant block exemption 
regulation.
A more serious argument against the reform’s compatibility with the Treaty was that because 
there would no longer be an a priori presumption that restrictive agreements were illegal 
pending a decision by an administrative authority or a court, the effectiveness o f the 
prohibition principle followed by the Treaty with regard to agreements (as opposed to the 
abuse principle applicable to monopolies), would be impaired 221 Thus, it was argued that 
there would be a presumption that anti-competitive agreements were valid, which would 
resemble, if  not amount to, the abuse system.222
In reply to this line of criticism, the majority' o f authors believe that the text of Article 81 EC 
is at least neutral and thus capable of accommodating secondary legislation opting for the 
authorisation or the legal exception system.223 These authors point out that Article 81 EC was
(2001), p. 54. See also Deringcr, supra (2000), p. 7, who also questions the nature of the act of withdrawal by u 
public authority of Ute benefit of a block exemption. According to this author such an act can only be 
declaratory under a legal exception system.
2A hi the prohibition system, adopted under Art. 81 EC, the law prohibits the existence itself of an 
agreement or concerted practice, while behaviour, as such, is in principle immaterial. On the other hand, in the 
abuse sy stem, adopted under Art. 82 EC, it is not the existence of a dominant position as such, but only its 
abuse, that is prohibited. The prohibition system is generally acknowledged to be a more efficient system with 
regard to cartels. To complete the picture, we should add that there are four models of regulation or non- 
regulation of economic activities: (a) the laissez-faire model, (b) the system of control of abuse, (c) the 
prohibition system, and (d) the state ownership model. See further I. Brinker, Mißbrauchsaufsicht au f der 
Gtw ullage der Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen, Die Bedeutung des Widerrufsrechts der EG-Kommission im 
Rahmen der Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen nach Anikei 85 Absatz 3 EG-1 'ertrag, Dissertation, Ludwig- 
Maximilians-Universität München (München, 1994), p. 9.
2“ See Mestmäcker, supra (1999), p. 528; idem, “Begrenzt abschreckend“, Kommentar, 50(7-8) WuW
(2000) ; ident, supra (2000), p. 411; Möschei, supra (2000a), p. 66; Paulweber, supra (2000), pp. 4(M l; 
Wißmann, supra (2000), p. 140; Rittner, “Diskussionsbeitnig - Wandel des Europäischen Wettbewerbsrechts“, 
in: Schwarze (Ed.), Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht int Wandel (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 44; Mestmäckcr, supra
(2001) , pp. 224-226; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 200. It should be noted that sometimes the criticism that EC 
competition law is moving towards an abuse system is also heard with regard to other broader reforms, such as 
the new policy on vertical restraints. According to this view, the fact that vertical agreements exceeding the 
market share cups, which have not been notified or have been notified late, still can be exempted ex tunc, seems 
to be not enirely in conformity with the prohibition system. See further Paulweber and Kögel, supra (1999), p. 
508; Bayreuther, “Die Reform der EG-Wettbewerbspolitik gegenüber vertikalen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen“, 
11 EWS 106 (2000), p. 109; Fuchs, “Die Modernisierung des europäischen Kartellrcchts im Bereich vertikaler 
Vereinbarungen”, in: Schwintowski (Ed.), Entwicklungen im deutschen und europäischen Wirtschaftsrecht, 
Symposium zum 65. Geburtstag von Ulrich Immenga (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 118.
i23 That the modernisation proposals were compatible with the Treaty was the overall conclusion in the 5th 
Annual EC Competition Law and Policy Workshop, held at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European 
University Institute in Florence. This was also the point of view expressed in the interventions and contributions 
of all former and current judges of Community Courts. See e g. Tesauro, supra (2001), p. 262 et seq. In 
addition, both Forrester and Marenco, w ho undertook to do research on the historical context of the drafting of 
Article 81 concluded that the Treaty left open the choice between an authorisation and a legal exception system. 
See Forrester, “The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal Security”, in: 
Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust
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a compromise between a system o f administrative authorisation, initially favoured by 
Germany, and the French-sponsored legal exception system.* 224 An argument in favour of the 
Treaty's open-endedness can also be adduced from the text accompanying the word “declare'’ 
in Article 81(3) EC. While this verb may at first sight lend some weight to the view that the 
authorisation system is Treaty-based, it can be argued to the contrary' that if  the Treaty had 
intended this, it would also have specified the author o f  the authorisation, i.e. the 
Commission, rather than stopping there.225 The incompleteness should therefore be taken as 
meaning that the whole matter was left to secondary legislation.226
With regard to  the economic complexity inherent in Article 81(3) EC, the counter-argument 
is that this point is equally valid for Article 81(1) EC,227 as well as for Articles 82 and 86 
EC.228 Competition law in general is characterised by complexity. The definition o f the 
relevant market, the cumulative effect o f  networks o f agreements, and the appreciability of 
restraints on competition, are all complicated fact-averse elements which require demanding 
treatment by judges.229 In particular, Article 82 EC is usually more difficult to apply than 
Article 81(3) EC.230 *Other authors stress the parallels to be drawn from the directly effective
Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 75 et seq:, Marenco, supra (2001a), p. 145 et seq. See also for an exposé of 
the historical context Marenco, “Le régime de l’exception légale et sa compatibilité avec le Traité”, 37 CDE 135 
(2001 ), p. 136 et seq.
224 Wils, ‘‘Notification, Clearance and Exemption in EC Competition Law: An Economie Analysis”, 24 
ELRev. 139 (1999), p. 155; Idot, “La révision du règlement 17/62 ou l'ouverture de la ‘boîte de Pandore’”,
( 1999-8/9) Europe 3; R. Wesseling, The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Law  (Oxford/Portland, 2000), p. 20. On 
the compromise solution attained with Reg. 17/1962 see also Marenco, supra (1994), pp. 626-627; Braun, 
“Deutschland”, in: Behrens (Ed.), EC Competition Rules in National Courts, Voi. Ill, Germany (Baden-Baden, 
1996), p. 417; Lane, supra (2000), p. 114; Appeldoom, “Are the Proposed Changes Compatible with Article 
81 (3) EC?”, 22 ECLR400 (2001), p. 401; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 331; Goyder, supra (2003), p. 26. Compare 
also Blinker, supra (1994), pp. 33-38.
225 As was the case with Art. 65 ECSC.
226 See Ehlcrmann, supra (2000a), p. 539; Marenco, supra (2001b), p. 139; Calvo Caravaca and Cancdo 
Airillaga, “Libre competencia y decentralización”, 2( I ) Rev.Esp.Dcr.Eur. 5 (2003), p. 27, fn. 54.
22 Compare with regard to Art. 81(1) EC case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission, [2003] 
ECR 11-4653, para. 80: “Judicial review' of Commission measures involving an appraisal of complex economic 
matters must be limited to verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons 
have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest 
error of assessment or a misuse of powers”.
228 See Nehl, “Changes in Legislation: Constitutional Reform and the Role of the Administrator”, in: The 
Modernisation o f  EC Competition Law: The Next Ten Years, CELS Occasional Paper, No. 4 (Cambridge, 2000), 
p. 15; Whish and Sufrin, “Community Competition Law: Notification and Individual Exemption - Goodbye to 
All That”, in: Hayton (Ed.), Law 's Future(s) (Oxford/Portland, 2000), p. 145; Gyselen, supra (2002), p. 183 et 
seq:, Schaub, “Continued Focus on Reform: Recent Developments in EC Competition Policy”, in: Hawk (Ed.), 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 2001, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 
(New' York, 2002), p. 45.
229 K.L. Ritter, D.W. Braun and F. Rawlinson, European Competition Law: A Practitioner’s Guide, Website 
Supplement, Update January 2003, in: http://www.kluwerlaw.com, p. 8, fn. 22.
210 See e.g. Temple Lang, “Decentralised Application of Community Competition Law”, in: Rivas &
Horspool (Eds.), Modernisation and Decentralisation o f  EC Competition Law (The Hague/London/Boston, 
2000), p. 24; Burrichter, “The Application of Article 81(3) by National Courts: Some Remarks from the Point of
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free movement rules of the Treat}' (Articles 28 to 30 EC), which also involve complex issues 
and presuppose a balancing act.231 Indeed, the fears expressed with regard to judges' ability 
or inability  ̂ to apply Article 81(3) EC do not do them justice, since in their own legal 
traditions they deal constantly with complicated legal and economic policy-connected 
problems. Even accepting that there is something special or ‘■'different’ about the third as 
opposed to the first paragraph of Article 81 EC, there is still no compelling reason why 
courts cannot adjudicate such “special'’ issues.* 233 Furthermore, EC competition law should 
not be seen as an unconnected aliud with respect to general Community law. Unlike US 
antitrust or EU Member States’ national competition laws, the Community competition 
provisions are enshrined in the EC Treaty, thus enjoying constitutional status. Thus, 
interestingly enough, modernisation should be seen in the context o f general Community law, 
and should not be perceived as a revolution but rather as a return to the norm 234 
Supporters of the reform stressed in addition that the margin o f discretion the Commission 
enjoyed under Article 81(3) EC never meant that it had the power to refuse an exemption to 
an undertaking if  all four conditions of Article 81(3) EC were fulfilled, or that it could grant 
an exemption if the four conditions were not met. On the contrary, undertakings had a right to 
have their agreements exempted if those conditions were fulfilled.235 It was also argued that
View of a Practitioner”, in: Ehlcrmann & Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 539.
331 Sec c.g. Ehlcrmann, supra (2000a), p. 558; Tesauro, supra (2000a), p. 10; Whish and Sufrin, supra 
(2000), p. 145.
233 See the contributions of Cooke, “Changing Responsibilities and Relationships for Community and 
National Courts: The Implications of the White Paper” and of Whish, “National Courts and the White Paper: A 
Commentary”, in: The Modernisation o f EC Competition Law: The Next Ten Tears, CELS Occasional Paper, 
No. 4 (Cambridge, 2000), p. 62 and p. 75 respectively.
233 See e.g. Schaub, “Das Europäische Kartellrecht im Jahr 2000”, in: Baudenbachcr (Ed.), Neueste 
Entwicklungen im europäischen und internationalen Kartellrecht, Siebentes St. Galler Internationales 
Kartellrechtsforttm 2000 (Basel/Genf/München, 2000), p. 14: Müller-Tautphaeus, supra (2000), p. 155.
234 See Tesauro, supra (2000b), p. 164; Ehlermann, supra (2000a), pp, 576-577; Tesauro, supra (2001), pp. 
263-264; Schaub, “The Reform of Regulation 17/62: The Issues of Compatibility, Effective Enforcement and 
Legal Certainty”, in: Ehlcrmann & Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), pp. 243-244; Fox, “Modernisation: Efficiency, 
Dynamic Efficiency, and the Diffusion of Competition Law”, in: Ehlemiann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), pp. 127- 
128; Paulis, supra (2001a), pp. 401-402; contra Martinez Lage and Brokelmann, supra (2001), pp. 598-599. 
Compare the view of Former AG Van Gerven, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies", in: Ehlennann 
& Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Animal 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust 
Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 19, who stresses that a Treaty provision that was not originally directly 
applicable can become so over time because of the precision given to it by subsequent case law.
233 See Schaub and Dohms, “Das Weißbuch der Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der 
Vorschriften zur Anwendung der Artikel 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag: Die Reform der Verordnung Nr. 17”, 49 WuW 
1055 (1999), p. 1064; Marenco, supra (2001b), p. 143; Schaub, supra (2001a), p. 246; Wils, “The 
Modernisation of the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the 
Commission's Proposal for a New Council Regulation Replacing Regulation No. 17", in: Hawk (Ed ), 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 2000, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute
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the review o f Article 81(3) EC Commission Decisions exercised in practice by the 
Community Courts may not be as reserved as many suppose: indeed, it perhaps does not 
differ from the review o f Commission Decisions under Articles 81(1), 82 and 86(2) EC.236 
Under the new system, block exemption regulations remain the backbone of EC competition 
policy-making.237 They are essentially acts that apply Article 81(3) to categories of 
agreements, thus ‘"circumscribing a portion o f the field where Article 81 is not applicable”.238 
They constitute hard law' Community legal prescriptions, which guarantee legal certainty239 
and the correct and consistent application o f Article 81(3) EC by national authorities and 
courts and thus reduce the risk that competition law enforcement in Europe will be re­
nationalised.240 National courts w ill go on applying them241 and will not have the power to
(New York, 2001), p. 329; Hirsch, “Amvendung der Kartellverfahrensordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 durch rationale 
Gerichtc”, 1 ZWeR 233 (2003), pp. 237-239. Interestingly enough, earlier statements of Commission officials 
seem to go to the opposite direction (see e.g. Paulis, “Decentralisation of Enforcement of Community Law - 
Working Paper VII”, in: Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 1996 (The 
Hague/Boston/London, 1997), p. 201.
236 See Marenco, supra (2001a), pp. 165-167; Wils, supra (2001), pp. 329-330; Gyselen, supra (2002), p. 
191. See also Ehlermann and Atanasiu, “The Modernization of EC Antitrust Law: Consequences for the Future 
Role and Function of the EC Courts”, 23 ECLR 72 (2002), pp. 74-75, who stress that the passage to a system of 
legal exception will eliminate the Community Courts’ self-imposed limited control over Commission decisions 
applying Art. 81(3) EC, to the extent that such a limit exists, and Art. 81(3) enforcement will now be subject to a 
normal standard of judicial review. This point is now shared by Montag and Janssens, “Article 81(3) in the 
Context of Modernisation -  A Lawyer’s View”, in: Geradin (Ed.), Modernisation and Enlargement: Two Major 
Challenges fo r  EC Competition Law (Antwerp/Oxford, 2004), p. 232.
238
See Beilis, supra (2000), p. 133.
Marenco, supra (2001a), p. 173; Lenaerts, “Modernisation of the Application and Enforcement of 
European Competition Law: An Introductory Overview”, in: Stuyck & Gilliams (Eds.), Modernisation o f  
European Competition Law, The Commission's Proposal for a New Regulation Implementing Articles 81 and 
82 EC (Antwerp/Oxford/New York, 2002), p. 17. See also the arguments of the Former Director-General 
Schaub, supra (2001a), p. 247, according to whom it is not incompatible with the Treaty to give a declaratory 
nature to individual applications of Art. 81(3) EC while maintaining a constitutive nature for block exemption 
regulations, which are binding and directly binding Community acts pursuant to Art. 249 EC. On another 
occasion the former Director General stressed that these block exemption regulations should not be considered 
as legislation (Gesetzgebung) but rather as application of the law (Rechtsanwendung) (Schaub, supra (2002a), p. 
8). See also Paulis, “Latest Commission Thinking and Progress on the Modernisation of Regulation 17”, in: 
European Competition Law: A New Role fo r  the Member Slates, Congress Organized on 2(fh and 21st November 
2000 by the European Association o f Lawyers (Bruxelles, 2001), p. 28: “we think that block exemption 
Regulations are not legislative acts but law enforcement”. See, however, Cooke, “General Report”, in: Cahill 
(Ed.), The Modernisation o f  EU Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union, FIDE 2004 National 
Reports (Cambridge, 2004), p. 630, referring to the Commission’s “legislative” function in proposing block 
exemption regulations. See also Bruzzone and Saija, “Modemizzazione dci regolamenti di esenzione: I confini 
rispetto alia regolazione settoriale”, 8 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 108 (2003), p. 116, considering these regulations of 
declaratory and at the same time of legislative nature. See also Baron, “Die Rechtsnatur der 
Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen im System der Legalausnahme -  ein Scheinproblem”, 56 WuW 358 (2006), 
w ho characterises the question of the BERs’ legal nature under the legal exception system a pseudo-problem of 
German making that is basically irrelevant.
239 See Schaub, supra (2002c), p. 46; Saria, in: Liebscher, Flohr & Petsche (Eds.), Handbuch der EU- 
Gruppenfreistellungsvenordnungen (Mflnchen/Wien, 2003), p. 52.
40 See Bruzzone and Saija, supra (2003), p. 117. These aims are of course also served through the many 
soft law' instruments issued by the Commission. Compare also Stillfried and Stockenhuber, supra (2001), p. 151, 
who stress the advantages of standardisation, simplification and legal certainty with regard to block exemption
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rule them invalid in the context of private litigation.241 42 As for the power to withdraw the 
benefit of the block exemption, this is reserved to the public authorities, since it entails the 
exercise o f state prerogatives in the public interest.243
Finally, the argument that because the new system was based on ex post control, it would 
mean a de facto shift towards the abuse system was the result o f a misunderstanding, since 
under no circumstances would there be a presumption that restrictive agreements were legal. 
On the contrary, although their overall legality or illegality in light o f the whole of Article 81 
EC would be examined ex post, it would operate ex tunc, rather than ex nunc, thus reinforcing 
the effectiveness o f the prohibition principle.244
In any case, it is very likely that the Court of Justice will interpret Article 81 EC 
teleologically, and will accept the legality o f the new Regulation and the legal exception 
system if it is ever called on to assess this question, notwithstanding the strict wording of the 
provision or the legislative history of the old Regulation 17.245 The Court's primary concern 
will be whether the Treaty objectives are served in an efficient manner and whether the new 
system provides for effective enforcement of the Treaty competition rules.
cc. Efficiency of Competition Law Enforcement under the New System
The efficiency o f the new system of enforcement as originally proposed in the White Paper 
also raised concerns. According to critics of the modernisation, the notification system 
provided a very useful mechanism, through which undertakings furnished important market
regulations under the legal exception system and see no problem in those regulations having a declaratory 
nature.
241 See Jaeger, “Die möglichen Auswirkungen einer Reform des EG-Wettbewerbsnxhts für die nationalen 
Gerichte", 50 WuW 1062 (2000), p. 1066. Naturally, national courts will now have to examine the compatibility 
with Ait. 81 F.C in its entirety (including its third paragraph) of agreements exceeding the market share 
thresholds of the new generation block exemption regulations.
242 See para. 2 of the Commission Notice on A rt 81(3) EC.
243 See Idot, supra (2004c), p. 19. According to Art. 29 Reg. 1/2003, the Commission may withdraw the 
benefit of a block exemption when an agreement, decision or concerted practice covered by the exemption 
produces effects that are incompatible with Art. 81(3) EC. NCAs have the same power when the effects pertain 
to all or part of the territory of a Member State that has the characteristics of a distinct geographic market.
244 See e g. Deselaers and Obst, “Weißbuch zum Europäischen Kartellrecht - Rechtssicherheit ade?"', 11 
EWS 41 (2000), p. 43; Schütz, “Zur Änderung des Kartell Verfahrens gemäß Artikel 81 EGV”, 50 WuW 686 
(2000), p. 689; Marcnco, supra (2001a), pp. 147-148. See further Gallot, “Protection efficace de la concurrence 
dans une communauté élargie grâce à l’association des autorités de concurrence et des juridictions nationales”, 
in: Conference on the Reform of European Competition Iaw  in Freiburg i. B. (9 and 10 November 2000), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/compctition/, p. 5, who rightly observes that the absence of administrative 
authorisation in the US docs not make the US system less etYicient or less oriented towards the principle of 
prohibition.
243 See Wliish and Sufrin, supra (2000), p. 143.
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information to the Commission.240 *46 Valuable information was also provided by the 
submissions from third parties when the Commission advertised its intention to grant an 
exemption.247 This would no longer be meaningful or possible when national courts applied 
Article 81(3) EC.248 In addition, it would no longer be possible for an agreement to be 
exempted subject to conditions and obligations imposed by an administrative authority. 
Under the new system of enforcement, national courts could not impose conditions or accept 
commitments in the area of Article 81(3) EC.249 A similar point was also made with regard to 
negotiated settlements between the Commission and the notifying parties, who may offer to 
the Commission to amend their agreements so as to be granted an exemption.250 Such a 
flexible mechanism would not fit in well with civil proceedings, which are governed by the 
party-initiative principle,251 and would run counter to the neutrality of the judges, whose task 
would be limited to declaring whether or not Article 81 EC applied to an agreement.252 
The first of these two arguments by opponents of modernisation, while of some credit in the 
earlier days o f competition law' enforcement in Europe is now not so persuasive. In the last 
four decades the Commission has acquired a substantial degree o f market information, and 
continues to do so, via investigations into sectors o f the economy and into types of 
agreements,253 as well as via the merger control system, rather than through the notification 
of usually unproblematic agreements.254 It is telling that up to the publication of the White 
Paper, in 35 years of antitrust enforcement, the Commission was informed of agreements
240 See e.g. Deringcr, supra (2000), p. 8; Wifimann, supra (2000), p. 149; Bòge, “The Discussion on the
Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: An Update on the Bundeskartellamt’s Point of View”, in: Ehlermann &
Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy
(Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 68; Hossenfelder, “The Development of the Bundeskartellamt's Position on the
Modernisation Proposals of the Commission”, in: European Competition Law: A New Role for the Member
States, Congress Organized on 2(fh and 21st November 2000 by the European Association o f Lawyers
(Bruxelles, 2001 ), p. 36.
247 Art. 19 Reg. 17.
248 See Power, “Representing Clients after the Modernisation of EC Competition Law'”, 14 ICCLR 335
(2003), p, 341.
249 See Vogelaar, supra (2002), p. 24; Lever, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: 
Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC 
Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 30; Mengozzi, “La giurisprudenza del Tribunale delle Comunità 
europee in materia di conorrcnza e l ’applicazione da parte dei giudici nazionali del regolamento del Consiglio n. 
1/2003”, 8 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 210 (2003), p. 224.
250 See e.g. Wolf, “Comment on the White Paper on the Reform of EC Competition Law'”, in: Hawk (Ed.), 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 1999, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 
(New York, 2000), p. 309.
251 See Mdschel, supra (2000a), p. 65.
252 See Vogelaar, supra (2002), p. 25.
253 Art. 17 Reg. 1/2003. The Commission had rarely used this instrument, although it recently decided to 
conduct such sector enquiries inter alia in the gas and electricity, business insurance, retail banking, financial 
services and New’ Media (3G) sectors.
254See Ehlermann, supra (2000a), pp. 561-562; Schaub, supra (2001a), p. 249.
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justifying the taking of a prohibition decision only in 9 cases.2 *55 As for the criticism o f the 
courts’ inability to take into account the remarks of third parties and to impose conditions or 
accept commitments, when applying Article 81(3) EC, it is the outcome of confusion. 
Pronouncements by national courts on Article 81(3) EC will certainly not have the character 
o f an “exemption”, a term hardly compatible with the new system. Instead, their judgments 
will apply Article 81 EC as a whole, will be of a declaratory and not a constitutive nature, and 
will only be binding inter partes.256 At the same time, the new system docs not eliminate the 
possibility for the Commission or other public authorities to reach informal settlements or 
accept commitments,257 which attain the same objectives and are as effective as the 
imposition of conditions and obligations under the previous system.
In sum, again, most commentators believed that the administrative authorisation system 
enforced by the Commission for the last 40 years had its day,258 and that the main lines o f the 
new system met the needs of modem efficient competition law enforcement.259 *According to
2Si See Rocca, “Livre blanc sur la modernisation des règles d'application des articles 81 et 82 du Traité'*,
(1999-3) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 1, p. 2.
2<6 ilius, tire criticism heard sometimes that it will no longer be possible for courts to hear third parties,
while applying Art. 81(3) EC, as the Commission was doing under the authorisation system (see Vogelaar,
supra (2002), p. 25), is misplaced, since the courts will not be granting “individual exemptions“ of constitutive
erga omttes effect.
2r Art. 9 Reg. 1/2003.
2S8 On the systems of enforcement employed by the Commission in Arts. 81, 82 F.C and in the Merger
Regulation see the study by Wils, supra (1999), p. 139 et seq., which was published shortly before the White 
Paper. The author explained that the Commission employed three systems, as provided for in secondary 
legislation: a. ex post enforecement through deterrence in the absence of prescreening, applicable to Art. 82 EC; 
b. ex ante enforcement through prescreening as a substitute to ex post enforcement through deterrence, 
applicable to mergers; and c. ex ante enforcement through prescreening as a complement to ex post 
enforecement through deterrence, applicable to Art. 81 EC. According to that author, back in 1957 the then Art. 
85 (now Art. 81 EC) was a novel provision for Europe, therefore, it was thought that only ex post enforcement 
through deterrence was unlikely to be effective, since undertakings were unaccustomed to the principle of cartel 
prohibition (though not to the principle of abuse of economic power, w hich had precedents in Germany in the 
pre-war period). Hence the prescreening elements that were introduced with the system of notification and 
administrative authorisation. However, in modem times, according to the author, e.r ante enforcement through 
prescreening appears inefficient and unsuitable for Arts. 81 and 82 EC {idem, p. 154). See also Idot, “La 
modernisation des règles européennes de concurrence : réforme, procédurale ou institutionnelle”, (2001-7/8) 
Rev.Conc.Consomm. 7, p. 8; Wils, supra (2001), pp. 318-335; Pimmg, “EU Enlargement towards Cartel 
Paradise? An Economie Analysis of the Reform of European Competition Law”, I Erasmus Law and 
Economics Review 77 (2004), p. 90.
2** See e.g. Pappalardo, “Les principales orientations actuelles de la politique communautaire en matière de 
concurrence", 119 JdT 488 (2000), p. 488; Bellamy, “The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy - Some 
Reflections: Don't Throw the Baby out with the Bath Water", in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Alotiemisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 315; 
Schröter, “The Reform of EC Competition Policy”, in: Chao, San et al. (Eds.), International and Comparative 
Competition Laws and Policies (The Hague/London/New York, 2001), pp. 161-162; Cot, “Les enjeux de la 
réforme: Le point de vue d'un juriste”, (2001-7/8) Rev.Conc.Consomm. 13, p. 14; Lucas de Leyssac and 
Parleani, supra (2002), pp. 60-61; Terhechte, “Gaslkommentar: Die Reform des europäischen Kartellrcchts -  
am Ende eines langen Weges?”, 15(12) EuZW (2004). Compare also the proposals for reform included by the 
late Dan Goyder in his EC Competition Law's 1998 edition, which echoed the dissatisfaction with the old 
enforcement system (D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (Oxford, 1998), p. 600 et seq.).
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this view, notification of usually innocuous agreements was not cost-effective.260 and created 
an excessive administrative workload261 and a reactive enforcement culture,262 and in anj­
ease the more repugnant anti-competitive agreements were never notified to the 
Commission.263 Indeed, the decentralisation o f the application of the Treaty competition mies 
and the abolition o f the notification system will certainly enable the Commission to focus on 
detecting and punishing the most serious infringements.264
dd. Consistency and Coherence of the New Enforcement System
A third type o f argument against the system o f legal exception relates to the consistency and 
coherence o f the new- enforcement system, in view o f the multiple enforcers and fora to 
which Article 81(3) EC is now opened up. According to opponents of the reform, the 
abolition o f the Commission’s exemption monopoly means that it would no longer be 
possible to exercise centralised control over the application of that sensitive provision, thus 
‘"inviting” national courts and NCAs from 25 Member States, from “Palermo” to “Helsinki”, 
to apply that rule inconsistently and incoherently, possibly taking into account erratic theories 
or simply serving their parochial national interests265 That would lead to a re-nationalisation 
of EC competition law, or at least to forum shopping 266
Inconsistency fears were largely exaggerated by European commentators, while US 
commentators were on the whole more positive towards decentralisation and the
2o° According to the UK Department of Trade and Industry the cost for UK companies of notifying an 
agreement to the Commission was between £30,000 and £100,000 in 2002 (Department of Trade and Industry, 
Modernisation - A Consultation on the Government’s Proposals fo r  Giving Effect to Regulation 1/2003 andfor 
Re-alignment o f  the Competition Act 1998, April 2003, p. 86).
20 See e.g. Siragusa, supra (1998a), p. 280.
262 See Kjolbye, “The New Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3): An Economic 
Approach to Article 81”, 25 ECLR 566 (2004), p. 573, stressing that the Commission under the old system used 
to spend a considerable amount of time checking individual clauses in notified agreements.
263 See further Forrester, “Modernisation of EC Competition Law”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust 
Law and Policy 1999, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2000), p. 185, 
who, interestingly, thinks that essentially the parties to agreements used the notification system merely as a 
tactical advantage in the event that the other contacting party chose to evade its contractual obligations by 
relying on EC competition law and arguing that the contract was void under Art. 81(2) EC. See also Schaub, 
“Modernisation o f EC Competition Law: Reform of Competition No. 17”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International 
Antitrust Law and Policy 1999, Annual Proceedings o f  die Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 
2000), p. 144.
264 See Lowe, “Facing New Challenges for EU Competition Policy”, in: The European Antitrust Review 
2004, Global Competition Review Special Report (London, 2003), p. 3.
205 This concern was increasingly expressed by in-house regulatory lawyers in big enterprises that preferred 
a Brussels-based easily-monitored to a decentralised hanl-to-monitor system of enforcement. See e.g. Becher, 
“Reform des Wettbewerbsrechts aus der Sicht der Industrie”, in: Schwarze (Ed ), Europäisches 
H’ettbewerbsrecht im Händel (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 39.
266 On the forum shopping fears see Calvo Caravaca and Canedo Arrillaga, supra (2003X p. 37.
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multiplication of enforcers.267 Inconsistency o f enforcement between the Commission, NCAs 
and national courts could also be seen not only negatively but to a certain extent as a sign o f 
“health}- experimentation”.268 Another argument was that multiple enforcers had been a 
reality for quite a long time with regard to Articles 81(1) and 82 EC, and experience showed 
that on the whole the decentralised application of these provisions had worked well. National 
courts had proved to be up to the task, while the preliminary reference procedure before the 
Court of Justice and recent co-operation mechanisms with the Commission provided 
important safety checks.
Indeed, the White Paper had advocated powerful preventive and corrective measures that 
would ensure consistent and coherent EC competition enforcement by NCAs and courts.269 
Then, it was never proposed that the Commission's leading role in the definition of EC 
competition policy would be in any respect affected.270 Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, 
we can observe that the Commission’s role is strengthened after modernisation. The 
Commission is now the intellectual leader and supreme enforcer o f the competition rules in 
Europe and it is not an overstatement to say that it leads in the formation of “competition 
culture”. O f particular importance in this context is the mass of soft law instruments that the 
Commission has adopted and which have considerably shaped the system of competition law 
enforcement in Europe. It is clear that in this regard the national authorities merely respond to 
and follow the Commission's initiatives.
ee. Legal Certainty in the New Enforcement System
Another fear of opponents of the modernisation was that legal certainty would decrease in a 
system of legal exception, since undertakings would no longer be able to notify their
^  See e.g., already before the White Paper, Fox, “Panel One Discussion: Decision Making at the Centre”, 
in: Ehlermann & Laudati (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 1996 (The Ilague/Boston/London, 1997), 
p. 8, stressing that the more enforcement is dispersed, the more likely it is that the best law would evolve from a 
larger set of enforcers and decision makers. On decentralisation and intcijurisdictional competition see Kerber, 
“Interjurisdictional Competition within the European Union”, 23 Fordham Int lLJ S217 (2000).
208 See Vance, “Judicial Application of Article 81(3): Are the Fears Justified?”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu 
(Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust Policy (Oxfoni/Portland, 
2001), p. 621. See also in that sense Böge, “Die Erste Seite: Europäisches Kartellrccht: Modernisierung ja, aber 
nicht um jeden Preis”, 12(4) EWS (2001); Venit, “Private Practice in the Wake of the Commission's 
Modernization Program”, 32 LIE1147 (2005), p. 153.
209 On these measures see below.
210 See Schaub, “Wandel des Europäischen Wettbewerbsnechts”, in: Schwarze (Ed.), Europäisches 
Wettbewerbsrecht im Wandel (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 21.
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agreements and seek an exemption or - at least - a comfort letter.271 Under the new system of 
enforcement they would have to evaluate the possibly anti-competitive nature of their 
agreement themselves and thus be in an insecure position, particularly when involved in 
significant transactions entailing a high volume o f investment and commercial risks. Legal 
uncertainty w ould increase further as a result o f the more economic approach favoured by the 
new block exemption regulations and other Commission soft law instruments, such as the de 
minimis Notice272 and the Guidelines on vertical restrictions and on horizontal co-operation 
agreements.273 The use of market power as a  criterion for applying the prohibition of Article 
81 EC made it more difficult for undertakings to assess the legality or otherwise o f their 
agreements.274 These arguments were made especially with reference to the ability o f national 
courts to deal with the new economic approach. Some authors stressed a  certain contradiction 
betw een the more economic approach and the opening up o f competition law enforcement to 
national courts 275
On the legal certainty side of the debate, it is noteworthy that US commentators again 
expressed the view that this concern is a  “European obsession”, since uncertainty is inherent 
in competition law, so long as per se mles of permission and prohibition arc only an 
exception.276 A certain degree o f uncertainty' is therefore inevitable.277 * However, the 
substantial and ever-increasing case law o f the Commission and the European Courts and the
21 See e g. Paulweber, supra (2000), pp. 37-38; Bartosch, “Von der Freistellung zur Legalausnahme: Der 
Vorschlag der EG-Kommission für eine ‘neue Verordnung Nr. 17”’, 12 EuZW 101 (2001), p. 105. It is 
somewhat ironic that in this line of rejectionist arguments against the legal exception system, comfort letters 
finallv found favour, when they had always been considered a failure of the previous system.
Commission Notice on Agreements o f  Minor Importance Which Do not Appreciably Restrict 
Competition under Article 81(1) o f the Treaty Establishing the European Community (de minimis), OJ [2001] C 
368/13.
273 Commission Notice - Guidelines on the Applicability o f  Article 81 o f the EC Treaty to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements, OJ [2001] C 3/2.
274 See Frignani, Gentile and Rossi, “La devolution del l’antitrust: Prime riflessioni intomo al ‘libro bianco’ 
sulla modemizzazione”, 2 Merc.Cone.Reg. 171 (2000), p. 188; Bishop, “Modernisation of the Rules 
Implementing Articles 81 and 82”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: 
The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), pp. 57-60; Schroter, supra (2003), p. 200; 
Idot and Van de Walle de Ghclke, supra (2001 ), p. 169, speaking of “insécurité généralisée”.
2 ,5 See Mestmücker, supra (2000b), pp. 422, 425; Bishop, supra (2001 ), p. 62; Mestmücker, supra (2001 ), 
p. 235; Vogelaar, supra (2002), pp. 21-22.
2,6 See Haw k and Denaeijer, “The Development of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty: Legal Certainty”, in: 
Ehleimann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust 
Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001 ), pp. 130,137,140.
277 See Fox, “Panel One Discussion: Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal Security”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu 
(Eds), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EU Competition Law (Oxford, 2001), p. 
24; Forrester, supra (2001), p. 102; Idot, “Les entreprises face à la suppression de l’autorisation préalable”, 
Paper Presented at the ICC (20 November 2003), p. 7. According to Venit, supra (2003), pp. 554-555, under the 
new regime, rigorous self-assessment possibly coupled with some informal consultation with the Commission 
should provide an adequate and less costly alternative than notification. The Commission has published a Notice
on informal guidance with regard to novel questions concerning Arts. 81 and 82 EC. This informal mechanism, 
however, is intended only for exceptional circumstances. On this Notice, see infra.
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publication o f block exemption regulations, as well as more notices, communications and 
other soft law instruments, should provide a satisfactory degree of legal certainty.278 
Besides, the old system was not really perfect from a certainty point of view. It too contained 
elements of self-assessment and consequently of uncertainty, notwithstanding the notification 
mechanism. Thus, following the Haecht II ruling279 the notification o f restrictive agreements 
did not amount to their provisional civil validity, and only very rarely did the Commission 
actually proceed to exemption decisions. If  anything, in most cases it would perhaps issue a  
comfort letter, which did not carry the same degree of legal certainty.
It therefore seems that, at least in that respect, the new system of enforcement will give firms 
more legal certainty, because owing to the abolition of the Commission's exemption 
monopoly and the need for notification, it will no longer be possible to use the nullity 
sanction of Article 81(2) EC as a tactical weapon for competition law litigation.280 Firms will 
no longer be held hostage to the split between the first and the third paragraphs of Article 81 
EC, with the Damocles sword of the second paragraph over their heads,281 leaving them no 
other option but to notify and thus submit “to a flawed system", as some have put it.282 Under 
the new system all agreements will be perfectly enforceable unless held to be otherwise by a 
court, which will be able to give judgment by reference to all the elements of Article 81 EC. 
This will reduce spurious litigation on competition grounds, while the more important and 
serious cases which are bound to come before the courts will foster the awareness of the 
judiciary, the bar and firms themselves of the true competition problems.283
d. The New Regulation 1/2003
2-î See Von Bogdandy, “Legal Equality, Legal Certainty and Subsidiarity in Transnational Economic Law' - 
Decentralized Application of Art. 81.3 EC and WTO Law: Why and why not", in: Von Bogdandy, Mavroidis & 
Meny (Eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination, Studies in Transnational Economic Law in 
Honour o f Claus-Dieter Ehlermatm (The I iague/London/New York, 2002 ), pp. 20-21.
219 See above.
280 See in this respect Bishop, supra (2001 ), p. 57; Alexiadis and Sullivan, supra (2003), p. 70.
281 See Vcnit, supra (2005 X pp. 148,151, speaking of the “procedural absurdity" of this ex lege illegality.
282 See Brown, “Notification of Agreements to the EC Commission: Whether to Submit to a Flaw'ed 
System”, 17 ELRev. 323 (1992), in particular p. 336 et seq.
283 See in this context former Commissioner Monti, “Les réformes en cours en matière de concurrence: 
Mise en perspective", Speech Made at the Cercle fédéraliste européen, (Brussels, 22 November 2002), in: 
http://europa.eu.mt/comm/competition/speeches, speaking of a “responsabilisation, par une plus grande liberté 
accordée à Eensemble des protagonistes de la politique de concurrence". One cannot, however, fail to note here 
a certain disharmony between this argumentation of the Commission and its overall enthusiasm for the 
enhancement of private antitrust enforcement.
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After substantial post-White Paper discussions (characterised as a “model of democracy”284) 
between the Commission and all interested parties (Member States, NCAs, businesses, 
lawyers, etc.), the Commission adopted a formal proposal on 27 September 2000 and 
forwarded it to the Council.285 The basic system set out in the proposal followed the White 
Paper, but it also contained provisions not spelled out there, the most important ones being 
Article 2, which provided that the burden o f proving an infringement of Article 81(1) EC 
rested with the authority, while the defendant had the burden o f proving the conditions of 
Article 81(3) EC,286 and Article 3 on exclusion of the application of national competition 
laws, which will be analysed in detail below.287
Many o f the proposed regulation's provisions were contested at Council level by some 
Member States, principally Germany, the centre of most negative reactions. However, as the 
general outlines o f the proposed system w ere accepted rather warmly and as there was a wide 
consensus that the old system was no longer tenable, the proposal’s prospects o f becoming
284 See Idot, “L ’application des articles 81 et 82 CE: L’entrée dans le nouveau millénaire...”, (2000-12) 
Europe 3, p. 4.
28i Commission Proposai fora  Council Regulation on the Implementation o f  the Rules on Competition Laid 
Down in Articles 81 and 82 o f the Treaty and Amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, 
(EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 ("Regulation Implementing Articles 81 and 82 o f the Treaty"), 
COM(2000) 582 final, OJ [2000] C 365E/284. On the Commission’s regulation proposal see e.g. Bcchtold, 
“Modernisierung des EG-Wettbewerbsrechts: Der Verordnungs-Entwurf der Kommission zur Umsetzung des 
Weißbuchs”, 55 BB 2425 (2000); Martinez Lage, “Editorial: ¿Próximo big bang en el derecho comunitario de la 
competencia?”, (2000-11/12) G J 3; Riley, “The Draft Competition Regulation”, Focus, [2000] 12 Euro.CL xi; 
Artiel, “Modernisation des règles relatives aux ententes et abus de position dominante”, Petites Affiches, 4-12- 
2000, No. 241, 7; Jalabert-Douiy, “Concurrence européenne et internationale : Le projet de nouveau règlement 
d'application des articles 81 et 82 TCE”, (2001) RDAI/1BLJ 55; Gröning, “Die dezentrale Anwendung des EG- 
Kartellrechts gemäß dem Vorschlag der Kommission zur Ersetzung der VO 17/62”, 47 WRP 83 (2001); 
Bartosch, supra (2001), p. 101 etseq.
286 Art. 2 did nothing more than codify the case law of the Community Courts. See e.g. Consten & Grundig, 
op.cit., at 347; case T-34/92, Fiatagri and New Holland Ford v. Commission, [1994] ECR 11-905, para. 99; 
Métropole Télévision, o p .c i tparas. 130-131. Because the White Paper had not addressed the question of the 
burden of proof in Art. 81(1) and (3) EC, some commentators referred to the risk that modernisation might place 
the burden of proving the conditions of Art. 81(3) EC on the Commission and on plaintiffs (see e.g. 
Mestmäcker, supra (2001), p. 233; Idot, supra (2001a), p. 343; Kist and Tierno Centella, “Coherence and 
Efficiency in a Decentralised Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: Some Reflections on the White Paper on 
Modernisation”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 375). The Commission sought to assuage 
these fears in its September 2000 proposal with the inclusion of Art. 2. See further Paulis and Gauer, supra 
(2003), p. 66. For a critical view of Art. 2 see Rinaldi, “Il regolamento del Consiglio N. 1/2003: Un primo 
esame delle principali novità e dei punti aperti della riforma sull’applicazione delle regole comunitarie in tema 
di concorrenza”, 17 Dir.Comm.Int. 143 (2003), p. 148. According to this commentator the reversal of the burden 
of proof in Art. 81(3) EC is not consistent with the philosophy of the new system and with the integrated nature 
of Art. 81 EC. An intriguing issue is the burden of proof in Art. 82 EC. While it would seem from the letter of 
Art. 2 Reg. 1/2003 that the burden o f proving all the conditions of Art. 82 EC lies with the Commission, the 
effectiveness o f competition law enforcement seems to require that the defendant should at least prove those 
facts that are within his own sphere of influence and tend to exculpate him. This should apply to efficiency 
defences or defences based on objective justification.
287 Another new - seemingly at least - provision wras Art. 7 on the imposition of structural remedies.
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law were good.288 Indeed, two wars after the official Commission proposal, on 16 December 
2002, the Council adopted the new “Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’, which became Regulation 
1/2003.289 The newr Regulation entered into force on 24 January 2003 and started to apply 
from 1 May 2004.290 It was accompanied by six Commission Notices making up the 
“Modernisation Package”, applicable from 1 May 2004.291 Since Regulation 1/2003 itself 
could not establish the details of how the new modernised and decentralised enforcement 
system would operate, the Notices were intended to fill this gap and offer national authorities 
and courts assistance in their ncwr role as EC competition law enforces. They arc essentially a 
“restatement” of substantive and procedural EC competition law'.292 Their flexibility and soft- 
law nature are perfectly adapted to the new system of self-assessment and the economic- 
based approach. They are not binding on national authorities and courts,293 but their 
persuasive value is such that they are already being treated as hard law.294 Indeed, they are 
frequently used as a source of inspiration for the application of national competition law.295 
The shift in the enforcement system that Regulation 1/2003 is stated in a celebrated manner 
in its Article 1(2), according to which “agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught 
by Article 8 1( 1) of the Treaty w hich satisfy the conditions o f Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall
m  For short descriptions of the long period between the Commission proposal of September 2000 and the 
final adoption of Reg. 1/2003, sec the Commission's Annual Reports on competition policy for 2000,2001, and 
2002, in particular the one for 2001: Commission XXXIst Report on Competition Policy - 2001 
(Brussels/Luxcm bourg, 2002), pp. 15-16.
ïtw OJ [2003J L 1/1. On the main points where Reg. 1/2003 departed from the original regulation proposal 
of September 2000 see Pignataro, ‘Ta riforma del diritto comunitario della concorrenza: II regolamento n. 
1/2003 sull'applieazione degli articoli 81 e 82 del Trattato CE”, 8 Contr. & Impr. (Eur.) 233 (2003), pp. 249- 
259.
Art. 45 Reg. 1/2003.
"yi Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ [2004j C 101/43; 
Commission Notice on Cooperation between the Commission and the Courts o f  the EU Member States in the 
Application o f Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ [2004] C 101/54; Commission Notice on the Handling o f Complaints 
by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 o f  the EC Treaty, OJ [2004] C 101/65; Commission Notice on 
Informal Guidance Relating to Novel Questions Concerning Articles 81 and 82 o f the EC Treaty that Arise in 
Individual Cases (Guidance Letters), OJ [2004] C 101/78; Commission Notice - Guidelines on the Effect on 
Trade Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 o f  the Treaty, OJ [2004] C 101/81; Communication front the 
Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the Application o f  Article 81(3) o f  the Treaty, OJ [2004] C 101/97.
:°2 With the exception of the Notice on Art. 81(3), all Notices apply equally to Art. 82 EC.
See further Pampel, “Rechtsnatur und Rechts Wirkungen von Mitteilungen der Kommission im 
europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht”, 16 EuZW 11 (2005), p. 12. It is not to be excluded, however, that unjustified 
and unqualified departure from the Notices by a national court or authority may violate Art. 10 EC, insofar as 
the Notices may make explicit what is implicit in hard law provisions of EC competition law, in Community 
Courts' case law and in their effet utile.
:°1 This raises of course a question of legitimacy as to the Commission’s action. Sec further Forrester, 
“Modernisation: An Extension of the Powers of the Commission?”, in: Geradin (Ed.), Modernisation and 
Enlargement: Two Major Challenges fo r  EC Competition Law (Antwerp/Oxford, 2004), pp. 87-89; Senden, 
“Soft Law and its Implications for Instititutional Balance in the EC”, 1(2) Utrecht Law Review 79 (2005), p. 87 
et seq.
:g? See Parret, “Judicial Protection after Modernisation of Competition Law”, 32 LIEI339 (2005), p. 347.
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not be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required”. To make this more evident, 
Articles 5 and 6 o f the new Regulation state that the competition authorities of the Member 
States and national courts will have the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC in individual 
cases. In sum, NCAs and national courts now have full competence to apply Articles 81 and 
82 EC in their entirety, the only exception being the withdrawal o f the benefit o f a block 
exemption with erga omnes effect under Article 29 of Regulation 1/2003, where the 
Commission enjoys exclusive competence.296
Under the new system, the Commission has the power to adopt four kinds of decisions. It 
may:
(a) order the termination of infringements (with or without the imposition of fines- 
negative decisions),297
(b) order interim measures (a power which was formerly judicially created),298
(c) accept commitments and make them binding on third parties,299 and
(d) declare that the competition rules do not apply to particular conduct (positive 
decisions).300
296 On the role o f national courts in such a case, see below.
297 Art. 7 Reg. 1/2003.
298 Art. 8 Reg. 1/2003.
299 Art. 9 Reg. 1/2003. The Commission may exercise this power when it intends to adopt a prohibition 
decision but refrains from doing so as a result of the commitments offered, if the commitments meet its concerns 
as expressed in its “preliminary assessment”, equivalent to a statement of objections. Interestingly enough, this 
new power of the Commission and NCAs applies to both Article 81 EC and Article 82 EC cases. For examples 
of this new procedure see case COMP/37.2 \ 4-Joint selling o f the media rights to the German Bundesliga 
(proposed commitments published in OJ [2004] C 229/13), case COMP/38.113-The Football Association 
Premier League Limited (FAPL) (proposed commitments contained in an Art. 19(3) Reg. 17 Notice, published 
at OJ [2004] C 115/3, and subsequently amended) case COMP/39.116-Coca-Cola (proposed commitments 
published in the Commission’s website on 19 October 2004) case COMP/38.38\-De Beers/ALROSA (proposed 
commitments published in OJ [2005] C 136/32); case COMP/38.^A%-Repsol CPP SA (proposed commitments 
published in OJ [2004] C 258/7); cases COMP/39A52-BUKL4 and COMP/39.15US4BAU (Santiago 
Agreement-COMP/3&.\26) (proposed commitments published in OJ [2005] C 200/11); case COMP/ 37.749- 
Austrian AirlinesS.iS cooperation agreement (proposed commitments published in OJ [2005] C 233/18); case 
COMP/38.681 -Universal International Music BV/MCPS and others (The Cannes Extension Agreement) 
(proposed commitments published in the Commission’s website on 23 May 2006 and reported in OJ [2006] C 
\22f2). In the first five cases the Commission adopted formal Decisions rendering legally binding the 
commitments concerned; Commission Decision 2005/396/EC of 19 January 2005 (Joint selling o f the media 
rights to the German Bundesliga), OJ [2005] L 134/46; Commission Decision of 22 March 2006 (Joint selling 
o f the media rights to the FA Premier League); Commission Decision of 22 June 2005 (Coca-ColaJ, 
Commission Decision 2006/520/EC of 22 February 2006 (De Beers/ALROSA), OJ [2006] L 205/24; 
Commission Decision of 12 April 2006 (Repsol CPP SA). In the other cases the Commission intended to 
proceed to a formal Decision after inviting interested third parties to submit their comments. On the bearing of 
these decisions on national proceedings, see below'. There are commentators that have doubted whether such 
commitments decisions are compatible with the Treaty. According to this line of criticism, Art. 83(2Xb) EC, on 
which Reg. 1/2003 is based, speaks of “detailed rules for the application of Article 81(3)”, yet a commitments 
decision does not amount to “application” of law, at least with regard to Art. 81(3) EC. See e.g. Jaeger, supra 
(2000), p. 1069. This view, however, appears overly formalistic. Besides, Art. 83(1) EC, which “speaks of 
appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82”, is wide 
enough to cover such commitments decisions.
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The new Regulation provides also for extensive duties of co-operation between the 
Commission and NCAs and courts. These are further specified in notices and guidelines in 
the “Modernisation Package'’.30 01
Regulation 1/2003 was hailed by most actors in EC competition enforcement as a 
breakthrough, since it ended the Commission’s monopoly on granting exemptions under 
Article 81(3) EC and it placed “national competition authorities and courts in the driving seat 
for much o f competition law enforcement”,302 thus also lending more legitimacy to EC 
competition law.303 As already noted, the fundamental basis o f the new system is that it 
abolishes the notification and authorisation system and decentralises antitrust enforcement to 
NCAs and courts. It thus leads to a certain “privatisation” o f competition policy enforcement, 
since the burdens and risks of the Treaty competition rules will fall entirely on companies and 
their legal advisers,304 who must now engage in rigorous self-assessment.305 That is bound to 
lead to “a new, ‘rights-based' common culture of competition in the Community”.306
3. The Pillars of the New Decentralised System of EC Competition Law 
Enforcement: “Centralised Decentralisation”?
The new decentralised system of enforcement had a profound effect on Member States’ laws 
and institutions. It has firstly succeeded in creating a level-playing field for competition law 
enforcement in Europe, favouring as much as possible the “one-stop shop” principle, and has
300 Art. 10 Reg. 1/2003. Only the Commission is competent to take this last ty pe of decision, and only when 
the Community public interest so requires. NCAs will not have the competence to take such decisions. The 
national courts are, of course, not precluded from applying Articles 81 and 82 in full in their jurisdiction, either 
negatively or positively.
301 See below.
302 Thus, according to Melanie Johnson, Parliamentary undersecretary of State for competition, consumers 
and markets, in: Department of Trade and Industry, op.cit.
303 On the legitimacy brought about by the decentralised application of EC competition law by national 
authorities and courts, see Maher, “Re-imagining the Story of European Competition Law”, 20 OJLS 155 
(2000), p. 159.
304 On the “privatisation” of EC competition law enforcement already in the context of block exemption 
regulations, where the Commission has in a sense “delegated” its review power to companies’ in-house 
compliance departments, see Marsden, “Inducing Member State Enforcement of European Competition Law: A 
Competition Policy Approach to ‘Antitrust Federalism’”, 18 ECLR 234 (1997), p. 235.
5 See Mersing, “The Modernization of EC Competition Law' - The Need for a Common Competition 
Culture”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 1999, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2000), p. 262; Venit, supra (2003), p. 546; Bechtlod, “MaBstübe der 
‘Selbstveranlagung* nach Art. 81 Abs. 3 EG”, Kommentar, 53(4) WuW (2003). See also Rev, “Les enjeux de la 
réforme: Le point de vue d'un économiste", (2001-7/8) Rev.Conc.Consomm. 11, p. 12, speaking of 
“responsabilisation des entreprises”.
300 See Middleton, “Modernization of European Community Competition Law Enforcement for the Tw enty- 
first Century”, in: Humanizing our Global Order, Essays in Honour o f  Ivan Head (Toronto, 2003), p. 125.
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secondly created a legislative and enforcement model that is widely copied and followed 
nationally. We can thus speak of the formation o f  a common EU-wide system of competition 
law enforcement, which may not be of a strictly federal nature, \e t has many federal 
elements.
It is interesting to note that communitarisation and decentralisation, two aims that may at first 
glance seem antithetical, go hand-in-hand. Thus, the expansion in the application of EC 
competition law in Europe, or in other words the ‘"communitarisation'’ of competition law 
enforcement, has been characterised in recent years by a parallel and proportionate process of 
decentralisation. Conversely, decentralisation itself leads to more checks and balances which 
ensure consistency in the system. This is the rather paradoxical link between decentralisation 
itself, and greater harmonisation, unification and, ultimately, communitarisation.307 The most 
striking features o f the modernisation and decentralisation o f competition law enforcement in 
Europe are the extended application of Community over national competition law and the 
strengthening of the “Community” identity o f  national enforcement organs when they apply 
EC competition law. These are in a sense the fundamental pillars upon which the new system 
is based.
a. Strengthening the Supremacy of Community over National Competition Law
One specific issue which deserves attention is the applicability o f EC competition law to the 
facts of a case and, more particularly, the relationship between that law and the national 
competition laws o f  the EU Member States. The new Regulation has placed this whole
307 Thus, decentralisation and subsidiarity have in this sense another facet, one of integration, 
harmonisation, unification and communitarisation. This is “l'effet caché et paradoxal” of subsidiarity, in the 
words of Lucas de Leyssac and Parleani, supra (2002), p. 794. See also Whish and Sufrin, supra (2000), p. 152; 
Gautron, “Subsidiarité ou néo-subsidiarité”, 8 RAE/LEA 3 (1998), p. 6; Tesauro, supra (2000b), p. 156; idem, 
supra (2001 ), p. 260. Compare also the Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in cases C-94/04, Federico Cipolla v. 
Rosaria Fazari (née Portolese) and C-202/04, Ste/ano Macrino and Claudia Capodarte v. Roberto Meloni, 
judgment pending, para. 28: “The force awarded by the Court to judgments it has delivered in the past may be 
considered to derive from the need to secure the values of cohesion, uniformity and legal certainty inherent in 
any system of law. Those values are all the more important within the context of a decentralised system of 
applying the law such as that of the Community legal system.” For a more general perspective compare the 
parallelism between integration and decentralisation drawn by Tizzano, supra (1995), p. 114; idem, supra 
(2001), p. 210. According to the latter author, the further integration advances, the greater should the 
involvement of national authorities and courts be, so as to ensure democracy, participation and to guarantee the 
efficiency of the whole system. At the same time, the more such authorities and courts take part in realising the 
Community's objectives and tasks, the more bound they are in their actions to respect the rules and goals of the 




question on a different basis and the supremacy of EC over national competition law has now 
been strengthened.
aa. The Confirmation of the Broad Nature of the Effect on Trade among 
Member States
Community competition law is applicable if the anti-competitive practice in question has an 
actual or potential effect on trade between Member States, which is the jurisdictional 
boundary between Community and national competition law.308 The Court of Justice has in 
the past given a broad interpretation to this criterion, so as to bring as many practices as 
possible into the ambit o f Community law.309 This broad interpretation furthers the Treaty's 
basic aim of ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted (Article 3(1 )(g) 
EC).310 Although the Court has occasionally followed a narrower meaning,311 the broad 
interpretation remains the norm312
In the decentralised enforcement system a narrow interpretation of the effect on inter-state 
trade would run counter to one of the most prominent aims of the reform, which is to involve 
as many enforcers as possible in EC competition law enforcement.313 It would also lead to re­
308 See Kirchner, “Verhältnis zwischen deutschem Kartellrecht und europäischem Wettbewerbsrccht - 
Zuständigkeiten, Konflikte, Reformkonzepte”, in: Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 2001, Referate des XXIX. 
FlW-Seminars (Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, 2002), p. 3, who rightly stresses that the inter-state trade effect 
criterion is not based on a clear legal notion, but rather on an economic-legal one,
309 Case 56/65, Sociétè Technique Miniere (LTM) v, Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (MBU), [1966] ECR 235; 
case 126/80, Maria SaIonia v. Giorgio Poidomani et al., [1981] ECR 1563; case C-41 /90, Klaus Höfnerand 
Fritz Elser v, Macrotron, [1991] ECR 1-1979.
310 Sec e.g. Ellger, “Das Verhältnis der Wettbewerbsregeln des EG-V zu den Gesetzen gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Vom Vorrangprinzip zur 
Exklusivitätsregeln”, in: Basedow, Drobnig etal. (Eds.), Aufbruch nach Europa, 75 Jahre Max-Planck-Institut 
fü r  Privatrecht (Tübingen, 2001), p. 269.
311 Cases C-215/96 and C-216/96, Carlo Bagnasco et al. v. Banco Popolare di Novara Scarl and Cassa di 
Rispamtio di Genova e Imperia SpA, [1999] ECR 1-135.
312 The Court of Justice has recently restated its traditional view that agreements relating to the marketing of 
products in only one Member State are still capable of affecting inte-state trade. See case C-359/01, British 
Sugar pic v. Commission, [2004] ECR 1-4933, paras. 27-28.
313 This appears to have escaped the Commission’s attention in its Dutch Banking Association Decision that 
was rendered after the publication of the White Paper and which followed Bagnasco (Commission Decision 
1999/687/EC of 8 September 1999 (Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (1991 GST agreement), Nederlandse 
Postorderbond, Verenigde Nederlandse Uitgeversbedrijven and Nederlandse Organisatie van Tijdschriften 
Uitgevers Nederlandse Christelijke Radio Vereniging), OJ [1999] L 271/28). In that respect the view- of a 
Commission official that the scope of application of Arts. 81 and 82 EC should not be narrowed and that a w ide 
interpretation of the effect on inter-state trade should continue to be adopted, is in the right direction (see Paulis, 
“Panel Two Discussion: Coherence”, in: Ehlermaim & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 
2000: The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust Policy* (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 284; idem, supra (2001a), p, 404). 
If we also take into account the doubts expressed by Former Advocate General Tesauro as to Bagnasco 
(Tesauro, “Panel Two Discussion: Coherence”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law 
Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 300), then we wonder
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nationalisation o f  competition law enforcement in Europe.314 As already stressed, the 
communitarisation o f  competition law enforcement is inherently connected with a parallel 
and proportionate process of decentralisation and conversely decentralisation requires a 
certain communitarisation of laws and institutions.315 That is why proposals to substitute, by 
means of legislation or judicial interpretation, a “Community interest” criterion for the inter­
state trade effect criterion, should be rejected316 Community interest can only be an 
administrative or procedural marker defining whether the anti-competitive practice will be 
dealt with by the Commission or national authorities. In such a case the enforcer may vary, 
but the law applicable to the practice in question remains Community competition law.
Indeed, in its recent Notice on the effect on trade between Member States,317 the Commission 
seems to follow the traditional liberal interpretation. The Notice lists the three elements to be 
addressed when considering whether trade between Member States may be affected. Firstly, 
the concept of ‘trade between Member States” implies that there must be an impact on the 
flow of goods and services or other forms o f economic activity, involving at least two 
Member States. Secondly, the notion “may affect” implies that it must be possible to foresee 
with a sufficient degree of probability that the agreement or practice may have an influence 
(direct or indirect, actual or potential) on the pattern of trade between Member States. 
Thirdly, the notion o f “effect” incorporates a  quantitative criterion, so effects must be o f a 
certain magnitude for EC law to apply.
whether this ruling will continue to be good law in the new system of enforcement. On Bagnasco and the 
modernisation see also Venit, supra (2001), pp. 465-471.
314 See M. Drahos, Convergence o f  Competition Laws and Policies in die European Community. Germany, 
Austria, and the Netherlands (The Hague/London/Boston, 2001), p. 433.
315 See above.
310 See Wesseling, “The Commission Notices on Decentralisation of EC Antitrust Law- In for a Penny, Not 
for a Pound”, 18 ECLR 94 (1997), p. 96; Rodger and Wylie, “Taking the Community Interest Line: 
Decentralisation and Subsidiarity7 in Competition Law Enforcement”, 18 ECLR 485 (1997), p. 490; Wifimann, 
supra (2000), p. 126. These proposals lead to confusion between a substantive criterion (inter-state trade ctfect) 
that determines the applicability of Community or national law, and a procedural-administrative one that 
determines the enforcing authority of Community competition law. In any event, while these views may have 
been reasonable under the old centralised enforcement system, they are inconsistent with the decentralised 
model of Reg. 1/2003, which clearly presupposes the use of the above two criteria for different purposes. In 
particular, the Community interest criterion will be widely used in the demarcation of competences and 
allocation of cases between the Commission and NCAs. This becomes more apparent in the Commission Notice 
on co-operation within the European Competition Network (ECN). Compare also the pertinent use of the 
“Community public interest” in Art 10 Reg. 1/2003, according to which the Commission will have exclusive 
competence, to the exclusion of NCAs, to adopt “inapplicability” decisions. On the distinction betw een “inter­
state trade effect” and “Community interest” see also Schaub, “EC Competition System: Proposals for Reform”, 
in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 1998, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute (New York, 1999), pp. 130-131.
317 OJ [2004] C 101/81. For a first view of the Notice see Idot, supra (2004c), p, 44 ei seq.\ Viennois, 
“Clarification du champ duplication du droit communautaire de la concurrence: Breves observations sur la 
communication de la Commission europeenne relative a la notion d’affectation du commerce figurant aux 
articles 81 et 82 du Traité”, Petites Affiches, 22-9-2004, No. 190,9.
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The Notice attempts to tackle the question o f the appreciability o f effect by employing two 
presumptions, one negative and one positive, which rely on quite low thresholds, thus 
extending the scope of Community competition law.31* According to the negative 
presumption, for an agreement to be presumed not to affect inter-state trade appreciably, the 
aggregate market share of the parties on any relevant market within the Community must not 
exceed 5 %, and the aggregate annual Community turnover in the products covered by the 
agreement must not exceed BUR 40 million.318 19 The turnover criterion refers to both 
undertakings concerned in case of horizontal agreements, and to the supplier in the case of 
vertical agreements. According to the positive presumption, an agreement or practice which 
by its very nature is capable of affecting trade between Member States, for example because 
it concerns imports or exports or covers several Member States, will be presumed to affect 
inter-state trade appreciably if the annual Community turnover exceeds EUR 40 million or 
the market share of the parties exceeds 5 %.320
bb. The Relationship between National and Community Competition law -  The 
Pre-existing Unsatisfactory State of the Law
Owing to the broad interpretation o f the inter-state trade effect criterion, many practices 
connected with a particular Member State which thus fall under national competition law arc 
also caught by the Treaty competition rules. The two legal regimes therefore apply 
cumulatively to such practices.321 The relationship therefore between Community and
318 See paras. 52-53 of the Notice. Some commentators go as far as arguing that thede minimis rule is no 
longer in accord with the ejfet utile of the Treaty competition rules under the new' decentralised system of 
enforcement. See e.g. Viennois, supra (2004), p. 12.
319 This rule is often referred to as the “NAAT -  non-appreciable-affectation-of-trade” rule. According to 
the Commission, the product-specific turnover criterion is a better indicator of trade effects than global turnover. 
See in this respect Director General Lowe, “Recent Reforms and Future Projects for the Enforcement of the EU 
Anti-trust System”, Speech Made at the Annual Conference of the Spanish Antitrust Court”, July 8th 2003, in: 
http://europa.eu.mt/comm/competition/speeches, pp. 3-4; Fellenius-Omnell, Landstrflm and Coyet, 
“Modernizing EC Competition Law: Will a System of Parallel Application of EC and National Competition 
Laws Ensure Convergence?”, in: Hawk (Ed.), Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 2002 (New York, 2003), p. 109.
3:0 Sec para. 53 of the Notice. The 5 % positive presumption does not apply if  the agreement covers only 
part of a Member State.
321 The cumulative application of both national and EC competition law to these practices is the rule, unless 
the national legislation provides otherwise. This is the case in Italian law', which is expressly applicable only to 
conduct that does not fall under the EC competition rules (Art 1(1) of L. 287 of 10 October 1990). However, 
the Italian authority and courts have interpreted this provision strictly and exclude the application of Italian law 
not in all cases of applicability of EC law, but only w here the latter has been or is actually applied. See further 
Benedcttelli, “Ulteriori rificssioni sull’ambito di applicazione della legge n. 287/1990 (risposta a Marino Bin)”, 
8 Contr. & Impr. 587 (1992), pp. 596-597; Munari, supra (1992), p. 623; Frignani, “Competition Law in Italy”, 
in: Vogelaar, Stuyck & Reeken (Eds.), Competition Law in the EU, its Member Suites and Switzerland, Vol. I,
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national competition law is a critical issue. While Article 83(2)(e) EC mentions the 
determination o f the relationship between national competition laws and EC competition law 
as a possible object o f secondary Community legislation, until recently this provision had 
never been used to that effect.322 Regulation 1/2003 breaks with this pattern and is explicitly 
also based on that Treaty provision.
Historically, there have been two views on the relationship between national and EC 
competition law. The “single barrier’ theory held that the applicability of Community 
competition law excluded national competition laws altogether,323 and the rather more 
popular "double barrier” theory held that the two sets of rules had different objectives, and 
were therefore both applicable. Consequently, an agreement or practice had to pass both tests 
in order to be lawful.324 Thus the more stringent legal regime would always prevail over the 
more lenient.
In Walt Wilhelm325 the Court of Justice accepted in principle that national and Community 
competition laws differ in their points o f  view, since Community law regards anti­
competitive behaviour in light o f the resulting obstacles to inter-state trade, and therefore 
both might be applicable. However, the Court stressed that this parallel application must not 
prejudice the uniform application o f EC competition law and the effectiveness (effet utile) of 
the relevant Community implementing measures. In other words, the Court rejected an 
unqualified application of the "double barrier” theory as contrary to Community law.326 
Working in the context of Article 81 EC and with reference to prohibition and exemption 
decisions taken by the Commission, the Court then made a sibylline reference to "certain
EC, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland (The Hague/Deventer, 2000), p. 
375; Oglio, “Italy”, in: Maitland-Walker (Ed.), Competition Laws o f Europe (London, 2003), p. 248. Danish law 
also contained a parallel provision (s. 4 of the Competition Act, which is now repealed), according to which 
national law would not apply to anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices falling under Community 
law that had been granted an individual exemption by the Commission or that satisfied the requirements of a 
block exemption regulation. The Danish rule was o f more limited scope than the Italian one, since it referred 
only to Art. 81 EC conduct. At the same time, however, it went further than the Halt Wilhelm principle (see 
infra), in excluding the cumulative applicability of national competition law altogether in such cases, even if the 
latter did not prejudice the uniform and effective application of Art. 81 EC. The UK Competition Act, as it 
currently stands, in s. 10 follows a similar approach, providing that any agreements exempted from the 
Community prohibition under Art. 81(3) will also be exempt from the equivalent domestic prohibition of 
Chapter I. The same is true, if the agreement falls under a Community block exemption regulation. See further 
Taylor, supra (1999), p. 101 et seq.
322 In dealing with this issue, Reg. 1/2003 is also based on Art 83(2Xe). See Recital 8.
323 See Catalano, “Rapports entre les règles de concurrence établies par le Traité CEE et les législations des 
États membres”, 15 RIDC 269 (1963), p. 283 et seq.
324 See Koch, “Das Verhältnis der Kartell Vorschriften des EWG-Vertrags zum Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen”, 14 BB 241 (1959), p. 244 et seq.
325 Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1969] ECR 1.
320 It is true, however, that the Court did not elaborate on the different possibilities of conflict between 
Community and national parallel proceedings.
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positive, though indirect” Community measures, which aim at promoting a harmonious 
development o f economic activities in the Community.327 328Presumably such measures would 
exclude an inconsistent application o f national law.
Following these principles, if Community competition law prohibited a certain anti­
competitive practice, the principle o f supremacy applied in full and national competition law 
could not permit that practice. In addition, Community- competition law could prohibit a 
practice that had been permitted under national competition law by national authorities or 
courts.329 If both laws prohibited the same behaviour, there was no conflict.330 If EC 
competition law did not apply because there was no actual or potential effect on trade 
between Member States, then only national competition law- was applicable.331 A problem 
arose when the behaviour in question was not prohibited under EC competition law, but 
national competition law w as stricter. The possibility of conflicts was more evident in cases 
governed by Article 81 EC, which is a more technically and procedurally complex provision 
than Article 82 EC.
There have been differing views as to what constituted a “positive” Community measure. 
Almost all commentators considered that individual exemption decisions had this quality in 
view of their constitutive nature.332 It has been debated whether block exemptions were also
327 Walt Wilhelm, op.cit., para. 5.
328 See e g. Rounis, supra (1992), p. 42; Putman, supra (1998), p. 381.
329 Cases43/82 and 63/82, Vereniging terBevordering van het llaamse Boekwezen (IBlB) and Vereniging 
ter Bevordering van de Belangen des Boekhandels (IT3BB) v. Commission, [1984] ECR 19, para. 40; case 45/85, 
Verband der Sachversicherer e.V, v. Commission, [1987] ECR 405, paras. 20-24; case T-66/89, Publishers 
Association v. Commission, [1992] ECR-II-1995, paras. 19-21,78-79. The latter judgment was set aside by the 
Court of Justice in case C-360/92, The Publishers Association v. Commission, [1995] ECR 1-23, paras. 30-32, 
42, because, although the Commission was not bound by the pre-existing decision of the national competition 
authority in question, which had applied national competition law, it nevertheless did not reason its departure 
from the national authority’s findings, although the addressee of the Commission decision had raised this 
specific plea during the administrative proceedings.
330 The only problem in this case lay in the sanctions and in the «on bis in idem principle.
331 See e g. Corte di cassazione, 30-6-01, n° 8887, which held that Italian competition law could apply to 
practices that had been considered in the Bagnasco judgment of the ECJ as not satisfying the inter-state trade 
effect criterion.
332 See Stockmann, “EEC Competition Law and Member State Competition Laws”, in: Hawk (Ed ), North 
American and Common Market Antitrust and Trade Laws 1987, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute (New York, 1988), pp. 291-293; Lieberknecht, “Das Verhältnis der EWG- 
Gruppcnffeistellungsveroidnungen zum deutschen Kartellrecht”, in: Freiherr von Gramm, Raisch & Tiedemann 
(Eds.), Strafrecht, Untemehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht, Festschrift fur Gerd Pfeiffer (Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, 
1988), p. 596; Klaue, “Einige Bemerkungen Über die Zukunft der Zweischrankentheorie”, in: Baur, Hopt & 
Mailänder (Eds.), Festschrift fö r  Emst Steindotff zum 70. Geburtstag am 13 März 1990 (Berlin/New York, 
1990), p. 985; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 151; contra M. Furse, Competition Law o f  the UK and EC (London, 
2000), pp. 30 and 275. According to one view, which had later been largely surpassed, not all individual 
exemptions should be considered “positive” measures and one had to proceed to an ad hoc examination of the 
specific exemption decision, in order to ascertain whether it was a measure expressing the Community 
economic policy (see Markert, “Some Legal and Administrative Problems of the Co-Existence of Community 
and National Competition Law in the EEC”, 11 CMLRev. 92 (1974), pp. 96-97; for a revival of that view- see
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such “positive” measures, with most authors believing that they were, thus pre-empting 
stricter national law.333
On the other hand, negative clearance decisions334 and comfort letters with the characteristics 
of either o f a negative clearance or an exemption335 were not covered, and could therefore not
Lane, supra (2000), pp. 216-217). Another view, which had not had many followers, propagated that the quality 
of an individual exemption as a “positive” measure meant that national competition law could not affect the core 
of the Community measure as such, but could, nevertheless, exercise control over the undertakings’ eventual 
abusive conduct subsequent to the exemption (theory of the core, Kembereichslehre\ see Rehbinder, “Der 
Vorrang des EG-Kartellrechts vor nationalem Kartellrecht bei Freistellungen: Dogmatische Konstruktion, 
Sachargumente und politische Interessen”, in: Immenga, Möschei & Reuter (Eds.), Festschrift für Emst- 
Joachim Mestmäcker zum 70. Geburtstag (Baden-Baden, 1996), p. 716). See also Zekoll, “European 
Community Competition Law and National Competition Laws: Compatibility Problems from a German 
Perspective”, 24 Vand.JTransnat'lL 75 (1991), p. 99, with further references to early views of the Commission, 
which also seemed to favour the theory of the core, by holding that a national prohibition should not affect the 
substance of an exemption. The same author concludes that German courts have not accepted easily the 
supremacy of Community over national competition law (idem, p. 101 et seq:, see also Braun, supra (1996), p. 
455 et seq.). On the early views of the Commission see Commission IVth Report on Competition Policy - Î974 
(Brussels/Luxembourg, 1975),p. 34,
333 See AG Tesauro’s Opinion in case C-70/93, Bayerische Motorenwerke AG v. .ILD Auto-Leasing D 
GmbH, [1995] ECR 1-3439: “the [group] exemption granted to [agreements] cannot but prevent the national 
authorities from ignoring the positive assessment put on them by the Community authorities. Otherwise, not 
only would a given agreement be treated differently depending on the law of each Member State, thus detracting 
from the uniform application of Community law, but the full effectiveness of a Community measure - which an 
exemption under Article 85(3) [nowr 81(3)] undoubtedly is - would also be disregarded” (paras. 38-39). See also 
Lieberknecht, supra (1988), pp. 597-599; M. Golfinopoulou, Regulation EEC/556/89 on Know-How Licensing 
(Athens/Komotini, 1989) [in Greek], pp. 80-81; Klaue, supra (1990), p. 985; Anagnostopoulou and 
Kleftodimou, supra (1992), p. 186; Zekoll (albeit with some qualifications), supra (1991), p. 105 et seq:, 
Tesauro, supra (2000a), p. 4; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 151; Petsche and Rinne, in: Liebscher, Flohr & Petsche 
(Eds.), Handbuch der EU-Gntppenfreistellungsverordnungen (München/Wien, 2003), p. 130; contra 
Stockmann, supra (1988), p. 291 et seq. It is interesting to note the w'ords used by AG Van Gerven in his 
Opinion in Delimitis, op.cit., para. 5: “The issue of [a block] exemption is an act o f  policy which falls within the 
exclusive competence of the Commission” (emphasis added). Doubts have been expressed as to the “new 
generation” block exemption Regulations, which do not contain “w hite lists” o f permitted clauses, therefore, the 
argument went, could not be “positive” measures that can supersede national competition law. This was, 
however, a very formalistic view' of the new Regulations. See Tzouganatos, supra (2001), pp. 127-128, who, 
referring to Reg. 2790/1999, stresses that, notwithstanding the absence of a “white list”, the conditions for the 
block exemption are sufficiently precise and, therefore, express in a positive way the Community competition 
policy on the field. The view' that national stricter law could sometimes supersede block exemption regulations 
relied on certain Recitals of some old Regulations that were leaving some leeway to stricter national law (e g. 
Recital 19 Reg. 1984/1983; Recital 29 Reg. 123/1985; Recital 13 Reg. 4087/1988). See further Soufleros, supra 
(1989), p. 308 et seq. However, other authors stress that the exceptional existence of these permissive Recitals 
meant that in principle block exemption regulations pre-empted national law (Lieberknecht, supra (1988), p. 
599). In any case, such references are no longer found in the new Regulations, which now state clearly in their 
Recitals that “in accordance with the principle of primacy of Community law', no measure taken pursuant to 
national law s on competition should prejudice the uniform application throughout the common market of the 
Community competition rules or the full effect of any measures adopted in implementation of those rules, 
including [the relevant] Reulation” (Recital 17 Reg. 2790/1999; Recital 19 Reg. 2658/2000; Recital 23 Reg. 
2659/2000; Recital 29 Reg. 358/2003).
334 See Galinsky, “The Resolution of Conflicts Between UK and Community Competition Law”, 15 ECLR 
16 (1994), p. 18; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 153.
335 See e g. Bcchtold, “Antitrust Law in the European Community and Germany: An Uncoordinated Co­
existence?”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 1992, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (New York/Deventer, 1993), pp. 349-350. In cases 253/78 and 1/79 to 3/79, Procureur 
de la République v. Giry and Guerlain et a l,  [1980] ECR 2327, para. 18, the Court wrent on to stress that a 
comfort letter “cannot by itself have the result of preventing the national authorities from applying to those 
agreements provisions of national competition law which may be more rigorous than Community competition
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restrict the application of national competition law. However, in recent years this latter view 
has been criticised as formalistic, since a negative clearance might well express the 
Community competition policy in a precise way, for example if  the Commission considered 
that an agreement did not restrict competition at all.* 336 Another argument was that it seemed 
paradoxical to protect agreements restrictive of competition which had been granted an 
exemption against national law, but not to do the same for agreements that were less 
restrictive or not restrictive at all.337 38The same could be true for comfort letters, especially 
those having the form o f an individual exemption, which presented many of the 
characteristics of “positive measures”.331
cc. The Relationship between National and Community Competition law -  The
Supremacy Rule of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003
law in this respect". According to the dominant view, national competition law could also apply to and prohibit 
agreements notified to the Commission under the opposition procedure of Art 4 of the old Reg. 240/1996 on 
technology transfers, if the Commission did not object thereto within four months of their notification. See, 
however, Lieberknecht, supra (1988), p. 600, who equated the Commission’s non-opposition to an individual 
exemption and denied, therefore, the application of stricter national law.
336 See e.g. Kovar, “Intervention : Les conflits dans la réglementation des pratiques restrictives de 
concurrence entre l’ordre juridique communautaire et l'ordre juridique français”, in. Les conflits des 
réglementations dans le droit français et le droit communautaire des pratiques réstrictives de concurrence, 
Journées d'étude de droit de la concurrence (Lyon 24 et 25 mai 1984) (Lyon, 1985), pp, 192-193; Ullrich, 
“Harmonisation within the European Union”, 17 ECLR 178 (1996), p. 181. The adoption by the Commission in 
a negative clearance of a rule of reason approach could attach to that decision the character of a “positive 
measure” that expressed the Community competition policy in the Walt Wilhelm sense. See in this sense 
Munari, supra ( 1992), p. 38.
337 See in this sense Lieberknecht, supra (1988), p. 601 et seq:, Walz, “Rethinking Walt Wilhelm, or the 
Supremacy of Community Competition Law over National Law”, 21 ELRev, 449 (1996), p. 455. Compare also 
AG Tesauro’s Opinion, para. 59, in case C-266/93, Bundeskartei lam t v. Volkswagen and VAG Leasing, [1995] 
ECR 1-3477. See also Wesseling, supra (1999), p. 427, who rightly used the argument of the changed 
circumstances, to stress that the Walt Wilhelm era divergencies of objectives between national and EC 
competition laws were no longer existent, therefore a negative clearance under Art. 81(1) EC should have a 
certain value in national competition law. However, if  the negative clearance stated that Article 81( 1 ) EC is not 
applicable, because the agreement did not have an appreciable effect on inter-state trade, then naturally national 
competition law could prohibit that agreement.
338 See Schwarze, “Die Auswirkungen des Vorrangs des Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das deutsche Kartell- und 
Wettbewerbsrecht”, 51 JZ 57 (1996), pp. 62-63; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 100. Compare case C-376/92, Metro 
SB-Großmärkte GmbH de Co. KG v. Cartier SA, [1994] ECR 1-15, where the Court essentially held that a 
distribution system that had been considered compatible with EC competition law through a Commission 
comfort letter should not be prohibited under German competition law. That case concerned a specific principle 
of German unfair competition law', under which a selective distribution system can be enforced as against 
persons that have assumed obligations under the contract, only if the system is “impervious” (liickenlosig), i.e. 
unauthorised dealers can obtain the goods covered by that system only by participating in the breach by an 
authorised dealer of his contractual obligations. If  the lack of “imperviousness” of the system leads to 
competition against authorised dealers from independent dealers, the manufacturer will no longer be able to 
compel the members of his network to comply with their contracts. The Court’s approach was that to make the 
validity of a selective distribution system under A rt 81(1 ) EC conditional on its “imperviousness” would lead to 
the paradoxical result that the most inflexible and most tightly sealed distribution systems would be treated more 
favourably under Art. 81(1) EC than distribution systems that are more flexible and more open to parallel 
transactions.
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A basic fear that emerged after the publication of the White Paper referred to the risk of re- 
nationalisation o f competition law enforcement in Europe.339 The argument was that under a 
system of legal exception Article 81(3) EC would implicitly be devoid of any policy 
discretion included therein, and there would no longer be exemption decisions of a 
constitutive nature which could have been considered “positive” measures in the Walt 
Wilhelm sense. Instead, all decisions of inapplicability would have the character o f a negative 
clearance of a declaratory nature, meaning that according to that case law and the dominant 
double barrier theory, the application of stricter national competition law could not be 
excluded.340 The same would hold true for block exemption regulations, which would 
essentially be “block negative clearances”.341 National competition authorities and courts 
would therefore have an incentive under the new system to discard EC and instead apply 
national competition law, thus prohibiting agreements which under EC competition law 
would be legal.342 In addition, the Commission had lately been following a more economic 
approach to the notion of restriction of competition, with the result that fewer agreements 
reached the stage o f Article 81(3) EC scrutiny. This would mean that the permission of such 
agreements under the first rather than the third paragraph of Article 81 EC would not qualify 
as a “positive” measure in the Walt Wilhelm sense, so the possible application of stricter 
national law could not be excluded.343
Re-nationalisation o f  competition law enforcement would also be the result of the companies’ 
own drive to notify agreements nationally thus making up for some o f the legal certainty' 
benefits lost through the abolition of the Community notification system. Thus, some 
commentators expected companies, in cases of concurrent applicability of Community and 
national law, to notify nationally so as to get a strategic advantage.344 This, however, would 
w eaken the effectiveness of the new system o f legal exception.
339 See e.g. Ehlermann, supra (2000b), p. 1; idem, “Artikel 3 des Kommissionsvorschlags vom September 
2000 - Wohlbegrilndet!”, Kommentar, 51(3) WuW (2001); Idol, supra (2001a), pp. 348-351.
340 See Wesseling, supra (1999), pp. 430-431; Ellger, supra (2001), p. 291; MestmScker, supra (2001), pp. 
239-240; Venit, supra (2001), pp. 462-463.
341 Some authors have even gone as far as to argue that such “block negative clearances”, which will haw a 
declaratory character, cannot oust national competition law, thus being in essence “pseudo-regulations”.
342 See also Tesauro, supra (2001), p. 266, stressing the need to activate NCAs to resort to EC rules through 
a realignment of the relationship betw een Community and national competition laws.
See Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 67; Paulis, supra (2001b), pp. 21-22, rejecting the idea of a 
competition among substantive competition laws because this would constitute a multiplicity of baniers to the 
detriment of companies.
344 See e.g. Folguera, “The Impact of the Commission’s Modernization White Paper and Vertical Restraints 
Regulation on Member State Antitrust Laws”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2000, 
Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2001), pp. 168-170,
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To assuage these fears, the Commission included for the first time in its official regulation 
proposal of September 2000 a specific provision (Article 3), which provided for the exclusive 
application o f EC competition law - if  the inter-state trade effect criterion was satisfied - by 
all enforcers, thus, also by national competition authorities and courts.345 This provision was 
strongly opposed by many commentators and, in particular, by some national competition 
authorities, because it was alleged that it would lead to the near-total neutralisation of 
national competition law.346 In the course of the negotiations in the Council it became the 
main point o f friction between the Commission and some Member States. Eventually, a 
compromise was reached in the Council and the new Regulation as adopted includes an 
obligation for national competition authorities and national courts to apply Articles 81 and 82 
EC concurrently with their national competition law347 if the inter-state trade effect criterion 
is satisfied. More importantly, the new provision excludes the application of stricter national 
competition law to agreements not falling under Article 81 EC as a whole or which are 
covered by a block exemption regulation.348
'u<! While the White Paper had not included a proposal to that effect, the Commission officials had on many 
occasions in the past alluded to such a possibility. See e g. Schaub, supra (1999), pp. 149-150.
316 See Arhel, “Modernisation des règles communautaires relatives à la mise en œuvre de l'interdiction des 
ententes et abus de position dominante (publication du nouveau règlement)”, Petites Affiches, 2-4-2003, No. 66,
6, p. 8.
3r Art. 3(1) Reg. 1/2003. Note that the letter of this provision imposes the application of Community 
competition law, if national competition law is applied to conduct affecting inter-state trade, but this obligation 
docs not naturally go vice versa. In other words, it does not mean that the national authority or court must apply 
its national competition law concurrently when it applies Community law; it remains free to discard the former 
and apply only the latter, if it so prefers. See Director General Lowe, “European Competition Rules: The New 
Enforcement System for Articles 81 and 82 EC Is soon to Be Reality”, Article for KANGAROO Group 
Newsletter, September 2003, in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches, p. 2, stressing that “of course 
[national courts and NCAs] may also apply Articles 81 and 82 on a stand-alone basis”. The aim is the 
application of EC law be it exclusively or, at the very least, concurrently with national law. Another point to be 
made here, is that this provision does not affect the national competition authority’s discretion - if such a 
discretion exists under its national law - to act. There is only a duty to apply EC competition law, only i f  that 
authority decides to act. This point does not apply to national courts, which, as juges communautaires de droit 
commun, are under a duty to apply EC competition law in all cases, where it is applicable, even ex officio, under 
the Van Schijndel principles (cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Jeroen Van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaos 
Comelis Van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, (1995) ECR 1-4705). However, as wre 
argue belowr, Art. 3 does not alter the I an Schijndel principles.
** Art. 3(2) Reg. 1/2003. However, unilateral conduct permitted under Art 82 EC can still be prohibited 
under stricter national rules on abuse of a dominant position or of economic dependence (as is, for example, the 
case in German, Greek, and French law). See also Recital 8 in fine of the new Regulation. A question arises as 
to the definition of what constitutes such “unilateral conduct”, as there are some situations that can be 
categorised as subject both to the rules on agreements, concerted practices and decisions and to the rules on the 
abuse of dominant position. Such is the case of selective distribution systems, where the relationship between 
producers and non-appointed dealers may be thought of as subject to rules on unilateral conduct It appears, 
however, that such a reading of Art 3(2) Reg. 1/2003 would not be in conformity with its spirit (see in this 
sense Wirtz, “Anwendbarkeit von § 20 GWB auf selektive Vertriebssy sterne nach Inkrafttreten der VO 1/2003”, 
53 WuW 1039 (2003), pp. 1043-1044). In addition, under Art. 3(3) the application of Community competition 
law does not preclude the application of national provisions that predominantly pursue an objective different 
from that pursued by Arts. 81 and 82 EC. This refers basically to national unfair competition laws (see Recital 
9). See Martinez Lage, “Editorial: Cambio de cultura: Aprobada, al fin, la reforma de las normas de aplicación
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The text of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 certainly marks great progress if compared with 
the post-Ufa// Wilhelm state of the law, which was neither very clear nor satisfactory. There 
are two basic advantages. The first is that national competition authorities and courts must 
now apply the competition provisions o f the Treaty along with their national laws349 if there 
is an effect on trade between Member-States. This will undoubtedly lead to a 
‘’communitarisatioiT’ o f competition enforcement by these authorities and courts.350 They can 
no longer ignore EC competition law if it is applicable. Instead, they will have to enforce it in 
parallel with their national competition laws,351 thus indirectly becoming subject to the 
specific Community law obligations and duties imposed by Articles 11, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of 
Regulation 1/2003, mainly as against the Commission.352
This will mean that the enforcer in question will have to begin by examining whether EC 
competition law is applicable in the first place, in particular whether the inter-state trade
de los artículos 81 y 82 CE”, (2003-1/2) G J 3, pp. 6-7; Idot, “Premières vues sur le nouveau règlement de mise 
en œuvre des articles 81 et 82 CE”, (2003-2) Europe 4, p. 6. Of course, it will not always be easy to establish 
what the objective is in a national rule and if this falls under “competition law”; see in this regard Lever, “The 
Commission’s Proposals for the Modernisation o f EC Competition Law: The Relationship between Articles 81 
and 82 EC and National Competition Laws”, in: Lawyers 'Europe, Autumn/Winter 2001,2, pp. 4-5. See also the 
critical comments by H. Ullrich, Anti-unfair Competition Law and Anti-trust Law: A Continental Conundrum?, 
EUI Working Paper, Law No. 2005/1, p. 5 et seq. Finally, it would seem that Community competition law 
would not preclude employing provisions in national civil codes prohibiting the abuse of rights in refusal to deal 
cases, thus attaining a result similar to that under the application of the “essential facilities” doctrine of EC 
competition law. See e.g. Hatzopoulos, supra (2002), p. 168 et seq:, compare, however, Mavroidis and Neven, 
“Bronner Kebab: Beyond Refusal to Deal and Duty to Cooperate”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2003, llftat Is an Abuse o f  a Dominant Position? (Oxford/Portland, 2006), p. 366.
9 As mentioned above, the duty to apply EC competition law is not a novelty for national courts, which are 
bound to do so by the direct effect of Arts. 81 and 82 EC, according to the Court’s case law (BRT v. S.ABASi (I), 
op.cit., para. 16, at 62: “the prohibitions of Articles 85 and 86 tend by their very nature to produce direct effects 
in relations between individuals [and] create rights directly in respect of the individuals concerned which the 
national courts must safeguard” -  emphasis added). Sec also below on the duties of national courts to apply EC 
competition law ex officio.
3i0 See Gerber and Cassinis, supra (2006), p. 12.
351 There should be no distinction as to the duty to apply Community competition law' between civil courts 
and courts exercising a judicial review of NCAs’ decisions. The latter, too, should apply Community law', even 
if the NCA in its decision did not. Compare, however, the position of the Commission in case C-238/05, 
ASNEF-EQUIFAX, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y  Crédito, SL and Administración del Estado v. 
Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (AUSBANC), currently pending, as reported in para. 17 of AG 
Geelhoed’s Opinion. The Commission, there, argued that a national court that reviews a NCA’s decision that 
has not applied Community competition law' (in that case the NCA was deciding before the coming into force of 
Reg. 1/2003 was not formally bound to apply EC law) has neither the duty nor, indeed, the power to apply 
Community competition law\ Such an approach, however, does not favour the effet utile of Art. 3(1) Reg.
1/2003.
352 Particularly NCAs will find themselves in the future, as a result of Art. 3 of Reg. 1/2003, more and more 
subject to the Network of competition authorities, with the Commission having the central role. This point is 
also made by Paulis and Gaucr, supra (2003), p. 67. Naturally, this has led some commentators to speak of 
centralisation rather than of decentralisation of competition law' enforcement. See e.g. Mestmäcker, supra 
(2000b), pp. 403, 443; Böge, “Stellungnahme zur Reform der europäischen Wettbewerbsregeln zur Anhörung 
des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Währung des Europäischen Parlaments am 27. Februar 2001”, Unpublished 
Paper (27-2-01), p. 4; Claudel, “Pratiques anticoncurrentielles : À propos du règlement CE n* 1/2003 du 16 
décembre 2002 relatif à la mise en œuvre des règles de concurrence prévues aux Articles 81 et 82 CE : Une 
réelle décentralisation du droit de la concurrence ?” Petites Affiches, 20-5-2003, No. 100,7.
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effect criterion is established.353 If there is such an effect, the national court or authority will 
be faced with a whole array o f autonomous concepts of Community law, ranging from the 
most basic ones of what constitutes an “agreement” a “concerted practice” or an “anti­
competitive object or effect”, to the complex concepts of “foreclosure” and “essential 
facilities”. These concepts will have to be interpreted and applied according to Community 
competition law.354
The second advantage o f Article 3 is that it does not use the “positive measure” criterion 
which led to lengthy debates in the past. Instead it opts for much clearer language, excluding 
from the ambit o f national competition law agreements, decisions by associations o f 
undertakings, and concerted practices which do or might affect inter-state trade, but either do 
not restrict competition under the first paragraph of Article 81 EC, or fulfil the conditions of 
the third paragraph, or are covered by a block exemption regulation. The progress attained is 
evident, since the dominant view in the past was that negative clearance decisions based on 
Article 81(1) EC, because of their declaratory character, could not exclude the application of 
stricter national law. In addition, the letter o f Article 3 does not require that Article 81 EC has 
already been declared inapplicable through a decision or comfort letter in order to exclude 
stricter national competition law, which will be excluded a priori, if  the behaviour in question 
is merely subject to Article 81 £ C 355 *Thus national competition law will not apply even in
353 As an indirect result, there will be a streamlining in the way NCAs and national courts apply EC 
competition law, with positive results for the latter’s consistent and unifonn application. In Greece, for example, 
the Competition Committee - and even courts - have been applying cumulatively Greek and EC competition law 
sometimes, without ever examining whether the requirements for the latter’s application were satisfied. In some 
cases it is not certain whether the authority or the court really applied the EC competition rules, or whether they 
used them as an interpretative tool, since the Greek law is basically a word-by-word transplant of Arts. 81 and 
82 EC. Such “application” of Community competition law might lead to inconsistencies in the future 
decentralised system of enforcement. For examples o f this practice of the Greek authorities and courts see Greek 
Competition Committee n# 53/1987 (Blythe Colours IT), where a national individual exemption was given to an 
agreement thought to fall under the old Reg. 1983/1983; Greek Competition Committee n* 63/1988 (K. 
I oreopoulos), “applying” the same block exemption Regulation to an agreement covering the Greek island of 
Rhodes (!) without any examination of Community law’s applicability in the first place; Greek Competition 
Committee n* 75/1989 [Toyota I), speaking of “non-direct application” of the old Reg. 123/1985; Greek 
Competition Committee n* 45/1996 (Lacoste), applying cumulatively national competition law, Art. 81 EC and 
the old Reg. 1983/1983, but only declaring the non-applicability of Art. 1(1) L. 703/1977 (equivalent to Art. 
81(1) EC) in the operative part; Dioikitiko Protodikeio Athens n° 3254/1991, in: D. Koutsoukis and D. 
Tzouganatos, The Application o fh . 703/1977 ’on the Protection o f Free Competition', Vol, III, 1990-1995 
(Athens, 1996) [in Greek], p. 220 et seq,\ Dioikitiko Efeteio Athens n° 68/2002, 22 RHDE 978 (2002), with 
critical comments by Hatziioannou, 22 RHDE 984 (2002) [in Greek], p. 986. On the impact of block exemption 
regulations on Greek national competition law- enforcement see also Dryllerakis, “The Relationship Between 
Block exemption Regulations and National Competition Law-”, 50 Epitheorisi Emporikou Dikaiou 447 (1999) 
[in Greek].
3M See Hirsch, supra (2003), p. 244.
355 In this sense, Art. 3 Reg. 1/2003 moves from the “ p r o c e d u r a l  precedence” o f Walt Wilhelm, according to 
w hich the application of stricter national competition law' is blocked only by the action of the Commission, to a 
“normative precedence”, where stricter national law is blocked by the mere applicability of permissive
Community competition law. On the successful term of “procedural precedence” see R. Walz, Der Vorrang des
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the ease of agreements falling under the new de minimis Notice, as long as they satisfy the 
inter-state trade effect condition.356 Under the old Walt Wilhelm state of affairs it was 
possible for stricter national competition laws to catch agreements subject to Community 
competition law but permitted under the de minimis rule. It is noteworthy that the current de 
minimis Notice deals only with the appreciation of whether an agreement restricts 
competition, and not also of its effects on inter-state trade,357 as was the case with the earlier 
de minimis Notices. Without Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, a whole array of agreements 
satisfying the inter-state trade effect jurisdictional criterion but considered minor by 
Community law7 could nevertheless have been prohibited under national competition law, 
which would have been unfortunate.358
The same holds true for agreements which according to other Commission soft law 
pronouncements, such as notices or guidelines359 may fall outside the scope of Article 81(1) 
EC, and as such have not been block-exempted by means of a regulation. While such 
agreements could previously be prohibited under national competition law ,360 under Article 3 
of Regulation 1/2003 they will be immune from prohibition, since they are not considered 
incompatible w ith Article 81 EC as a whole 361
europäischen vordem nationalen Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden, 1994), p. 226 et seq.\ idem, supra ( 1996), p. 451; 
Rehbinder, supra (1996), p, 713; Kingston, “A ‘New Division of Responsabilities' in the Proposed Regulation 
to Modernise the Rules Implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC?; A Warning Call”, 22 ECLR 340 (2001 ), p. 342.
See Arhel, supra (2003), p. 9.
35’ The Commission opted to issue a separate Notice on inter-state trade effects because it thought that 
market share thresholds of the level of the de minimis Notice were not good indicators on their own of what is 
an appreciable effect on trade between Member States. Indeed, the Notice defines the appreciable effect on trade 
by means of a turnover threshold combined with a much lower market share threshold (5% - see supra). See 
Pecperkom, “Revision of the 1997 Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance (De Minimis Notice)”, (2001-2) 
EC Competition Policy Newsletter 4, pp. 4-5; idem, “New Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance (De 
Minimis Notice)”, (2002-1 ) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 45.
358 For example, in case of a vertical restraint, an agreement, in which the supplier has a market share 
between 15% and 30%, would benefit from the block exemption of Reg. 2790/1999 and would not be caught by 
stricter national competition law, whereas an agreement, in which the supplier has a lower market share, i.e. 
below 15%, might be prohibited under national competition law ! The same would be true for specialisation or 
research and development agreements with market shares between 10 % and 20 % or betw een 10 % and 25 % 
respectively, which could not be prohibited under national laws, whereas those agreements falling under the 
10% market share might be prohibited. But see Van Oers, “The Way Ahead for the Commission’s 
Modernisation Plans: Position of the Netherlands Competition Authority”, in; European Competition l/xw; A 
\ ’ew Role for the Member States, Congress Organized on ¿(f* and 21st November 2000 by the European 
Association o f Lawyers (Bruxelles, 2001), pp. 59-60, for the opposite view' from an NCA perspective. The 
author finds that it would be hard to accept the legality' under the Community de minimis rule of an anti- 
compctive agreement that affects trade among Member States, while a similar or even less significant agreement 
that does not affect inter-state trade could be found illegal under national competition law’.
“Block negative clearances” in the words of R. Joliet, Le droit institutionnel des Communautés 
européennes, Les institutions, les sources, les rapports entre ordres juridiques (Liège, 1983), p. 188.
300 See Koutsoukis, “The Relationship between Community and National Competition Law”, 4 RHDE 513 
(1984) [in Greek], pp. 536-537.
361 See in this sense Blaise and Idot, supra (2003a), p. 297. An example can be given through Reg. 
2790/1999 and the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. While the former deals only with agreements that are
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O f course, in all these cases the national authority or court may have its own views as to the 
applicability to the agreement in question of the de minimis Notice or o f other Commission 
notices and guidelines. However, these will be conflicts on the application of Community 
competition law,362 which is different from the issue of the conflict between Community and 
national competition law.363
b. The New Institutional Position of National Competition Authorities and the 
European Competition Network
aa. The Powers of NCAs under the New System
The new decentralised system of competition enforcement will have important consequences 
not only for private, but also - indeed, one may argue, primarily - for public enforcement at 
the national level. National competition authorities will have the power364 and the duty'365 to
examined under Art. 81(3) EC, the latter refer also (in section II) to agreements that are not falling under Art. 
81 (1) EC altogether, such as minor agreements, agreements between small and medium-sized undertakings and 
agency agreements (see further Whish, “Regulation 2790/99: The Commission's ‘New Style’ Block Exemption 
for Vertical Agreements”, 37 CMLRev. 887 (2000), pp. 887-888, 897). Under the Walt Wilhelm principles the 
former would be immune of the national law prohibition, while the latter could well be so prohibited. Again, 
hardly a consistent result.
362 On the avoidance and resolution of such conflicts, see infra.
363 It is therefore not entirely appropriate to speak of a “binding effect” of these Commission soft lawr 
instruments on national courts and competition authorities. On this general question see Schweda, “Die 
Bindungswirkung von Bekanntmachungen und Leitlinien der Europäischen Kommission”, 54 WuW 1133 
(2004), p. 1139 et seq.
364 Art. 5 Reg. 1/2003 provides that “the competition authorities of the Member States shall have the power 
to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in individual cases” (emphasis added). It is clear from this provision 
that this empowerment is given directly to NCAs by Community law. Of course, co-operation by the Member
States is also required to deal with the technicalities entailed when national public authorities apply EC 
competition lawf. Thus, Art. 35(1) requires Member States to designate the authorities responsible for the 
application of the pertinent Community rules. However, the fact that this provision and Recital 35 of the new 
Regulation refer to Member States’ measures designating and empowering NCAs to apply those provisions does 
not alter the substance of our first observation. It remains clear that Reg. 1/2003 deals with i f  (question of 
principle), while national measures deal with which national authorities apply EC competition law and how 
(procedural and technical issues). See in this sense Cooke, supra (2001b), p. 14; contra, i.e. in favour of Member 
States’ competence to empower national authorities, Idot and Van de Walle de Ghelke, supra (2001), p. 195. It 
is interesting to note here that under the old system of enforcement there has also been a debate as to whether 
NCAs had to be expressely empowered by national law to apply the Treaty competition rules or whether they 
had the power to do so directly from Community law. While the Commission had sometimes opined that 
national empowerment of NCAs was a necessary requirement for the latter to apply Community law' (see e g, 
para. 15 of the 1997 co-operation Notice), many authors had argued that NCAs were already empowered and 
bound by Community law' itself to do so (Art. 84 EC in conjunction with Art. 9(3) Reg. 17/1962). See e.g. 
Munari, supra (1992), pp. 612-613; idem, “Ambito di applicazione e rapporti con 1’ordinamento comunitario”, 
in; Affemi (Ed.), Concorrenza e mercalo, Commento alia Legge 10 ottobre 1990 n. 287 e alDecreto 25 gennaio 
1992 n. 74 (Padova, 1994), pp. 23-24; Ehlermann, supra (1995d), p. 51; Waelbroeck, “Panel Discussion: EC 
Competition System: Proposals for Reform”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 1998, 
Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 1999), p. 216; Günther, “Österreich”, 
in: Behrens (Ed.), EC Competition Rules in National Courts, Vol. VI, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Austria
91
apply Articles 81 and 82 EC. According to Article 5 of the new Regulation, they may take the 
following types o f decisions:
(a) prohibition decisions ordering that an infringement be brought to an end,
(b) interim measures,
(c) decisions accepting commitments,
<d) decisions imposing fines and other penalties, and
(e) decisions stating that there are no grounds for action on their part.
What has been decentralised to those authorities is not the power to grant exemption 
decisions,366 since the legal exception system has made the very7 concept o f exemption 
obsolete. Instead, they will be enforcing Article 81 EC in its totality. Of course, companies 
can still notify agreements to NCAs, since nothing in Regulation 1/2003 prohibits this, but in 
such cases the NCAs arc not able to grant a negative clearance or an exemption but only to 
state in their decision that there are no grounds for them to act, as indeed recognised by 
Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003.367 *
(Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 345); Tesauro, supra (2000b), p. 158 et seq.\ contra Hiopoulos, “Griechcnland", in: 
Behrens (Ed.), EC Competition Rules in National Courts, Vol. V, Spain, Portugal and Greece (Baden-Baden, 
2000), p. 241 et seq.; compare the more balanced approach of Bourgeois, supra (1997), pp. 90-92). See also 
Saggio, supra (1997), p. 5, who even believes that national empowering legislation may not only be superfluous 
but also contrary to EC law. A duty to apply Community competition law would arise also under Art. 10 EC 
(see Temple Lang, supra (1999), p. 13; idem, supra (2000), p. 16). This is the standard rule for all directly 
effective provisions of Community law, w hich are to be enforced by national public authorities and courts alike. 
As to public authorities see e.g. case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano, [1989] ECR 1839, 
paras. 29-31; case C-198/01, C1F Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato, [2003] ECR 1-8055. Therefore, even without national empowrcrment NCAs had the pow'er and, indeed, 
the duty to apply the directly effective provisions of Arts. 81 and 82 EC, using their national procedural rules. 
However, it was also accepted that by virtue of the principle of legality such NCAs could not impose sanctions 
to natural or legal persons while enforcing EC competition law. See on this issue Todino, supra (1998), p. 759, 
fn. 17. In any case, the issue has become now obsolete, since there is in the new Regulation an express provision 
(Art, 5), which leaves no further doubts.
105 For the duty of NCAs to apply EC competition law7, as prescribed in Art. 3 Reg. 1/2003, see above.
366 See Wils, supra (2001), p. 342.
367 See Gauer, “Does the Effectiveness of the EU Network of Competition Authorities Require a Certain 
Degree ofllarmonisation of National Procedures and Sanctions?”, in: Ehlcrmann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing the EU Network o f  Competition Authorities (Oxford/Portland, 
2004), p. 195). See, however, Folguera, supra (2001), p. 168, according to whom NCAs could still issue 
negative clearance decisions. Such a view7 is probably the product of confusion. In any event, the prospective 
amendment of national competition laws that will mirror the Community abolition of the notification and 
authorisation system will lead to the complete disappearance of the notification procedure in Europe. It is 
interesting to note that in the UK one of the compelling arguments for abolishing the system of domestic 
notification is exactly the likelihood of undertakings’ - indeed from across the EU - seeking to notify agreements 
under domestic competition law', in order to attain in the UK a certain degree of comfort that has been lost under
the new' EC system. See Department of Trade and Industry, op.cit., paras. 3.19-3.20, Of course, some national 
competition laws have remained unreformed. Thus, for example, the 2005 amendment of the Greek Competition 
Act has left untouched the system of administrative authorisation and notification. See the critical comments by 
Komninos, “The New Amendment of the Greek Competition Act: Harmonisation with or Departure from the 
EU Model?”, 27 ECLR 293 (2006),
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It is noteworthy that national authorities will not have the power to take inapplicability 
decisions, i.e. decisions finding that certain conduct is not caught by Article 81 EC (either 
because the conditions o f its first paragraph are not fulfilled, or because the conditions of its 
third paragraph are satisfied), or by Article 82 EC. Such decisions, which resemble the 
negative clearance o f  the old system, are exceptionally reserved solely to the Commission, 
acting on its own initiative in the Community public interest.368
The Regulation did not establish a “full faith and credit'* principle on mutual recognition of 
decisions taken by NCAs.369 On the contrary, such decisions will be subject to territorial it y, 
i.e. the effect of their rulings will be limited to their respective national territories.370
bb. Co-operation Mechanisms within the European Competition Network
A focal point of decentralisation is collaboration between NCAs and the Commission in the 
framework o f the European Competition Network (ECN), which makes all these authorities 
subject to specific duties of co-operation and consultation in the enforcement of Community 
competition law.371 Its main objective will be to ensure an efficient work sharing between the 
public enforcers and to promote a coherent application of the EC competition rules.372 While 
the Network should not be viewed in hierarchical terms,373 there is no doubt that the
308 Art. 10 Reg. 1/2003. At least as far as Arts. 81(1) and 82 EC are concerned, this is a retrogression for 
NCAs, as they always had the possibility to grant such negative clearances under the old system of enforcement.
3t,g See Paulis, supra (2001b), p. 19.
370 See on this issue Montag, “The Case for a Reform of Regulation 17/62: Problems and Possible Solutions 
from a Practiotioner’s Point of View”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy ¡998, Annual 
Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 1999), pp. 175-176; Idot, “L’efficacité des 
decisions dans l’espace”, Petites Affiches, 28-12-2000, No. 259,29, pp. 33-34; Greaves, “EC Competition Law: 
Centralised or Decentralised Enforcement”, Focus, [2000J 11 Euro.CL xi, p. xiv; Bourgeois, “Decentralised 
Enforcement of EC Competition Rules by National Competition Authorities: Some Remarks on Consistency, 
Coherence and Forum Shopping”, in: Ehlcrmann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000; 
The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p . 332; Mestmäcker, supra (2001 ), p. 237; 
Idot, supra (2001a), p. 344; Immcnga, “Coherence: A Sacrifice of Decentralisation?”, in: Ehlcrmann & Atanasiu 
(Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 
2001), p. 588; Miram, supra (2001), p. 23; Ehlermann and Komninos, “The Consequences of the Proposed 
Modernisation of the Community Competition Law Enforcement”, 21 RHDE 745 (2001) [in Greek), p. 760; 
Tesauro, in: The 2002 Handbook o f Competition Enforcement Agencies, A Global Competition Review Special 
Report, p. 53.
31 On the European Competition Network see Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), pp. 65-73; Böge, “Das 
Netzwerk der EU-Wettbewerbsbehörden nimmt Gestalt an: Anforderungen an das Bundeskartellamt und 
Änderungsbedarf im deutschen Kartcllrecht”, 14 EWS 441 (2003); various contributions in: Ehlcrmann & 
Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing the EU Network o f Competition 
Authorities (Oxford/Portland, 2004); Burnside and Crossley, “Co-operative Mechanisms within the EU: A 
Blueprint for Future Co-operation at the International Level”, 10 Int.TLR 25 (2004).
72 See Lowe, supra (2003a), p. 3.
373 See e.g. Kist and Tiemo Centella, supra (2001 ), p. 382, strongly against the “hierarchical” relationship. 
See also Lavagne, “La réforme du droit des ententes : Le règlement du 13 décembre 2002”, 46 RMC 526 
(2003), p. 529.
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Commission will enjoy a central role in it,374 in conformity with its specific tasks in 
competition law enforcement that flow directly from the Treaty (Article 85 EC)375 
The system established by Chapter IV of Regulation 1/2003 is not a  federal one, but follows 
the standard Community’ law relationship between the supranational and the national.376 Thus 
the Commission, a supranational institution, will naturally not have the power to review 
directly or strike down the decisions of NCAs. However, its dominant role is apparent when 
viewed in light o f  the various co-operation and consultation mechanisms provided for and its 
power to relieve the national authorities o f their competencies by initiating proceedings for 
the adoption o f a  decision, as enshrined in Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003.377 The 
Commission will only rely exceptionally on this latter provision, which reproduces Article
374 Sec Recital 34 Reg. 1/2003. In the words of some commentators the Commission will be the “head” or 
“remain at the centre” of the Network. See e,g. former Director General Schaub, supra (2001a), p. 255; 
Bergeron, “Antitrust Federalism in the European Union after the Modernization Initiative”, 46 Antitrust Bull. 
513 (2001), p. 531; Blaise and Idot, “Chronique concurrence (années 2000 et 2001 )”, 38 RIDE 103 (2002), p. 
140; Kovar, “Le règlement du Conseil du 16 décembre 2002 relatif à la mise en œuvre des règles de 
concurrence prévues aux articles 81 et 82 du Traité CE”, D. 2003.478, p. 484. Note the possibly significant 
divergence between the earlier references on the part of the Commission to a “Network of Competition 
Authorities” and the latest references to a “European Competition Network” (see Paulis and Gauer, supra 
(2003), p. 70). While versions of the former term indicate a certain parity among all participating competition 
authorities (the Commission included), this may not be true of the latter, where the addition of the adjective 
“European” and the suppression of the reference to authorities in plural stresses the supranational character of 
this network, since it is European competition law that will be enforced, and thus, by implication, the centrality 
of the Commission.
3 3 On the Commission's central role, see the groundbreaking judgment by the ECJ in Masterfoods, op.cit., 
in particular para. 46.
3 6 See, however, Pace, supra (2004), p. 155, who fails to see the supranational model of organisation and 
criticises the Commission for considering the NCAs as “Community public authorities”.
377 “Sudden death” in the words of Lever, “Panel Discussion: German and UK Antitrust Law and Policy”, 
in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 1992, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute (New York/Deventer, 1993), p. 375. In this context see Jalabert-Doury, “Livre blanc sur la 
modernisation de l'application des articles 81 & 82 : Quel avenir pour le droit de la concurrence 
communautaire?”, (1999) RDAI/IBLJ 497, p. 504, who speaks of an intervention of the Commission that 
“communitarises the dossier”. This, however, is not accurate, since the dossier is already “communitarised”, as 
the NCA applies - wholly or at least partly - Community competition law', thus being subject to the rules of the 
Network. One relevant question is whether the NCAs can still go on applying their national competition law 
after intervention by the Commission. According to Commission officials the answ er should be negative. Under 
this view; the combined reading of Aits 3(2) and 11(6) Reg. 1/2003 means that the opening of proceedings by 
the Commission in an Art. 81 EC case bars NCAs from initiating proceedings under their national competition 
law. This possibility remains open only with regard to abuse of dominance cases, to the extent that there are 
stricter national rules prohibiting unilateral conduct. See Gauer, Dalheimer, Kjolbve and De Smijter, 
“Regulation 1/2003: A Modernised Application of EC Competition Rules”, (2003-1) EC Competition Policy 
Newsletter 3, p. 6: “It is particularly important to take note of the relationship between Article 3 and Article 
11(6) according to which the competence of NCAs to apply Articles 81 and 82 is withdrawn when the 
Commission opens proceedings in the same case. In that case the national competition authorities can no longer 
comply with their obligation under Article 3(1) to apply Community competition law, which means that any 
case based on national lawr must also be closed. The only exception is w here the application of stricter national 
competition law is not excluded”. Under a more balanced view, however, this remains theoretically possible 
even in Art. 81 EC cases (see Idot, supra (2004c), p. 76). Indeed, Art. 3 Reg. 1/2003 is concerned only with 
conflicts between Art. 81 EC and the equivalent national provisions. It can happen that a NCA may apply its 
own national rule consistently with the Commission and only wishes to order a particular remedy additionaly to 
the remedies imposed by the Commission (for example an order of publication).
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9(3) of Regulation 17/1962,378 nevertheless, its mere existence is a very efficient safety valve 
in the system.379
Among the most important co-operation and consultation mechanisms380 are the general duty 
o f co-operation;381 the obligation of NCAs to consult the Commission at the outset o f 
proceedings under EC competition law382 and before adopting a prohibition decision, 
accepting commitments or withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption;383 the possibility to 
consult the Commission in all other cases;384 and the use o f the Advisory Committee on 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions to discuss a case pending before an NCA before 
a final decision is taken.385 In addition, the Commission will have two further powers at the 
stage of judicial review o f decisions by NCAs: Firstly, it will always be able to initiate 
proceedings and adopt a  decision which a national court reviewing the decision of the 
national authority will have to respect pursuant to Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003; 
secondly, it may intervene as amicus curiae in national judicial review proceedings.386 
Some problems might arise from divergences in the procedural framework applicable to 
NCAs.387 Regulation 1/2003 did not contemplate harmonising national procedural rules388
378 See Joint Statement o f the Council and the Commission on the Functioning o f the Network o f
Competition Authorities, Doc. 15435/02 ADD 1 of 10 December 2002, in:
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/stl5/15435-alen2.pdf, point 21. According to the Joint Statement the 
indicative cases, where this mechanism is likely to be used are rather exceptional: “(a) Network members 
envisage conflicting decisions in the same case; (b) Network members envisage a decision which is obviously in 
conilict w ith consolidated case law; the standards defined in the judgments of the Community courts and in 
previous decisions and regulations of the Commission should serve as a yardstick; concerning facts, only a 
significant divergence will trigger an intervention of the Commission; (c) Network memberfs) is (are) unduly 
drawing out proceedings; (d) There is a need to adopt a Commission decision to develop Community 
competition policy in particular when a similar competition issue arises in several Member States; (e) The 
national competition authority docs not object.” This specific point in the Joint Statement is taken up verbatim 
in para. 54 of the ECN co-operation Notice (see infra). It should be stressed that Art. 11(6) of the new 
Regulation had been criticised from the point of view of NCAs as going beyond what is necessary and tolerable. 
See e.g. Bdge, “Panel Two Discussion: Broad Systemic Issues”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing the EU Network o f Competition Authorities (Oxfonl/Portland, 
2004), p. 169.
379 That this rule is intended more as a deterrent can be understood by the fact that the equivalent Art. 9(3) 
Reg. 17/1962 was never put directly and willingly to effect by the Commission in 40 years of antitrust 
enforcement. See P.J.W. Wils, The Optimal Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law, Essays in Law & Economics 
(The Hague/London/New York, 2002), p. 243.
380 See further on these mechanisms Gysclen, “EC Anti-trust Law Enforcement within the European 
Competition Netw ork”, in: The PLC Global Counsel Competition Law Handbook 2004 5 (London, 2004), pp. 
88-89.
381 Reg. 1/2003, Art. 11(1).
382 Ibid, Art. 11(3).
383 Ibid, Art. 11(4).
384 Ibid, Art. 11(5).
m  Ibid, Art. 14(7).
386 As to this latter possibility, see Cooke, supra (2001b), p. 18.
387 See e.g. Jones, “Regulation 17: The Impact of the Current Application of Articles 81 and 82 by National 
Competition Authorities on the European Commission’s Proposals for Reform”, 22 ECLR 405 (2001), pp. 406- 
413, analysing the diverse procedural frameworks of the NCAs at that time. Italian law offered until very
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and these will continue to apply, subject to the Community law principles o f equality and 
effectiveness. However, the fact that NCAs will now increasingly apply the Community 
competition rules means that their procedural autonomy will also be increasingly called into 
question. This may eventually result in further calls for harmonisation of national remedies 
and procedures.38 89 390
cc. Allocation of Cases and Exchange of Information
The criteria for allocation between the members o f the Network have been stipulated through 
the Notice on co-operation with NCAs. The absence o f strict allocation criteria prescribed by  
law reflects the conscious and persistent choice to ensure the most efficient application o f the 
rules.39*1 The Notice makes clear that the Commission will not be just a “clearing house” in
recently an example of possible deficits created by national procedural law inadequacies. Under national 
competition law, the national competition authority did not have the power to order preliminary measures, 
which could only be pursued in the ordinary courts. The latest amendment of the Italian Competition A ct 
through Decreto-Legge 223/2006 has now remedied this and provides for a conclurent power of the Italian 
authority to order such measures. Italian authors had considered that lacuna detrimental to an effective 
decentralised application of the Community competition rules in Italy and stressed that under the Factortame I  
case law (case C-213/89, Regina v. Secretary o f  State fo r  Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd et a i (I), [1990] 
ECR 1-2433), the Italian rule should be set aside and that the NCA should be able to order such measures by 
direct reference to Community law. See further Todino, supra (1998), p. 780 et seq:, Pizzicaroli, 
“L'applicazione della disciplina comunitaria della concorrenza da parte dell’Autorità garante del mercato in 
Italia”, 40 Dir.Com. 601 (2001), pp. 616-617; Mastroianni, “La tutela dei privati nel sistema italiano di 
applicazione ‘decentrata’ del diritto comunitario della concorrenza”, in: Caitei & Vannucci (Eds.), Diritto 
comunitario e ordinamento nazionale (Milano, 2003), p. 155 et seq.
388 See on this issue Idot, supra (2001a), pp. 341-342; Nouvel, “1er mai 2004 L’entrée en viguer du  
règlement 1/2003 et du ‘paquet modernisation’ portant réforme des règles de mise en œuvre des articles 81 et 82 
CE”, (2004) RDAI/IBLJ 371, pp. 374-375; Idot, “A Necessary Step towards Common Procedural Standards o f  
Implementation for Articles 81 and 82 EC within the Network”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing the EU Network o f  Competition Authorities (Oxford/Portland, 
2004), p. 211 et seq., who also addresses the rather neglected issue of the national systems for judicial review o f  
NCAs’ decisions.
389 See e.g. Plompen, “Modernising EU Competition Policy: The Point o f View of Undertakings”, in: Pérez 
van Kappel (Ed.), Decentralised Application o f  EC Competition Law: National Experience and Reform (Köln, 
2001), p. 118; Mastroianni, “Osservazioni in merito alla effettività del sistema italiano di tutela ‘decentrata’ del 
diritto comunitario della concorrenza”, 6 Dir.Un.Eur. 78 (2001), pp. 87 et seq. Compare in this context a very 
interesting recent ruling of the Paris Court of Appeal, which stressed that the conditions for the granting o f  
provisional measures by the Conseil de la concurrence, when the latter applies exclusively the Community 
competition mies, should be governed by Community and not national law: CA Paris, 26-6-02, SA Pharma-Lab, 
BOCCRF n° 8, 11-7-2003, commented by Idot, (2003-8/9) Europe 22. Such a solution goes further than it is 
required by Reg. 1/2003, which adopts the principle o f national procedural autonomy and this explains that 
judgment’s reversal by the Courde cassation: Cass.com., 14-12-04, Pharma Lab v. Glaxosmithkline GSK and  
Pfizer, LawLex200400003494JBJ, reported in and commented by L. Vogel, Droit de la concurrence, Vol. II, 
Procedure de concurrence. Concentrations (Paris, 2005), pp. 1259-1262. Notwithstanding the reversal, such a 
solution responds better to the efficiency and uniformity of Community competition law enforcement and 
indeed it u'as at the end adopted by French competition law'. Thus, Ait. L470-6 Code de commerce equips the 
Conseil de la concurrence with all procedural powers enjoyed by the European Commission under Reg. 1/2003.
390 See Gauer, “Les programmes de clémence au regard du réseau communautaire”, 3/2005 Concurrences
16, p. 16.
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the sense of distributing cases to NCAs.391 The basic principle is that members of the ECN 
should endeavour to re-allocate cases to a single well-placed NCA which fulfils the following 
cumulative conditions:
(a) an agreement or practice has substantial direct actual or foreseeable effects on 
competition in the NCA’s territory and is implemented in or originates on that 
territory,
(b) the NCA is effectively able to bring the entire infringement to an end, and
(c) it can gather the evidence required to prove the infringement, possibly with the 
assistance of other authorities.
In sum, there must be a clear link between the infringement and the territory of the NCA.392 
The Commission will not initiate proceedings when a competition infringement affects the 
territories of only two or three Member States; in such cases the NCAs concerned should 
instead consider working together.393 The Commission considers it is better placed to act in 
cases with a wider geographical scope and some particular importance for Community law'.394 
Interestingly enough, the Commission believes that the allocation of cases does not involve a 
formal decision on its behalf or that of an NCA: rather, the act or failure to act in question is a 
preliminary’ step in a Community procedure, and thus not challengeable before the courts395 
The basic aim is to allocate cases at the outset o f proceedings. Problems of allocation should 
be resolved promptly, normally within two months from the date o f the first information sent 
to the ECN under Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003 396
The co-operation Notice envisages exchanges of information between NCAs and the 
Commission (via the ECN intranet) on complaints received and the initiation of proceedings. 
It also provides for the exchange and use of data, including confidential information, both 
between NCAs and the Commission and between NCAs. The information exchanged should 
only be used in evidence for the purposes o f  applying Articles 81 and 82 EC, and in respect
391 See Schaub, supra (2002c), p. 39; Ratliff, “Major Events and Policy Issues in EC Competition Law, 
2001-2002 - Part 2”, 14 ICCLR 87 (2003), p. 108. Such a “clearing house” role for the Commission was 
favoured by Plompen, “Efficient Protection of Competition in an Enlarged Community through Full Association 
of National Competition Authorities and National Courts”, in: Conference on the Reform o f European 
Competition Law in Freiburg i. B, (9 and 10 November 2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition, p. 5.
392 ECN co-operation Notice, paras. 7-8.
393 See also Schaub, supra (2002b), p. 107.
394 ECN co-operation Notice, paras. 14-15.
395 See Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 72. The Commission’s fear was that giving companies the 
opportunity to make preliminary objections to die exercice of jurisdiction by an authority that is member of the 
Network would cause delay, unnecessary litigation, and expense, and make application of Community 
competition law less effective. See e.g. Temple Lang, supra (2000), p. 20. However, it cannot be ruled out that 
an NCA may be obliged by national law to take a formal decision subject to review by the national courts, while 
reallocating a case inside the Network (see Idot, supra (2004c), p. 66).
3% ECN co-operation Notice, para. 18.
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of the subject matter for which it was collected by the transmitting authority. Stricter rules 
apply to the exchange o f information which may be used to impose sanctions on 
individuals.397 The Commission and NCAs must also co-operate during various 
investigations, including Commission requests for information and investigations.
The position o f leniency applicants is particularly problematic. The Notice considers it is in 
the Community interest to grant favourable treatment to undertakings which co-operate with 
the Commission in the investigation o f  cartel infringements. However, it admits that in the 
absence of an EU-wide system of “fully harmonised leniency programmes”, an application 
for leniency to one authority is not to be considered as an application for leniency to any 
other authority'. A company seeking leniency would therefore have to apply to the 
Commission and all NCAs with competence to apply Article 81 EC that would likely act 
against the infringement in question. The problem is perhaps less acute with regard to 
leniency applications to the Commission, which can always relieve the NCAs of their 
competence by initiating proceedings, but it becomes more serious if applications for 
leniency are filed with NCAs under national leniency programmes. Multiple national 
applications for leniency to different NCAs by different companies would represent a very 
unfortunate scenario. One solution, favoured in the Notice, would be for an applicant to file 
leniency applications with all national authorities simultaneously.398 
A related issue is the exchange between ECN members o f information submitted voluntarily 
by an applicant for leniency. The Notice indicates that leniency-related information submitted 
to the Network pursuant to the co-operation and notification mechanisms of Article 11 o f 
Regulation 1/2003 cannot be used by other Network members to start an investigation.399 A 
second safeguard is that if  a Network member wants to use leniency-related information from 
other ECN members, they must request this under Article 12 of the Regulation, but 
information will not be shared without the leniency applicant’s consent, except in cases 
where the undertaking concerned has applied for leniency in both the authorities concerned or 
the receiving authority' ensures the protection o f the leniency applicant.400 The Commission 
has received w'ritten commitments in this sense from the vast majority' of Member States, and 
has published a list o f those NCAs.401
397 See Arts. 12 and 28 Reg. 1/2003 and paras. 26-28 of the ECN co-opcration Notice.
398 Ibid, para. 38.
399 See further Gauer and Jaspers, “The European Competition Network: A chievements and Challenges -  
A Case in Point: Leniency”, (2006- l)E C  Competition Policy Newsletter 8, pp. 9-10.
400 Ibid, paras. 40-41. See also Gauer and Jaspers, supm  (2006), p. 10.
401 Ibid, para. 72 and Annex.
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c. The New Institutional Position of Civil Courts
aa. The Powers of National Courts under the New System
Decentralisation of EC competition law enforcement will have a highly dramatic impact on 
the application of that law by civil courts, and on private antitrust enforcement, which is 
expected to grow from a rather meagre to a more complete and mature system.402 National 
courts will no longer play a  marginal role, but will soon become “full players” in the 
enforcement o f the competition rules,403 albeit at a level complementary to that of public 
antitrust authorities, most notably the Commission. Indeed, the Commission considered 
private antitrust enforcement, as part of effective decentralisation, to be one of the three main 
objectives of the modernisation reforms.404
The direct effect o f Article 81(3) EC will have a certain impact on civil litigation before 
national courts as, at least in theory, the Commission exemption monopoly was undoubtedly
402 See various authors in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective 
Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003).
403 See Whish and Sufrin, supra (2000), pp. 151-152; Gerber, “Modernising European Competition Law: A 
Developmental Perspective”, 22 ECLR 122 (2001), p. 123; Favre, “Les défis de la mise en œuvre: Une 
compétence élargie pour les juges”, (2001-7/8) Rev.Conc.Consomm. 21, p. 22; Venit, supra (2001), p. 461; 
Burrichter, “Panel Three Discussion: Courts and Judges”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 479; Van 
Gerven, “Harmonisation Within and Beyond”, in: Van Empel (Ed.), “From Paris to Nice ", Fifty Years o f Legal 
Integration in Europe, International Pallas Conference, Nijmegen, May 24, 2002 (The Hague/London/New 
York, 2003), p. 12; Lowe, “Meeting the Challenge of Modernisation”, Speech Made at the Oxford Competition 
Policy Conference, July 15th and 16th 2003, in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches, p. 6; Lenaerts 
and Gerard, “Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement: Judges in the Frontline”, 27 World 
Competition 313 (2004), p. 314. See also Van Fleet, Imus, Johnston and Hennessee, “Private Antitrust Actions”, 
in: The PLC Global Counsel Competition Handbook 2002-3 (London, 2002), p. 77, speaking of a shift to a 
litigation-based system. See also Venit, supra (2001), p. 464, stressing the more practical advantages of private 
enforcement in the new decentralised system of enforcement. That author stresses, in particular, the fact that 
civil proceedings will be swifter than national public proceedings because of the condensation of the application 
of the law into one proceeding. Then the judicial impartiality and the frequent access to expert testimony will 
improve the quality of enforcement and the role of the bar and of consultants will be far more developped and 
visible.
404 See e.g. Schaub and Dohms, supra (1999), p. 1060; former Commissioner Monti, “Modernisation of EU 
Competition Rules”, Speech Made at the Launch of the Competition Act 1998, London, March 2'*d 2000, in: 
http://europa.eu.int/conun/competition/ speeches/index_2000.html, p. 4. The objectives of the modernisation 
initiative were, firstly, to refocus the Commission’s activity on combating the most serious restrictions of 
competition, by ending the system of notification and authorisation while ensuring intensified ex post control; 
secondly, the decentralised application of the competition rules, while maintaining consistency throughout the 
Community; and, thirdly, easing the administrative constraints on undertakings, while providing them with 
sufficient legal certainty (paras. 41, 42, 74 and 75 of the White Paper). See Ehlermann, supra (2000a), p. 560, 
who criticises this multiplicity of objectives, when the sole objective should have been the increased efficiency 
of EC antitrust policy. According to the former Director General, decentralisation is a tool, not an objective. It is 
true that on occasions, the Commission proposes the enhancement of private enforcement not as a direct 
objective of the reform, but rather as a “result” thereof (see e.g. former Commissioner Monti, “Guest Editorial: 
A European Competition Policy for Today and Tomorrow ”, 23(2) World Competition 1 (2000), p. 2).
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an obstacle to increased private enforcement.405 With regard to timing in particular, the 
abolition o f the Commission’s monopoly will on balance be positive for national litigation, 
since the courts will be able to address the full range o f  competition law for the first time.406 
In other words, they will no longer be obliged to suspend their proceedings until the 
Commission has decided on the applicability o f Article 81(3) EC, thus “leaving the 
agreement suspended in a twilight zone between validity and nullity”.407 On many occasions 
and, most notably, in the White Paper the Commission had admitted that the old system o f  
enforcement was hardly encouraging for the development o f  private enforcement. In its 
words,
“since national competition authorities and courts have no power to apply Article 
81(3), companies have used this centralised authorisation system ... to block private 
action before national courts and national competition authorities. This has 
undermined efforts to promote decentralised application o f EC competition rules. As a 
result, the rigorous enforcement o f competition law has suffered and efforts to 
decentralise the implementation o f Community law have been thwarted”.408 
The new’ role of national courts makes better economic sense, since the whole analysis under 
Article 81 EC will now take place in one forum, but, more importantly, creates a real culture 
o f diffuse competition law enforcement and, as one commentator rightly observes,
405 This conviction is widely shared. See e g. Department o f Trade and Industry, op.cit., para. 9.5. See also 
Slot, “Panel Discussion: EC Competition System: Proposals for Reform”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International 
Antitrust Law and Policy 1998, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 
1999), p. 228; Paulweber and Kögel, supra (1999), p. 503; Montag and Rosenfeld, “A Solution to the Problems? 
Regulation 1/2003 and the Modernisation o f Competition Procedure”, 1 ZWeR 107 (2003), p. 132; Hirsch, 
supra (2003), p. 237. On the measures that are proposed to be introduced in order to further develop private 
antitrust enforcement see infra.
406 Jones, supra (2003), p. 96. See also Wißmann, supra (2000), p. 132.
407 Venit, supra (2003), p. 554. Note, however, that the direct effect o f Art. 81(3) EC will also mean that in 
those cases where under the previous system a restrictive agreement had not been notified to the Commission 
and thus the national civil courts had no other option but to declare it void (see supra), under the new system, 
voidness will not be an automatic consequence, but the courts will have to examine themselves the applicability 
of Art. 81(3) EC. According to the Commission, this will improve the “civil enforceability of agreements” (see 
e.g. former Commissioner Monti, supra (2003a), p. 9). There seems to be some confusion of identity as between 
the improvement of the civil enforceability o f agreements and the enhancement of private enforcement. The two 
objectives, however, are contradictory. Indeed, one could argue that the automatic voidness of non-notified 
agreements under the previous system wfas more beneficial for private enforcement, if the latter is seen in its 
active form of persecution of anti-competitive agreements through civil claims.
408 Para. 6 of the White Paper. See also Van Miert, “European Competition Policy; A Retrospective and 
Prospects for the Future”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy> 1999, Annual Proceedings o f  
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2000), p. 10. See, however, Riley, “EC Antitrust 
Modernisation: The Commission Does Veiy Nicely - Thank you! Part One: Regulation 1 and the Notification 
Burden”, 24 ECLR 604 (2003), p. 612, who doubts the significance of the Commission’s “blocking effect” 
arguments.
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consolidates the interpretation o f the third paragraph of Article 81 EC as a “true rale o f law” 
and not as a  “discretionary political tool”.409
Regulation 1/2003 places national courts on an equal footing with the public enforcers for the 
first time. The competence of the courts to apply the antitrust provisions of the Treaty is 
solemnly recognised by Articles 1 and 6 of the new Regulation. Article 1, which introduces 
the legal exception system, reads as follows:
“ 1. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) o f the 
Treaty which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) shall be prohibited, no 
prior decision to that effect being required. 2. Agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty which satisfy the conditions o f 
Article 81(3) shall not be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required. 3. 
The abuse o f a  dominant position referred to in Article 82 shall be prohibited, no prior 
decision to that effect being required.”
Article 6 provides that: “national courts shall have the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty.” It should be mentioned at this point that the equivalent provision o f the initial 
Regulation proposal was less appropriate and its style echoed the ancien régime: ‘"national 
courts before which the prohibition in Article 81(1) of the Treaty is invoked shall also have 
jurisdiction to apply Article 81(3).” It seems that the text in the proposal aimed to prevent 
parties to restrictive agreements from seeking declaratory relief from national courts in the 
sense that the agreement in question was lawful under Article 81(3) EC, thus reintroducing 
the administrative authorisation system through the back door. The reference in the text to the 
need for the prohibition of Article 81(1) EC to be “invoked” before the court aimed to 
exclude such declaratory claims based on Article 81(3) EC410 However, that text was 
unfortunate because it did not treat Article 81 EC as a whole, but referred to a “jurisdiction to 
apply Article 81(3)”, which was reminiscent of the old system of authorisation.411
409 Wils, supra (2002), p. 246.
410 See Wils, supra (2001 ), p. 354. The same issue is raised by Whish and Sufrin, supra (2000), p. 151, who 
stress that English courts can adjudicate only if there is a genuine Us pendens inter partes. Thus according to the 
authors, parties could not use civil proceedings as an alternative to the notification procedure; in other words, it 
would not be possible for them to seek declaratory judgments on the applicability or otherwise of Art. 81(3) EC.
411 See criticism by Komninos, “Arbitration and the Modernisation of European Competition Law 
Enforcement'’, 24 World Competition 211 (2001), p. 220, That text in fact caused a lot of confusion. See e.g, 
Holmes, “Hie EC White Paper on Modernisation”, 23(4) World Competition 51 (2000), p. 57, who read the 
draft text of Art. 6 as giving the power to apply Art. 81(3) EC only to national courts through so-called “positive 
decisions”. Only the latter would, according to that author, be able to declare that an agreement satisfied the 
tests of that Article and that it “was exempted from the prohibition”. Thus, the author went on to say that only 
the national courts and not NCAs could apply Art. 81(3) EC through “positive decisions”. It is clear, however, 
that such a view is the product of confusion, since the concepts of negative clearance and exemption are 
obsolete in the new system of enforcement.
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The answer to this concern is that the legal exception system does not certainly delegate the 
application of Article 81(3) EC, as such, to national courts. Indeed, the latter will apply 
Article 81 EC as a whole to past and present situations in a civil dispute before them, unlike 
the case o f the old exemption decisions that had effects also for the future.412 Courts simply 
apply Article 81 EC as a whole to a dispute before them and declare inter partes the 
applicability or inappicability o f that provision to an agreement. To speak o f a competence to 
apply Article 81(3) EC no longer makes sense.
The permissive language in the initial proposal also seemed to imply that national courts 
would still have the discretionary choice as to whether or not to apply Article 81(3) EC, thus 
sticking to their old practice to stay proceedings in order to refer the matter to the 
Commission or an NCA.413 The final text of Article 6 of Regulation 1/2003 remedies these 
points by adopting more correct language which treats Article 81 EC as a whole and 
abandons the old philosophy of the split between the first and third paragraphs of that 
provision.414 Moreover, by also referring to Article 82 EC, it makes the point o f its 
declaratory nature clearer. In other w ords, as Article 1 already introduces the legal exception 
system, Article 6 does no more than state the obvious, which is that Article 81 EC as a whole 
w ill be directly effective before national courts. The direct effect o f Articles 81 and 82 EC is 
a direct consequence of the Treaty itself;415 Article 6 o f Regulation 1/2003 therefore does not 
change the legal reality, but merely clarifies it.416 For the same reason, we must criticise the 
confusing references in the Notice on co-operation between the Commission and national 
courts to an “empowerment” of national courts to apply EC competition law through
412 See in this regard Paulis, supra (2001a), p. 409. This explains why the related discussion on the temporal 
effects of national courts’ judgments applying Art. 81(3) EC and on the possibility for the courts to accept 
commitments is misplaced. Some commentators had addressed the question whether national courts could 
determine the duration of “exemptions” under the new system and whether they could induce the parties to 
reach settlements, for example by offering and accepting commitments. See e.g. the conflicting approaches by 
Burrichter, supra (2001), pp. 542-543; Gröning, supra (2001a), p. 590; Schurmans, supra (2004), p. 94. On the 
possibility of such settlements “brokered” by national courts between the litigants see also Montag and 
Rosenfeld, supra (2002), p. 133.
413 See in this sense the critical comments by Vogelaar, supra (2002), p. 23.
4,4 The text o f Recital 4 of the new Regulation appears clearer, speaking of “a directly applicable exception 
system”.
415 For this reason we find curious the intention of the UK Department of Trade and Industry to “designate 
‘national courts’” for the purposes of Reg. 1/2003. See Department of Trade and Industry', op.cit.t para. 9.11. 
Tliis reference is probably the product of confusion, since the only duty o f Member States is to designate NCAs 
(Art. 35 Reg. 1/2003) and certainly not courts, which have in any case the power and the duty to apply the 
directly effective competition provisions of the Treaty.
410 See on this point Komninos, supra (2001), p. 220; Scuffi, supra (2004), p. 123. Of course, the opponents 
of the reform use the text of Art 6 Reg. 1/2003 to argue that the Council Regulation is illegal, because it has 
ascribed direct effect to a Treaty provision, whereas the direct effect of a Treaty provision depends only on that 
Treaty provision itself. See e.g. the criticism by Pace, supra (2004), pp. 185-186.
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Regulation 1/2003,417 In essence, with regard to Article 81 EC, the legal reality is changed 
only by Article 1 o f Regulation 1/2003 with the introduction of the legal exception.
The only remnant o f the old exemption monopoly system that has survived the introduction 
o f the new system, is the exclusive power to withdraw' the benefit o f a block exemption 
regulation which is enjoyed by the Commission and by Member States’ competition 
authorities for their respective national territories. This is the sole instance where national 
courts are not on a equal footing competence-wise with the Commission and NCAs. Some 
commentators have relied upon this exclusive administrative competence to argue that even 
under the new system of legal exception national courts, when faced with situations in which 
the benefit of the block exemption should be removed, should still stay their proceedings, 
until the Commission or a national competition authority adopts a  formal Decision to that 
extent.418
However, under the new system of enforcement, national courts are no longer deprived o f full 
competence to decide a case based on the whole o f Article 81 EC and on the block exemption 
regulation. In that sense, the exclusive powrer o f the competition authorities to withdraw the 
benefit of a block exemption does not interfere with the courts’ competences, and the latter 
are no longer required to stay proceedings. They will apply the block exemption regulation if  
the latter is applicable, irrespective o f the existence o f factors that might justify the 
withdrawal of the exemption benefit with erga omnes effect by a public authority.
Although the benefit of the block exemption may be withdrawn in an individual case if  the 
conditions of Article 81(3) EC are not fulfilled, Member States’ courts have no power in that 
respect, since withdrawal can only take place through a constitutive decision by a public 
authority (the Commission or NCAs). The courts only have the power to decide whether or 
not the agreement is covered by the block exemption regulation.419 They need only prove that 
the agreement is block-exempted. According to the Commission, “the application o f Article 
81 (3) to categories o f agreements by way o f block exemption regulation is based on the 
presumption that restrictive agreements falling within their scope fulfil each o f the four 
conditions laid down in Article 81(3)”.420 In other words, in the context of private
417 Para. 6 of the co-operation Notice.
418 See Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, supra (2003), p. 81.
419 See already Bechtold, supra (2001), p. 54, who presciently refers to this new function of block 
exemption regulations to free parties of their burden of proving the fulfillment o f the Art. 81(3) EC conditions.
4i0 Para. 35 of the Notice on Art 81(3). See, however, Recital 12 of the new block exemption Regulation 
772/2004 on technology transfer agreements wrhich states: “Hiere can be no presumption that above [the] 
market-share thresholds technology transfer agreements do fall within the scope of Article 81(1) ... There can 
also be no presumption that above these market-share thresholds, technology transfer agreements falling within 
the scope of Article 81(1) will not satisfy the conditions for exemption...’' There seems to be a divergence
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enforcement, the fact that an agreement falls under a block exemption functions as a non- 
rebuttable presumption that it is legal under Article 81(3) EC, at least while the block 
exemption benefit has not been withdrawn in the context of public enforcement.421 
It would therefore not be in accordance with the spirit o f  the new parallel competencies 
system for the court to stay proceedings at this stage a fortiori because the public authority 
involved retains full discretion as to  whether or not to withdraw the benefit of the block 
exemption.422 This case is different from the old individual exemption decisions to which 
notifying parties were entitled, especially in view of pending stayed national proceedings.
O f course, in appropriate cases a court may consider staging proceedings if  the Commission 
has already started proceedings, ex officio or following a complaint (possibly by one o f the 
litigants), with a view to withdrawing the benefit o f a block exemption from the agreement at 
issue. This faculty o f the court, however, would no longer be connected with its incapacity to 
apply the competition provisions in their entirety and to render judgment, but would rather be 
motivated by its duty to avoid giving a decision which might conflict with a decision 
contemplated by the Commission423 in proceedings it had initiated, as stressed by Article 
16(1) of Regulation 1/2003.
between the use o f the term “presumption” in the Notice on Art. 81(3) and in the technology transfer block 
exemption Regulation. We submit that the kind of presumption to which the Notice on Art. 81(3) refers is a non- 
rebuttable one in the context of a civil litigation, whereas the kind of presumption, to which Reg. 772/2004 
refers, is always rebuttable
421 See also para. 51 of the Commission Notice on the handling of complaints: “Agreements that fulfil the 
conditions of a block exemption Regulation are deemed to satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3)” (emphasis 
added).
422 See in this regard para. 2 of the Commission Notice on Art. 81(3) EC, which addresses this issue and 
stresses that competition-restrictive agreements within the meaning of Art. 81(1) EC will be legally valid and 
enforceable if covered by a block exemption regulation. Such agreements could “only be prohibited for the 
future and only upon formal withdrawal o f the block exemption by the Commission or a national competition 
authority”.
423 But not decisions contemplated by NCAs. Community law does not deal with such cases of possible 
conflicts between decisions by national courts and NCAs, which can only be resolved according to national law. 
Formidable problems would arise, if  an NCA initiated proceedings and contemplated withdrawing the benefit o f 
a block exemption regulation in its distinct geographic market, but the parallel civil litigation took place in a 
different jurisdiction (possibly pursuant to a choice*of-forum clause). In such cases it should be appropriate for 
the Commission to open proceedings pursuant to Art. 11(6) Reg. 1/2003, unless the distinct geographical market 
to which the NCA’s decision relates, presents special characteristics that justify the separate treatment. See for 
example Jenny, “On the Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy”, in: Ehleimann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition I jx w  Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), pp. 364- 
365, who considers more important consistency of reasoning rather than consistency of decisions. That author 
docs not exclude the possibility that one and the same agreement might generate different responses in different 
Member States, because of differing conditions of competition in these markets. This is more likely to happen 
with vertical rather than with horizontal agreements. See, howrever, contra Cooke, “Commission White Paper on 
Decentralisation of Competition Rules. The Threat to Consistency”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 554, who 
identifies in these conflicts a problem for the single market function of the competition rules.
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Finally, a new role to be played by national courts under the new system established by 
Regulation 1/2003 is the enforcement o f commitments contained in binding Commission 
decisions and addressed to specific parties. Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 introduces for the 
first time the possibility' for the Commission and for national competition authorities - though 
not for courts - to accept commitments offered by undertakings and to make them binding 
upon the latter. That will happen when the Commission or the national competition authority 
intends to adopt a prohibition decision, but refrains from doing so, as a result of the 
commitments offered, if  the commitments meet the concerns o f the authority in question, as 
expressed in its ‘‘preliminary assessment”, which in the EC competition law enforcement 
context equals to a statement o f objections.424 Commitments offered by the undertakings, if 
accepted by the Commission, may be integrated by the latter in a formal decision, which 
simply finds that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission, without 
concluding that there has been or still is an infringement o f the Treaty competition rules.425 
In that sense, such Commission decisions are neither applicability nor inapplicability 
decisions and equally should not be confused with the negative clearance decisions of the old 
system.426 Undertakings not in compliance with commitments declared binding upon them by 
Commission decision, face fines up to 10% of their total worldwide turnover in the preceding 
business year and periodic penalty payments up to 5% of their average daily turnover.427 In 
addition, in case of breach of commitments the Commission may reopen proceedings.428 
Notwithstanding these powerful administrative mechanisms to enforce commitment 
decisions, an interesting question is whether national courts can also enforce commitments
424 Note that Art. 9 Reg. 1/2003 does not allow for the Commission to formally accept commitments and to 
make them binding upon the undertakings concerned, when the commitments are given in order for the former 
to reduce a fine for an infringement of the competition rules. According to Recital 13 Reg. 1/2003 commitment 
decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine. See to that extent the 
Commission’s public communication entitled Commitment Decisions (Article 9 o f Council Regulation 1/2003 
Providing fo r  a Modernised Framework fo r  Antitrust Scrutiny o f Company Behaviour), Frequently Asked 
Questions and Answers, MEMO/04/217, 17 September 2004, in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition. Such 
commitments have been informally accepted in the past in Commission Decision 85/202/EEC of 19 December 
1984 (Wood pulp), OS [1985] L 85/1. It seems, however, that, outside the context of Reg. 1/2003 and in an 
informal manner, the Commission can still use this possibility.
425 Recital 13 Reg. 1/2003.
426 Since such Commission decisions will leave open the question whether there was an infringement of 
Arts. 81 or 82 EC, and since they w ill incorporate commitments that were given by the parties themselves, they 
cannot be challengeable before the CFI by their addressees. See further Celli, “Modernisation of Competition 
Rules in the EU: What Will Change in Practice?”, Paper Presented at the Sixth Annual 1BA Competition 
Conference (Fiesole, 20 September 2002), p. 10. Compare, however, Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 68, 
according to whom the undertakings concerned can still seize the CFI in case of infringement of essential 
procedural requirements and of misuse of powers. Of course, complainants can still challenge commitment 
decisions before the CFI.
427 Arts. 23(2Xc) and 24(1 Xc) Reg. 1/2003.
428 Art. 9(2Xb) Reg. 1/2003.
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contained in a Commission decision as against the addressee o f  that decision and whether 
third parties can rely on the decision to enforce rights derived therefrom. While the 
Commission is clearly keen to engage the courts in the monitoring, application and 
enforcement of such commitment decisions,429 doubts have been expressed as to whether 
these decisions enjoy horizontal direct effect and can confer rights on third parties.430 
The answer to this question must be that, indeed, national courts will have the competence to 
apply and enforce commitment decisions to the extent that such decisions are sufficiently 
clear, precise and unconditional as to the obligations they impose on their addressees431 and 
confer rights on third parties to invoke these obligations.432 Since the addressees of these 
decisions are individuals, the decisions will naturally have horizontal direct effect, exactly 
like Articles 81 and 82 EC.433
bb. Co-operation Mechanisms between the Commission and National Courts
Regulation 1/2003 does not stop at making national courts competent to apply the Treaty 
antitrust rules in full; it also creates an institutional framework, with prudential mechanisms 
w hich aim at meeting concerns regarding the consistency o f decentralised enforcement of EC 
competition law. The Chapter IV provisions under the title “Co-operation with national 
authorities and courts” are permeated by a  general spirit o f co-operation. That spirit is further
429 Compare the Commission’s public communication on commitment decisions, op.cit., which states that 
“national courts must enforce the commitments by any means provided for by national law, including the 
adoption of interim measurers”. See also Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 68.
430 See further Montag and Cameron, ‘'Effective Enforcement: The Practitioner’s View of Recent 
Experiences under Regulation 1/2003”, Paper Presented at the International Bar Association and European 
Commission Conference: Antitrust Reform in Europe: A Year in Practice Brussels (9-11 March 2005), p. 12; 
Davies and Das, “Private Enforcement of Commission Commitment Decisions: A Steep Climb, not a Gentle 
Stroll”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2005, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2006), p. 202 et seq.
431 See Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, [1970] ECR 825, para. 9.
432 Compare Grad, o p .c itpara. 5: “It would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed to decisions 
by Article 189 [now 249] to exclude in principle the possibility that persons affected may invoke the obligation 
imposed by a decision, Particularly in cases where, for example, the Community authorities by means of a 
decision have imposed an obligation on a Member State or all the Member States to act in a certain way, the 
effectiveness ( '/ 'ejfet utile') of such a measure would be weakened if the nationals of that State could not invoke 
it in the courts and the national courts could not take it into consideration as part of Community law”. Note that 
there is a debate in the academic and judicial circles in Europe as to the nature of direct effect, in particular as to 
whether the conferral of rights to individuals is a constitutive element of direct effect or w hether it merely 
follows from their sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional status. See further Edward, “Direct Effect - 
Myth, Mess or Mystery?”, 7 Dir.Un.Eur. 215 (2002).
433 Compare the position under UK law. S. 94 of the Enterprise Act 2002 expressly states that commitments 
(“enforcement undertakings”) produce rights owed to any person who may be affected by a contravention of the 
commitments and any breach o f the duty to comply with such commitments which causes such a person to 
sustain loss or damage shall be actionable by him.
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elaborated and given effect by the accompanying Notice on co-operation between the 
Commission and national courts.
We should stress, however, that while national competition authorities make part o f  a 
network of public enforcers, national courts are placed in an institutionally different 
context.434 Indeed, the latter cannot formally make part o f such a  network. They cannot 
formally belong to such a network, because o f their independence o f the executive branch. In 
fact the Commission’s approach to the proposed system o f co-operation with national courts 
is entirely different from its approach to co-operation with NCAs, in language, style, and 
substance. National courts, being both independent and also juges commumutaires de droit 
commun, are accorded much greater deference, because o f their independence of the 
executive branch.435 They are subject only to the European Court o f Justice, which is 
effectively the Supreme Court o f the European Union and its Member States on matters o f  
Community law.436
Notwithstanding this stance of deference, one cannot fail to note the difference o f philosophy 
between US antitrust and EC competition law. Although the enforcement agencies in the US 
do file occasionally amicus curiae briefs in pending cases before the courts, ‘‘assistance” 
from or “co-operation” with the Antitrust Division of the Department o f Justice or the Federal 
Trade Commission in the EU sense, has never been an issue for US courts applying the 
antitrust laws.437 On the contrary, in the EU, this has been a persevering concern. The reasons 
o f  this diversity lie in the profound development of the US system of private antitrust 
enforcement and in its long emancipation from the public enforcement model. They are also 
to be explained historically, because in the EU the previous prior authorisation system and 
the centralised enforcement at the level of the Commission made natural such dependence o f 
civil courts on the Commission and public authorities.
There are two ways to view the co-operation mechanisms between the Commission and 
national courts. One way is to explain them by reference to the long-held conviction in
434 On European networks of national courts mainly in the justice and home affairs area see Canivet, supra
(2004), p. 48 etseq.
435 See above on the question whether the principle of separation of powers applies as between the 
Community and the national level.
436 In that sense, one can, indeed, speak of a “network” of Community courts, i.e. a network comprising the 
Court of Justice and national courts in their capacity as Community courts of general jurisdiction (juges 
commumutaires de droit commun). The functioning of this network is based on the principle of co-operation, 
enshrined in Art. 234 EC. See further Anagnostopoulou-Yiannakou, supra (2004), p. 80.
437 See e.g. Vance, supra (2001), p. 638, stressing that for US judges it appears distasteful for a court to 
interrupt its proceedings in order to ask a public authority for an answer to complex economic questions. See 
also McCurdy, “The Impact of Modernisation of the EU Competition Law' System on the Courts and Private 
Enforcement of the Competition Laws: A Comparative Perspective”, 25 ECLR 509 (2004), p. 511.
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Europe that by definition public enforcement is superior to private enforcement, simply 
because a specialised public authority is better acquainted with the economic specificities o f  
antitrust law than generalist judges.438 However, apart from the feet that such a paternalistic 
view does not do justice to the courts, it results in subjugating private to public enforcement 
and is certainly incompatible with the independent status o f the foimer, as we have explained 
above.439 Therefore, in our view, the provisions o f Article 15 o f Regulation 1/2003 owe their 
existence to the more “mundane” sensitivities that are developed in the Community-national 
law fine balance, and not to a  precedence o f public over private enforcement. In other words, 
these co-operation mechanisms were intended in order to assuage the concerns o f the 
opponents o f modernisation and decentralisation, who cautioned against inconsistency and 
incoherence o f antitrust enforcement as between the Community (i.e. the Commission) and 
the national level (in casu the courts) 440 As we have explained above, giving a certain degree 
o f  precedence to the Community over the national level is different from doing the same to  
public over private enforcement.441 The fact that civil antitrust litigation has an impact not 
only on the private interests o f the parties but also on the general public interest442 certainly is 
an additional factor that further explains the co-operation mechanisms of Article 15 o f
438 Compare the view held by Capelli, supra (2000), p. 567, who addresses this question with reference to 
the old co-operation Notice and to the “advice” given by the Court o f Justice in Delimitis to national courts 
towards co-operation rather than confrontation with the Commission. According to this commentator those 
principles make evident the marginal role o f national courts and of the predominant position of the Commission 
under the old system of enforcement. See also Jones and Sharpston, supra (1996-97), p. 108; Meli, supra 
(2002), p. 129. These authors criticise the 1993 Notice as indicative of a paternalistic attitude of the Commission 
towards national courts. According to these authors the Commission should have instead genuinely encouraged 
private antitrust enforcement, by not furthering the dependence of the national courts on itself, but by 
establishing the principle that national courts have enough authority to decide cases before them.
Compare the paternalistic approach o f former Commissioner Monti with reference to the co-operation 
mechanisms between the Commission and national courts, supra (2003b), p. 5: “These means of interactions are 
intended to allow the Commission ... to draw courts’ attention to important issues relating to the application o f 
EU antitrust rules and contribute to the coherence o f  their rulings” (emphasis added).
440 Of course, one may still wonder why competition law is singled out for special treatment. See in that 
regard Bourgeois and Humpe, “The Commission’s Draft ‘New Regulation 17’”, 23 ECLR 43 (2002), p. 46. As 
the authors rightly point out, national courts are involved in interpreting and applying general EC law, subject to 
the Ait. 234 EC preliminary reference procedure which apparently has proven to be sufficient. A response to the 
authors’ question can be that the intervention mechanisms of the Commission before national proceedings are as 
exceptional, as indeed exceptional had been the initial centralisation o f competition law' enforcement. The 
gradual decentralisation explains historically the putting in place o f these particular mechanisms of co­
ordination between the Commission and national courts.
441 With specific regard to A rt 15(3) Reg. 1/2003, the fact that the text of the Regulation gives the power to 
submit observations not only to the Commission but also - indeed primarily - to NCAs (see infra), does not 
affect our analysis, since Reg. 1/2003 sees the latter as agents for the Commission and, in any event, as indirect 
Community administration when they apply Community competition law.
441 See above on the “private attomey-general” role of private enforcement and on the goals of public and 
private antitrust enforcement.
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Regulation 1/2003 and, indeed, other existing mechanisms in national competition laws, but 
this by no means indicates any precedence of public over private enforcement.443 
The co-operation mechanisms provided for in Regulation 1/2003 and expounded in the co­
operation Notice and are uniformly available to all national courts around the EU. This is to 
be welcomed, since they are no longer dependent on national procedural laws or practices. 
Furthermore, contrary to some authors’ view that the dialogue between the Commission and 
the national courts must be expressly accommodated by national procedural law s which will 
have to be amended “to make it practically possible to enforce Chapters IV and V of the new 
Regulation”,444 Regulation 1/2003 is directly effective and does not need any implementing 
measures in the national legal orders.445
It is rather disappointing, however, that the Commission does not offer any clarity on this 
point. The co-operation Notice in paragraph 9 refers to Community lawf determining ‘The 
conditions in which EC competition rules are enforced” and stresses the following:
“Those Community law provisions may provide for the faculty o f national courts to 
avail themselves of certain instruments, e.g. to ask for the Commission’s opinion on 
questions concerning the application of EC competition rules or they may create rules 
that have an obligatory impact on proceedings before them, e.g. allowing the 
Commission and national competition authorities to submit written observations. 
These Community law provisions prevail over national rules. Therefore, national 
courts have to set aside national rules, which, if applied, would conflict with these 
Community law provisions. Where such Community law provisions are directly
443 Compare, with regard to the situation in the UK, Peretz, supra (2001-02), p. 10: “In general, the courts 
regard themselves as being able to resolve issues of law (even issues with a significant public policy element) 
without the assistance of the executive”.
444 See e.g. Keserauskas, “Practical Implications of the EC Antitrust Enforcement Revolution”, in: 
http://www.lpvp.lt/en/docs.dowTiload/341 .php, p. 10. This question arises also with regard to the amicus curiae 
intervention of the Commission and NCAs before national courts. For the view that implementing measures are 
necessary see Wezenbeek-Geuke, “Should the Competition Authorities Be Authorized to Intervene in 
Competition-related Problems, Particularly when they Are Handled in Court? If so, w hat Should Form the Basis 
o f their Powers of Intervention? National Report from the Netherlands”, LIDC Questions 20Û1/2002, in: 
http://www.ligue.org, p. 14; Idot, “L’entrce en viguer du règlement n° 1/2003 : Les dispositions procédurales du 
‘paquet modernisation”’, (2004-5)Europe 4, p. 5.
445 See e.g. Scuflfi, supra (2004), p. 127; Hirsch, supra (2003X p. 241. According to Lenaerts and Gerard, 
supra (2004), p. 334, w hile no further implementing measures are necessary because of the direct effect of Reg. 
1/2003, the principle of legal certainty may, however, require the Member States to adapt their internal law to 
ensure the effective implementation of the Community legislation. This is in line with the ECJ case law'. See e.g. 
case 230/78, SpA Eridania-Zuccherifici nazionali and SpA Società Italiana per l 'Industria degli Zuccheri v. 
Minister o f Agriculture and Forestry et at., [1979] ECR 2749, para. 34. A similar approach has been followed 
by Belgian law'. The Arrêté Royal of 25 April 2004, Moniteur belge, 3-5-2004, pp. 36537-36543, which adapted 
Belgian competition law to Reg. 1/2003, expressly states: “Even if Regulation 1/2003 is directly applicable and 
has supremacy over incompatible national rules, European law' obliges, nevertheless, the Member States to 
formally adapt, in the interest of legal certainty, all incompatible rules. This necessitates a number of adaptations 
in the Act on the protection of economic competition”.
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applicable, they are a direct source of rights and duties for all those affected, and must 
be fully and uniformly applied in all the Member States from the date of their entry 
into force.”
However, paragraph 17 o f the Notice qualifies all this by stating that ‘ Member States m ust 
adopt the appropriate procedural rules to allow both the national courts and the Commission 
to make full use o f the possibilities [Regulation 1/2003] offers”.
A final note should be added with regard to horizontal (or maybe diagonal) forms o f  co ­
operation.446 While the new Regulation and the accompanying co-operation Notice 
essentially deal with “vertical” co-operation as between the Commission and national courts, 
there are cases where a more “horizontal” or “diagonal” form of co-operation as between 
national courts of one Member State and national competition authorities of another Member 
State may, indeed, be necessary.447 It is tme that such forms o f horizontal co-operation are 
not totally unknown to Community law,448 but this matter was probably considered too 
sensitive even for a soft law instrument to refer to. While it is difficult to speak o f  
Community lawr duties between Member States judicial and administrative organs, it can be 
argued that such a co-operation may well be in line with the spirit of the EC Treaty as well as 
with numerous specific provisions which refer to “solidarity” and “co-operation” among 
Member States.449 In all likelihood, in cases necessitating this form of co-operation, a  
national court could seize the Commission and request the latter's assistance in getting in 
touch with another Member State’s competition authority.450
446 This matter is different from the question of the binding or non-binding nature of the decision o f  a 
Member State’s court or NCA over the courts/NCAs of other Member States. This question is dealt with below.
44' See e.g. the comments submitted by the American Bar Association on the Commission’s Modernisation 
package, available in: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/procedural_rules/comments.
Compare Art. 135 EC speaking o f Community measures “in order to strengthen customs coperation 
between Member States” and Art. 280(3) EC with reference to co-operation among Member States’ authorities 
aimed at protecting the financial interests o f the Community against fraud. See also European Parliament and  
Council Regulation 2006/2004 o f  27 October 2004 on Cooperation between National Authorities Responsible 
fo r  the Enforcement o f Consumer Protection Laws (the Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation), OJ 
[2004] L 364/1; European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31/EC o f  8 June 2000 on Certain Legal 
Aspects o f  Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (' ‘Directive 
on Electronic Commerce "), OJ [2000] L 178/1, Art. 19.
449 See e.g. Art. 2 EC in fine. Art. 61 EC could provide for an additional legal basis for Community 
legislation in this area. On the principle o f solidarity among Member States in the framework of the European 
Constitution see Callies, supra (2004), p. 1039.
450 One cannot exclude also the relevance of Council Regulation 1206/2001 o f  28 May 2001 on 
Cooperation between the Courts o f  the Member States in the Taking o f  Evidence in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, OJ [2001] L 174/1. While, on the one hand, it is clear that the Regulation does not apply to 
administrative authorities, on the other hand, specialist tribunals or “competition” or “market” courts seem to be 
covered. Such courts may, indeed, have been designated under Article 35 Reg. 1/2003 as “the competition 
authority or authorities responsible for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty”, therefore they are 
bound to co-operate for evidence purposes writh other Member States’ courts.
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cc. The Right of National Courts to Seek the Commission’s Assistance
The possibility o f national courts dealing with EC antitrust issues to seek the Commission’s 
assistance is the first important mechanism o f cooperation. This was at the courts’ disposal 
already under the previous system of enforcement but now is “codified” and strengthened by 
Regulation 1/2003 and the accompanying cooperation Notice. The European Court of Justice 
has long stressed on numerous occasions the duty of the Commission to assist the national 
courts in this respect, a duty that emanates from Article 10 EC.451 To that end, the 1993 co­
operation Notice contained detailed provisions on this mechanism, but national courts did not 
make considerable use of the procedures enshrined therein.452 This may have been due to 
national procedural obstacles to such cooperation with the Commission, or to the courts’ 
general reluctance to take that course because of the perceived limited scope of the 
information the Commission could give them under the Notice;453 or, perhaps most likely, to 
the belief of national judges that if  the national litigation had to be delayed in order to consult 
an “outside” body, it was better to consult the Court of Justice on the question, rather than the 
Commission. From the side of practitioners it has also been stressed that, while the 
Commission in the early years seemed more prepared to intervene in order to guide national
451 In case C-2/88, Criminal Proceedings against JJ . Zwartveld et a i, [1990] E C R 1-3365, paras. 17-18, the 
ECJ stressed that the principle of sincere co-operation in Art. 10 EC is not one-sided, namely it does not impose 
duties only on Member States but covers also Community institutions. These have a duty to co-operate with 
Member States’ authorities, in particular judicial authorities, which are responsible for ensuring that Community 
law be applied and respected in the national legal system. As far as EC competition law enforcement is 
concerned, in Delimitis v. Henninger Brûu, op.cit., para. 53, the Court reiterated this duty of co-operation on the 
part of the Commission by stating that national courts may address the former and seek economic and legal 
information.
452 See Riley, “EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nicely - Thank you! Part Two: 
Between the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1”, 24 ECLR 657 (2003), p 665-666. Up 
to 1998, national courts had seized the Commission in fifteen cases. Such applications for assistance came from 
Belgium (three cases - one of this cases is reported by Stuyck, supra (1995), pp. 48-49), France (three cases), 
Germany (three cases), the Netherlands (one case), Spain (three cases), the UK. (one case), and, interestingly, 
from one arbitral tribunal having its seat in Spain (see below). The time the Commission took to respond varied 
from some months in most cases, to two years in one case. See further Joris, “Communication relative à la 
coopération entre la Commission et les juridictions nationales pour l’application des articles 85 et 86 : Cas 
d’application jusqu’à présent”, (1998-4) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 47, pp. 47-48. In 1999 national 
courts used only in five cases the 1993 co-operation Notice in order to seek the assistance of the Commission 
(Commission XXIXth Report on Competition Policy - 1999, op.cit., pp. 17 and 363 et seq.). In 2000 national 
courts seized the Commission in seven cases (see Commission XXXth Report on Competition Policy - 2000 
(Brussels, 2001), p. 338 etseq.).
453 See the criticism of the Notice in this regard by Blinker, “Rapport allemand”, in: X l’III congrès FIDE 
(Stockholm, 3-6 juin 1998), Vol. U, Application nationale du droit européen de la concurrence (Stockholm, 
1999), p. 20. Other authors explain the rarity of contacts between national courts and the Commission by 
reference to the traditional reluctance of the former to engage in a dialogue with a non-judicial administrative 
authority'. See e g. Temple Lang, supra (1999), p. 288.
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courts, recently it was hesitant to give an opinion to a  national court, unless specifically 
solicited by the court.454
The express provision of Article 15(1) o f the new Regulation resolves these problems by  
establishing a  right for national courts to obtain legal or economic information from the 
Commission or request its opinion on questions relating to the application o f the competition 
rules.455 The new Cooperation Notice develops the details o f  this procedure further, and also 
provides for deadlines by which the Commission must reply.456
The specific language of Article 15(1) which refers to courts asking the Commission to  
transmit to them information or its opinion has led some commentators to doubt whether this 
establishes a right for national courts and a duty for the Commission to co-operate.457 This 
line of criticism, however, seems unjustified, because Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 
does nothing more than specifying the more general rights and duties flowing from Article 10 
EC. Taking also into account the Community Courts’ precedents, there is no doubt that 
indeed national courts have the right to actually co-operate with the Commission and to  
receive the requested information and/or opinion, subject to die limitations of the Treaty, 
Regulation 1/2003 and the co-operation Notice.
There are tw o kinds of assistance a national court may request from the Commission. It m ay 
ask for documents in the Commission’s possession, or for information of a procedural nature, 
basically concerning the status o f  the proceedings before the Commission. The Notice 
promises that the Commission will respond to such requests within a month.458 Alternatively, 
the court may ask the Commission for its opinion on economic, factual and legal matters.459 
The Commission will aim to respond within four months.460
The co-operation Notice appears to grant this second possibility only if other tools (the case 
law o f the Community Courts and Commission regulations, decisions, notices and guidelines)
454 See Holley, “EEC Competition Practice: A Thirty-year Retrospective”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International 
Antitrust Law and Policy 1992, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New 
York/Deventer, 1993), p. 724.
455 See also cases C-l 74/98 P and C-l 89/98 P, The Netherlands and Gerard van der Wal v. Commission, 
[2000JECRI-1.
4 See paras. 21 -30 of the Notice.
457 See e.g. Kirchner, supra (2002), p. 15.
458 Para. 22 of the Notice. The one month period may be excessive in cases of pure procedural information 
(for example on whether there is a pending proceeding before the Commission).
450 For an example of a case where the national court requested and received a written opinion from the 
European Commission see Cour d'appel de Bruxelles, 10-11-05, Wallonie Expo (WEX) v. La Chambre 
Syndicale des constructeurs d ’automobile et de motocycles de Belgique and Fédération belge des industries de 
¡'automobile et du cycle réunies (FEBLAC), in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts.
400 Para. 28 of the Notice. Again, this may not be satisfactory especially in cases of urgency, such as in 
preliminary injunction proceedings.
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“do not offer sufficient guidance".461 This limitation, however, which echoes a similar 
limitation in the Notice on guidance letters,462 is not found in the Court of Justice's case law 
on co-operation between national courts and the Commission. According to the principles 
emanating from Article 10 EC, the time and circumstances of a national court’s request for 
the Commission’s assistance should be entirely subject to the national court’s discretion, 
unless of course the court acts in an abusive manner that undermines the whole principle of 
co-operation. In any event, the above limitation appears to be really more a reminder to 
national courts to ensure the effectiveness o f this mechanism by using it prudently, and not to 
overwhelm the Commission with requests for assistance.
Apart from the co-operation between the Commission and national courts, it should be noted 
that some national competition laws, already before modernisation, have provided for such a 
procedure, whereby national courts may address questions regarding the application of 
national competition laws to the national competition authority or to a specific national court, 
such as was, until recently, the case with the Brussels Court of Appeal in Belgium.463 Since 
national competition authorities and courts will under the new system apply fully the Treaty 
competition rules, the possibility for a national court to seize with such questions the 
respective national authority or court should extend also to EC competition law questions, to 
the extent that this has not yet been expressly introduced by national law.464
401 Para. 27 of the Notice.
462 Notice on Guidance Letters, para. 8, point (a).
403 Arts. 42 and 42bis of the old Belgian Competition Act. See on this point Mafiei, “Judicial Review in 
Competition Cases”, in: Judicial Enforcement o f Competition Law, Committee on Competition Law and Policy, 
OECD (Paris, 1997), pp. 128-129; Van Bael, “Belgium”, in: Maitland-Walker (Ed.), Competition Laws o f  
Europe (London, 2003), p. 58. For examples of this procedure see Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, 28-9-04, Eddy 
Lodiso v. La SPRLU Af.O.N.D.E., in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts; Cour 
d’appel de Bruxelles, 23-6-05, Laurent Emond v. Brasserie llaacht, in: 
htlp://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts. This possibility does not deprive the ordinary 
judge of his power to send instead an Art. 234 EC preliminary reference to Luxembourg or to seize the 
Commission under Art. 15(1) Reg. 1/2003, if there are also Community law questions. It is interesting to note 
that in 2004 the Brussels Court of Appeal forwarded three such references to the Commission as requests for an 
opinion under Art. 15(1) Reg. 1/2003. The requests raised issues concerning the simultaneous application of 
Arts. 81 and 82 EC, the scope of Art. 82(c) EC, the vertical agreements block exemption Regulation and the 
accompanying Guidelines and the de minimis Notice. See Commission XXXIVth Report on Competition Policy -  
2004 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2005), para. 113. It is understood that this competence of the Cour d'appel has 
now been transferred to the Belgian Cour de cassation. See further De Bauw, Talion, Dubois, Zonnckeyn, 
Diamant, Braun, Fierens, Smeets, Verdonck, Poncelet and Dessard, “La modernisation belge après la 
modernisation européenne du droit de la concurrence - Le nouveau projet de loi sur la protection de la 
concurrence économique n ’apporte pas de véritable révolution : Une opportunité à pourtant saisir ?”, (2006) 
Electronic-Revue de la Concurrence, March Issue, in: http://www.ligue.org, pp, 27-29.
404 Thus, in France, national courts have been able to address questions regarding also the application of EC 
competition law to the Conseil de la concurrence (see now Art. L462-3 Code de commerce). For an example of 
a case where this procedure has recently been followed with regard to national competition law see Conseil de 
la concurrence, 9-11-05, Avis n° 05-A-20, concerning a preleminary reference by the Paris District Court in Luk 
Lamellen v. Valeo. In Germany, before the latest amendment of the Competition Act, this was possible pursuant 
to ss. 96 and 87 GWB in conjunction with s. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). Reference is now- made
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While a national court will be seizing the Commission under Article 15(1) of Regulation 
1/2003, it may decide to stay its proceedings. The staying o f  proceedings will take place 
according to national procedural rules. Some legal systems have encountered difficulties in 
accommodating easily this co-operation of national courts with the European Commission, 
because their procedural system does not formally allow for a process of contacts with a non­
judicial authority.465 As a result, some Member States’ courts have never seized the 
Commission with requests of information, while other courts have proceeded to such co­
operation in a non-formalised manner.466 This particular problem was regrettable, because it 
created conditions of divergence in the full and effective decentralised application of the EC 
competition rules by national courts. This problem should no longer exist under the new 
system. While it is true that the 1993 co-operation Notice specified that the facility to stay 
proceedings and seize the Commission depends on the applicable national procedural rules,467 *43
to s. 90a(3X4) GWB. In Finland, see Art. 18a(4) of the Competition Act providing that during the judicial 
proceedings regarding an action for damages, courts may request a statement from the Finnish Competition 
Authority. In Spain, Art. 13(3) of the Competition Act (LDC) of 1989 (as subsequently amended), provides that 
civil courts may request the Tribunal de defensa de la competencia to issue an opinion on the appropriateness 
and amount o f the damages to be paid in a case of antitrust violation. We understand that this procedure is 
retained in the recent Spanish Competition Bill. In the Netherlands, there have also been precedents where the 
civil courts requested an opinion from the Dutch Competition Authority in the context of preliminary relief 
proceedings, which are quite informal and could allow for such a mechanism: see President Rechtbank 
Amsterdam, 23-7-98, Wij Special Media v. 17\TJ, reported by Wezenbeek-Geuke, supra (2001-2002), p. 10. In 
Greece, the Competition Committee may address an opinion to some Ministries or even to chambers of 
commerce and to commercial and industrial unions, either ex officio or at their request (see detailed rules of 
Arts. 8e and 8f L. 703/1977, prior to the 2005 amendment). However, courts are not included in this list of 
addressees, although it is accepted that Art. 249 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure could be relied upon to 
this aim. It is striking that the latest amendment o f the Greek Competition Act has provided for a co-operation 
mechanism between Greek civil courts and the European Commission (as indeed Art. 15 Reg. 1/2003 requires) 
but has not extended this to cover the relationship with the Greek Competition Committee.
405 This is the case in Italy. See Tavassi, ‘TI regolamento CE N. 1/2003: Verso la devoluzione di 
competenze in materia di concorrenza dalla Commissione europea alle autorità garanti ed ai giudici nazionali”,
43 Dir.Com. 315 (2004), pp. 335, 361-362. In Italian law, Art. 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be used 
for the request o f factual information. With regard to legal matters, commentators have doubted whether Art. 
295 can be used for obtaining the opinion o f the Commission, because that provision refers to “another judge 
that must resolve a civil or administrative dispute, on which the decision in question depends” The Commission 
not being a judge and its decision not binding the civil court, that provision could not be used to the stated aim 
(see Lang, supra (1996), p. 257; Di Via, supra (1996), p. 92; Tavassi and Scuffi, supra (1998), pp. 50-52). It 
should be stressed that those authors’ view as to the non-binding nature of Commission decisions precedes the 
judgment of the ECJ in Masterfoods, where the opposite was decided. However, the problem remains that the 
Commission is not a judge, in order for Art. 295 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure to apply. Another 
possibility would be provided by Art 14 Legge n. 218/1995, which allows courts to seize experts or other 
specialised institutions. This discussion has now, in any case, become obsolete, because Reg. 1/2003 expressly 
provides itself for this power of national courts (see Scuffi, supra (2004), p. 127).
m  Apart from Italian courts (see Tavassi, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: Ehlermann & 
Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law 
(Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 18; Scuffi, supra (2004), p. 127), this also seems to be the atittude of Austrian courts 
(see Gilnther, supra (2001), p. 353; Eilmansberger and Thyri, supra (2004), p. 52).
467 This had also been accepted by the ECJ. Sec Dijkstra, op.cit., para. 36: "... the national court may, i f  it is 
appropriate and consistent with the national rules o f  procedure, obtain additional information from the 
Commission or allow the parties to seek a decision from the Commission” (emphasis added).
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the new express provisions of Community secondary legislation supersede any national 
legislative or practical obstacle. This should also come as a result o f Article 10 EC. Indeed, 
under the previous system of enforcement, it was proposed, as a way out o f national 
procedural obstacles, to rely on pertinent domestic procedural rules read in conjunction with 
Article 10 of the Treaty, which obliges national courts to ensure the effective application o f 
Community law.468
The decision whether to seize or not the Commission under the terms of Article 15(1) 
remains that of the national court.469 Any opinion or assistance given by the Commission 
under this mechanism does not bind national courts.470 Nevertheless, the co-operation 
procedure has raised concerns regarding due process, since the Commission’s opinion will be 
transmitted without the parties being heard,471 and a court might follow it slavishly without 
giving the parties an effective opportunity to contradict it. As the rules stand, the Commission 
will not be under an obligation to communicate its submissions to the parties or to base them 
on the evidence before the court.472 This may contrast with the equivalent status of 
communications to national courts by NCAs. Thus in French law, any communication by the 
Conseil de la concurrence pursuant to a court request which concerns national or Community 
competition law questions presupposes that the parties are heard {procédure contradictoire), 
unless the information transmitted has its source in past proceedings before the Conseil473 
A final reservation based on Community, rather than on national law, regards the extent to 
which these opinions can interpret EC law, which only the Court of Justice has the 
competence to do.474 The prevailing view has been that the Commission can act as legal or 
economic advisor and that it can perform essentially the same work as the Court in 
preliminary ruling proceedings with one important limitation being that its views are not 
binding upon national courts. The fact that already the Community Courts are heavily 
overloaded speaks in favour of allowing the Commission to fill a certain gap.
468 See, in this context, Synodinos, supra (1995), pp. 432-433, according to whom, the legal basis for the 
Greek civil courts’ co-operation with the Commission is Arts. 245(1 ), 249, and 368 et seq. of the Code of Civil 
Procedure in conjunction with Art 10 EC.
** Compare, on the other hand, the power of the Commission to submit ex officio written observation 
before nactional proceedings even without the express permission of the court in question (see infra).
470 See paras. 19 and 29 of the co-operation Notice.
471 Ibid, paras. 19 and 30.
472 See in this respect the critical comments by Gilliams, “Modernisation: From Policy to Practice”, 28 
ELRev. 451 (2003), p. 462. See also Lucas de Levssac and Parleani, supra (2002), p. 59.
473 Art. L462-3 Code de commerce. Compare also Art. 70 of the Swedish Competition Act, which provides 
that parties to civil proceedings must be given the opportunity to comment on statements submitted by the 
Commission or the Swedish Competition Authority pursuant to Art. 15 Reg. 1/2003.
474 See e.g. reservations by Wahl, “Rapport suédois”, in: XU.II emigres FIDE (Stockholm, 3-6 juin 1998), 
Vol. II, Application nationale du droit européen de la concurrence (Stockholm, 1999), p. 252. On the EC J 
interpretation “monopoly”, see Schroeder, “Die Auslegung des EU-Rechts”, 44 JuS 180 (2004), p. 181.
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The first experiences of this mechanism are rather positive. In 2005, the Commission 
provided information in reply to three requests from national judges and issued six opinions: 
three in reply to requests from Belgian courts, one to  a  Lithuanian court and two to Spanish 
courts. Three requests received in 2005 were pending at the end o f the year.475 In order to 
enhance the consistent application o f  EC competition law and to avoid conflicting opinions 
from the Commission and national competition authorities, it was agreed that, as soon as a  
national court turns to the Commission or to a national authority for an opinion on the 
application o f EC competition law, the Commission and the competition authority o f that 
Member State will inform each other.476 Furthermore, in order to increase transparency, the 
Commission has decided to make publicly available opinions which the Commission has 
given on the application of the Community competition rales at the request o f a national court 
pursuant to Article 15(1) o f Regulation No 1/2003 477
dd. Information Exchange between the Commission and National Courts
The co-operation procedure between the Commission and national courts also raises some 
important questions regarding the kind o f  information which the Commission can transmit to 
national courts. One issue is protection o f  professional and business secrets. The co-operation 
Notice attempts to reconcile the various conflicting interests by leaving it up to national 
courts whether to request information covered by professional secrecy. However, it provides 
for some safeguards: in particular, before transmitting such information, the Commission 
must ask the national court whether it can offer a guarantee that it will protect confidential 
information and business secrets. The Commission has opted for this specific kind o f  
“dialogue” with the national courts based on a combined reading of Articles 10 and 287 
E C 45 *7*
45 XXXI ‘th Report on Competition Policy -  2005, op.cit., paras. 219-221 and 225 et seq. For the first cases 
during 2004 when Art. 15(1) Reg. 1/2003 was used by national courts to seize the Commission with requests for 
information or for an opinion, see Commission XXXIVth Report on Competition Policy -  2004 
(Brussels/Luxembourg, 2005), paras. 112-113.
4 * Reg. 1/2003 has not formally imposed such a duty of mutual information, but it is something that has 
been decided informally within the ECN.
477 Opinions will be posted on the 1X3 COMP website once the judgment in the case in which the opinion 
was requested has been notified to the Commission pursuant to Art. 15(2) Reg. 1/2003. This is no guarantee that 
the opinion will be made public because some Member States systematically fail to discharge their duty to 
cummunicate relevant national judgments to the Commission under Art. 15(2) Reg. 1/2003 and there may also 
be national procedural impediments that do not allow such publication.
J'8 See paras. 23-25 of the co-operation Notice. See also Temple Lang, “Developments, Issues, and New 
Remedies -  The Duties of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10 of the EC Treat) ”, 27 Ford.IntLJ 
1904 (2004), p. 1922, who reads into Art. 10 EC a more general duty of national courts to enjoin litigants from
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Furthermore, the Commission may refuse to transmit any kind o f information to national 
courts, in order to ‘"safeguard the interests of the Community or to avoid any interference 
with its functioning and independence, in particular by jeopardizing the accomplishment of 
the tasks entrusted to it” * 479 This is also intended to cover the correspondence between the 
Commission and national competition authorities in the framework o f the European 
Competition Network.
A problem arises with regard to corporate statements made in the context of a application for 
leniency under the Leniency Notice. Whether litigants may request indirectly,480 i.e. through 
the national court, the disclosure of such statements is doubtful.481 The Commission in its co­
operation Notice declares that it will only transmit such information to national courts with 
the leniency applicant’s consent, as otherwise the accomplishment of its tasks would be 
jeopardised.482 In particular, such disclosure would prejudice the effective enforcement of 
Community competition law by the Commission.483 In principle, public enforcement by the 
Commission and its intention to facilitate detection through immunity of fines should not 
function to the detriment of private enforcement and the compensation of cartel victims; that 
is why the Leniency Notice cannot interfere with such civil claims, which, in any case, are 
based on the direct effect of Treaty provisions.484
However, there are less onerous ways for these objectives to be pursued than by disclosing 
documents companies have submitted to the Commission under the Leniency Notice, which 
w ould frustrate the Notice’s aim of making detection o f hard core restrictions o f competition 
easier, since fewer companies would be willing to come under it. Private litigants will 
therefore basically485 have to rely solely on discovery in the framework of the civil
using documents obtained from the Commission in the context of the EC administrative proceedings, when the 
Commission has transmitted such documents on the express condition that these cannot be used in other 
contexts.
479 See para. 26 of the co-operation Notice.
480 The new co-operation Notice no longer provides for the possibility of litigants to seize directly the 
Commission. On this point and on the alternative possibilities offered by Reg. 1049/2001, see below.
481 See Temple Lang, “The Implications of the Commission’s Leniency Policy for National Competition 
Authorities”, 28 ELRev. 430 (2003), pp. 432-433, who leaves open this possibility.
481 Para. 26 of the co-operation Notice. See also paras. 32-33 of the Leniency Notice: “The Commission 
considers that normally disclosure, at any time, of documents received in the context of this notice would 
undermine the protection of the purpose of inspections and investigations within the meaning of Article 4(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.”
483 See further Blake and Schnichels, “Leniency Following Modernisation: Safeguarding Europe’s Leniency 
Programmes”, (2004-2) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 7, p. 12; D. Voillemont, Gérer la clémence 
(Paris/Bruxelles, 2005), p. 46.
484 Leniency Notice, para. 31 in fine. “The fact that immunity or reduction in respect of fines is granted 
cannot protect an undertaking from the civil law consequences of its participation in an infringement of Article 
81 EC”. See further above.
485 On the Reg. 1049/2001 possibilities see below.
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proceedings, content themselves with non-leniency related evidence held by the Commission, 
or, finally, await and rely on the final Commission infringement decision. O f course, 
protection is accorded only to the statements specifically prepared by the leniency applicant 
for the Commission in the context o f the application for leniency and not to pre-existing 
documents that the leniency applicant is in any case required to submit to the Commission.486 
It is noteworthy that there have recently been cases where private litigants tried to seek 
discover}' in US courts of EC leniency “corporate statements”, i.e. o f statements submitted to 
the Commission in the context o f a leniency application. The Commission has viewed this as 
a serious risk for the effectiveness o f  its leniency programme and has tried to assuage the 
fears o f  leniency applicants by giving them the possibility to make oral statements.487 The 
Commission’s current practice is that oral statements made by leniency applicants are 
routinely recorded by the Commission,488 transcribed and signed by leniency applicants.489 
The Commission has very recently published a draft of an amended Leniency Notice, in order
486 See Van Barlingen, “The European Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice after One Year of Operation”, 
(2003-2) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 16, p. 20.
487 Initially, foreign plaintiffs in US courts succeeded twice in securing access to statements made by EU 
leniency applicants, and failed once. In all these cases the Commission had filed a brief in opposition as amicus 
curiae. Discovery was allowed in two cases in the context of the Vitamins cartel: In Re Vitamins Antitrust 
Litigation, Mise. No. 99-197 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2002 and Sept. 30, 2002). It was not allowed in one case: In Re 
Methionine Antitrust Litigation, No. C-99-3491-CRB (N.D.Cal. July 29,2002). It appears, however, that one of 
the parties in that case settled, while offering the plaintiffs in exchange the CD-ROM provided to it by the 
Commission in the EC administrative proceedings, which contained essentially the whole Commission file. On 
these questions, see generally Burnside and Botteman, “Networking amongst Competition Authorities”, 10 
IntTLR l (2004), p. 9; Nordländer, “Discovering Discovery -  US Discovery of EC Leniency Statements”, 25 
ECLR 646 (2004), p. 650 et seq.\ Levy and O’Donoghue, “The EU Leniency Programme Comes of Age”, 27 
World Competition 75 (2004), p. 86 et seq.\ Amory and Marchini Càmia, “La demande de ‘clémence’ auprès de 
la Commission européenne : Effets collatéraux dans d’autres juridictions”, Sept. 2005, Vol. H, e-Competitions, 
in: http://Avww.concurrences.fr, p. 2; Guersent, “Table ronde : Les conséquences civiles et pénales dans un 
contexte ¿ ’internationalisation des programmes de clémence”, in: Clémence et transaction en matière de 
concurrence, Premières experiences et interrogations de la pratique, 125 GP n* 287-288 7 (2005), pp. 49-50. 
The recent judgment of the US Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices. Inc., 542 US 241 
(2004), refers to the rather different situation where a complainant in a Commission administrative proceeding 
requested the US courts to order discovery against the alleged competition law infringer. The complainant’s aim 
w as to use that evidence before the Commission proceedings, though the Commission itself did not wish to have 
access to that evidence and, indeed, resisted the complainant’s US discovery action by filing two amicus curiae 
briefs urging the US courts to reject that For a different outcome see In Re Microsoft Corp., M.B.D, No. 06- 
I0061-MLW (2006), where the Massachusetts US District Court rejected Microsoft’s request to force software 
rival Novell Inc. to hand over EU correspondence that Microsoft claimed it needed to defend itself against 
antitrust charges in Europe.
488 The Commission tries to keep such statements short, and excludes business secrets and confidential 
information to avoid the need for editing.On the oral leniency procedure, see Van Barlingen, supra (2003), pp. 
19-20; Van Barlingen and Baronnes, “The European Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice in Practice”, (2005-3) 
EC Competition Policy Newsletter 6, pp. 8-10.
484 Hie Commission requests a signature but considers it immaterial whether the transcipt is signed or not; 
the danger of signing a transcript is that this document could potentially be seen as an admission of liability by 
the company.
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to formalise this practice,490 which is also followed in the context of certain national leniency 
programmes491
ee. The Duty of Member States to Transmit Copies of Judgments to the
Commission
Regulation 1/2003 provides also for a duty o f the Member States to forward copies of 
judgments of their national courts to the Commission. It is noteworthy that while the 
Commission's draft regulation had proposed to directly impose upon courts the duty to send 
the Commission copies of their judgments applying Articles 81 and 82 EC, the final text of 
Article 15(2) of Regulation 1/2003 departs from the Commission proposal and does not place 
national courts, as such, under this administrative duty. Instead, it will be Member States that 
must forward the copies of such judgments of national courts to the Commission.492 This 
choice has been very prudent in our view, because courts are not accustomed with such 
“clerical” duties, which are usually carried out by their registries 493 Besides, courts might 
have felt under the “direct control” o f the Commission and this could backfire in that they 
might seek to avoid applying EC competition law at all costs in order to escape the exposure 
to the Commission’s scrutiny.494 In addition, the Community' law duty in question becomes 
far more concrete, and, thus, more easily justiciable, since it would have been more sensitive 
and cumbersome to attribute the failure o f national courts to apply this provision to the 
Member State on the basis of Article 10 EC.49S
490 Draft Amendment o f the 2002 Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction o f F'ines in
Cartel Cases, in: http://europaeu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/leniency.html. The public
consultation period expired on 20 March 2006 and a new formal text is expected soon. Compare also option 28 
of the Green Paper on damages actions.
491 This is the case in France. See further Lasserre, “Propos introductifs”, in: Clémence et transaction en 
matière de concurrence, Premières experiences et interrogations de la pratique, 125 GP n° 287-288 7 (2005), p. 
14.
m  Transmission will take place after the written text of the judgment has been duly notified to the parties of 
the proceedings. See Tavassi, supra (2004), p, 362.
m  See Ehlermann, supra (2000a), p. 580, who had expressed reservations as to the initial text of the 
regulation proposal that imposed the duty of information directly upon the courts. See also the critical comments 
by Holmes, supra (2000), p. 71, Under Greek national law (Art. 24(3) L. 703/1977) the registries of courts that 
have applied national competition law' must forward copies of these judgments to the Greek Competition 
Committee. However, it is telling that this provision has on the whole been ignored by court registrars, 
notwithstanding their disciplinary' liability.
494 This is a fear, however, that is still expressed under the new text of Art. 15(2) by some commentators. 
See e.g. Terhechte, “Die Rolle des Wettbewerbsrechts in der Europäischen Verfassung”, in: Hatje & Terhechte 
(Eds.), Das Binnenmarktziel in der Europäischen Verfassung (Baden-Baden, 2004), p. 124.
495 For examples of such attribution see Köbler, op.cit. para. 59; case C-129/00, Commission v. Italy, [2003] 
ECR1-14637, paras. 29-33.
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It should also be emphasised that the Commission initially proposed in the White Paper the 
more far-reaching obligation to inform the Commission of all proceedings where Articles 81 
and 82 EC are invoked before national courts.496 However, this proposal was already 
abandoned in the September 2000 draft regulation and according to the final text o f  
Regulation 1/2003, Member States will only have to forward copies of judgments to the 
Commission, in particular judgments where Articles 81 and 82 EC are applied and not just 
invoked497 This essentially means that the Commission will have no other way o f  learning 
about such proceedings before judgment is reached, and must rely on being informed by  
litigants.498 A further remark to be made here is that national competition authorities are not 
directly concerned by Article 15(2) o f  the Regulation, although there had been proposals for 
the Commission to use them as its local agents for that purpose.499
One last question is whether the Commission must be furnished only with copies o f  final 
judgments which bring the litigation to an end, or whether other judgments which might be 
final in their nature but do not conclude the proceedings as a whole must also be forwarded. 
They might include final partial or interim judgments such as a judgment granting a 
preliminary injunction. While the letter o f Article 15(2) o f Regulation 1/2003 may seem to 
refer only to final judgments, a more attentive reading may lead to the conclusion that 
preliminary' injunction judgments should also be covered, as they too “decide on the
496 Para. 107 of the White Paper. The initial Commission proposal to require national courts to inform the 
Commission of proceedings where EC competition law was invoked, was criticised because it was 
disproportionately onerous and technically difficult to comply with. See e.g. Cooke, supra (2001a), pp. 555-556. 
According to Martinez Lage, supra (2000), p. 9, fn 24, it might have been more reassuring to extend this 
obligation to all cases, where the relevant competition provisions were invoked, irrespective of whether they 
w ere actually applied or not in the judgment. Although more preferable, such a solution would further increase 
the bureaucracy involved. In any case it is fair to say that the application of a legal provision as such has a rather 
wide sense and it is at the Member State’s discretion to identify those cases where the Treaty competition 
provisions were applied by its courts.
49' It cannot be excluded that a particular national law may impose more substantial duties on its national 
courts in that respect. Such is the case in German law', where by virtue of s. 90(1) GWB German courts 
entertaining civil actions have to inform the Bundeskartellamt, though not the Commission, of all legal actions 
arising from Arts. 81 and 82 EC.
498 See Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 73. Martinez Lage, supra (2000), p. 9, believes that this is 
sufficient. This is now the formalised practice in England where any party w'hose statement of case raises or 
deals with ait issue relating to the application o f Arts 81 and 82 EC or the equivant national provisions must 
serve a copy of the statement of case on the OFT at the same time as it is served on the other parties to the 
claim. See Practice Direction -  Competition Law -  Claims Relating to the Application o f Articles 81 and 82 o f  
the EC Treaty and Chapters I  and II o f  Part I  o f  the Competition Act 1998, para. 3. The same duty of 
notification is imposed on appelants. See Practice Direction 52-Appeals, para. 21.10A.
499 See Cooke, supra (2001a), p. 556. The non-involvement of NCAs in this mechanism may be explained 
by the fact that the final text of Art. 15(2) Reg. 1/2003 imposes on Member States, not the courts, the duty to 
transmit judgments to the Commission. It would certainly have been inappropriate for a Community text to 
provide for the allocation of such duties inside national administrations.
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application of Article 81 or Article 82 o f the Treaty’’.500 Such a reading would in any event 
correspond better to the provision’s objective of ensuring more consistent application o f the 
Treaty competition rules by national courts, through the possibility of a Commission 
intervention under Article 15(3) of the Regulation.501 The effet utile of this provision would 
be weakened if the obligation to forward copies of judgments did not cover preliminary 
injunctions too, since in many Member States such interim measures are de facto  final, as the 
parties usually settle afterwards and the issue never goes to a full hearing.502
ff. The Am icus Curiae Mechanism
A further new mechanism o f co-operation that Article 15(3) o f the new Regulation introduces 
for the first time503 is the power o f the Commission and o f national competition authorities to 
file amicus curiae briefs in national proceedings.504 This is intended to be used more as a 
preventive mechanism in order to draw the courts’ attention to specific competition law 
problems. Again, there have been similar mechanisms in some Member States, already before 
EC competition law modernisation, that have provided for the national competition 
authority’s ex officio power to give an opinion before another regulatory authority or a 
court.505
500 The text of Art. 15(2) Reg. 1/2003 refers to “any written judgment of national courts deciding on the 
application o f  Article 81 or Article 82 o f  the Treaty” (emphasis added).
501 See below on that possibility.
501 This is the case for example in Greece and in Ireland. For Ireland, see Maher, “Ireland”, in: Behrens 
(Ed.), EEC Competition Rules in National Courts, Vol. II, Benelux and Ireland (Baden-Baden, 1994), p. 293.
503 For a rare case where the European Commission has intervened in a national proceeding long before 
Reg. 1/2003 came into effect see Hasselblad v. Orbison (CA), [1985] QB 475; [1984] 3 CMLR 679. th is case 
is rather atypical, in that it concerned a libel action brought against a person that had complained to the 
Commission. The Commission intervened not to make submissions of substantive competition lawr but in order 
to stress that the effectiveness of competition law enforcement would be impaired if potential complainants ran 
the risk of being sued for libel in national courts.
504 It should be stressed that the continental European legal tradition is not very familiar with the amicus 
curiae briefs, although recently some openings seem to hesitantly emerge with regard to participation in civil 
proceedings by certain independent administrative authorities. See further Kerameus, “Procedural Tools in the 
Different European States Concerning the Uniform Interpretation of Law by the Supreme Courts: A 
Comparative Presentation”, 53 RIIDI613 (2000), p. 619.
5 This is the case in France and Germany. In France the competent authority to intervene has been the 
Minister of Economy, who, pursuant to Art. L470-5 Code de commerce, does not become party’ to the 
proceedings, but rather fulfills a mission de police juridique in ensuring the consistent application of national 
competition law (see Boulanger, “Frankreich”, in: Behrens (Ed.), EEC Competition Rules in National Courts, 
Vol. IV, France (Baden-Baden, 1997), p. 192; CA Paris, 16-1-89, SA Technisom France v. SARL Serap 
Ameublement et a i ,  D. 1990, somm. 106; Cass.com., 7-7-04, Ministre del'économie et Syndicat des détaillants 
spécialistes du disque et al. v. Société Carrefour France, 1 Concurrences 68 (2004)). This provision of the Code 
de commerce, read in conjunction with Art. 470-6, extends also to Arts. 81 and 82 EC (see Idot, supra (2004b), 
p. 161 ). Under Art. L470-6, also the Conseil de la concurrence has the powrer to intervene as amicus curiae in a 
pending case before the French civil courts, when an EC competition law question arises (Art. L470-6 here does 
nothing more than refer to Art. 15 Reg. 1/2003). In Germany the Bundeskartellamt has had the power to appoint
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There are naturally certain reservations with regard to this new instrument,506 but on th e  
overall this exceptional mechanism could serve well the aim of the Commission to help 
national courts come to grips with difficult competition issues that require a high degree o f  
consistent application throughout the European Union.507 In that sense, such amicus curiae  
briefs complement the preliminary reference procedure o f  Article 234 EC,508 although, 
naturally, the opinion of the Commission, unlike the judgment o f the Court o f Justice, cannot 
bind the national court.509
The Commission and national competition authorities are intended not to be parties to the 
proceedings, but rather to act as an objective, neutral and independent economic expert.510
a representative authorised to submit written statements, to attend hearings and give evidence, and even to 
address questions to the parties, witnesses and experts (s. 90(2) GWB). See further Schroeder, Deselaers, 
Federle, Seeliger and Hartog, “Germany”, in: Maitland-Walker (Ed.), Competition Laws o f Europe (London, 
2003), p. 193. Of course, most national competition laws that have been amended following the modernisation, 
now have similar provisions on the possibility of amicus curiae interventions by their NCAs.
506 Although the Commission had acknowledged in the Explanatory Memorandum preceding the regulation 
proposal (at p. 12) that such submissions would be made in accordance with the procedural rules in force in the 
Member State in question and that “the proposal does not purport to harmonise national procedural law”, there 
had been a certain degree of criticism of this “intrusion” of the Commission into the national judicial systems. 
One serious doubt was whether a Council Regulation without a specific legal basis and with no national 
implementing measures could impose obligations on national courts and give the power to the Commission to  
intervene in national proceedings on its own initiative (see Bechtold, supra (2000), p. 2430). Another doubt was 
whether the right of national competition authorities to intervene in such national proceedings could be a 
question of Community or national law (see Grbning, supra (2001b), p. 89).
507 See the aiticle-by-article Explanatory Memorandum under Art. 15 o f the September 2000 regulation 
proposal, which refers to questions “of considerable importance for the consistent application of Community 
competition law”. See also Kjolbye, 39 CMLRev. 175 (2002), p. 179.
See Kjolbye, 39 CMLRev. 175 (2002), p. 179, fn. 16; Calvo Caravaea and Canedo Anillaga, supra
(2003) , p. 39. While Art. 234 EC remains the undisputable co-operation channel between the national and the 
Community judicial level, it has some limitations in competition law', since the preliminary reference procedure 
is only intended to interpret the law and not to deal with the facts o f a case, which are left to the national judge. 
On Art. 234 EC’s inadequacies see already Steindorff, supra (1983), p. 128, who pointed out that in a - at that 
point still remote - decentralised application o f Art. 81(3) EC, the preliminary reference procedure would not 
help much, since Art. 234 EC rulings are “more or less abstract”, thus contributing little to antitrust decisions. 
See also Montag, “The System of Legal Exception”, 37 CDE 145 (2001), p. 158; Ehlermann and Atanasiu, 
supra (2002), p. 76; Hirsch, supra (2003), p. 250. Some authors have suggested the reconsideration of the Art. 
234 EC split between interpretation and application of the law (see e g. Holmes, supra (2000), pp. 64-65; 
Deringer, “Reform der Durchiuhrungsverordnung zu den A rt 81 und 82 des EG-Vertrages”, 36 EuR 306 
(2001), p. 318 et seq.\ Ehlermann and Atanasiu, supra (2002), pp. 77-78). Contra Lenaerts and Gerard, supra
(2004) , p. 339 et seq.t who stress that in reality the rulings o f the ECJ are usually preceded by a very fact­
intensive reasoning, In any case, these co-operation mechanisms between the Commission and national courts 
should be welcomed and seen complementarity and not antagonistically with the Art. 234 EC procedure. See 
Paulis, supra (2001a), p. 406, who explains these mechanisms, particularly the one of Art. 15( 1) Reg. 1/2003, by 
reference to the ECJ’s limitations under Art. 234 EC and to the fact-based nature of competition law.
509 Exceptionally, the Art. 15(3) mechanism and Art. 234 EC might operate in practice in a conflictual 
manner. A national court faced with a Commission amicus curiae brief with which it disagrees, might be 
tempted to seek support from the Court o f Justice by making a preliminary reference. See CederschiOld, 
“Efficient Protection of Competition in an Enlarged Community through Full Association o f National 
Competition Authorities and National Courts”, in: Conference on the Reform o f  European Competition Law in 
Freiburg i. B. (9 and 10 November 2000% http://europa.eu.int/comm/cornpetition, pp. 3-4.
510 See Parlasca, “Should the Competition Authorities Be Authorized to Intervene in Competition Related 
Problems, Particularly when they Are Handled in Court? If so, what Should Form the Basis of their Powers o f 
Intervention? National Report from Germany”, LIDC Questions 2001/2002, in: http://www.ligue.org, p. 5; Idot,
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This mechanism has raised some concerns of due process mainly from the practitioners’ 
side.511 The fear is that the Commission’s statements might be followed in a copy-paste 
manner by the judge, without the parties having the opportunity to effectively contradict 
them. In addition, while Article 15(3) o f Regulation 1/2003 restricts this intervention of the 
Commission only to cases where ‘the coherent application o f Article 81 or 82 of the Treaty 
so requires” and the co-operation Notice states that the Commission will be guided in its 
submissions only by its duty to defend the public interest and not any private interests 
involved, it is not always easy for the Commission not to take sides. The water-tight 
distinction between the public and the private interest in competition cases, a distinction, of 
which the Commission is so often fond, is totally fictitious in our view.
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Commission in its co-operation Notice is so eager 
to stress its detachment from the actual litigation,512 it is difficult to see how one or the other 
of the parties may not be entitled to cross-examination, especially when the national court 
gives them this opportunity.513 Indeed, the latest post-modernisation amendments o f some 
national competition laws are more liberal in this respect and provide that the parties can at 
least make statements on top o f the Commission’s or the national competition authority's 
observations,514 or that the observations o f the national competition authority' (though not 
those of the Commission) will be subject to the parties’ being heard.
It should be stressed that the conditions for the submission of observations by the 
Commission and by national competition authorities are different. The latter are the preferred 
amici curiae and may submit their observations on any issue “relating to the application of 
Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty”. The former, on the other hand, can submit such 
observations only exceptionally, if “the coherent application of Article 81 or Article 82 o f the
supra (2004b), p. 184; Cooke, supra (2004b), pp. 658-659. On the principles of objectivity and neutrality in the 
Commission’s co-operation with national courts see Schröter, supra (2003), p. 47.
511 See e.g. Bellis, “Les défis de la modernisation du droit européen de la concurrence”, 11 JdT (Eur.) 73
(2003) , p. 74. For a more general critical assessment of this mechanism see Cooke, supra (2001a), pp. 557-558, 
addressing the question of the protagonist role, which, according to the author, the Commission will play de 
facto in national proceedings and which may seem to be in conflict on occasions with the principle of party 
initiative that applies to civil proceedings.
512 See e.g. paras. 19 and 29 of the co-operation Notice.
513 See in tins sense Cooke, supra (2001b), p. 17; Favre, supra (2001b), p. 82; Lenaerts and Gerard, supra
(2004) , p. 333. This is a very sensitive issue that eventually may have to be resolved by the Court of Justice 
through a preliminary reference by a national court, before which the Commission has exercised its power of 
amicus curiae intervention. The Commission may indeed realise this sensitivity. See in this regard Director 
General Lowe, supra (2003c), p .  6, acknowledging that “it is of course up to the courts to involve the parties -  
as appropriate in the respective procedural framework”.
514 Art. 70 of the Swedish Competition Act.
Treaty so requires” .515 National competition authorities had not been initially spelled out as 
possible amici curiae in the 1999 White Paper. The proposal to use them as agents o f the 
Commission in this context was first aired in the 2000 draft regulation, as a result o f the 
reservations that had been expressed.516 Those reservations explain also the re-dimensioning 
o f that mechanism by the new Regulation, which refers firstly to national competition 
authorities and only secondly to the Commission 517 Finally, the Commission and national 
authorities will have the power to submit on their own initiative written observations, while 
the submission of oral observations will depend on the national court’s permission.518 
In order for the Commission and national competition authorities to be able to make use o f  
the amicus curiae mechanism, Article 15(3)(b) o f Regulation 1/2003 imposes a duty upon 
national courts to transmit to the former any documents necessary' for the assessment o f  the 
case. This constitutes the only direct duty placed upon the courts in the co-operation context 
o f Article 15 o f the new Regulation and it is one o f “administrative” or “clerical” nature, 
discharged via the courts’ registries.519 It should be noted that there are no sanctions involved, 
if national courts fail to adhere to that obligation (e.g. procedural irregularity of the judgm ent 
in question that could lead to its cassation under national procedural law). Only in wholly 
exceptional circumstances, where the courts o f a Member State would refuse in a number o f  
occasions to co-operate with the Commission under these provisions, could the Commission 
initiate a Treaty infringement action o f Article 226 EC against that Member State or, under 
certain conditions, could an individual advance a damages claim against the Member State 
concerned under the Francovich and Köhler principles.
The Article 15(3)(b) duty of national courts to forward documents necessary for an eventual 
amicus curiae intervention must be seen in conjunction with the Article 15(2) duty o f  
Member States to transmit to the Commission copies of judgments. The two provisions are 
intended to complement each other: in other words, it will only be at the stage when the
' 5 Art 15(3Xa) R eg. 1/2003. According to Pace, supra (2004), p. 175, the interest of the NCAs differs 
from that of the Commission. The former would aim at reducing the risk of the Member State being answerable 
for its judicial organs’ failure to respect Community law, while the latter aim at safeguarding the coherent 
application of Community law. Such a view, however, is not in perfect harmony with the supranational nature of 
the Community institutional and legal system and neglects the fact that NCAs are essentially acting as 
administration communautaire indirecte.
510 See e.g. Cooke, “Panel Three Discussion: Courts and Judges”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o fE U  Competition Law (Oxford, 2001), p. 482.
*17 See further Cooke, supra (2001b), pp. 16-17.
518 Of course, national procedural law may grant NCAs wider powers in this context. Reg. 1/2003 does not 
prohibit or exclude this. See on this point Kovar, supra (2003), p. 484. Where, under national law, the court 
proceedings are only oral, then the effectiveness of Art. 15(3) Reg. 1/2003 necessitates that the Commission and 
the NCA be entitled to make oral submissions, irrespective of the authorisation of the national court in question. 
See Idot, supra (2004b), p. 184.
519 See para. 33 o f the co-operation Notice.
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Commission has in its possession a first instance national judgment, that it will use Article 
15(3)(b) to request the documents of that case from the specific court. This means that in the 
majority of cases the Commission will intervene only at the appeal stage, after it will have 
accordingly been alerted through the mechanisms of paragraphs (2) and (3)(b) of Article 15 
of the new Regulation.520
gg. Other Indirect Co-operation Mechanisms or Support for National Courts
In addition to these more formal ways o f co-operation between the Commission and national 
courts, there may be other informal and indirect forms o f "dialogue”.
A first question is whether informal guidance letters issued by the Commission521 at the 
request of undertakings may also have a bearing upon an on-going litigation procedure. The 
possibility of undertakings to approach the Commission informally, in order to seek 
guidance, is in essence a concession, aiming at compensating to a certain extent the loss of 
legal certainty of companies as a result o f abolishing the notification and prior authorisation 
system. These informal channels of co-operation would be most necessary in exceptional 
cases of particularly difficult questions regarding the interpretation o f Article 81 EC. In its 
regulation proposal of September 2000 the Commission had declared that it would "remain 
open to discuss specific cases with the undertakings where appropriate; in particular, it 
[would] provide guidance regarding agreements, decisions or concerted practices that raise[d] 
an unresolved genuinely new question o f interpretation”.522 It had also reitered its resolve to 
issue such reasoned opinions in the public interest in its Joint Statement with the Council on 
the Network.523
Thus, the Commission's Notice on guidance letters promises to offer guidance in exceptional 
circumstances o f “genuine uncertainty”, referring to "novel or unresolved questions for the
5:0 See Marenco, “Consistent Application of EC Competition Law in a System of Parallel Competences”, 
in: Conference on the Reform o f European Competition Law in Freiburg i. B. (9 and 10 November 2000), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition, p. 3, who submits that this would be sufficient to ensure coherence and it 
would also save Commission’s resources. While this is how the system is intended to work in practice, it should 
not be totally excluded that in exceptional cases the Commission may use Art. 15(3)(b) Reg. 1/2003 already at 
the first instance stage of an on-going litigation. In such cases the Commission will have sufficient information 
about that litigation through some other informal channel, presumably through one of the litigants (see in that 
regard Beilis, supra (2003), p. 74).
î2i To be more precise, these letters will be issued not by the Commission, as such, but by DG COMP.
522 See the Explanatory Memorandum of the regulation proposal, p. 10; see also Rocca, “Sécurité juridique 
dans un système de compétences parallèles”, in: Conference on the Reform o f  European Competition Law in 
Freiburg i. B. (9 and 10 November 2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition, p. 5.
î23 See Statement by the Commission, accompanying the Joint Statement of the Council and the 
Commission, op.citr, Recital 38 Reg. 1/2003.
application of Articles 81 and 82”.524 Companies are not entitled to obtain such opinions and 
in no circumstances will this informal mechanism re-introduce a notification system from the 
back door. A guidance letter is without prejudice to the Commission's powers as to the 
subsequent assessment of the same issues and cannot bind national courts,525 although, it is 
presumed that such Commission statements can be of persuasive value before the latter, their 
legal effects thus resembling those of the old comfort letters.
The Notice requires that in order for the Commission to exercise its discretion and proceed to 
a guidance letter, five cumulative conditions, three positive and two negative, must be 
satisfied:526
(a) the question involved cannot be clarified by reference to the existing EC legal 
framework, to the case law, to publicly available notices, communications or 
guidelines, to the desicion-making practice or to previous guidance letters;
(b) the clarification of the novel question is useful, taking into account the economic 
importance from the point o f view o f consumers, and/or the possible correspondence 
o f the practice in question to “a more widely spread economic usage in the 
marketplace", and/or the scope o f the investments involved and whether the 
transaction affects structural operations (e.g. partial function joint ventures);
(c) the guidance letter can be issued on the basis o f  information provided to the 
Commission;
(d) the questions involved are not identical or similar to questions, with which the Court 
o f Justice or the Court o f  First Instance are seized in a  pending case;
(e) the specific practice concerned is not subject to proceedings pending before the 
Commission, a national competition authority, or a national court.
It is clear, therefore, from the last negative condition that the Commission is not prepared to 
issue a  guidance letter requested by parties to an on-going litigation. This contrasts with the 
1993 co-opertation Notice which allowed for an indirect dialogue between national courts 
and the Commission, when the latter w as seized by the parties to the litigation - rather than by 
the court directly.527 The possibility o f  that kind o f indirect mechanism o f the old co­
operation Notice can be explained by the Commission's desire to show some flexibility in
?24 Notice on Guidance Letters, para. 5. Note the extension of the possibility to issue such letters to Art. 82 
EC cases. On this new tool of competition policy see e.g. F.L. Fine, The EC Competition Law o f Technology 
Licensing (London, 2006), pp. 25-30. That author rightly stresses the importance of such letters for technology 
transfer agreements.
525 Paras. 24 and 25 of the Notice.
530 Para. 9 of the Notice.
527 Paia. 40 of the 1993 co-operation Notice.
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view of national procedural obstacles that could not accommodate a more direct system of 
co-operation. In such cases, indeed, it was easier for a national court, in its difficulty to seize 
itself the Commission, to induce the litigants to do so. Regulation 1/2003, however, makes 
such indirect channels no longer useful, since the express provisions of the new Regulation 
supersede any national procedural obstacle or judicial practice that may hinder the more 
direct and structured co-operation mechanism between the Commission and national courts. 
In our view, this explains the withdrawal by the Commission in the new Notice on guidance 
letters of its availability to be seized by parties to an on-going litigation.
In any case, the Commission only excludes the possibility to issue guidance letters if the 
same practice to which the request refers is subject to a pending national proceeding. This 
means that a guidance letter would be possible if there is no litigation as yet, in which case 
the already issued letter would be subsequently of use to the national court when an action is 
filed. Then, the Notice does not seem to exclude the possibility of informal guidance being 
given to undertakings, if the object of their request refers to a practice different, yet similar, 
with the one currently pending before a national court. In such a case, if  the Commission 
were to accept to issue a guidance letter, the litigants in the pending national proceedings 
could use that letter before the national court and the court could attribute to such a statement 
a certain degree o f persuasiveness.
An opinion on Articles 81 and 82 EC may also be given by national competition authorities. 
Such opinions are already available for example under UK law, by the OFT.528 They would 
be given ‘"where individual cases give rise to genuine uncertainty because they present novel 
or unresolved questions” for the application of the Treaty competition provisions. It is also 
recognised that any written opinion given by the OFT ‘ would not be binding on the 
Commission, any other NCA or the courts”.529 Furthermore, national courts will continue to 
have the possibility to rely on old comfort letters that were given before 1 May 2004. Such 
letters will continue to have importance for the time period that the Commission has given 
them and for as long as the factual situation remains identical.530
528 See Department of Trade and Industry, o p .c i tpara. 3.22.
529 Ibid. While Reg. 1/2003 clearly does not prohibit NCAs from giving such opinions on Arts. 81 and 82 
EC, which are in any case informal, extra-statutory, and non-binding, nevertheless some doubts exist as to the 
possible content of these opinions by NCAs, It should not be forgotten that under the new Regulation NCAs do 
not have the power to adopt inapplicability or “positive” decisions finding that the prohibitions of Arts. 81 and 
82 EC do not apply. In such cases they can only declare that there are no grounds for action on their part 
(compare Arts. 5 and 10 Reg. 1/2003). In this regard, compare the hesitations expressed by Ehlermann, supra 
(2000a), p. 574; Bunichter, supra (2001 ), p. 546.
530 See above on the transitional provisions of Reg. 1/2003, in particular Art. 43(1) which refers to 
exemption decisions given before 1 May 2004. By analogy comfort letters given before that date should remain
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Another possibility that private litigants may use in order to seize the Commission and 
request information necessary to them in the context o f an on-going litigation, is to rely upon 
general Community legislation on access to documents held by the EU institutions. Thus, 
Regulation 1049/2001 lays down the general framework for such access to information.531 
Under these rules, an EU institution may refuse access to such documents, only when this 
would undermine the protection of:
(a) the public interest as regards public security, defence and military matters, 
international relations, or the financial, monetary or economic policy o f the 
Community or a Member State;
(b) privacy and the integrity o f the individual;
(c) commercial interests of a  natural or legal person, including intellectual property;
(d) court proceedings and legal advice;
(e) the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits.532
When disclosure of a document in its enirety is not possible, the Regulation provides for a 
right o f partial access. In a recent case third parties tried to rely on that Regulation in order to 
have access to the Commission’s file in a cartel proceeding. Access to that information would 
have enabled those parties to bring civil claims for damages against the cartel members in 
Member States courts. The Commission resisted this request mainly because allowing third 
parties access to such information would deter firms from co-operating with the Commission 
and would be detrimental to inspections and investigations in future cases. The CFI 
disagreed and rendered a nuanced judgment, in which it held that the Commission is required, 
in principle, to carry' out a concrete, individual assessment o f  the content o f the documents 
referred to in the request in order to determine whether partial access was possible. The Court 
added that it is only in exceptional cases and only where the administrative burden entailed 
by a concrete, individual examination o f the documents proves to be particularly heavy; 
thereby exceeding the limits o f  what may reasonably be required, that derogation from that 
obligation to examine the documents may be permissible.533
useful. See further on this, Gauer, Dalheimer, De Smijter, Schnichels and Laurila, “Regulation 1/2003 and the 
Modernisation Package Fully Applicable since 1 May 2004”, (2004-2) EC Competition Policv Newsletter 1, p.
6 .
531 Regulation 1049/2001 o f 30 May 2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission Documents, OJ [2001] L 145/43.
532 Art. 4 Reg. 1049/2001.
i33 Case T-2A)3, Verein fiir Konsumenteninformation v. Commission, [2005] ECR II-l 121, para. 65 etseq. 
See comment by Muguet-Poullennec, 4/2005 Revue Lamy de la Concurrence 75.
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d. Strengthening the Supremacy of Community over National Proceedings
aa. M asterfoods and Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003
As already mentioned above, while the European Court o f Justice moved quickly to recognise 
the direct effect o f Articles 81 and 82 EC and to consider national courts on a par with the 
Commission in a  system of parallel competences -  exception made for Article 81(3) EC, it 
was at the same time aware o f problems of conflict that this system might lead to. Such 
conflicts were considered undesirable from a number o f points o f view: first, because the 
fundamental principle o f legal certainty would be seriously impaired, second, because of the 
whole supranational system of the relationship between Community and national proceedings 
and the principles o f  supremacy and uniformity of Community law, and third, because, from 
a purely competition angle, companies would not be able to rely on a level-playing field o f 
antitrust enforcement all-over the Community. The approach o f the Court of Justice was 
initially to encourage the national courts to stay their proceedings and await the 
Commission's decision. This implied certainly a degree of deference but the Court at that 
time did not present this as a fully-fledged duty based on Community law. It was rather 
something desirable in order to avoid legal uncertainty.534
Gradually, however, the Court o f Justice started using a more stringent language. Essentially, 
this meant that national courts were indeed under a duty to stay proceedings and avoid 
conflicting decisions.535 Delimitis encapsulates this gradual shift towards a system o f 
deference to Commission decisions. There, the Court o f Justice made it clear that there was 
something more than just the principle of legal certainty at stake. That was the Commission's 
fundamental role in the “implementation and orientation o f Community competition 
policy”.536 This became clearer in Masterfoods where the Court went even further in 
subjecting national courts to a clear duty, based on Article 10 EC, not to take decisions
534 See above on the competence of national courts to apply the Treaty competition provisions under the old 
system of enforcement.
335 On legal certainty in this context, see Basedow, supra (1996), p. 582. Usually national courts have 
proved ready to suspend their proceedings in expectation of a Commission decision. In England such a stay of 
proceedings may take place at any stage of the Commission proceedings, while the court may sometimes prefer 
not to suspend and proceed to preparatory steps as long as these steps do not prejudge the Commission’s 
decision (see MTV Europe, op.cit,). See further, on the attitude of English courts with references to case law', 
Cutting, supra (2002), pp. 32-33; R. Nazzini, Concurrent Proceedings in Competition Law, Procedure, 
Evidence and Remedies (Oxford, 2004), p. 156 et seq.
536 Delimitis, op.cit, para. 44.
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‘‘running counter to” decisions o f the Commission, in case the Commission has already 
reached a decision on the case in question.
The facts o f that case deserve to be mentioned, since they constitute one o f the few cases o f  
direct conflict between a national judgment and a  Commission decision. The Irish High 
Court, dealing with ice cream freezer exclusivity in Ireland, had found that Articles 81 and 82 
EC were not breached.537 While an appeal was pending, the Commission initiated 
proceedings and reached the opposite conclusion.538 The Irish Supreme Court on appeal 
seized the Court o f Justice with a preliminary reference, while expressing disapproval o f the 
Commission decision which had disregarded the national judgment.
The Court o f  Justice in a rather bold judgment stressed the duty o f national courts (a) to avoid 
giving decisions which w’ould conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission and, 
more importantly, (b) not to take decisions running counter to those already adopted by the 
Commission.539 The Court’s ruling is based on four pillars:
(a) First, the Court started from the premise that the Commission’s primacy over national 
proceedings is justified “in order to fulfil the role assigned to it by the Treaty”.540 To 
that end, the Court proceeded to an explicit reference to Article 85(1) EC, according 
to which ‘The Commission shall ensure the application o f the principles laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82”.541
(b) Second, the Court referred to Article 10 EC which imposes upon national courts a 
duty to ensure the effectiveness o f Community law;542
537 Masterfoods v. HB Ice Cream, [1992] 3 CMLR 830. For a presentation of the case, see also Maher, 
supra (1999), pp. 67-68, 140-141. A conflict between the Commission and the Irish High Court had again 
happened in the Alagill case. See case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireatm (RTE) v. Commission, [1991] EC R 11-485 
and case T-76/89, Independent Television Publications Ltd. (1TP) v. Commission, [1991] ECR 11-575; 
confirmed on appeal in cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireatm (RTE) and Independent 
Television Publications Ltd. (TTP) v. Commission, [1995] ECR 1-743.
538 In its Decision, the Commission considered that “it is not inconsistent with the principles governing the 
concurrent powers of the national courts and the Commission in the application of Article [81(1)] and Article 
[82] o f the Treaty, for the Commission to take a decision which differs from a judgment delivered by a national 
court, provided that there exists a sufficient Community interest in doing so’'. Such an interest may consist “in 
settling fundamental questions about business practices which are found throughout the Community”. 
According to the Commission, the resulting conflicts could be resolved by the European Courts through Aits. 
230 and 234 EC (Commission Decision 98/531/EC of 11 March 1998 (Van denBergh Foods Ltd.),OJ [1998] L 
246/1, para. 279).
539 Masterfoods, op.cit., paras. 51-52.
540 Masterfoods, op.cit, para. 46.
541 It is noteworthy that this specific Article was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Previously the text 
included the words “as soon as it takes up its duties” between “shall” and “ensure”. The amendment means that 
the provision should no longer be treated as temporary or transitional; rather it constitutes an important basis for 
the Commission’s central role in EC competition law enforcement.
542 Masterfoods, op.cit, paras. 49, 56.
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(c) Third, the Court emphasised the sole competence o f the Community Courts to 
examine the legality of Commission decisions.543 Under the Foto-Frosz544 line of 
case law, national courts cannot consider Community acts as invalid, but must refer 
the question of validity to the Court of Justice, which is the sole judge that can 
declare their invalidity.
(d) Finally, the Court relied on the general principle of legal certainty and referred in that 
respect to D eiim itis545
This line of argument is very interesting because it dissipates the fear that the Deiimitis 
principles on the duty of national courts to avoid conflicting decisions might have been 
motivated by the Commission’s traditional exemption monopoly.546 The Court’s fundamental 
reliance on Articles 85 and 10 EC, rather than exclusively on the general principle of legal 
certainty as was the case in Deiimitis,547 indicates that in a fully decentralised system of 
parallel competences the supremacy and uniformity o f Community competition law, as 
applied by the supranational organ, the Commission, must not be compromised by national 
courts and authorities.548
Masterfoods was decided at a very critical time in the context o f modernisation and offered 
the Commission substantial support in its decentralisation drive.549 Already before 
Masterfoods many authors and even national judgments had taken a very deferential 
approach vis-à-vis the Commission, relying on the exigency o f consistent application of 
Community competition law, on the supremacy of EC law, and on Article 10 EC.550
543 Masterfoods, op.cit, paras. 50, 53,54,57.
544 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, [1987] ECR 4199.
545 Masterfoods, op.cit., para. 51.
546 See on this issue Ehleimann, supra (2000b), p. 2; Jaeger, supra (2000), p. 1067; Paulis, supra (2001a), p. 
420; Venit, supra (2001), p. 474; Gröning, supra (2001a), p. 586. Such a fear was, however, unjustified, because 
the Deiimitis principles were clearly applicable not only to Art. 81(3) EC, but also to Arts. 81(1) and 82 EC (see 
Deiimitis, op.cit., paras. 47 and 52 in fine).
547 Deiimitis, op.cit., para. 47; cases C-319/93, C-40/94 and C-224/94, Hendrik Evert Dijkstra et al. v. 
Friesland (Frico Domo) Coöperatie et al., [1995] ECR 1-4471, para. 28. In Deiimitis there was also no express 
reference to Art. 85(1) EC, though in para. 44 the Court implicitly relied on the principle emanating from that 
provision. See also Bartels, “Kooperation zwischen EU-Kommission und nationalen Gerichten im europäischen 
Wettbewerbsverfahren: Einige Anmerkungen zum Masterfoods-Urteü des EuGH”, 43 ZfRV 83 (2002), p. 88, 
stressing Ihe Masterfoods departure from the Deiimitis reasoning which was essentially based on legal certainty.
548 See Hirsch, supra (2003), p. 249.
549 See Komninos, supra (2002), pp. 447-449.
5i0 Prc-Masterfoods some commentators had considered incompatible such binding force of Commission 
decisions with the parallel competence of national courts to apply the competition provisions and with the 
principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. See e.g. Marenco, supra (1994), p. 615 et seq.; 
Jones and Sharpston, supra (1996-97), p. 92; Temple Lang, supra (1998), p. 118; Marenco, supra (2001a), p. 
135; idem, supra (2001b), p. 172; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 324. However, for the opposite view see e.g. 
Synodinos, supra (1995, pp. 434-435; Stuyck, supra (1995), pp. 1514, 1517; Saggio, supra (1997), pp. 12-13; 
Kerse, supra (1998), p. 442; Temple Lang, supra (1999), p. 278; Paulis, supra (2001a), p. 420; Siragusa, supra
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Nevertheless, the passage to a system where the competences of the Commission, national 
courts and national authorities are fully and purely parallel, might have accentuated 
undesirable conflicts.551 Indeed, deference among national judges for the views o f the 
Commission under the previous system was more a question o f assumption than of legal and 
explicit imposition.552 Although a fundamental principle was that national courts had to apply 
Community competition law in a consistent manner with the Commission subject to the 
Court's supervision, this could not exclude conflicts. For this reason, the Court’s powerful 
and clear pronouncement in M asterfoods gave the Commission the strength to advocate a  
more Community-friendly legislative solution to this problem in the negotiations leading to 
the adoption o f  Regulation 1/2003.
It is indeed telling that the Commission’s had used a  much less stringent language in its draft 
regulation o f  September 2000, speaking o f a duty o f  national competition authorities and 
courts to “use every effort to avoid any decision that conflicts with decisions adopted by the 
Commission”.553 However, this text was superseded by the Masterfoods ruling which went 
even further in stressing that national courts (and, by implication, authorities) cannot take 
decisions running counter to a  Commission decision, not even one that conflicts with a prior 
judgment by a national court of first instance.554 As a result, Article 16(1) o f the new 
Regulation adopted the Court o f  Justice’s ruling verbatim.555
bb. The Scope of the Suprem acy Rule of Masterfoods and Article 16 of
Regulation 1/2003
Some commentators rejected the “primacy o f the Commission”, i.e. of an administrative 
authority, over decisions o f national judicial organs,556 and considered Masterfoods a
(2001), pp. 450-451. For French judgments holding that Commission negative clearance decisions bound the 
national courts see Mail-Fouilleul, supra (2002), p. 28, in. 140.
551 See e.g. former Commissioner Monti, “Competition Law Reform”, Speech Made at the CBI Conference
on Competition Law Reform, London, June 12th 2000, in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches, p. 4; 
Jacobs, “Modernisation de la politique communautaire de la concurrence : Une réflexion des entreprises”, 
Petites Affiches, 5-11-2001, No. 220,30, p. 31.
553 See Putman, supm  (1998), pp. 382-383; A. Amull, The European Union and its Court o f Justice 
(Oxford, 1999), p. 411.
553 Emphasis added. The use of the verb “avoid” echoed para. 47 oiDelimitis.
554 It is interesting to note Wouter Wils’s view prior to Atasterfoods. That author had defended the more 
cautious text in Art. 16(1) of the regulation proposal on the basis of the principles of judicial independence and 
access to courts (Wils, supra (2001), pp. 357-358).
555 See also Recital 22 Reg. 1/2003.
550 See in this regard Mottard, Partsch, Pittie and Struys, “Chronique semestrielle de droit communautaire”, 
120 JdT (2001) 809, p. 810; Blaise and Idot, supra (2002), p. 143. But see Paulis, supra (2001a), pp. 419-422,
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“centralist” judgment not entirely in conformity with the decentralisation of EC competition 
law enforcement in the new era.5S7 Others have severely criticised the Commission’s 
“primacy” as a form of intellectual and bureaucratic arrogance.558
In reality, however, Masterfoods and the corresponding provision o f Article 16 o f Regulation 
1/2003 make national courts subject not to the Commission’s authority, but rather to that o f 
the Court of Justice which is the only judicial organ that can review Community acts in an 
authentic way in the Community through Article 234 EC.559 This approach relies on the fact 
that Masterfoods does not stipulate that national courts must always consider themselves 
positively bound by Commission decisions. In fact, the Court avoided using the positive term 
“binding” but rather followed the more negative expression that national courts “cannot take 
decisions running counter to that o f the Commission”.560
A formal positive binding effect of Commission decisions exists therefore only in fields 
where the Commission has exclusive competence. This was the case with with the old 
Articles 65 and 66 ECSC561 and with Article 81(3) EC under the previous system of 
enforcement. It still continues to be the case with decisions withdrawing the benefit o f a 
block exemption regulation under the present system of enforcement. In the latter case such a 
decision will indeed be positively binding on any subsequent court judgment. On the 
contrary, in a system of parallel competences, the courts should in principle be in a position 
to form their own view as to the application of the competition rules independently of 
administrative agencies.562 Indeed, the Court essentially held in Masterfoods that a national
according to whom the principle of separation of powers applies only within the same legal order and cannot 
apply as such to the relationship between the Community legal order and national legal orders.
ii7 See B.J. Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and 
United Kingdom (London/Sidney, 2001), p. 51.
558 See Green, “Practical Implications of Reform”, in: Rivas & Horspool (Eds.), Modernisation and 
Decentralisation o f EC Competition Law (The Hague/London/Boston, 2000), p. 37, who stresses that the duty of 
sincere co-operation of Art. 10 EC should apply not only in an one-sided way and that the Commission should 
pay due deference to judgments of national courts that may be the result of an exhaustive analysis, especially 
when the courts relied upon information or facts not known to the Commission. See also Toffoletti, supra 
(2002), pp. 434/1-435/1.
559 See former Director General Schaub, supra (2002a), p. 13; Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 69. These 
authors retreat from the earlier position of Paulis (supra (2001a), p. 420), which was expressed more in terms of 
a Commission primacy.
560 Masterfoods, op.cit, paras. 51-52.
561 Thus, in case C-128/92, H.J. Banks cfr Co. Ltd. v. British Coal Corporation, (1994] ECR 1-1209, para. 
23, the Court held that Commission decisions based on Arts 65 and 66(7) ECSC, w hich lacked direct effect and 
could only be enforced by the Commission, were “binding on the national courts”.
562 This distinction between positive effect of Commission exemption decisions and negative effect of 
Commission applicability or inapplicability decisions might lie behind the rather unfortunate Order of the CFI in 
a recent case. See case T-28/02, First Data Corp., FDR Ltd, and First Data Merchant Services Corp. v. 
Commission, Order of 17 October 2005, paras. 49-50: “When national courts rule on agreements or practices 
which are already the subject of a Commission decision they cannot take decisions running counter to that o f the 
Commission ... However, negative clearance does not bind the national courts, even if it constitutes a fact
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court is not bound by a Commission decision which is being attacked before the Community 
Courts,563 but may decide to stay proceedings pending a final ruling in Luxembourg, “unless 
it considers that, in the circumstances of the case, a reference to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary' ruling on the validity' o f  the Commission decision is warranted'’. In other words, 
the Court did acknowledge that at the very end o f the day, national courts could not, strictly 
speaking, be bound by a Commission decision directly,564 but only indirectly through 
intervention by the Court o f Justice, to which they could always have access by means o f the 
preliminary' reference procedure. As a Community judge stresses extrajudicially,
“Community law is interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice. It does not follow 
from this principle that the Commission is infallible. Whether or not an administrative 
decision of the Commission must be followed as embodying superior law depends not 
on the fact that the Commission has adopted it, so much as upon the fact that it has 
been upheld as valid by the Court of Justice”.565 
Thus, in principle the Commission’s decisions should not be treated as positively binding. 
Instead, the supranational nature of the Community7 legal system requires that national courts 
should not compromise the supremacy and uniformity’ of Community7 law by taking decisions 
which are incompatible with those adopted by the Commission. This negative duty o f  
abstention means that the courts should always seize the Court of Justice if  they intend to 
contradict the Commission.
This also means that Commission decisions retain this indirect-negative binding force over 
national proceedings, so long as the material factual circumstances have not changed in the 
meantime. Otherwise, the national courts can always depart from the Commission’s
which national courts may take into account in their assessment. It is apparent from Article 2 of Regulation No 
17 that negative clearance means only, for the Commission, on the basis of the facts in its possession, that there 
is no need to intervene. Negative clearance does not therefore constitute a definitive assessment, nor in 
particular the adoption of a position w hich falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission. As Article 
81(1) EC is directly applicable, as the Court o f  Justice has held on various occasions, it follow s that individuals 
may rely on it before national courts and derive from it rights and, as national courts may also have other 
information on the particular circumstances o f the case, they are naturally bound to reach their own opinion, on 
the basis of the information in their possession, on the applicability of Article 81(1) EC to certain agreements”. 
It is true that this language rests upon the proviso that the national court may have other information on the 
particular circumstances of the case that were not available to the Commission, but still there is some difficulty 
to reconcile it with the rationale of A rt 10 EC and with tire clear principle enunciated by the ECJ in Atasterfoods 
which, after all, does not make any distinction between Art. 81(3) or 81(1) EC decisions and between 
applicability or inapplicability decisions.
563 According to the Court, it is immaterial in this context whether the Commission decision has been 
suspended by the Community Courts. Acts o f Community institutions are in principle presumed to be lawful 
until such time as they are annulled or withdrawn (Kfasterfood.r, op.cit., para. 53).
See in this sense O'Keeffe, “First among Equals: The Commission and the National Courts as Enforcers 
of EC Competition Law'”, 26 ELRev. 301 (2001), p. 304.
565 See Cooke, sttpra (2001b), p. 19.
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pronouncements and reach a different conclusion. In such cases, the courts would not act 
disrespectfully to Articles 10 or 85 EC, therefore the Masterfoods principles should not 
apply. Indeed, the national courts should not even feel obliged to seize the Court of Justice 
with a preliminary reference only because of the existence o f the earlier Commission 
decision, unless a  new and genuine concern arose that necessitated the Court’s 
intervention.566
This line of argument leads to the conclusion that decisions o f national competition 
authorities cannot, as a matter o f existing Community law, bind national civil courts, even 
when those authorities act in the framework of Community competition law under Regulation 
1/2003.
First of all, these authorities cannot be considered as “Community organs” under Article 10 
EC.567 Article 10 EC cannot cover the co-operation between national competition authorities 
and national courts, although it might be tempting at first sight to argue so, in order to 
establish a “horizontal” duty o f  co-operation, as between competition authorities and courts 
o f different Member States.568 Arguments in favour seem to confuse the theory o f 
dédoublement fonctionneZ569 *with the ambit of Article 10 EC, which uses an organic criterion 
in order to arrive at a functionalist result. In other words, it would not make sense to use 
Article 10 EC in order to impose duties on national courts or authorities vis-à-vis other 
national courts or authorities. This is because both the national competition authority and the 
national court are indeed respectively “indirect Community administration and judge”, so 
Article 10 EC could not resolve disputes as between two organs at the same level o f the 
Community supranational structure {both in this case being organically national but 
functionally Community organs).
Second, a national competition authority does not have a central role in defining or 
implementing the EC competition policy, as the Commission does under Article 85 EC,
506 The situation is different for constitutive decisions falling under the Commission’s exclusive 
competence. In the new system of enforcement a Commission decision withdrawing the benefit of a block 
exemption would be always positively binding on national courts even if the facts have changed. See further
below.
56 With regard to national courts, compare AG Léger’s Opinion in Köhler, op.cit., para. 66. According to 
AG Léger, the expression juges communautaires de droit commun “must not be understood literally, but 
symbolically: where a national court is called upon to apply Community law, it is in its capacity as an organ o f a 
Member State, and not as a Community organ, as a result of dual functions”.
568 Some commentators doubt whether an EC regulation can enter into such internal national procedural law
questions. See in this regard, Gröning, supra (2001b), p. 89. See also Lenaerts and Gerard, supra (2004), p. 325, 
according to whom “the design of the relationships between national courts and their national competition
authority resorts exclusively to national law”.
509 See supra.
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therefore one o f the most important rationales behind M asterfoods cannot be transposed to  
cover this case.
Third, national authorities are not subject to the review o f  the Community Courts, so the 
argument o f the primacy o f the European Court of Justice, referred to above, is not 
transposable to this case, since a national court could never request a preliminary ruling from 
Luxembourg on the validity o f a national act.570
Notwithstanding the fact that Community law itself does not impose duties on national courts 
to respect or not to contradict national competition authorities’ decisions, such a duty may yet 
be prescribed by national law. First o f all, when the court and the competition authority 
belong to the same legal order, then national law may contain specific rules about this 
relationship.571 As mentioned above, the new generation o f  national competition laws that 
were enacted after modernisation provide for quite interesting solutions in that respect. Thus, 
the recently amended German Competition Act confers all decisions of national competition 
authorities within the EU a binding effect on German civil proceedings but this rule is 
confined to follow-on civil litigation, basically aiming at facilitating damages claims against 
convicted cartelists.572 The same is true of English law, which is less revolutionary than 
German law since it applies only to Commission, OFT and CAT decisions.573 Finally, 
secondary Community legislation may opt to establish such an EU-wide binding effect o f  
national competition authority decisions. Indeed, this remains an option in the Commission’s 
Green Paper on damages.574
cc. The Concept of “Conflict” between Commission Administrative Proceedings 
and National Civil Proceedings
Article 16 o f Regulation 1/2003, while containing a rule on the avoidance and resolution o f 
conflicts between Commission and national court proceedings, does not define the notion o f 
‘'conflict”. It is at first sight not entirely clear whether the conflict refers to the 
incompatibility between the operative part o f a Commission decision and the result reached
51) The national court could conceivably request a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of EC 
competition law, as applied by the NCA in question, but this does not change the reality that the rationale behind 
Masterfoods and Ait. 16(l)Reg. 1/2003 is not present here.
51 See e.g. Art. 18 of the Greek Competition Act which provides that the judgments of the administrative 
courts reviewing the Competition Committee decisions -  but not the decisions themselves - have the force of 
erga onmes res judicata before the civil courts.
573 S. 33(4) GWB (7. Novelle). See further above.
573 S. 58A of the UK Competition Act, as subsequently amended. See further above.
574 Option 8 in fine  of the Green Paper.
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by a national judgment, or whether it also extends to the reasoning o f the two instruments. In 
the former case, a conflict would essentially take place only if the object and facts of the case 
before the Commission and those before the national court were identical and the operative 
parts of the Commission decision and of the national court judgment were incompatible with 
each other. In the latter case, a conflict would always ensue when the facts were similar and 
there was also inconsistency of reasoning as between the Commission and the national court. 
In order to take a position on this debate, it is, firstly, important to examine the legal nature of 
Commission . decisions. Such decisions should be viewed in their proper context of 
administrative-public proceedings before a public authority which has extensive investigative 
and decisional powers and applies these powers vertically, acting as an emanation of the 
state. Because of this fundamental difference between vertical public-administrative 
proceedings and horizontal civil proceedings between private litigants, decisions by a public 
authority such as the Commission do not, formally speaking, produce a res judicata or issue 
estoppel effect.575 These are both legal concepts pertaining to civil litigation and aim at 
protecting certain fundamental legal values like legal certainty and finality o f judgments.576 
Therefore, a conflict in the present sense cannot be viewed as narrowly as it is seen in civil 
litigation. There, a conflict presupposes identity of object and litigants. Such a narrow 
concept, however, is not appropriate when examining the effects o f Commission decisions in 
the competition field.
This means that a Commission decision that deals with a particular anti-competitive conduct 
may be in conflict with a civil judgment dealing with that same conduct, even when, the 
persons affected by that decision are not identical with the litigants in the national civil 
proceedings. A recent judgment o f the Brussels Court o f Appeal exemplifies this point. The 
Belgian court held that it had to pay deference, under Article 16 o f Regulation 1/2003, to an 
infringement Decision by the Commission which had considered as anti-competitive a rale o f 
the Belgian Architects Association providing for a scale o f recommended minimum fees. The 
court rightly considered that it was bound to follow the Commission, since the latter had dealt
575 See in this sense also Nazzini, supra (2004b), pp. 112-113, with references to common law. In 
continental legal doctrine, which is an appropriate source to guide us because Commission proceedings follow 
the continental model of public administrative proceedings, decisions by administrative authorities do not 
produce res judicata but rather enjoy a “presumption of legality”. The Commission has, however, on occasions 
referred to findings in its decisions as producing “res judicata”. See e.g. Commission Decision 2005/480/EC of 
30 April 2004 (Compagnie Maritime Beige 5.4), OJ [2005] L 171/28, para. 11. This is also the case with some 
commentators who express themselves in terms o f res judicata. See e.g. M. Fallon, Droit matériel général de 
¡‘Union europêenne (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2002), p. 329. Such an approach is not technically correct.
576 Res judicata and issue estoppel are slightly different notions, in that the former refers only to the 
dispositive part of a judgment and not the reasoning, while the latter extends also to the reasoning. The former is 
followed usually in continental and the latter in common law systems.
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with the legality o f  exactly the same professional rule as was at stake in the national action. 
The fact that the complainants in the Commission case were not litigants in the national 
proceedings was, naturally, immaterial, although this fact would have been critical in the 
context of multiple civil proceedings.577
The conclusion, therefore, is that the concept of conflict is not here dependent on the identity 
or otherwise o f  the parties concerned but rather on the facts o f the Commission’s decision. 
Yet, this does not give us an answer as to the debate described above on whetherM asterfoods 
and Article 16 o f  Regulation 1/2003 stipulate a duty for national courts to pay deference to  
Commission decisions of identical or similar facts. In order to give an answer to this 
question, one would have to delve again into the rationale o f Masterfoods and Article 16.
As analysed above, the basic rationale is the principles o f supremacy and effective and 
uniform application of Community law. The duty for national courts not to take decisions 
running counter to those of the Commission must not be seen as an indication of primacy o f  
an antitrust authority over civil courts but rather as a duty of national organs, here the 
national courts, to pay respect to a Community institution, the Commission, always under the 
final control o f the Court o f Justice. At the same time, this rationale cannot be stretched too 
much in favour of the Commission because national courts too are Community' courts o f  
general jurisdiction under the supreme authority of the Court o f  Justice. To impose on them a  
wide duty' o f  deference to Commission decisions dealing with similar facts, would decrease 
their role in the decentralised application o f Community' law' and might turn them to 
secondary organs dealing w'ith the uninteresting and unimportant details rather than with the 
core issues. While there is truth in the view’ that in the decentralised system of enforcement, 
consistency o f  reasoning counts more than consistency of decisions,578 a system o f parallel 
competences relies also on some degree o f healthy experimentation.
Following the more minimalist view as to the concept of conflict, seems to be in harmony 
with the very specific circumstances o f  Masterfoods, w here the Irish court clearly wished to 
depart from a specific Commission Decision dealing with the same facts.579 Indeed, Advocate 
General Cosmas in Masterfoods viewed the concept of conflict between a Commission 
decision and national court proceedings narrowly:
577 See Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, 28-9-04, Eddy Lodiso v. La SPRLU KW.N.D.E., in: 
http://europa.eu.ini/commycompetition/antitrust/national_courts and Commission Decision of 24 June 2004 
(PO/Barème d ’honoraires de i 'Ordre des Architectes belges).
^  See Jenny, supra (2001), pp. 365-366.
579 See above.
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“In order to establish such a form of conflict, a connection between the legal problem 
which arises before the national courts and that being examined by the Commission is 
not in itself sufficient. Nor is the similarity of the legal problem where the legal and 
factual context of the case being examined by the Commission is not completely 
identical to that before the national courts. The Commission’s decision may provide 
important indications as to the appropriate way to interpret Articles [81(1) and 82], 
but in this case there is no risk, from a purely legal point o f view, of the adoption o f 
conflicting decisions. Such a risk only arises when the binding authority which the 
decision o f the national court has or will have conflicts with the grounds and operative 
part o f the Commission’s decision. Consequently the limits o f the binding authority of 
the decision of the national court and the content of the Commission's decision must 
be examined every time.”580
Besides, it is not clear why the judge should pay deference to a Commission decision that is 
addressed in the Article 249 EC sense to persons different from the litigants. It is also 
noteworthy that the Commission views the conflict in its narrower sense, being prudent in 
this very sensitive field.581
The debate between the minimalist-narrow and maximalist-broad reading of the concept of 
conflict and of the corresponding duty of national courts not to contradict Commission 
decisions is best personified in the latest UK episodes of the Courage v. Crehan saga 
In Crehan v. Inntrepreneur,582 a  case decided on appeal from the High Court,583 the English 
Court of Appeal was confronted with the effect that past Commission decisions had on a civil
580 Masterfoods, op.cit., AG’s Opinion, para. 16. Compare also cases T-125/97 and T-127/97, The Coca- 
Cola Company and Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. v. Commission, [2000] ECR 11-1733, para. 85: “The possibility 
that a national court applying Article [82] of the Treaty directly in the light of the decision-making practice of 
the Commission might reach the same finding that CCSB holds a dominant position [does not] mean that the 
contested finding has binding legal effects. A national court which has to assess action taken by CCSB after the 
contested decision in the context of a dispute between CCSB and a third party is not bound by previous findings 
o f  the Commission. There is nothing to prevent it from concluding that CCSB is no longer in a dominant 
position, contrary to the Commission’s finding at the time when the contested decision was adopted.” This case 
concerned a merger clearance decision which in its reasoning included a finding of dominance. Although the 
merger was cleared, the addressee of that decision had sought to challenge that finding, arguing that this might 
be used to its detriment in national civil litigation.
581 According to para. 8 of the co-operation Notice, “the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC by the 
Commission in a specific case binds the national courts when they apply EC competition rules ;>» the same case 
in parallel with or subsequent to the Commission” (emphasis added). The same viewr is expressed in the 
Commission’s article-bv-article Explanatory Memorandum to the draft regulation, under Art. 16, “the potential 
for conflict depends on the operative part o f  the Commission decision and the facts on which it is based” 
(emphasis added).
582 Bernard Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Co. CPC (CA), [2004] EWCA Civ 637, [2004] EuLR 693.
583 Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Company et al. (Ch.D), [2003] EWHC 1510, [2003] EuLR 663.
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case where the facts were similar.584 The Commission in its past decisions, w'hich w ere 
considered to be relevant to the facts o f  the civil case at hand, had found that the lease 
agreements between certain beer suppliers and pub tenants affected trade between Member 
States and that the restrictive effect o f  the cumulative networks and other factors contributed 
to the foreclosure o f the UK on-trade beer market. The significant contribution made by those 
specific networks to that restrictive effect meant that the exclusive purchasing and non­
competition obligations of the leases fell foul of Article 81(1) EC.585 In Crehan the English 
courts had to identify whether the cumulative effect of several similar networks o f beer 
distribution agreements foreclosed the UK market. The Court o f Appeal reversed the High 
Court findings that a beer tie imposed on a pub tenant had not infringed Article 81 EC and 
held that the High Court judge should have followed the European Commission’s findings in 
the similar cases referred to above. It was the first time that the English Court of Appeal had 
awarded damages for breach of competition law.
The Court o f Appeal held that since the beer supplier in the case at hand, Inntrepreneur, was 
not a party to the Commission proceedings which resulted in those decisions, “it [was] not in 
dispute that those decisions did not formally bind anyone not addressed by those 
decisions”.586 However, the Court of Appeal took issue with the High Court’s departure from 
the Commission decision findings and its giving more weight to the evidence presented by  
the defendant. The court felt “uneasy by the judge’s approach to the evidence”.587 Since a  
comprehensive investigation and evaluation of a complex economic situation needed to be 
conducted and courts could not possibly embark on a detailed research investigation 
themselves, the Commission and other specialised antitrust authorities’ exhaustive 
investigations should, according to the court, be given proper deference. The court then 
proceeded to rely upon Articles 3(1 )(g) and 10 EC and M asterfoods, as well as upon the 1993 
co-operation Notice and the principle o f legal certainty, to arrive at a general principle o f  
deference owed to Commission decisions, even if there is no conflict as such between the 
operative parts o f the Commission decisions and the national court’s judgment and the parties
584 These were: Commission Decision 99/230/EC of 24 February 1999 (Whitbread), OJ [1999] L 88/26; 
Commission Decision 1999/473/EC of 16 June 1999 (Bass), OJ [1999] L 186/1; Commission Decision 
99/474/EC o f!6  June 1999 (Scottish and Newcastle), OJ [1999] L 186/28.
585 Notwithstanding this finding, the Commission proceeded to exempt the notified agreements in all three 
cases concerned.
^  Ibid, para. 74.
58 Ibid, para. 76.
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in the proceedings are not identical.588 The Court of Appeal held that ‘the English court was 
obliged under the duty of sincere co-operation to give to the Commission much greater 
deference than that which the judge, with all respect to him, was prepared to give”.589 
This was not, however, the last episode and the House o f Lords very recently overturned the 
Court of Appeal and found that the High Court judgment should be restored. The House o f 
Lords referred to the Community case law on conflicts between decisions of the Commission 
and national courts and followed the narrower concept o f conflict, referring to the Opinion o f 
Advocate General Cosmas in Masterfoods.S9° It held therefore that there was no conflict 
between the Commission Decision in Whitbread and the High Court’s finding that the 
Inntrepreneur agreements did not infringe Article 81(1) EC. According to the House of 
Lords, whilst the court should respect the Commission’s expert analysis, Commission 
decisions are ultimately only part o f the admissible evidence which the court must take into 
account. The House of Lords also noted that the Court o f  Appeal did not comment on the 
Judge’s analysis o f the facts as it considered this was an approach he should never have 
adopted in the first place.
This approach deserves approval. While the Court of Appeal also clearly preferred the 
narrower view in the assessment of what constitutes a conflict between a Commission 
decision and a national court’s judgment, it was nevertheless ready to accord full deference to 
the findings of past Commission decisions. This was because o f the Commission’s expertise 
and, more importantly, because o f the principles of loyal co-operation and effectiveness, 
supremacy and uniformity of Community law.591
The Court o f Appeal’s approach may seem Community-friendlier than the one o f the House 
o f Lords, but a closer analysis shows that it is problematic. First, because it is based more on 
policy than on clear principles of law.592 A duty to pay deference can only be based on 
Article 10 EC (lex generalis) or Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003 (lex specialis). Yet it is 
clear that these two provisions, as indeed interpreted in M asterfoods, do not extend as far as
588 Ibid, paras. 79 to 94. The court also referred to precedents such as Hasselblad, AfTVEurope and Iberian 
(op.cit.) where English courts had expressed the view that Commission decisions should be given deference. See 
on this question above.
589 Ibid, para. 97.
590 Inntrepreneur Pub Company (CPC) et a i  v. Crehan (HL), [2006] UKHL 38, in particular para. 49 ei 
seq. of Lord Hoffmann's speech.
591 For a positive assessment of the Crehan judgment of the Court of Appeal, see Nazzini and Andenas, 
“Awarding Damages for Breach of Competition Law in English Courts -  Crehan in the Court of Appeal”, 17 
EBLR 1191 (2006), p. 1197.
592 See Nazzini and Andenas, supra (2006), p. 1201, who admit that the “judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
based on policy considerations in the framework of Article 10 EC rather than the application of established 
principles and doctrines of Community or national law”.
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the Court o f  Appeal may have wished. Second, even from a policy point of view, introducing 
a principle o f deference to the Commission because o f its undisputed expertise in the field o f  
EC competition law, would result in a principle of primacy of public over private 
enforcement. In a system of parallel competences, the juges communautaires de droit 
commun must however be given full competence - and indeed full responsibility - to apply 
materially the Treaty competition rules on a par with the Commission. Turning them to mere 
assessors o f  damages would not in the long term be beneficial to the establishment o f an 
emancipated system of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. e
dd. Resolution of Conflicts
Bearing these principles in mind, we proceed below to five scenarios as to the resolution o f  
conflicts between Commission and national court proceedings.593
i. First Scenario: Pending National Court Proceedings and Envisaged or Final Commission 
Decision
If the Commission has initiated a procedure or if it has, a fortiori, adopted a final decision, 
national courts are not devoid of their competence to deal with the same facts, since their 
function is different from that o f the Commission.594
However, according to Article 16(1) o f Regulation 1/2003 and to the Masterfoods principles, 
in the first case (initiated Commission procedure) the national court must ‘’avoid giving 
decisions” conflicting with the decision contemplated by the Commission595 while in the 
second case (Commission decision) it “cannot take” decisions running counter to the already 
existing decision. In the first o f these two cases, the national court will most likely be 
informed by one o f the litigants of the Commission proceedings. If, however, the court wants 
to formally ascertain whether the Commission has initiated proceedings and contemplates a 
decision, it may so ask the Commission.596 The national court’s best practice should then be
593 See already para. 102 of the White Paper.
594 As the Commission co-operation Notice stresses (para. 11, fn. 29), if the Commission has initiated a 
procedure, a national court would be prevented from applying Arts. 81 and 82 EC, only in case the national 
court acts as "‘national competition authority” in the sense of Arts. 11(6) and 35 Reg. 1/2003 (for example, this 
is the case of Ireland). In that case, the national court makes part of national public, rather than of private 
enforcement.
595 See also case C-418/01, M S  Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. ADC Health GmbH & Co. KG, [2004] ECR 
1-5039, para. 19.
590 The Commission promises in para. 12 o f the co-operation Notice to give priority to such cases.
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to stay proceedings in order for the Commission to reach its final decision. If the court takes 
this step, the possibility of conflicts between the Commission and itself is excluded, since, 
once it resumes proceedings, it would be bound not to give judgment runing counter to the 
Commission decision which it had awaited during the suspension period. However, as 
paragraph 12 o f  the co-operation Notice recognises, ‘Nvhere the national court cannot 
reasonably doubt the Commission’s contemplated decision or where the Commission has 
already decided on a  similar case, the national court may decide on the case pending before it 
in accordance with that contemplated or earlier decision without it being necessary to ... 
await the Commission’s decision”.
As stressed above, the supremacy rale o f Article 16(1) o f Regulation 1/2003 serves well the 
fundamental requirements of uniformity o f the application o f Community law and legal 
certainty.597 Thus, national courts cannot consider invalid Community acts, but must refer 
this question to the Court, which is the sole judge that can declare the invalidity' of such acts. 
O f course, a preliminary reference will be possible within the limits o f the TWD Textilwerke 
jurisprudence o f the Court o f Justice,598 which has established that parties that fail to 
challenge a Commission decision under Article 230 EC, cannot later circumvent that 
provision and challenge the same decision through a preliminary reference under Article 234 
EC. It will have to be judged on an ad hoc basis whether the preliminary reference conceals a 
circumvention of Article 230 EC.
The deference required from national courts covers all kinds o f decisions, not only 
applicability' decisions which declare a practice to be prohibited by Articles 81 or 82 EC, but 
also inapplicability or “positive” decisions which declare the innocuousness of a certain 
practice, either because it does not fall under Article 81(1) EC, or because it does but fulfils 
the conditions of Article 81(3) EC, or because it is not caught by Article 82 EC.599
597 Compare Foto-Frost, op.cit., para. 15: “that requirement of uniformity is particularly imperative when 
the validity of a Community act is in question. Divergences between courts in the Member States as to the 
validity' of Community acts would be liable to place in jeopardy the very unity of the Community legal order 
and detract from the fundamental requirement of legal certainty”.
598 Case C-l 88/92, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v. Germany, [1994] ECR 1-833, paras. 17, 18, 24- 
26. Compare, however, joined cases C-346/03 and C-529/03, Giuseppe Atzeni et a i  v. Regione autonoma della 
Sardegna, [2006] ECR 1-1875, paras. 30-34, w'here the TWD principles were read somewhat narrowly by the 
ECJ.
599 See Schaub, “Panel One Discussion: Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal Security”, in: Ehlermann & 
Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f  EU Competition Law (Oxford, 
2001), p. 35; Paulis, sttpra (2001a), p. 424. See, however, Schütz, “VO 1/2003”, in: Müller-Henneberg, 
Schwartz & Hootz (Eds.), Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und Europäisches Kartellrecht, 
Gemeinschaftskommentar, 9, Lieferung (Köln/Berlin/München, 2004), para. 9 under Art. 10, with references to 
different views.
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There is no possibility for a national court to depart from a Commission decision, unless an 
action for annulment of the decision is pending before the Court o f First Instance or unless 
the national court decides to address a preliminary reference on the validity o f this decision to 
the Court o f Justice.600 In both cases the national court would have to stay proceedings, 
possibly granting interim measures.601
However, it seems possible for the national court to depart from the Commission’s decision, 
if  the facts o f  the case have changed materially or if  the Commission decision has been 
qualified or overruled in its substance by subsequent jurisprudence o f the Community 
Courts.602 In such a case, the Commission decision itself will not have been annulled, but its 
substance will have been superseded, therefore a judgment o f  a national court that would 
depart from it and, at the same time, follow the line o f  reasoning of the subsequent 
Community Court judgment, would not violate Article 16(1) o f Regulation 1/2003. If we 
ascribe to Masterfoods and to the corresponding provision o f Article 16(1) the meaning that 
national courts are not subjected to the authority o f the Commission but rather to that o f the 
Court of Justice, then, if there is already a Community Court judgment that supersedes the 
substance of the Commission decision, the national court can depart from the latter and 
follow the former. Indeed, the national court would not be bound to stay proceedings and 
address a preliminary judgment to the Court, although it could well do so, if  it chose. In all 
these cases, the national court, of course, will not declare the invalidity o f  the superseded 
Community act, indeed it cannot do so. Instead, it will merely decide not to give deference to 
that act but rather follow the Community Courts’ new interpretation or explain in the 
reasoning of its judgment why the facts have materially changed to render the Commission’s 
decision obsolete.
The situation would have been different and a reference to the Court of Justice would have 
been obligatory, if  the Commission decision had constitutive nature and the Commission 
enjoyed exclusive competence, as was the case with exemption Decisions under the old 
system. In such cases, the constitutive nature o f the Commission decision, notwithstanding
600 See Schaub, “Panel One Discussion: Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal Security”, in: Ehlcrmann & 
Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation ofEU  Competition Law (Oxford, 
2001), p. 35; Hirsch, supra (2003), p. 249.
1 Under national law it may not be possible for the court to order interim measures ex officio. For example, 
this was - until the recent adoption of Decreto-Legge 223/2006 - the case in Italy. However, the problem was 
more theoretical than practical, since in most cases one of the litigants would make an application to the court.
002 See in this sense Schaub, “Panel One Discussion: Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal Security”, in: 
Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation ofEU  Competition 
Law (Oxford, 2001), p. 35; Paulis, supra (2001a), p. 423; Venit, supra (2003), p. 560. Regrettably, the co­
operation Notice remains silent on this point.
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the fact that in its substance the decision is qualified or superseded by subsequent 
jurisprudence, means that the national court would have no other option but to seize the Court 
of Justice under Article 234 EC with a preliminary reference on the validity of that 
decision603
ii. Second Scenario: Non-final National Court Judgment and Envisaged Commission 
Decision
If the national proceedings have already resulted in a judgment which is not yet final, either 
because it is still open to appeal or because appeal is pending, there is not as yet a res 
judicata effect and the Commission may at any time adopt a contrary' decision, which the 
national court of appeal would be bound to avoid contradicting, further to Article 16(1) o f 
Regulation 1/2003. The power o f the Commission to adopt a decision, notwithstanding the 
existence of an earlier judgment of a national court, is an autonomous power that the 
Commission enjoys based on the Treaty.604 The Court of Justice has stressed this in 
Masterfoods, relying basically on Article 85 EC.605
However, this pow er o f the Commission is not entirely unqualified. The Commission is also 
bound by the principle of sincere co-operation of Article 10 EC, which means that it would 
be entitled to intervene in rather exceptional circumstances that pertain to the Community 
interest and raise serious policy interests.606 Such exceptional circumstances would be 
present, if various national courts and competition authorities are dealing with parallel cases 
raising similar issues to those in the case at issue and the Commission decision is necessary in 
order to ensure that the Community' competition rules are applied coherently throughout the 
Community.607 The undue intervention of the Commission would in fact create more
603 Compare case C-461/03, Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur BV  v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en 
Voedselkwaliteit, [2005] EC R 1-513, paras. 18-25, where the ECJ stressed that national courts must always seek 
a ruling from the Court of Justice on a question relating to the validity of the provisions of a Community act 
even where the Court has already declared invalid analogous provisions of another comparable act, 
notwithstanding the CILF1T jurisprudence. This ruling does not, however, contradict our argumentation above 
that national courts are not bound by superseded Commission decisions. The question that we dealt w ith above 
is the effects of such decisions on national judges and not whether national judges can declare their invalidity, 
which, as we stressed, they cannot declare.
641 See Bunichter, supra (2001), p. 542; Gröning, supra (2001a), p. 585.
605 Masterfoods, op.cit., para. 46; Van den Bergh Foods, op.cit, paras. 197-199.
606 See in this sense Kjolbye, 39 CMLRev. 175 (2002), p. 178, mentioning the facts of the Irish ice cream 
case as indicative of such a policy issue that would justify the Commission’s intervention. There, the 
Commission considered that there was a sufficient Community interest in taking a decision differing from a 
judgment delivered by a national court: settling fundamental questions about business practices which are found 
throughout the Community ( Van den Bergh Foods Decision, op.cit., para. 279).
607 Van den Bergh Foods, op.cit., para. 198.
145
i
problems and would risk antagonising the juges communautaires de droit commim with 
negative repercussions for decentralisation. At this point, one may draw parallels from the 
more co-operative atmosphere of the relationship between national courts and the European 
Court of Justice, whose approach towards the national judges has always been one o f  
persuasion rather than constriction, with the positive results being more long-term than short­
term. The Commission should follow' the same approach and use the good measure.608 
A question arises as to whether the Commission would still be able to open proceedings and 
adopt a decision in order to “pre-empt” the national court o f appeal, also in cases where the 
Commission has already made its position clear before the first instance court609 This may 
have happened either pursuant to Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003, through an amicus 
curiae intervention by the Commission itself or by the national competition authority acting 
as agent for the former or pursuant to Article 15(1) o f the Regulation, through an opinion on 
questions concerning the application o f  the Community competition rules addressed to that 
court in response to a request by the court. Our view is that while in practice it would be very 
unlikely for the Commission to adopt a decision in such cases,610 in law, it would still be
608 See Cooke, supra (2001b), pp. 19-20, who submits that “if the Commission believes in subsidiarity and 
decentralised administration of the competition rules, then it should accept the logic of its proposal and live with 
the results, even if from to time that may mean having to live with some decisions it would rather not have”. The 
same author goes on to stress that fallibility o f  national courts in individual cases is the price of the reform 
which the Commission should live with.
^  Sec further Cooke, supra (2001a), p. 559, who also argues that a Commission decision, subsequent to a 
national court judgment, would be less justified, even w hen the Commission did not intervene as amicus curiae 
but was informed of the first instance judgment (pursuant to Art. 15(2) Reg. 1/2003) by the Member State in 
question, without exercising its power to intervene in the appeal proceedings. These views must be seen in the 
time context before the September 2000 regulation proposal which proposed a duty to notify the Commission 
only of final judgments where the EC competition rules have been applied, and not of national proceedings 
where these rules are being invoked. In any case, it can be counter-argued that the right to appeal against a 
judgment can only be exercised by the litigants, therefore, one cannot exclude that the loosing party docs not file 
an appeal. In such a case, the serious competition law' issue that has arisen can only be addressed by the 
Commission in a subsequent decision.
610 Compare the Commission’s approach in the Irish ice cream case. There, the Commission adopted a 
prohibition Decision, although the Irish High Court had earlier decided otherwise. See Van den Bergh Foods 
Decision, op.cit., in particular para. 279, where the Commission stressed that the Irish court had considered the 
option of contacting the Commission, as well as the possibility of referring a preliminary question to the ECJ 
prior to giving judgment. However, as the Commission put it, “the High Court did not find either of these 
options necessary for it to give judgment”. Thus, it follows, the Commission was entitled to adopt itself a 
decision because o f the existing Community interest “in settling fundamental questions about business practices 
which are found throughout the Community”. This, therefore, implies that fire Commission would not have f
intervened, had the Irish court been prudent enough to seize the Commission or the ECJ before rendering its |
judgment. Compare the provision of para. 57 o f the ECN co-operation Notice which deals with an equivalent 
situation: “The Commission will normally not - and to the extent that Community interest is not at stake - adopt 
a decision which is in conflict with a decision of an NCA after proper information pursuant to both Article 11(3) 
and (4) of the Council Regulation has taken place and the Commission has not made use of Article 11(6) of the 
Council Regulation”. Of course, the difference here is that in the relationship between the Commission and 
national courts there is no equivalent to the Art. 11(6) Reg. 1/2003 mechanism.
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perfectly entitled to do this, as long as the Community interest dictated so.611 As the 
Masterfoods principles make clear, the Commission is entitled to adopt decisions at all 
times.612
More sensitive would be for the Commission to adopt a decision subsequent to a national 
judgment, when the national court has sought a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. 
In such case, it is again hardly arguable that the Commission is impeded in adopting a 
subsequent decision, although certainly in practice such an action is highly unlikely. 
However, in law, the Commission can still proceed to the adoption of a decision which, 
nevertheless, would have to be compatible with the Court of Justice’s subsequent ruling in its 
substance otherwise it would be liable to be annulled.613
iii. Third Scenario: Final National Court Judgment Finding Inapplicable the Competition 
Rules and Envisaged Applicability Commission Decision
If national courts have reached a final judgment of inapplicability o f the EC competition 
provisions, a so-called “positive” judgment, the Commission may instead find that there is a 
violation o f those provisions.614 Indeed, such were the facts in Masterfoods and the ECJ 
unequivocally held that ‘the Commission is ... entitled to adopt at any time individual 
decisions under Articles [81 and 82] of the Treaty, even where an agreement or practice has 
already been the subject of a decision by a  national court and the decision contemplated by 
the Commission conflicts with that national court’s decision”. As we just saw, this conflict is 
rather easy to resolve if  the pre-existing national court judgment is not final and is therefore 
still open to appeal or cassation. In that case, the higher court will be bound to respect the
611 See in this sense Kjolbye, 39 CMLRev. 175 (2002), pp. 179-180, according to whom the amicus curiae 
intervention and the power of the Commission to adopt a subsequent contrary position are two complementary 
mechanisms that pursue the same fundamental aim, namely the effective and consistent application of the law. 
The first, however, is preventive in nature, while the second is corrective. The fact that the Commission has 
already submitted an amicus curiae brief should not deprive it of its power to adopt a subsequent decision 
contradicting the national court’s judgment in question. But see Cooke, supra (2001b), pp. 18-20, who identifies 
a problem of “fairness” with regard to the subsequent Commission decision.
612 See contra Cooke, supra (2001a), p. 559, who, writing before the September 2000 regulation proposal, 
appears far more deferential to the national courts’ independence.
613 Alternatively, the validity of a Commission decision that would depart from an earlier preliminary' ruling 
o f the ECJ could be submitted anew to the latter by means of another preliminary reference by the national court 
that adjudicates on appeal.
614 A similar situation would arise if a national court has already applied a block exemption regulation to an 
agreement, thus considering it legal, while subsequently the Commission decides to withdraw' the benefit of the 
block exemption from this agreement and the facts have not substantially changed since the time of the 
judgment. More complicated would be the situation, if  an NCA has, subsequently to another Member State’s 
court judgment, withdrawn the benefit of the block exemption in a distinct geographic market. See supra.
Commission’s final or contemplated decision under the principles established in M asterfoods 
and Article 16( 1) of Regulation 1/2003.
Problems arise when the national court’s judgment is no longer open to review and thus 
produces res judicata and constitutes -  what in continental jurisdictions is called - an 
enforceable title. The Commission has indicated that in such cases the inter partes res 
judicata  effect of the national court’s judgment should not be affected.615 This means that the 
Commission will essentially prohibit the agreement or practice at issue with erga omnes 
effect for all other market players with the exception o f the litigants.616 
With all due respect, we fail to comprehend the Commission’s logic and its apparent 
deference to the principle of res judicata.617 In particular, we wonder how the Commission’s 
adoption o f an applicability or “negative” decision can leave intact the res judicata effect o f a 
judgment that finds lawful that same agreement or behaviour which is prohibited by the 
Commission’s decision. The Commission’s logic might work in cases of a network o f vertical 
agreements where the national judgment becomes res judicata  only as between the litigants 
and naturally does not bind the other contractual parties of the network. For example, in case 
of a distribution network, a national “positive” judgment would be res judicata as between 
the supplier and one of the distributors (inter partes), and the Commission would be able, if it 
wished, to prohibit all other agreements o f the network with the exception of the specific one 
that gave rise to the national litigation.
On the other hand, the Commission’s approach becomes less meaningful in cases of 
horizontal agreements or abuse o f dominance. In such instances, it is unavoidable that the 
prevailing party in the national proceedings will also be one o f the addressees o f  the 
Commission’s prohibition decision. If the subsequent prohibition decision were to avoid 
infringing the inter partes res judicata effect of the national proceedings, then one wonders 
how much remains for the Commission to prohibit. When the Commission takes the dramatic 
step to proceed to a decision618 which then under Article 249 EC is binding on its addressees, 
it would be totally immaterial if  the latter have prevailed in national litigation, since they 
could never go on with the behaviour condemned by the Commission.
615 Para. 102 o f  the White Paper.
616 See Schaub and Dohms, supra (1999), p. 1068; Schaub, supra (2000a), p. 157.
617 See also the critical comments by Cooke, supra (2001a), pp. 558-559; idem, “Panel Three Discussion: 
Courts and Judges”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation o f  EU  Competition Law (Oxford, 2001), p. 505.
618 As explained above, the Commission would decide to take up a case and produce a decision 
contradicting a national judgment only in very exceptional cases where the Community public interest requires. 
All the more so here, where we have a judgment that is no longer subject to appeal.
Therefore, one has to re-dimension the statements of the Commission with regard to the 
respect of the principle of res judicata. Such statements, we should stress, appear more as 
political declarations rather than as descriptions of the law. The Commission’s position o f 
deference can be seen as an attempt, firstly to appease the reactions of those who see 
decentralisation as centralisation and, thus, to enhance the possibilities o f a positive reception 
o f the new system at the national level, and secondly not to antagonise the national courts, 
which, being the juges communautaires de droit commun, are very sensitive to interventionist 
inroads by Community organs into their fields o f competence.619
In law, however, the principle of res judicata does not appear sacrosanct at closer scrutiny. 
Regulation 1/2003 contains no direct reference to the question of respect of the res judicata 
effect of national judgments and limits itself at establishing a rule o f precedence in Article 
16( 1), which makes clear that national courts cannot contradict decisions adopted by the 
Commission. Neither does the Court o f Justice make any reference to such a principle in its 
Master foods judgment. In that case the Court of Justice stressed the unqualified power of the 
Commission to adopt a decision even in contradiction to an earlier judgment of a national 
court.
The natural consequence of such a contradictory administrative decision of the Commission 
is that, while the national civil judgment technically still stands, its res judicata effect 
becomes nominal.620 This is so because, firstly, the winning party will not be practically able 
or willing to enforce such a judgment, because the substantive conduct involved would be 
incompatible with a prohibition decision by the Commission. For example, if an undertaking 
has been awarded damages by a national court but has then been found guilty of abuse of its 
dominant position by a subsequent Commission decision and the damages award is connected 
with its abusive behaviour, it will not be able to “consummate” its victory because that would 
constitute non-compliance with the decision.621 Secondly, in eventual new civil proceedings
Compare, for example, the national judiciary’s reactions as to the recent Köhler judgment, where the 
ECJ established that Member States may be liable for violations of EC law by their supreme courts. See Wattel, 
“Köhler, CILF1T and We lihgrove: We Can’t Go on Meeting Like This”, 41 CMLRev. 177 (2004). A fortiori, the 
intervention by the Commission, which is not a judicial organ, raises more objections at the national judiciary 
level. Reference is also made to the discussion above on the application of the principle of the separation of 
powers as betw een the Commission and national courts.
020 See Burrichter, supra (2001), p. 542, who argues that res judicata cannot bar the opening of an 
administrative procedure by the Commission. This is because the administrative procedure is justified by the 
public interest and the subject of the dispute is technically different from the one of the civil national 
proceedings. The author goes on to note, though without reasoning, that the Commission cannot impose fines in 
such situations. Presumably, the imposition of fines upon undertakings whose conduct has been considered legal 
by national courts, would raise serious concerns of legal certainty.
031 For a rare case where the Commission decided to go ahead and move towards adopting a prohibition 
decision notwithstanding a contradictory national final judgment see the Preflex/Lipski case (see Commission
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between the litigants, the court dealing anew with the case, would be bound to follow the 
Commission’s decision pursuant to Article 16(1) of the new Regulation, thus not recognising 
the res judicata  effect of the earlier judgment
Until recently, the European Court of Justice had been rather reserved, if not evasive, to touch 
upon the principle of res judicata o f national courts judgments and the eventual limitations of 
Community law. In Köhler however,* 622 the Court held that the violation of Community law 
by a national supreme court may under certain circumstances engage the state liability o f the 
Member State in question. The Court essentially rejected, albeit implicitly, the res judicata 
arguments on the basis that a  claim for damages would not really invalidate a court judgment 
that had misapplied manifestly Community law.623 Rather such a claim would compensate 
the individuals that suffered damage as a  result of the violation o f Community law.624 
More explicit was the Court’s pronouncement in the recent Kühne & Heitz case,625 where it 
made clear that national principles echoing the res judicata  rule cannot stand in the way of 
national courts’ duties to give full effect to Community law and thus such principles recede 
before the principle of legality.626 Besides, it is rightly argued that legal certainty, which 
underlies the principle of res judicata, cannot in reality be created by a national supreme 
court's judgment, as far as questions o f Community law are concerned, since it is only the 
Court of Justice that is the ultimate and authoritative interpreter of Community (including
Xth Report on Competition Policy - 1980 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 1981), para. 126, pp. 87-88). The facts were 
that an arbitral award had required the defendant to continue paying license fees pursuant to a patent licensing 
agreement after the expiry of the patents. The award was upheld by a judgment of the Tribunal de premiere 
instance of Brussels (Civ. Bruxelles, 15-10-75, Preflex SA v. Lipski, 91 JdT 493 (1976)). The court rejected an 
action to have the award set aside, because, after dealing with the EC competition issue, it concluded that no 
infringement had taken place. The Commission, however, held that this agreement, as interpreted by the arbitral 
award and upheld by the national court, was incompatible with the Treaty competition rules. It communicated 
its objections to the parties and in essence rejected the construction given by the arbitral tribunal and the 
national court to the problematic contractual clause. As a result, the parties complied with the Commission’s 
view's and reached a settlement, thus putting an end to the dispute. In this case the national court’s judgment, 
though formally still final and valid, w'as essentially deprived of its practical effects. On this case in the context 
of arbitration, see below.
622 Köhler, op.cit. For commentaries see Obwexer, 14 EuZW 726 (2003X Schwarzenegger, 44 ZfRV 236 
(2003); Wattel, supra (2004), p. 177 et seq.; Pittie and Van Ypersele, “Contentieux communautaire”, 12 JdT 
(Eur.) 236 (2004), pp. 239-240; Hoskins, “Suing the HL in Damages: Career Suicide or Community Lawr 
Right?”, 9 Judicial Review 278 (2004); Drake, “State Liability under Community Law for Judicial Error. A 
False Dawn for the Effective Protection of the Individual’s Community Rights”, 11IJEL 34 (2004).
623 Köhler, op.cit, paras. 38-40.
624 See also Skouris, “Which Are the Consequences of the Violation o f the Duty to Apply Community Law 
by National Supreme Courts?”, 24 RHDE 251 (2004) [in Greek], pp. 254-255.
625 Case C-4 53/00, Kühne & Heitz AT'v. Productschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, [2004] ECR1-837. See on 
this case Pittie and Van Ypersele, supra (2004X p. 240.
620 The conflict was not resolved in too extreme a way, since the EC J identified signs of discretionary power 
in the national organ concerned, thus inviting the latter to exercise that discretion in a manner in conformity with 
the full effect o f Community law. See also Skouris, supra (2004b), p. 265.
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competition) law.627 Therefore, the claim o f legal certainty with regard to such national 
judgments cannot be as strong as the equivalent one with regard to an ECJ judgment.
The same question also arose - though only in theory and never in practice - under the 
previous system o f enforcement, when a national court considered that certain conduct did 
not fall under Articles 81(1) or 82 EC, or that an agreement was covered by a directly 
applicable block exemption regulation, while the Commission subsequently, based on the 
same facts, reaching the opposite conclusion and prohibiting that conduct or withdrawing the 
benefit of the block exemption regulation.62® It had been argued that if  the national judgment 
was final and no longer subject to appeal, thus constituting res judicata , the parties benefiting 
from the exemption could institute new proceedings, for example for restitution of damages 
paid. According to this line of argument, which is transposable to the new decentralised 
system of enforcement,629 the res judicata principle in this case could not pre-empt the 
precedence due to EC law.630
A further possibility that has been suggested as a remedy in such cases of conflict is the use 
o f  certain extraordinary means o f recourse against final judgments that some legal systems 
provide for. Such a means of recourse can be the reopening of a contested judgment,631 which 
may lead to the re-examination of a case, notwithstanding the final character of the contested 
judgment. Sometimes the appeal is aiming at the interest of establishing a correct legal 
precedent {recours dans l Intérêt de la loi).632 The reopening o f the proceedings will have as 
a  result that the national court will now be bound by the Commission decision pursuant to 
Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003, always on the condition that the facts since the rendering 
o f  the Commission decision have not materially changed.
627 See A. Metaxas, State Liability for Violations o f  Community’ Law by National Supreme Court Judgments 
(Athens/Thessaloniki, 2005) [in Greek), p. 62.
628 A further possibility was for a judgment to consider Art. 81(1) EC non-applicable and for the 
Commission decision to consider that provision applicable to an agreement while also granting an individual 
exemption under Art. 81(3) EC. That would not be, however, a conflict in the Mastetfoods sense since it would 
refer only to the reasoning and not to the operative parts.
629 Naturally, the new system makes the negative clearance and individual exemption decisions obsolete. 
Instead, the Commission will be taking applicability (negative) and inappicability (positive) decisions.
630 See Marenco, supra (1994), pp. 619-620.
631 Requete civile and Wiederaufitahme des Vetfahrens in French and German law respectively. Greek law 
also provides for such an extraordinary means of recourse (anapsilafisi). See loannou, supra (1984), p. 447, who 
mentions the possibility of a reopening of the contested judgment in case a national court has applied a block 
exemption regulation and the Commission has subsequently withdrawn the benefit of the exemption accruing to 
the specific agreement.
032 See the proposal by Bourgeois, “Panel Three Discussion: Courts and Judges”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu 
(Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation ofEU  Competition Law (Oxford, 2001), p. 
508.
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The problem with the reopening o f a contested judgment is that those national legal systems 
that provide for such an extraordinary remedy, usually subject it to very limited and 
restrictive conditions which generally are connected with situations where respect for res 
judicata  conflicts with fundamental procedural principles, or where the judgment is erroneous 
in its merits and the error has been instigated by a criminal act, such as perjury, or where the 
judgment relied upon another judgment that was subsequently quashed.633 The latter situation 
may be comparable to the case where there is a subsequent Commission decision that is 
incompatible with the already existing court judgment, A Commission decision, though not 
constituting res judicata for civil proceedings, nevertheless binds its addressees and gives rise 
to negative duties o f deference for the national courts pursuant to Article 16(1) of Regulation 
1/2003. Therefore, through a wide interpretation o f the national conditions for this 
extraordinary7 means of recourse, consistently to Community law,634 it is not excluded that 
this mechanism may be available in cases where a final court judgment is followed by a 
conflicting Commission decision.635
The question arises whether Community law may actually require such a result for reasons o f 
effectiveness o f Community law', even in the absence o f this extraordinary' means o f  recourse 
under national procedural law. Pursuant to the Factortame I  line o f  cases it could be argued 
that under Article 10 EC a national court may be required to use its best endeavours in order 
to set aside a  judgment that conflicts with a Commission decision if this conflict creates an 
intolerable situation for Community law.
Indeed, the Kühne & Heitz case rests upon these premises. There, national law provided for 
the opportunity for the public administration to review an administrative decision. This 
allowed the Court o f Justice to dismiss arguments based on the principle o f legal certainty 
and to stress the duty of the authorities under Article 10 EC to review their decisions in 
conformity with Community law.636 It could be argued that the same principle is transposable 
to the case o f  the extraordinary remedy o f  the reopening of a contested judgment. However, 
the Court o f Justice recently in Kapferer rejected this approach and placed more emphasis on 
the principle o f  res judicata 637 The Court held that “Community law does not require a 
national court to disapply domestic rules o f procedure conferring finality on a decision, even
633 This is generally the position adopted by Greek law. See further K.D. Kerameus, Methods o f  Appeal 
(Athens/Thessaloniki, 2002) [in Greek], p. 85 etseq.
634 Pursuant to the principle of consistent interpretation.
635 See Kamann and Horstkotte, supra (2001), p. 466, who speak o f  the possibility to use by analogy the 
Wiederaufnahme des Verjahrens means of recourse in Germany.
636 See further Gautier, 132 JDI (Ciunet) 401 (2005), p. 403.
637 Case C -234/04, Rosmarie Kapferer v. Schkmk & Schick GmbH, [2006] ECR1-2585, para. 20.
152
if to do so would enable it to remedy an infringement of Community law by the decision at 
issue”.638 639This judgment, however, does not exclude that Community law may indeed impose 
a duty upon national courts to revisit their judgments, when such a possibility exists under 
national law. The Court clearly distinguished its Kühne & Heitz ruling, not only on the basis 
that the relevant body there was administrative and not judicial, but also because national law 
there allowed for that possibility, whereas in Kapferer it was not the case.
A further question is whether, in case one of the parties does not comply with the national 
court’s judgment, courts that are called upon to enforce the non-complied judgment, through 
a subpoena or other means of enforcement/execution, such as seizure, garnishment, 
attachment, periodic penalty' payments (astreintes), etc., are bound by Articles 10 EC and 
16(1) of Regulation 1/2003 to refuse to order the enforcement of the judgment. While such an 
interpretation might seem attractive at first sight, it would nevertheless go too far in 
interfering with national procedural autonomy. Besides, Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003 
refers to national courts ruling “on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 81 or 
Article 82 of the Treaty”. It is not obvious to us that national enforcement proceedings would 
fall under the rationale of that provision since, in reality', the courts in those cases are not 
applying the Treaty competition provisions as such, but rather aim at compliance by 
recalcitrant litigants.
It should further be mentioned that the recognition or enforcement of a national court 
judgment that has applied EC competition law in an erroneous way and has, thus, considered 
legal an anti-competitive conduct, which has later been prohibited by a  Commission decision, 
may be against public policy in another EU Member State, according to Article 34(1) of 
Regulation 44/2001. The public policy exception has been interpreted in a very narrow 
manner by the European Court o f Justice,640 but it should not be excluded that in exceptional 
circumstances the violation of EC competition law by a national court may qualify as an 
offence against public policy (ordre public internationalJ.641
However, the violation of public policy, in such exceptional cases, will be the result of some 
fundamental error in the application of EC competition law by the judge and not of the 
inconsistency with the Commission decision itself. In other words, public policy in this sense 
has a substantive meaning and can be exceptionally violated only because the judgment 
allows a prima facie  repugnant anti-competitive conduct. It does not have a “procedural”
638 Ibid, para. 21.
639 Ibid, para. 23. Compare also AG Tizzano’s Opinion in the same case, paras. 26-28.
640 See below.
641 See e.g. Bunichter, supra (2001), p. 545.
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meaning and cannot be violated simply because the court’s judgment is contradicted by the 
Commission’s decision. In our view, in the Irish ice cream case,642 the Irish judgment that 
was later contradicted by the Commission would most likely be perfectly enforceable under 
the then applicable Brussels Convention, since the disagreement between the two organs 
cannot amount by itself to a violation o f public policy. Furthermore, the errors, if  any, 
committed by the Irish court, do not by themselves suffice to qualify as public policy 
violation, since the public policy exception’s function is not to lead to the review o f the 
foreign judgment but rather to block its recognition or enforcement in order to avoid negative 
effects on the most fundamental social and economic values o f  the country of enforcement. 
We cannot see how a possible erroneous assessment by the national court o f the ice cream 
market’s foreclosure can qualify as a matter falling under the public policy exception and 
thus lead to non-recognition or non-enforcement o f that judgment in other Brussels 
Convention signatories.
A fortiori, Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003 does not bind the judge granting the exequatur 
to refuse to recognise or enforce a national judgment that is in conflict with a Commission 
decision even in cases where there is no violation of public policy, as has been suggested by 
one commentator,643 There are compelling reasons to resist such an over-expansive reading 
of Article 16(1) o f Regulation 1/2003. First, that would lead to an unacceptable sacrifice of 
legal certainty vis-à-vis final judgments having the force o f res judicata inter partes. Second, 
it would not be in accordance with the principle of free movement of judgments in the 
Community644 and with more general long-standing principles o f  public international law and 
comity that allow only exceptionally for the non-enforcement or non-recognition of a  foreign 
judgment. It is, therefore, preferable to refrain from such disproportionately intolerable 
intrusions into national procedural autonomy and into the spirit and text of international and 
Community instruments that deal with the recognition and enforcement of judgments. The 
exception o f public policy remains a sufficient tool o f review in those exceptional cases of 
flagrant violation of EC competition law by courts, irrespective of the existence o f a 
contradictory Commission decision.
642 See above.
643 This is the view of Schurmans, supra (2004), p. 101. That author follows the same approach also with 
regard to domestic judgments at the stage of their enforcement (execution). W e find such an expansive reading 
of the Masterfoods principle and of Art. 16( 1) Reg. 1/2003 inappropriate.
4,44 Especially post-Amsterdam and after the communitarisation of the Brussels Convention through Council 
Regulation 44/2001 o f  22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement o f  Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ [2001] L 12/1. On this fundamental principle, see below the analysis in the 
context of arbitration.
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iv. Fourth Scenario: Final National Court Judgment Finding a Violation of the Competition 
Rules and Envisaged Inapplicability Commission Decision
If the final judgment o f the national court finds that there is a violation of EC competition law 
(“negative” judgment), the Commission has stressed that it would normally not seek to 
contradict that judgment.645 This more liberal approach of the Commission with regard to this 
kind of conflicts is explicable, because it is taken for granted that the public interest is not 
particularly harmed in a case of erroneous “over-application” of the competition rules by the 
national judges.646 However, the possibility o f a conflict does not cease to exist, if the 
Commission chooses to initiate proceedings and render a decision contradicting the national 
judgment. The Commission’s power to do so is undisputed. This has been the case under the 
system of administrative authorisation647 and will continue to be so under the system of legal 
exception. The result will be the co-existence of two conflicting decisions, one o f 
applicability o f Articles 81 or 82 EC (by the national court) and another of inapplicability (by 
the Commission). The latter kind o f decision is one that only the Commission can take in its 
pursuit of the Community public interest.648 It should be stressed that the Delimitis and 
Masterfoods principles, along with Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003, apply also to this 
case. This means that any second or last instance court adjudicating on appeal or cassation 
must not contradict or must avoid contradicting the Commission’s final or contemplated, 
respectively, decision.649
If the national court’s judgment has become final, it will constitute res judicata as between 
the parties, while any likely positive decision by the Commission will only be an erga omrtes 
“declaration”. The national court’s judgment will deal with the inter partes civil 
consequences of the perceived incompatibility with the EC competition provisions, whereas
645 See Schaub and Dohms, supra (1999), p. 1068. See also Jones and Sufrin, supra (2004), p. 1026, who 
stress that the Commission is more concerned about the “wrong'’ authorisation of anti-competitive agreements 
than it is about the “wrong” prohibition of harmless ones.
646 See Burrichter, supra (2001), p. 542. Whereas from a Community law angle this view may be correct, 
from a pure competition law angle it is unsatisfactory, since undue over-application of competition law distorts 
the market and creates assymetries.
647 See on this specific case Saint-Esteben, “La mise en oeuvre de l’Article 85 après l’arrêt de la Cour de 
justice des Communautés européennes du 6 février 1973 (alï. no. 48/72: Brasserie de Ilaecht dconsorts Wilkin, 
Janssen)", 9 RTDE 270 (1973), p. 287.
648 Art. lOReg. 1/2003.
649 It is also possible for the Commission (or for NCAs) to intervene in the appeal or cassation proceedings 
as amici curiae and, of course, Ihe appeal court has always the power (or duty, if  it is a court of last instance) to 
seize the ECJ under the preliminary reference procedure of Art. 234 EC, where, not to forget, the Commission’s 
observations will in any event be heard (see on that point Schaub and Dohms, supra (1999), p. 1068).
the Commission in its declaratory decision will simply state that Articles 81 or 82 EC do not 
prohibit that specific conduct. The Commission’s pronouncement will have been made in the 
Community public interest, without, however, affecting the national court’s ruling. Contrary 
to the third scenario analysed above, since the Commission’s decision will not be 
accompanied by an injunction, it will not affect the national res judicata in practical terms. At 
the same time, compliance by the parties with the national judgment will not offend against 
the Commission decision. Thus, for example, a contract will be void as between the litigants 
(personal scope of the res judicata effect) and any possible antitrust damages awards will 
stand.650
Naturally, if  national procedural law allows, the loosing party may request a reopening o f the 
contested judgment, or it could sue the winning party for unjustified enrichment. The further 
civil proceedings that would follow as a result will, on their part, be pre-empted by the 
Commission decision and the national court this time would be bound to follow the 
Commission reasoning pursuant to Article 16(1) o f Regulation 1/2003. Contrary, however, to 
the third scenario above, the principle o f  effectiveness o f  Community law in this case cannot 
go as far as offering a legal basis for the reopening o f the contested judgment, i f  such 
recourse is unknown under national procedural law. The exigency o f effectiveness o f  
Community competition law' cannot be o f the same degree in the present case o f “over­
application” o f  EC competition lawr by national courts as in the above case of “under- 
application” which essentially leads to the upholding o f a harmful anti-competitive practice. 
The only Community law duty imposed upon national courts is to interpret the pertinent 
conditions o f  national procedural law - if  the latter allows in exceptional cases for such 
course - in conformity with EC law.
In addition, since this is a case o f  over-application o f EC competition law by the national 
courts, which, as the Commission also admits, is not particularly offensive for the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Treaty' prohibitory provisions, such judgments of national 
courts can still always be recognised and/or enforced in other EU Member States, without 
being contrary to  ordre public communautaire 651
Finally, it should be mentioned that in all cases of national judgments conflicting with 
Commission Decisions and thus with Community law, the Commission can always choose to
650 In this sense and contrary to the third scenario discussed above, the practical result of this specific 
conflict between the national court’s final judgment and the Commission’s decision will be that the parties will 
have no other way but to comply with the national judgment.
651 If it is accepted that the recognition/enforcement of a foreign judgment that upholds a serious violation 
of EC competition law constitutes an ordre public violation in the sense of Ait. 34( 1) Reg. 44/2001.
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bring this infringement of Community law by the Member State before the Court of Justice 
under Article 226 EC. This rather extraordinary possibility that has been used very rarely in 
the past,652 in order not to antagonise national judiciaries, will doubtlessly be used not very 
often.
v. Fifth Scenario: The Special Case o f Commission Commitment Decisions under Article 9 
of Regulation 1/2003
As already mentioned above, Commission decisions accepting and making binding on 
specific undertakings commitments are neither applicability nor inapplicability decisions. 
They merely close the administrative proceedings and state that as a result of the 
commitments offered the Commission no longer has an interest in pursuing the case. This 
particularity differentiates these decisions as to the effects they develop in national civil 
litigation.
Indeed, Recital 13 o f Regulation 1/2003 stresses that commitments decisions do not bind 
national authorities and courts as to the applicability or non-applicability of Articles 81 and 
82 EC but leave them free to decide whether or not there has been infringement of 
Community competition law.653 The last sentence of Recital 22 makes this clearer. This 
Recital corresponds to Article 16 which deals specifically with conflicts between 
Commission decisions and national courts’ judgments and repeats that “commitment 
decisions adopted by the Commission do not affect the power of the courts ... of the Member 
States to apply Articles 81 and 82 o f the Treaty”.654 Such commitments decisions do not 
affect the courts’ competences because their operative part is not in principle such as to lead 
to a conflict with the operative part of a judgment in the sense o f Masterfoods or Article 16 of 
Regulation 1/2003 655
Therefore, the courts remain free to find an infringement of the competition rules 
notwithstanding the commitments decision and on the basis o f  that finding to order an 
injunction or award damages. Indeed, the finding of the infringement can refer not only to the
652 C-129/00, Commission v. Italy, op.cit., paras. 29-33. In the latter case the ECJ held Italy liable for 
infringement of the EC Treaty, because Italian courts, including the Corte di Cassazione, interpreted national 
law in a manner that violated Community law.
653 See on this point Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 68.
See, however, R. Whish, Competition Law (London, 2003), p. 257, who finds that Recital 13 Reg. 
1/2003 is “a strange provision which sits oddly with Article 16”.
655 See further Wils, “Settlements of EU Antitrust Investigations: Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of 
Regulation No. 1/2003”, 29 World Competition 345 (2006), p. 361 etseq.
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period before the adoption o f  the commitments decision by the Commission656 but also after 
that.657 In such a case, the national judgment will have an inter partes res judicata  effect, 
while the Commission’s commitments decision will be binding erga omnes.
The situation, however, becomes more complicated with regard to national judgments finding 
that there has never been an infringement of the competition rules. While the language o f  
Recitals 13 and 22 o f Regulation 1/2003 states that courts are not deprived of their power to 
reach a finding o f inapplicability, it is nevertheless true that the national courts’ competence 
is circumscribed by the general principles of Community law and, in particular, by the 
principle that national courts cannot bring into question the validity and full effectiveness o f 
Community acts.658 This may create certain problems. Thus, concretely speaking, the courts 
cannot meddle with the exercise of the Commission’s discretion in the specific commitments 
decision. They must ensure that the binding commitments are respected in an effective way 
and they certainly cannot relieve the undertakings from them.659 Third parties perceived as 
the beneficiaries o f the commitments must be able to plead the commitments before national 
courts and enforce them upon the recalcitrant promisor.660 At the same time, parties to 
agreements which have been de jure or de facto modified through commitments integrated 
into a decision, can no longer rely in court upon the original version o f the agreements.661 
If these principles are valid, one wonders how much latitude remains for national courts to 
take an inapplicability decision. Conversely, if  the courts remain free to disregard the duties 
imposed by the commitments decisions on their addressees and find them not in violation o f 
competition law in the first place, the validity’ and binding effect o f a Community’ act as w ell 
as the w hole effectiveness o f this enforcement tool is seriously impaired.
An attempt to resolve this complicated question, which might well end up eventually before 
the Court of Justice, must start from the fundamental premises on which Masterfoods rests: 
namely, (a) the central role o f the Commission in the orientation and implementation o f
656 Indeed, plaintiffs may be alerted by the commitments decision as to potential competition law violations 
and may thus seek damages. In so doing, they may seek assistance in the preliminary assessment or the 
statement of objections, which refer to the Commission’s initial concerns, thus being helped in proving a 
violation of Art. 81 or 82 EC. On this possibility', see Montag and Cameron, supra (2005), p. 15.
657 See Wils, supra (2006), pp. 361-362. See contra Temple Lang, “Commitment Decisions under 
Regulation 1/2003: Legal Aspects o f a New Kind of Competition Decision”, 24 ECLR 347 (2003), p. 349, 
according to w hom national courts are precluded from making findings that there is still an infringement if the 
commitment is being fully implemented because that would conflict with the Commission’s finding that there 
are no longer grounds for its action. This unqualified view, however, contradicts the letter of Reg. 1/2003.
058 See above.
According to the Commission’s public communication on commitment decisions, op.cit., “national 
courts must enforce the commitments by any means provided for by national law, including the adoption of 
interim measures”. See also para. 7 of the newr co-operation Notice.
600 See Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 68.
661 See Marenco, jwpra (2001b), p. 174.
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European competition policy, as enshrined in Article 85 EC, (b) the duty of national courts to 
ensure the effectiveness of Community law, based on Article 10 EC, (c) the lack of 
competence of national courts to review the legality of Community measures, and (d) the 
principle of legal certainty. These four elements were considered by the Court of Justice 
sufficient in order to limit the scope of the principles of separation of powers and judicial 
independence. Besides, Masterfoods stressed the paramount role of the Court of Justice 
which remains the only final and authoritative interpreter o f Community law. To that 
authority national courts must always defer.
On the basis o f the above, it is our view that a commitments decision by the Commission
cannot affect the competence o f national courts to reach the conclusion that there has been no
infringement o f the Treaty competition rules and thus to refiain from enforcing the
commitments as against their addressee. This is so, for the following reasons:
Firstly', it is doubtful whether a decision by the Commission to close proceedings and accept
commitments represents a measure o f orientation or implementation of the Treaty
competition mles in the Article 85 EC sense. There may indeed be reasons of administrative
convenience that have led the Commission to that decision. The recent practice of
662commitment decisions supports this argument.
Secondly, the duty' o f national courts to respect the effectiveness o f Community' law and o f 
Community acts recedes in a case where the Commission opted itself not to proceed to a  clear 
declaration as to the applicability or inapplicability of Articles 81 or 82 EC. Effectiveness of 
Community law as such or as positively applied by the Commission cannot be equal to 
effectiveness o f the commitments or o f the general mechanism o f Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003.
Thirdly, it is not all clear how the Court o f Justice’s authority over national courts fits into 
this mechanism. As stressed above, Mctsterfoods in reality' does not establish a primacy o f the 
Commission but rather of the Court o f Justice. To the latter the national courts must always 
turn, if they have doubts about the validity o f a Community act. It remains unclear, however, 
how the national court brings into question the validity o f a Community act by deciding that 
there has been no infringement of competition law. The Commission's decision docs not 
contain any explicit finding as to the latter question; therefore its validity’ is not formally 
questioned by the national court. It is also unclear what the national court can seize the Court 
of Justice with.
663 In none of the published commitment decisions did the Commission indicate that it was positively taking 
a measure o f foimulation of Community competition policy.
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In sum, in our view, a commitments decision does not impose on national courts a  duty to 
give effect to it, if  the courts find inter partes that the conduct in question is not anti­
competitive. O f course, the Commission itself retains the power to impose fines and periodic 
penalty payments under Articles 23(2)(c) and 24(l)(c) o f Regulation 1/2003 as against the 
recalcitrant addressee of the commitments decision, irrespective o f the national judgment that 
finds him not in violation of the competition rules. This means that the problem above 
becomes more theoretical than practical, since the addressee o f  the Commission decision, 
even if  victorious before the national courts, will practically have no other option but to 
comply with the binding commitments o f  the decision.
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C. THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW ASPECTS OF EC PRIVATE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
1. Moving from a Decentralised System to a System of Private Enforcement
a* Decentralisation: A Necessary but Insufficient Tool to Promote Private Enforcement
The decentralisation brought forward by the new Regulation 1/2003 did not raise 
disproportionately high expectations in Europe of a US-like system of private antitrust 
enforcement. The majority of commentators was of the view that while the Article 81(3) EC 
Commission exemption monopoly was an obstacle,663 its mere abolition would not by itself 
energise private enforcement. In this sense Regulation 1/2003 was, in the words o f  a 
commentator, “a  necessary but not sufficient condition to promote private action in 
Europe” 664 It was thus thought that the modernisation project and the direct effect of Article 
81(3) EC, though in the right direction, would not contribute significantly towards the 
development of a system of effective private enforcement.665
According to this line of argument, Article 81(3) EC and the possibility of an exemption 
under the old system rarely come into play in cases, where there is substantial liability o f a 
person that has committed a serious violation of the competition rules and has inflicted harm 
upon another. Damage is more likely to be the result either of very serious anti-competitive 
practices that were not previously notified and would not in any case benefit from Article 
81(3) EC or of abuses of dominant position under Article 82 EC, whose enforcement is not 
affected by the reforms and which has long been recognised as directly effective and 
concurrently enforceable by the Commission and national courts. With the possible exception 
of some minor cases, where civil liability might have arisen but the likelihood o f a 
Commission exemption may have blocked civil litigation, not much changed on 1 May 2004 
as to the possibilities o f more private enforcement.
Many follow-up problems remained that were not sufficiently addressed by the Commission 
in its modernisation initiative. These problems refer basically to the weaknesses o f the 
substantive and procedural framework o f  civil litigation in the EU, which is up to a great
663 See supra.
664 See Norberg, supra (2003), p. 29. See also Commission XXXIVth Report on Competition Policy -  2004 
(Brussels/Luxembourg, 2005), p. 15, speaking o f Reg. 1/2003 as “a first step in strenghtening private 
enforcement before national courts before national courts by giving the latter the power to apply Article 81(3)”.
665 See e.g. Riley, supra (2003a), pp. 612-613; idem, supra (2003b), p. 665 et seq:, Venit, supra (2005), p. 
151.
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extent governed by national and not Community law and which is not well-adapted to the 
difficulties o f civil antitrust litigation. Besides, national civil courts have to engage in a  full 
assessment o f complex legal and economic circumstances that are not limited to the specific 
agreement or practice but refer to whole markets.666 If  even the Commission, a supranational 
institution o f considerable resources, experience, and powers finds it at times extremely 
difficult to prove the existence o f  anti-competitive practices, the burden placed upon national 
litigants and courts can really be insurmountable.
b. EC Private Antitrust Enforcement Between National and Community Law
At the heart of private antitrust enforcement in Europe lies the question of the relationship 
between Community and national law. At the current stage o f European integration, rights 
and obligations emanating from Community law are in principle enforced under national lawf 
and before national courts. The Community legal order is not a federal one and the 
Community acts only within the limits o f the powers conferred upon it by the EC Treaty. The 
Community standard is that Community law is enforced primarily by having recourse to 
national administrative and civil law before national administrative authorities and national 
courts.667
Thus, on the side o f substance, there is no Community law o f contract, tort or unjustified 
enrichment, or a  European Civil Code. Indeed, even if  the Community' had the power or 
intention to legislate in such a vast cross-sector area, it would be almost impossible to arrive 
at a common denominator applicable across the EU Member States, taking into account the 
century-long divisions in the European legal systems and families. Equally, on the side of 
procedure, there are no Community courts of full jurisdiction that could basically apply 
Community law' and deal with Community law-based claims. Although the proposal has 
already been made to introduce Community courts o f general jurisdiction, following the US 
model o f federal circuit courts,668 the current judicial structure is bound to remain unchanged 
for some time. National courts act also as “Community' courts” of full jurisdiction {juges 
communautaires de droit commun).669 *
666 See Braakman, supra (2000), p. 167.
667 See supra.
668 See e.g. Sullivan, “Antitrust around the World”, (2000) Antitrust Report 30, pp. 31-32.
6<w See Skouris, “The Proposals for the Reform of the Community System of Judicial Protection: On the
Basis o f the Draft Constitution of the European Union”, in: Frangakis (Ed.), The Court o f Justice o f the 
European Communities after 50 Years o f Operation (Athens/Komotini, 2004) [in Greek], p. 18, with references
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It is tiue that in the last twenty years, much has changed and one can now speak of a positive 
integration drive to unify or harmonise rules on remedies and procedures. Thus, there is now, 
for example, secondary Community legislation on substantive and procedural rules in the 
area of consumer protection,670 public procurement,671 sex and racial discrimination,672 unfair 
commercial practices,673 electronic commerce,674 late payments,675 and enforcement o f
to Art. 1-29(1 Xb) of the European Constitution Treaty which stresses that “Member States shall provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”.
070 See e g. Council Directive 85/577EEC o f  20 December 1985 to Protect the Consumer in Respect o f  
Contracts Negotiated Away front Business Premises, OJ [1985] L 372/31; Council Directive 93/13/EEC o f  5 
April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, OJ [1993] L 95/2; European Parliament and Council 
Directive 97/7/EC o f 20 May 1997 on the Protection o f Consumers in Respect o f  Distance Contracts, OJ [1997] 
L 144/19; European Parliament and Council Directive 98/27/EC o f  19 May 1998 on Injunctions for the 
Protection o f Consumers’ Interests, OJ [1998] L 166/51; European Parliament and Council Directive 
1999/44 EC o f  25 May 1999 on Certain Aspects o f  the Sale o f Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, OJ 
[1999] L 171/12; European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/65,EC o f 23 September 2002 Concerning 
the Distance Marketing o f  Consumer Financial Services and Amending Council Directive 90/619ÆEC and 
Directives 97/7ÆC and 98/27ÆC, OJ [2002] L‘271/16.
0,1 See e.g. Council Directive 89/665EEC o f  21 December 1989 on the Co-ordination o f the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Application o f Review Procedures to the Award o f  
Public Supply and Public Works Contracts, OJ [1989] L 395/33; Council Directive 92/13EEC o f 25 February 
1992 Coordinating the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Application o f  
Community Rules on the Procurement Procedures o f Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and 
Telecommunications Sectors, OJ [1992] L 76/14. See also Commission Proposal fo r  a Directive Amending 
Council Directives 89/665EEC and 92/13EEC with Regard to Improving the Effectiveness o f Review 
Procedures Concerning the Award o f Public Contracts, COM(2006) 195 final. See further Metaxas, “Public 
Procurement Contracts and Community Law: The Interrelationship between National and Community 
Regulatory Framework and the Relevant Case Law of the ECJ”, 48 Epitheorissi Dimosiou Dikaiou kai 
Dioikitikou Dikaiou 441 (2004) [in Greek], p. 448. Note that the fact that a contract may fall below the 
thresholds for the application of the public procurement Directives does not mean that primary Community law 
does not impose limits on the national legal orders. Thus, individuals are always entitled to effective judicial 
protection of the rights they derive from the Community legal order, even if secondary Community legislation 
(i.e. the remedies Directives) is not applicable. Compare the Commission Interpretative Communication on the 
Community Law Applicable to Contract Awards not or not Fully Subject to the Provisions o f  the Public 
Procurement Directives, OJ [2006] C 179/2, section 2.3.
672 From among the new generation measures, see e.g. Council Directive 97/80/EC o f 15 December 1997 on 
the Burden o f  Proof in Cases o f  Discrimination Based on Sex, OJ [1998] L 14/6; Council Directive 2000/43EC 
o f  29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle o f  Equal Treatment between Persons irrespective o f  Racial or 
Ethnic Origin, OJ [2000] L 180/22; Council Directive 2000/78/EC o f 27 November 2000 Establishing a General 
Framework fo r  Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, OJ [2000] L 303/16; European Parliament 
and Council Directive 2002/73EC o f 23 September 2002 Amending Council Directive 76/207EE C  on the 
Implementation o f the Principle o f Equal Treatment fo r  Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, 
Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, OJ [2002] L 269/15; Council Directive 
2004/113EC o f  13 December 2004 Implementing the Principle o f Equal Treatment between Men and Women in 
the Access to and Supply o f  Goods and Services, OJ [2004] L 373/37.
673 Parliament arid Council Directive 2005/29EC o f 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to- 
consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market and Amending Council Directive 84/450EEC, 
Directives 97/7EC, 98/27E C  and 2002/65EC o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council ( ‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive ), 
OJ [2005] L 149/22. See further Stuyck, Terryn and Van Dyck, “Confidence through Fairness? The New 
Directive on Unfair Business-toConsumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market”, 43 CMLRev. 107
(2006J
Directive 2000/31 /EC, OJ [2000] L 178/1.
675 European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/35EC o f 29 June 2000 on Combating Late Payment 
in Commercial Transactions, OJ [2000] L 200/35.
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intellectual property rights,676 where indeed one can note a more active stance of the 
Community legislator. However, with very few exceptions,677 these are sectoral rules 
applying to very specific areas that are considered important for the attainment o f  the most 
basic objectives o f the Community. This remarkable progress cannot change the basic reality 
that there are no cross-sector Community rules of administrative or civil law dealing with the 
enforcement o f  Community law-based rights.
Overambitious projects to harmonise or unify national civil rules on contract and tort and 
national procedural rules have had rather modest results, not least because o f the very 
defensive - if  not hostile - attitude o f the legal professions in the Member States. The long­
standing proposal -  or rather wish -  to  introduce at some point a European Civil Code has 
been watered down to proposals to improve the coherence o f the existing and future sectoral 
acquis, especially with regard to the acquis relevant to consumer protection, and to reflect on 
the opportuneness of an optional instrument on European contract law, which would provide 
parties to a contract with a body of rules particularly adapted to cross-border contracts in the 
internal market.678 An even more ambitious project to harmonise national civil procedural 
law s had a rather worse fate and w as abandoned 679 6
6 0 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48/EC o f  29 April 2004 on the Enforcement o f  
Intellectual Property Rights, OJ [2004] L 195/16.
6,1 See Council Directive 2002/8/EC o f  27 January 2003 to Improve Access to Justice in Cross-border 
Disputes by Establishing Minimum Common Rules Relating to Legal Aid fo r  Such Disputes, OJ [2003] L 26/41. 
This is one o f the few exceptional cross-sector legislative measures, though again limited to cross-border 
matters. Compare S. Weathcrill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (Cheltenham/Northampton, 2005), p. 240, who 
in respect of this Directive notes emerging traces of a “European legal space”.
See Commission Communication o f  I I  July 2001 to the Council and the European Parliament on 
European Contract Law, COM(2001) 398 final, OJ [2001] C 255/1; Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council, A  More Coherent European Contract Law, An Action Plan, OJ 
[2003] C 63/1; Council Resolution on ‘A More Coherent European Contract Law’, OJ [2003] C 246/1; 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Contract Law 
and the Revision o f  the acquis: The Wav Forward, COM(2004) 651 final. On the original plans related to the 
possible introduction of a European Civil Code and the subsequent developments, see Legrand, “Against a 
European Civil Code”, 60 MLR 44 (1997); Basedow, “The Renascence of Uniform Law: European Contract 
Law and its Components”, 18 LS 121 (1998); Schmid, “Legitimacy Conditions for a European Civil Code”, 8 
MJ 277 (2001); Weathcrill, “European Contract Law: Taking the Heat out of Questions of Competence”, 15 
EBLR 23 (2004). On the 2001 Communication and its aftermath, as well as on other Community instruments, 
such as on the 2001 Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection (Commission Green Paper on European Union 
Consumer Protection, COM(2001) 531 final), see e.g. Antonioli Dcflorian, “Consumer Protection, Fair Dealing 
in Marketing Contracts and European Contract Law -  A Uniform Law?”, 2(2) Global Jurist Frontiers, Article 4. 
On the constitutional law underpinnings of the development o f a “European contract law'” and of a “European 
Civil Code” see more generally Remien, “Europäisches Privatrecht als Verfassungsfrage”, 40 EuR 699 (2005).
On this and other similar projects see e.g. Storme (Ed.), Rapprochement du droit judiciaire de I 'Union 
européenne (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994); Kerameus, “Procedural Harmonization in Europe”, 43 
Am.JComp.L 401 (1995); Gilles, “Vereinheitlichung und Angleichung unterschiedlicher nationaler Rechte -  
Die Europäisierung des Zivilprozeßrechts als ein Beispiel”, 7 ZZPInt. 3 (2002), p. 8 et seq. This result illustrates 
well the fact that a harmonisation or communitarisation of procedure is more taboo than a harmonisation of 
substantive laws.
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Consequently, as the law currently stands, natural and legal persons relying upon Articles 81 
and 82 EC have no other means to pursue their civil claims but to have access to national 
courts and laws. This means that the substantive and procedural conditions of civil antitrust 
enforcement can be quite different in Europe, depending on which national law applies and 
which national court adjudicates. Inconsistencies and inadequacies of national laws on 
remedies and procedures are certainly a source of serious concern not just for EC competition 
law but for Community law in general. In this context, the problem can be identified in three 
different, albeit interconnected, levels:680
• jFirstly, there is a problem for the effective or adequate judicial protection, i.e, for the 
effective protection of Community rights.681 As the Court o f Justice has recognised, 
Articles 81 and 82 EC ‘tend by their very nature to produce direct effects in relations 
between individuals [and] create direct rights in respect o f the individuals concerned 
which the national courts must safeguard”. Failure to afford this safeguard, ‘“would 
mean depriving individuals of rights which they hold under the Treaty itself’.682 This 
is o f course an old question transcending the boundaries of EC competition law. 
Indeed, since the 1980s the duality Community rights-national remedies has been 
elevated to the central issue in “second” and “third generation” Community law, to 
use a “classical” expression.683
• Secondly, there is a problem for the effectiveness o f the whole system of Community 
law as such, and, more particularly, for the efficiency of the Community (competition) 
rules. There are two facets here. One is Community law-specific and the other is 
competition law-specific. The first facet of the problem is that when citizens pursue 
their Community rights before the juges communautaires de droit commun, apart 
from serving their private interests, they also become instrumental and indirectly act 
in the Community interest, becoming “the principal ‘guardians’ of the legal integrity
680 See further Komninos, supra (2002), p. 464.
681 On this central to Community law principle among the abundant works, see Van Gerven, “O f Rights and 
Remedies in the Enforcement of European Community Law before National Courts: From the 
Communitarization of Domestic Law towards the Europeanization of Community Law”, VIII(l) Collected 
Courses o f the Academy o f  European Law (1997) 241, p. 247 etseq.; T. Tridimas, The General Principles o f  EC  
Law (Oxford, 1999), p. 276 et s e q Rodriguez Iglesias, “Judicial Protection o f the Citizen under European 
Law”, in: Markesinis (Ed.), The Clifford Chance Millennium Lectures, The Coming together o f  the Common 
Law and tlte ChilLaw  (Oxford/Portland, 2000), p. 195 etseq.
682 BRT v. SAB AM  (I), op.cit., paras. 16 and 17.
683 See Curtin and Mortelmans, “Application and Enforcement o f Community Law' by the Member States: 
Actors in Search of a Third Generation Script”, in: Curtin & Heukels (Eds.), Institutional Dynamics o f  European 
Integration, Essays in Honour o f Henry G. Schermers, Vol. II (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994).
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o f Community law within Europe”.684 The direct effect doctrine was developed partly 
with this consideration in mind. The second -  competition law-specific - facet refers 
to the “private attorney-general” role o f individuals in antitrust cases.685 In a mature 
antitrust system, private enforcement is a necessary complement, by no means inferior 
to or weaker than public enforcement. In such a system private actions, and - we 
should stress - in particular, actions in damages, are focal to the whole system's 
efficiency.686 *
• Thirdly, disparities and inadequacies o f national legal systems are offending against
the principle o f consistent and uniform application o f Community law 687 It has been 
persuasively argued that the requirement of uniform application or enforcement is not 
“an all-embracing principle which does not allow for national principles”.688 
Therefore, national remedial and procedural discrepancies up to a certain extent are 
unavoidable. It is arguable, however, that such discrepancies are particularly 
regrettable from an EC competition law point o f view, because they tend to create 
variations in the costs o f the enforcement of the EC antitrust rules and, thus, unequal 
conditions of competition among the Member States 689 
In the decentralised system of antitrust enforcement the problem is accentuated. Competitors 
and economic actors in general take seriously into account the likelincss of public or private 
antitrust action in defining their market strategies. In this context, especially damages have a 
powerful impact on business behaviour690 Capitalisation by an economic operator on its
684 See Weiler, supra (1999), p. 20. Private enforcement can also further the effectiveness of other areas of 
Community law, apart from EC competition law. Such is the case for example of Community environmental 
law (see in this regard Somsen, ‘The Private Enforcement of Member State Compliance with EC Environmental 
Law: An Unfulfilled Promise?”, 1 YEEL (2000) 311, p. 312 et sea.).
685 See supra.
686 On this particular point, see below the analysis of the ECJ’s Courage ruling.
657 On the principle of uniform application of Community law, see Fines, “L’application uniforme du droit 
communautaire dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes”, in: Études en 
l ’honneur de Jean-Claude Gautron, Les dynamiques du droit européen en début de siècle (Paris, 2004), p. 334.
088 See Van Gerven, “Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures”, 37 CML Rev. 501 (2000), p. 503 (emphasis in 
the original text). The author goes on to argue that “although the objective of uniform enforcement of 
Community law throughout the Community is a fundamental requirement o f the Community legal order that 
must be pursued as much as possible, it is not a Community law principle of the same nature as direct effect, 
supremacy, or access to a court” (p. 522). In the same spirit see Fines, supra (2004), p. 336.
68? It is interesting to note that this argument in favour of more uniformity has been used not only in the 
antitrust area itself but also in the EC labour law field, since the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
cannot extinguish cost variations in the enforcement of EC labour legal provisions in the different EU Member 
States. See in this respect Ryan, “The Private Enforcement of European Union Labour Law's”, in: Kilpatrick, 
Novitz & Skidmore (Eds.), The Future o f  Remedies in Europe (Oxford/Portland, 2000), pp. 161-162.
og0 See Jones, supra (2003X p. 103, who quotes senior officers of a US company which had settled a 
monopolisation action against IBM for more than S 100 million as boasting “that the lawsuit had been the best 
investment the company had ever made”. Another telling example of the importance that triple damages awards 
can have in the business world is the specific case of a US company (Information Resources Inc.) that became
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‘‘immunity” from civil actions in damages and the failure of victims to be adequately 
compensated in a certain jurisdiction, as opposed to other jurisdictions where companies are 
constantly successfully or unsuccessfully defending civil antitrust actions and victims get 
fully compensated, is hardly compatible with the creation of “a  level playing field for 
agreements, decisions by associations o f undertakings and concerted practices within the 
internal market”, as the new Regulation 1/2003 propagates.691
The Court o f Justice692 has recognised in a consistent line of judgments, though very rarely 
referring to it by name,693 the “procedural/remedial and institutional autonomy” of the 
Member States694 to identify the remedies, courts and procedures that are necessary for the 
exercise of Community law rights at the national level.695 More importantly, however, the
the subject of a takeover bid by US private equity investors (Gingko), precisely because its chief asset was 
pending antitrust litigation against its rivals that had colluded to drive it out of business (Global Competition 
Review, Electronic Newsletter, 26 September 2003). While such commoditisation and commercialisation of 
antitrust civil claims may not be desirable, these examples certainly make the point that damages actions and 
awards affect business behaviour.
691 Recital 8. See also Recital 1, which speaks of the necessity for Arts. 81 and 82 EC to “be applied 
effectively and uniformly in the Community” (emphasis added), and Impact Assessment Form of the September 
2000 regulation proposal, p. 56, where reference is made to a “level playing field for companies in the internal 
market by ensuring more widespread application o f the Community competition rules”. See further Temple 
Lang, “Rapport général”, in: XVIII congrès FIDE (Stockholm, 3-6 juin 1998), Vol. II, Application nationale du 
droit européen de la concurrence (Stockholm, 1999), p. 290; Paulis, supra (2001a), p. 399, according to whom, 
divergencies in the enforcement of the antitrust rules constitute discrimination that can lead to distortions of 
competition in the market.
m  The role of the CFI in this area is rather non-existent, since these legal issues arise in ECJ preliminary 
reference cases.
m  One rare exception is case C-201/02, The Queen ex parte Delena Wells v. Secretary o f State for  
Transport, Local Government and the Regions, [2004] ECR1-723. In para. 70 of its ruling, the ECJ stresses the 
following: “Under Article 10 EC the competent authorities are obliged to take, within the sphere of their 
competence, all general or particular measures for remedying the failure to carry out an assessment of the 
environmental effects of a project as provided for in Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337. The detailed procedural 
rules applicable in that context are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, under the 
principle o f procedural autonomy o f the Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those 
governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in 
practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (principle of 
effectiveness)” (emphasis added).
694 On the question whether a principle of “national procedural autonomy” really exists see the provocative 
article by the late ECJ judge Kakouris, “Do the Member States Possess Judicial Procedural ‘Autonomy’?”, 34 
CMLRev. (1997) 1389. According to Kakouris, national remedial and procedural systems are subservient to 
Community lawr. Thus, the “principle” of national procedural autonomy is a descriptive term that does not mean 
that the Community lacks the power to legislate or regulate such procedural and remedial rules as are necessary 
for the enforcement of substantive Community rules. See further VA. Christianos, Dynamics in the Relations 
between Judiciary and Legislature in the European Community (Athens/Komotini, 2005) [in Greek], pp. 88-89; 
contra Paviopoulos, supra (1993), p. 119, wrho sees that principle through the perspective of an exclusive power 
of national law to deal with these matters. Some commentators approach the principle of national procedural 
autonomy in the context of subsidiarity (see e.g. Gautron, supra (1998), pp. 5-7, speaking of “judicial 
subsidiarity”).
695 The term “procedural autonomy” creates the wrong impression that tins principle refers only to national 
rules of civil, administrative or criminal procedure. However, its scope is much larger and covers all substantive 
or procedural mechanisms at national level that can be used for the enforcement of Community law. That is why 
the term “remedial/procedural autonomy” is more preferable. Besides, it is not always clear among the EU 
Member States legal systems where substance stops and procedure begins and vice versa. See on this question
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Court has also imposed demanding Community limits and safeguards upon that autonomy.696 
These are the principles o f equality and effectiveness,697 The first one means that the 
enforcement o f  Community law at the national level should not be submitted to more onerous 
procedures than the enforcement of comparable national law. The second requirement, which
/ A D
is a direct consequence o f the principles o f direct effect and supremacy, is a much harder
test. It means that although Community-derived rights will have to count on national 
substantive and procedural remedies in order for them to be enforced, such remedies still 
have to be effective and must not render the exercise and enforcement of such rights 
impossible or unjustifiably onerous. It reflects a more general guiding principle of 
Community law, the principle o f full and useful effectiveness (effet utile) 699 Undoubtedly 
those two requirements make less burdensome the national divergences that we described 
above (negative integration side). To all these we must add also the Article 234 EC 
preliminary reference procedure, whose importance is paramount for any attempt to proceed 
to a private enforcement system of EC competition law.
The Court o f Justice has, nevertheless, proceeded further than that. It has also recognised the 
existence o f autonomous Community law remedies and has delegated to national law only the 
very specific conditions for their exercise as well as the procedural framework mies, and this, 
always under the limitations o f equality' and effectiveness. In doing so, it has relied upon ‘the 
full effectiveness o f Community mies and the effective protection of the rights which they
Berge and Sinopoli, “Droit des obligations et autonomie procédurale : La distinction fond/procédure sous le 
double éclairage du droit communautaire et du droit des États membres”, Petites Affiches, 24-8-2004, No. 169, 
7, pp. 8-10.
096 On the remédiai and procédural autonomy of Member States and its Community law limits, see e.g. 
Tridimas, “Enforcing Community Rights in National Courts: Some Recent Developments”, in: O’Keeffe & 
Bavasso (Eds.), Liber Amicorum in Honour o fLord Slynn ofHadlev, Vol. I, Judicial Review in European Union 
Law (The Hague/London/Boston, 2000), p. 465 et seq;, Kilpatrick, “The Future of Remédies in Europe”, in: 
Kilpatrick, Novitz & Skidmore (Eds.), The Future ofRemeâies in Europe (Oxford/Portland, 2000), p. 2 et seq; 
Vilaras, “Judicial Protection of Individuals”, in: Frangakis (Ed.), The Court o f Justice o f the European 
Communities after 50 ïears o f  Operation (Athens/Komotini, 2004) [in Grcek], p. 43; Mehdi, “Le Revirement 
jurisprudentiel en droit communautaire”, in: L ’intégration européenne au XXïe siècle, En hommage à Jacques 
Bourrinet (Paris, 2004), pp. 122-123; J.-V. Louis and T. Ronse, L ’ordre juridique de l ’Union européenne 
(Bruxelles/Paris, 2005), pp. 262 et seq. and 292 et seq.
697 See e.g. case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfmanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG  v. Landwirtschaftskammer fü r  das 
Saarland, [1976] ECR 1989, para. 5; case 45/76, Cornet BV  v. Produkschap voor Siergewassen, [1976J ECR 
2043, paras. 12-13; case 199/82, Amministnazione de lie Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio, [1983] ECR 3595, 
para. 12; case C-261/95, Rosalba Palmisani v. Istituto Nazionale délia Previdenza Sociale (INPS), [1997] ECR 
1-4025, para. 27.
098 See Louis and Ronse, supra (2005), p. 296.
099 See Karageorgou, supra (2005), p. 18. On the principle o f effectiveness (effet utile) see inter atia Dubos, 
supra (2001), p. 278 et seq;, Zuleeg, “Die Wirksamkeit des Europarechts”, in: Colneric, Edward et al. (Eds.), 
Une Communauté de droit, Festschrift fu r  GU Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias (Berlin, 2003), pp. 222 and 228 et seq.
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confer’ and upon the duties that Article 10 EC imposes on Member States and on their 
judicial organs.700
A former Advocate General of the Court of Justice and eminent scholar of Community law 
has, therefore, proposed a more global approach of the issue of remedies in Community law, 
thus stressing the requirement of effective judicial protection that better describes the Court’s 
case law on remedies. Professor Van Gerven speaks of four already existing Community 
substantive remedies: a general one, to have national measures conflicting with EC law set 
aside,701 and three specific ones, compensation, interim relief and restitution.702 Individual 
civil liability is integrated in the first limb of these three specific remedies, at the side of its - 
admittedly much more developed - sibling, state liability.703
The former Advocate General furthermore makes a distinction between “constitutive” and 
“executive” elements o f remedies. The first pertain to the principle of the remedy as such, 
whereas the second to its “content and extent”. The first elements must be uniform, since they 
are utterly connected with the Community “right”, of which individuals avail themselves. The 
executive elements, instead, may, up to a certain extent, be governed by national law, but 
only under more substantial Community requirements. For these elements Community law 
should require an “adequacy test”, rather than a mere “minimum effectiveness” or “non­
impossibility” one, w hich may continue to apply for simple procedural rules.704 
On the basis of the above, it is unfortunate that Article I-29(l)(b) o f the (so far) ill-fated 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has missed totally this point and uses the 
following unsophisticated text: “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”. While the intention was clearly 
to ensure the effective judicial protection of Community-law based rights,705 the language 
used seems to imply that the corresponding remedies706 are a matter o f national law only. 
Such a reading, nevertheless, would not only contradict the case law o f the Court of Justice 
ever since Factortame 1 and Francovich, but would also not be in conformity’ w ith the spirit
700 Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur 5.4 v. Germany and Regina v. Secretary o f  State fo r  
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. et al. (Factortame III), [1996] ECR 1-1029, para. 39. On the Art. 10 EC 
legal basis, see in particular Temple Lang, “The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts under 
Article 10 EC: Two More Reflexions”, 26 ELRev. 84 (2001), p. 87.
701 This general remedy, in our view, encapsulates the duties of national courts to ignore national law that 
conflicts with directly effective Community law (principles of supremacy and direct effect) and to interpret 
national law in conformity with Community law.
702 See Van Gerven, supra (2000), p. 503.
703 On the extension of this principle to cover individual civil liability, see belowr.
7<M See Van Gerven, supra (2000), pp. 502-504,524-526.
705 See Skouris, supra (2004a), p. 18.
700 This is the only time that the European Constitution refers to “remedies”.
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and system o f the European Constitution itself. It is clear that this provision, which is a 
paragraph in the Article dealing with the Court of Justice, should not be considered a rule on 
competences. Its aim is to energise the national courts and to point to the duties that these 
have as Community judges of general jurisdiction. Therefore, the rationale of this provision 
cannot be to exclude that in appropriate cases Community law itself may provide for 
substantive remedies
3. The Substantive Law Framework
a. Nullity
aa. Nullity of Anti-Competitive Agreements under Article 81(2) EC
Article 81(2) EC is the only express provision in the EC Treaty that bears on private legal 
relationships. As such, it was a  rather bold and exceptional provision for 1957 to be included 
in an international treaty.707 This certainly highlights the importance o f the competition rules 
and their binding nature.708
Article 81(2) EC is usually raised by means o f defence by one o f  the litigants-parties to an 
alleged anti-competitive contract (“shield litigation'’). While it is generally true that the 
raising of EC competition law by means o f “shield”, i.e. by means of defence to an action 
based on contractual liability or on unfair competition law, may not constitute pro-active 
private antitrust enforcement, it still constitutes the exercise o f a  Community right, directly 
derived from the Treaty. In certain circumstances, apart from protecting the private interests 
of the person raising the “Euro-defence”, it may also further the effectiveness o f the 
competition rules and in that sense it serves the public interest, in particular when that 
defence is raised by many litigants in multiple litigation proceedings. Such can be the case of 
network agreements and of multiple litigation when one undertaking claims damages from 
several parties for breach of such agreements. Exactly as the cumulative effect of such 
agreements may pose a problem for competition, the cumulative effect of the raising o f the 
“Euro-defence” may constitute a powerful civil sanction o f the competition law violation.
707 See e.g. Gavalda and Parleani, supra (2002), p. 355, who do not miss the exceptionality point.
708 See E. Steindorfi, EG-Vertrag undPrivatrecht (Baden-Baden, 1996), p. 308, who sees the Ait. 81(2) EC 
civil sanction not only from the perspective of individual rights but also from the perspective of the full and 
effective application of EC law. See also below on the Eco Swiss and Courage references to the role of Art. 
81(2) EC.
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National courts are required under Community law to render the application of Article 81(2) 
EC as effective as possible. The Court of Justice in Eco Swiss and Courage relied exactly on 
that provision to stress the primacy of Article 81 EC in the system of the Treaty, since it 
“constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks 
entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning o f the internal market”.709 
Thus, any obstacles that national law poses to the exercise of the right to defend oneself 
against an action aiming at giving effect to anti-competitive conduct would be contrary to 
Community law and to the principle of effectiveness. Indeed, a certain reticence on the part 
o f  national courts to admit such defences based on Community competition law must be 
regarded as offending against effective judicial protection and the effet utile of the 
prohibitions of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
For this reason the attitude of English courts to view with extreme suspicion the “Euro­
defence” in actions o f  contractual liability or o f infringement of intellectual property rights 
does not accord with Community law.710 To give an example, there are serious doubts as to 
the compatibility' with EC law o f the approach of the English judges that there must be a 
nexus between an alleged violation o f Articles 81 and 82 EC and the relief sought by the 
plaintiff for infringement of an intellectual property right, in order for plaintiff s claim to 
fail.711
bb. The N ature of the Article 81(2) EC Nullity
The nullity o f Article 81(2) EC has a  Community' law meaning,712 *although all national legal 
systems avail themselves of equivalent notions. Thus, the only applicable norm in case of an
709 Case C -l26/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International N l\ [1999] ECR1-3055, para. 36;
Courage, op.cit., para. 20.
710 See e.g. Jones and Sufrin, supra (2004), p, 1199.
711 See e.g. Ransburg-Gema AG v. Electrostatic Plant Systems Ltd. (Pat.Ct.), [1989] 2 CMLR 712; Hewlett- 
Packard v. Expansys (Ch.D), [2005] EWHC 1495; Sportswear Company SpA et aí. v. Ghat laura and Stonestyle, 
[2005] EWHC 2087. In Chiron Corp. v. Mu rex Diagnostic (CA), [1994] 1 CMLR 410, a patent case, the 
English Court of Appeal granted injunctive relief to plaintiff, although the defendant had raised a breach of Art. 
82 EC. According to the court, it would have been disproportionate to deny interim relief to plaintiff, while the 
defendant could always bring a damages claim for breach of Art. 82 EC or complain to the Commission! For an 
equally disappointing case see ICI v. Berk Pharmaceuticals, [1981] 2 CMLR 75, where no nexus was found 
between the alleged abuse and the tortious liability of the defendant. For critical comments of these judgments 
see e.g. Tritton, Davis, Edenborough, Graham, Malynicz and Roughton, supra (2002), p. 941 et seq. Dutch 
courts have also been reproached for being “reluctant” to apply Arts. 81 and 82 EC, when the latter are used to 
attack the status quo of contractual agreements. See in this regard Ver Loren van Themaat, Adema, Rijnsberger, 
Schutte and Sevinga, “Rapport néerlandais”, in: AT7// congrès FIDE (Stockholm. 3-6 juin 1998), Vol. n, 
Application nationale du droit européen de la concurrence (Stockholm, 1999), pp. 212-213.
712 Case 56/65,Société Technique Minière (LTM) v. Maschinenbau Vim GmbH (MBU)> [1966] ECR 235, at
250. See Schröter, supra (2003), p. 310.
agreement that is contrary to Article 81 EC will be Article 81(2) EC to the exclusion of 
similar norms on nullity of illegal contracts under national law. This is because o f the 
specificity of the Community norm.713 The nullity* has a retroactive effect;714 it is automatic 
and comes as an ipso iure consequence o f the application o f Article 81 EC as a whole to a 
specific agreement, no prior administrative or judicial decision to that effect being 
required.715 The nullity is absolute, which means that it has an ergo orrmes effect. Therefore, 
it can also be invoked even by co-contractors716 and, most importantly, by third parties, as 
indeed the Court o f Justice has stressed in its very recent M anfredi ruling.717 The national
7,3 Of course, national general provisions on nullity may be applicable, if the agreement in question is 
lawful under Art. 81 EC, yet it is considered unlawful under national (not competition) law. In this case, the 
supremacy of Community competition law is unaffected, since the agreement will fail not because it is 
incompatible with national competition lawr, but rather with national law that pursues other objectives (e.g. the 
protection of the w eaker party in negotiations). See in this regard Art. 3(3) in fine Reg. 1/2003, which allows the 
application of stricter national that predominantly pursues other objectives than Arts. 81 and 82 EC.
'14 Brasserie de Haecht II, op.cit., para. 27.
15 Brasserie de Haecht II, op.cit, paras. 6 and 25.
716 Most Member States’ legal systems have found no difficulty in recognising this. See e.g. Gtlnther, supra 
(2001), p. 394, on Austrian law; Erametsà, supra (2001), p. 220, on Finnish law; Boulanger, supra (1997), pp. 
225 and 292; Winckler, “Remedies Available under French Law' in the Application of EC Competition Rules”, 
in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f 
EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), pp. 122-123, on French law'; Braun, supra (1996), p. 575, on 
German law, Ligustro, “Italie”, in: Behrens (Ed.), EEC Competition Rules in National Courts, Voi. I, United 
Kingdom and Italy (Baden-Baden, 1992), pp. 254-255; Siri, in: Marchetti & Ubertazzi (Eds.), Commentario 
breve al diritto della concorrenza, Antitrust, Concorrenza sleale. Pubblicità. Marchi, Breveti, Diritto d  autore 
(Padova, 1997), p. 42, on Italian law, in which the ordre public nature of EC competition rules leads to the 
disapplication of the principle nemo auditur turpitudinem suam allegans. The only exception has been English 
law , in which that audage excluded the invocability o f the Art. 81(2) EC nullity, notwithstanding its absolute 
nature under Community law. This issue w'as referred by the English Court of Appeal to the ECJ (along with the 
more important questions on damages) in the Courage case. The Court’s answer was unequivocal. Having 
recourse to earlier case law, (references to case 10/69, 5.4 Portelange v. 5,4 Smith Corona Marchant 
International et al., [1969] ECR 309; case 22/71, Béguelin Import Co. v. 5.4GL Import Export, [1971] ECR 949; 
and Brasserie de Haecht II, op.cit.) it stressed the automatic and absolute nature of the nullity, which results in 
having absolutely no effects as between co-contracting parties and in not being possible to be set up against 
third parties. Any individual, according to the Court, could rely on a breach of Article 81(1) EC before a 
national court, even if he was a party to an anti-competitive contract (Courage, op.cit., para. 24). On the issue 
see also Van Gerven, “Substantive Remedies for the Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules before National 
Courts”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement 
o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 55, who cites pertinent precedents, referring also to the Opinion 
of AG Mayras in De Bloos, op.cit. The AG in that case had left no doubt that the rule nemo auditur suam 
turpitudinem allegans did not prevent co-contracting parties from relying on the voidness of their contract, in 
view of the public policy character of Art. 81(2) EC. See also in this direction Hubeau, “La nullité, au sens de 
Particle 85 §2 du Traite CEE des accords et decisions incompatibles avec le marché comm un”, in: Liber 
amicorum Josse Mertens de Wilmars (Antweipen/Zwolle, 1982), p. 103; Norberg, “The Complementarity of 
Community Remedies and of National Remedies (Such as Damages Available in Competition Cases in National 
Courts w hen a Community Institution has Determined a Violation of the Competition Provisions in the Treaty 
of Rome”, in: Sundstróm & Kauppi (Eds.), Access to Justice, A Record o f  Thoughts and Ideas Dealing with the 
Interrelationship between National Law and Courts and Community Law and Courts, The Nordic Conference 
on the European Union: Access to Justice, the Rule o f  Law and Due Process 6-8 November 1998 (Helsinki, 
1999), p. 168.
1 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi et al. v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA et 
al., Judgment of 13 July 2006, not yet reported, paras. 57-59. On this case, see below. With regard to the 
invocability of the Art. 81(2) EC nullity by third parties, see also Béguelin, op.cit., para. 29; Courage, op.cit., 
para. 22.
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court’s judgment has only a declaratory and not a constitutive character as to the voidness 
itself.718
It is noteworthy that some national courts’ judgments, notably of English courts, which speak 
o f  “transient voidness”, seem to be incompatible with its automatic character. In Passmore v. 
M orlancf19 the English Court o f Appeal, affirming Laddie J., held that since the legality or 
illegality of an agreement under Article 81 EC is always dependent on surrounding economic 
circumstances that could change, the prohibition itself has a temporaneous or transient effect 
{rebus sic stantibus). The same transient nature should be attributed to the Article 81(2) EC 
nullity.720 Thus, if an agreement was prohibited and void at the time of its conclusion, the 
change of economic circumstances might render that agreement valid at a later time.721 We 
submit, however, that this interpretation violates the Community law meaning of that 
provision and that, in any case, a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice was 
called for.
According to the Court o f Justice’s case law the Article 81(2) EC nullity’ “is ... capable o f 
having a bearing on all the effects, either past or future, o f  the agreement or decision [in 
question]”.722 While it is true that a  certain conduct might cease to fall under the prohibition 
o f  Article 81 EC, the absolute and automatic character o f the nullity sanction cannot be 
affected. Any other result would not be compatible with the effet utile o f that provision and 
would not facilitate enforcement of aggrieved parties’ rights under the doctrine of direct 
effect of Article 81 EC.723 In all cases of “transient prohibition”, the contract, as initially 
concluded, will be void, although the conduct involved may no longer be prohibited. It is
718 See Koutsoukis, “The Private Law Remedies for Infringement of Articles 85 and 86 EEC”, in: Studies in 
Honour o f Andreas D. Loukopoulos (Athens/Komotini, 1993) [in Greek], p. 318.
719 David John Passmore v.Morland pic. etal. (CA), [1999] 1 CMLR 1129; [1999] EuLR 501.
720 See, in favour of such a transient nature of the voidness, Rodger, “The Interface between Competition 
Law and Private Law: Article 81, Illegality and Unjustified Enrichment”, 6 Edin.LRev. 217 (2002), pp. 233- 
234.; A. Kamerling and C. Osman, Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law (London, 2004), 
pp. 292-293.
721 For a Belgian case following the “transient voidness” logic see Cour d'appel de Bruxelles, 23-6-05, 
Laurent Emond v. Brasserie Haacht, in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts.
22 Brasserie de Haecht II, op.cit., para. 26; Manfredi, op.cit., para. 57. See also Schröter, supra (2003), p.
312.
723 See in this sense the comment by Cumming, 21 ECLR 261 (2000), p. 264. Compare also the facts of the 
Shaw and Falla case, op.cit, para. 200 et seq., where the applicants had alleged that the Commission had erred 
in granting an individual exemption to an anticompetitive beer supply scheme, after having taken into account 
the subsequent intervention of circumstances, which, however, did not exist on the day of the conclusion of the 
contracts. Therefore, according to the applicants, the initial contracts were illegal at the date of their conclusion 
and invalid under Art 81(2) EC, thus no exemption could be given to a void agreement notwithstanding the new 
circumstances. The CFI in its findings did not reject these arguments but found that the Commission had not 
really limited its assessment post-contractually and that it had also considered the agreements during the crucial 
time of their conclusion. This case, therefore, shows that the doctrine of transient voidness is probably not in 
line with EC competition law.
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quite another issue whether a new valid contract can be considered to exist between the same 
parties, which will be operable ever since the prohibition of Article 81 EC has ceased to 
apply. However, in such a case the validity of the new contract will operate ex nunc and will 
affect neither the effects of the voidness o f the initial contract, nor any possible claims for 
damages referring to the crucial time period o f the contract’s voidness.724 
An interesting practical and theoretical question is the validity o f agreements that fall under 
Article 81(1) EC yet were not notified to the Commission under the previous system of 
enforcement. Does this mean that, notwithstanding the introduction o f the legal exception 
system with Regulation 1/2003, such agreements will now have to be considered invalid also 
for the period after 1 May 2004 without it being possible for a  national court to examine them 
under Article 81(3) EC?725 We believe that the new system no longer calls for such a  harsh 
solution. While, as we stressed above, the Article 81(2) EC nullity operates in principle both 
for the past and for the future, a national court now has full competence to examine whether 
an agreement that was not notified under the old system can nevertheless be saved under 
Article 81(3) EC. There is no reason to extend into the system of legal exception an 
unsatisfactory problem of the old system. There is no question o f protecting the effet utile of 
the Article 81 EC prohibition by considering such agreements null for the future. While such 
a solution was appropriate for the previous system, it no longer makes sense.
Therefore, a national court dealing with an “old agreement”, i.e. an agreement concluded 
before 1 May 2004, should no longer feel constrained to consider it invalid, if the agreement 
restricts competition in the Article 81(1) EC sense. Instead, it should examine whether the 
agreement can be saved through Article 81(3) EC. If Article 81(3) EC cannot save the 
agreement, then it would of course be null and void from the time o f  its conclusion. If, on the 
contrary, the agreement does benefit from Article 81(3) EC, the court should consider it valid 
without making any distinction for the period before 1 May 2004. There is no reason to 
follow a formalistic approach by favouring the agreement’s nullity for the period before 1 
May 2004, since this would essentially amount to honouring form rather than substance; 
indeed form that has been abandoned. We should stress that the question here is different 
from the question we describe above and that gave rise to the “transient voidness” theories. 
There, the issue is one of substance, i.e. the variance in time o f the compatibility of an
724 See in this sense Libertini, “Autonomia privata e concorrenza nel diritto italiano”, 100 Riv.Dir.Comm. 
433 (2002), p. 450.
725 This problem is identified by Idot, “The Application of EC Competition Rules by national Courts: 
Remarks by a French Academic”, Paper Presented at the International Bar Association and European 
Commission Conference: Antitrust Reform in Europe: A Year in Practice Brussels (9-11 March 2005), pp. 4-5.
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agreement with Article 81 EC as a  whole, while here the issue is one of form, i.e. how to 
decide, now that the old notification system has been abandoned, on the validity' o f  an non- 
notified agreement that would have always benefited from Article 81(3) EC.726 
Occasionally, commentators refer to the exclusive competence of civil courts to apply Article 
81(2) EC727 and criticise some Commission pronouncements, which tend to adduce from the 
illegality of an agreement its nullity. Such pronouncements give the impression that the 
Commission could also declare anti-competitive agreements void.728 Indeed, the Commission 
and also national competition authorities have in the past actually applied the civil sanction of 
nullity.729
It is indicative that while the draft Commission notice on the handling of complaints in 
paragraph 13 had included the statement that “only national courts can decide upon the nullity 
or validity of contracts and only national courts can grant damages to an individual in case of 
an infringement of Articles 81 and 82”,730 the final text adopted is slightly - yet very tellingly 
-  different: ‘‘National courts can decide upon the nullity or validity o f  contracts and only 
national courts can grant damages to an individual in case o f an infringement of Articles 81 
and 82”. The deletion o f the word “only” in the first part o f that sentence seems to indicate 
that the Commission would rather not view the nullity question exclusively dealt with by the 
national courts.
In any event, to speak of exclusive competence on the part of national courts in this case 
would equally not be accurate. This would not be in conformity' with the automatic character 
o f  the nullity. This automatic character means, indeed, that the parties can invoke the nullity 
o f  an anti-competitive agreement even extra-judicially, without it being necessary to seize a
726 Of course, the national court would consider the agreement null and void if it did not satisfy the 
conditions of Art. 81(3) EC at some point in the past before 1 May 2004, even though it may now do so. This is 
a problem of substance and our previous analysis on the retrospective and prospective nature of the nullity fully 
applies here, too.
727 See e.g. loannou, supra (1984), p. 434; Bernini, “Panel Discussion: Administrative/Prosecutorial 
Discretion of Antitrust Authorities Including: Leniency or Amnesty, Cooperation and Plea Bargaining, Positive 
Comity, and Allocation of Agency Resources”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 1999, 
Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2000), p. 658; Favre, supra (2001b), 
p. 78; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 311; Van Gerven, supra (2003a), p. 54; Lenaerts and Gerard, supra (2004), pp. 
320-321; Idot, supra (2004b), p. 160.
728 See Mail-Fouilleul, supra (2002), pp. 139-140, 154.
729 In Greece, see e.g. Opinion 8/IU/2003 of 30 June 2003 of the Greek Competition Committee, in which 
the authority was requested to examine the civil validity of certain clauses in contracts for the sale of new 
automobiles. The Committee declared the nullity of some specific clauses, although it would have been 
preferable for it to determine the legality or illegality of the latter, rather than drawring itself the legal 
consequence of such illegality. See also Decision n° 288/1V/2005 o f the Greek Competition Committee, with 
critical comments by Kinini, 11 Dikaio Epicheiriseon kai Etairion 1059 (2005) [in Greek], where the Greek 
authority actually declared the partial nullity of several clauses in a car distribution contract
730 Emphasis added. The draft text w as published in OJ [2003] C 243/30.
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court. Any pronouncements of the Commission or of national competition authorities that an 
anti-competitive contract is null and void will not produce any more legal effects than their 
finding o f illegality. The civil validity or invalidity of a contract is merely an ex lege 
consequence o f  its legality or illegality. Therefore, Commission decisions that declare the 
nullity o f an illegal agreement cannot be said to be ultra vires, simply because the 
Commission in such cases states the obvious.731 Of course, the Commission or a national 
competition authority, technically speaking, cannot “declare an agreement void”.732 The 
Commission in such a case essentially examines the legality or illegality o f the agreement 
with regard to Article 81 EC. On the other hand, a national court may be requested by a  party 
to declare the nullity as such,733 which means that its judgment will be res judicata as to the 
nullity. Nevertheless, this is quite different from the view adopting the “exclusive 
competence” approach.
The nullity must be raised ex officio by the national court,734 unless the national procedural 
law applicable clearly does not allow the court to do so.735 According to the Van Schijndel 
case law, national courts are under a duty to raise ex officio questions of Community law, 
unless their national procedural law prohibits them from doing so.736 
Another issue is whether the nullity is subject to prescription. A certain part of the theory 
considers the nullity o f Article 81(2) EC not subject to any national regime o f prescription,
731 However, the Commission or an NCA would be acting ultra vires, if  it wrere to apply the severability 
rule of the civil sanction of nullity. Compare Decision n° 288/1V/2005 of the Greek Competition Committee, 
mentioned above.
32 See e.g. the Decisions of the French Conseil de h  concurrence of 5-3-91 and of 6-11-01 in cases 91- 
MC-01 and Ol-D-73, respectively, reported in and commented by Vogel, supra (2005), pp. 1627-1628.
733 See e.g. the actions en nullité in French and Belgian law'.
See Koutsoukis, supra (1993), p. 319; Noirfalisse, “La Belgique”, in: Behrens (Ed.), EEC Competition 
Rules in National Courts, Vol. II, Benelux and Ireland (Baden-Baden, 1994), p. 79; Boulanger, supra ( 1997), p. 
225; Erämetsü, supra (2001), p. 222; Diopoulos, supra (2000), p. 251; Mail-Fouilleul, supra (2002), p. 138; 
Winckler, supra (2003), p. 124, fn. 15; Schröter, supra (2003), p. 311. The ex officio application of Art. 81(2) 
EC has also been recognised by national courts. See e.g. in Austria, OGH 23-5-96, 6 Ob 691/95, 
Bierbezugsvertrag, cited by Günther, supra (2001), pp. 356 and 394; in Belgium, Comm. Bruxelles, 30-6-67, 
NVCanoy Herfkens Steenfabrieken v. Poncelet, (1967) JCB 277; in Greece, Polymeles Protodikeio Athens n* 
13118/1995,47 Epitheorisi Emporikou Dikaiou 183 (1996), pp. 188-189.
735 In jurisdictions where the courts can raise ex officio questions pertaining to public policy (moyens 
d ’ordre public), they must also do so with the nullity provision o f Art. 81(2) EC, since Art. 81 is such a public 
policv rule. See e.g. Saint-Esteben, supra (1973), p. 286.
736 On the ex officio application of EC competition law by national courts see infra. It is noteworthy that in 
some areas other than competition law', such as in consumer protection, the Court of Justice has stressed that the 
nullity provisions, contained in secondary Community legislation aiming at the protection of consumers, must 
be raised ex officio by national courts. Thus, see cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v. 
Roch Murciano Quintero and Salvat Editores SA v. José M. Sanchez Alcôn Prades et al., [2000] ECR 1-4941, 
paras. 26, 29; case C-473/00, Cofidis SA v. Jean-Louis Fredout, [2002] ECR I-Î0875, paras. 33-37.
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since it is a notion o f Community law and the latter does not determine this issue.737 This, 
however, would lead to an excessive degree o f legal uncertainty, w hich would not comply 
w ith Community law. Therefore, there is no other option but to refer to national provisions on 
prescription, taking into account the public policy nature o f EC competition law and the 
Community law principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Thus, the Article 81(2) EC 
nullity w ill be subject to a prescription that is applicable to the nullity o f acts for violation of 
rules o f public policy {nullités d'ordre public), or, if such a specific regime is absent, to the 
general national prescription regime applicable to civil actions, subject to the two limitations 
o f  Community law (equivalence and effectiveness).738
When the automatic nullity o f anti-competitive agreements is invoked before a civil court by 
way of an objection to a claim based on civil law (usually on contract) or on unfair 
competition law', it blocks all eventual claims for performance or damages based on the 
illegal and void agreement or juridical act. Other consequences of the nullity are governed by 
national law.739 A specific question is whether national rules on unjustified enrichment can 
apply, so that a party' to the void agreement that has performed thereunder can be restituted to 
the degree of the other party’s enrichment.740 In some legal systems such claims are possible, 
while in others the rule in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis prohibits restitution.741
737 See Cienfuegos Mateo, “L’application de la nullité de l’article 85§2, du Traité CEE par les juridictions 
nationales (avec un examen particulier du domaine des transports aériens) : Consequences dans l’ordre juridique 
interne”, 27 CDE 317 (1991), pp. 322-323.
738 Compare the recent Mmfredi ruling where the ECJ held that limitation periods for seeking compensation 
for harm caused by an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81 EC are subject to national law, but a 
short limitation period which is not capable of being suspended could make it practically impossible to exercise 
the right in damages and would thus offend against the principle of effectiveness (joined cases C-295/04 to C- 
298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi et a l v. Lloyd Adriatico AssicurazioniSpA et a l, Judgment of 13 July 2006, not yet 
reported, paras. 77-80). On this judgment, see below.
739 According to case 319/82, Société de Vente de Ciments et Bétons de l'Est SA v. Kerpen & Kerpen GmbH 
& Co. KG, [1983] ECR 4173, paras. 11-12, the consequences of the nullity on any orders and deliveries made 
pursuant to an anti-competitive and void agreement and on the resulting financial obligations are a matter for 
national law. See also cases T-l 85/96, T-l 89/96 and T -l90/96, Riviera Auto Service Êtablisssements Dalmasso 
SA et al. v. Commission, [1999] ECR 11-93, para. 50.
740 Such claims should not be confused with restitutionary or damages claims of the victim of the anti­
competitive agreement. The latter are the consequence of the harm caused by the anti-competitive agreement 
and derive not from the nullity provision of Article 81(2) EC, but directly from Article 81(1) EC, while the 
former refer to the harm caused by the sanction itself that EC competition law imposes, i.e. by the nullity.
741 This rule is to be met also in English and in German law (§ 817(2) BGB). A similar provision exists in 
Spanish law (Art. 1306(2) of the Civil Code). However, no problem arises in Greek law', since the Greek Civil 
Code (Art. 917(2)), which otherwise follow's the German BGB, excludes restitution of the enrichment only in 
case of immoral transactions. Recovery of sums paid is possible in Spain; see Audiencia Provincial de Girona 
(secc. n* 1), 10-6-04, Clou SA v. Cepsa Estaciones de Senicio SA, reported in e-competitions, December 2005 
Vol. II. French law also allows for the restitution of such benefits pursuant to Art. 1376 CC (action en répétition 
de l'indu) (see further Boulanger, supra (1997), pp. 195-196). Therefore, a party to a void - pursuant to Art. 
81(2) EC - contract has an obligation to restitute anything received under the contract, if this amounts to 
unjustified enrichment, unless the claimant bears most of the responsibility for the imposition of the anti­
competitive clause or contract on the former (see Mail-Fouilleul, supra (2002), p. 157). Needless to say that
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cc. The Legal Consequences of Nullity: Severance and Related Contracts
The automatic nullity in question only applies to those parts and clauses of the agreement that 
are affected by the prohibition. It applies to the agreement as a whole if it appears that those 
parts are not severable from the agreement.742 The question o f severance is to be decided 
under the applicable national law.743 In most legal systems, a  void clause cannot be severed 
from the contract if the parties would not have concluded the latter in the absence of the 
former.744
The question arises as to the relationship between the validity o f subsidiary or 
complementary contracts and the invalidity of the basic contract under Article 81(2) EC. 
Independent yet ancillary contracts, such as a liquidated damages or a penalty clause,745 
directly aim at ensuring or securing the performance of the contractual obligations in question 
and constitute an inseparable whole with the basic agreement, thus following its fate in case 
of its voidness.746 It is, however, unclear whether this problem will be resolved according to 
Community or national law. It seems that this must be a question of Community law, since
such claims can be set off against possible damages claims of the other party with regard to harm resulting from 
the anti-competitive agreement.
742 Société Technique Minière, op.cit., at 250. Under EEA law the severability of parts of an agreement that 
fall under Art. 53(1) EEA is also a question of national law (case E-7/01, Hegelstad Eiendomsselskap ArvidB. 
Hegelstad et al. v. Hydro Texaco AS , [2002] Report of the EFTA Court 312, para. 43). Note that the question 
whether the nullity of Art. 81(2) EC is partial or total is a question of Community law, whereas the question of 
severability of a specific illegal clause is one of national law. See also Schröter, supra (2003), p. 313.
,45 The question of severability for the purpose of A rt 81(2) EC has to be distinguished from the 
severability of clauses imposing obligations that are not block-exempted by Regs. 2790/1999 on vertical 
agreements, 1400/2002 on motor vehicle distribution and 772/2004 on technology transfer agreements. Under 
Ait. 5 o f these three Regulations some non-hard core restrictions of an agreement do not enjoy the benefit of the 
block exemption, but at the same time do not deprive the remaining clauses o f the agreement of that benefit, if 
they are severable. This specific kind of severability is a question of the lex causae. See Whish, supra (2000a), 
p. 917, fn. 137; Jones and Sufrin, supra (2004), p. 672; Ritter, “The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
under EC competition Law”, 31 LIEI 161 (2004), p. 167; Fine, “The EU’s New Antitrust Rules for Technology 
Licensing: A Turbulent Harbour for Licensors”, 29 ELRev. 766 (2004), p. 783, fn. 85.
744 Nevertheless, the possibility o f  divergence among national legal systems as to the result of severance 
cannot be excluded. This is regretted by some authors, who see the potential o f forum shopping. See e.g. Furse, 
supra (2000), p. 137; Jones and Sufrin, supra (2004), pp. 1199-1200.
745 For example a “profit pass-over clause” which might be included in a distribution contract. According to 
such clauses the distributor that has made sales in the pre-assigned geographical area of another distributor is 
bound to compensate the latter with a fixed sum of damages. See also Winckler, supra (2003), pp. 125-126, fn. 
23, on a case regarding a similar “penalty' pure and simple in case of non-delivery”.
740 See Koutsoukis, supra (1993), p. 322; Boulanger, supra (1997), p. 293; Schröter, supra (2003), pp. 314- 
315.
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the underlying question is not the subsidiary character of such contracts, but rather whether 
the latter are affected by the prohibition of Article 81 EC.747
An exception is the fate of an arbitration clause/agreement, which is such an independent yet 
subsidiary' contract.748 Under the principle of autonomy or separability of the arbitration 
agreement, which is accepted in all European and in most foreign legal systems, the 
arbitration clause will be intact,749 and, indeed, the arbitrators will examine the question of 
applicability o f Article 81(2) EC to the main contract. Only in exceptional circumstances 
could the voidness of the main contract and its incompatibility with Article 81 EC catch the 
arbitration clause, too. As we explain in the pertinent part, the function of an arbitration 
clause in an anti-competitive agreement may be such as to increase the competition­
restraining function o f the unlawful practice. In such a case the arbitration clause itself will 
also be illegal and void under Article 81(2) EC.750
Another issue is the influence of the nullity of the main contract to other independent, yet 
consequential or follow-on contracts (Folgevertrdge), which are concluded with third parties 
and indirectly aim at giving effect to the obligations undertaken under the main contract in 
question. Such will be contracts for the lease of premises, employment contracts, and other 
contracts for the supply of raw materials, for the sale of products, or for the transfer of 
property' rights.751 Since these contracts do not restrict competition by themselves, they will 
not be affected by the viodness sanction of Article 81(2) EC,752 unless they are part and 
parcel of a network o f competition-restraining agreements that also includes the main illegal 
contract. The same would be the result if  such agreements are consequential to an illegal 
concerted practice or decision by an association of undertakings. In such cases Community
747 According to the ECJ, “any other contractual provisions which are not affected by the prohibition, and 
which therefore do not involve the application of the Treaty, yâ// outside Community law” (Société Technique 
Minière, op.cit., at 250, emphasis added).
748 Some authors speak of “severance” of the arbitration clause from an illegal agreement (see Braun, supra 
(1996), p. 576). Such terminology should be avoided, firstly because the arbitration clause is a separate and 
independent agreement from the main contract and not a “clause” that can be severed, and secondly because the 
concept of “severance” is used in the context of illegal clauses that can be severed from an otherwise legal 
agreement and not of legal clauses severable from an illegal agreement.
749 This is sometimes missed by competition littérature, which tends to include the arbitration clause into the 
affected contracts. See e g. Koutsoukis, supra (1993), p. 322.
750 On this question, reference is made to the more detailed analysis infra.
751 See Koutsoukis, supra (1993), pp. 322-323.
752 See Schröter, supra (2003), p. 315, who senses here a certain weakening of the effectiveness of the 
prohibition, w'hich national courts are bound to avoid under Art. 10 EC. See also AG Warner's Opinion in case 
22/79, Greenwich Film Production v. Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs de Musique (SACEM) and 
Société des Éditions Labrador, [1979] ECR 3275, at 3296: “[N]ot every transaction or legal relationship having 
a connexion with an agreement, decision or concerted practice prohibited by [Article 81] is necessarily void. For 
instance in the case of a price-fixing cartel, sales by members of the cartel to customers are not void even if 
made at the prices illegaly fixed.”
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law will become o f issue, if  these consequential contracts, usually intellectual property 
licences, are affected by the prohibition o f  Article 81 EC by giving effect to the anti­
competitive agreement or practice itself {Ausfuhrungsvertrtìgè) 753
We should finally mention that the parties to the contract can include separability clauses in 
their contracts whereby it is provided that the nullity o f  a particular clause because o f its 
contrariety with competition law does not invalidate the contract as a whole. Separability 
clauses (salvatorische Klctuselri) raise concerns when clearly aiming at saving specific anti­
competitive clauses. In such cases they may become tainted themselves by the illegality, if 
their aim is clearly to frustrate the voidness sanction and to facilitate the illegality. Thus, 
while national courts have in principle accepted the legitimacy o f such general clauses, they 
have at the same time considered that clauses specifically designed to circumvent the Article 
81(2) EC nullity* and essentially to relieve the parties from any risk of illegality-, would be 
illegal and thus void on competition law grounds.754
dd. Nullity under Article 82 EC
It is noteworthy that there is no equivalent Treaty provision on the voidness o f agreements or 
other juridical acts that violate Article 82 EC.755 The explanation usually given is that this 
was a  conscious choice, since the abuse of a dominant position, unlike cartels, does not 
typically rely on legal agreements, but rather on factual situations. However, the conduct 
prohibited by Article 82 EC may, indeed, take the form o f agreements or other juridical acts 
that are capable o f  producing legally enforceable rights and obligations. Such agreements or
753 In case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH and Uwe Danziger v. Ideal-Standard GmbH and 
Wabco Standard GmbH, [1994] ECR 1-2789, the Court dealt with certain assignments of trademarks that 
followed an anti-competitive (market-sharing) agreement. The Court held that “where undertakings independent 
of each other make trade-mark assignments following a market-sharing agreement, the prohibition of anti­
competitive agreements under Article [81] applies and assignments which give effect to that agreement are 
consequently void. However, ... that rule and the accompanying sanction cannot be applied mechanically to 
every assignment. Before a trade-mark assignment can be treated as giving effect to an agreement prohibited 
under Article [81], it is necessary to analyse the context, the commitments underlying the assignment, the 
intention of the parties and the consideration for the assignment” (para. 59). See also the facts of case 28/77, 
Tepea BV  v. Commission, [1978] ECR 1391, paras. 33-34, where agreements granting exclusive rights to use a 
trademark were in fact giving effect to exclusive distribution agreements offering absolute territorial protection 
excluding all parallel imports, thus being subject to Art. 81(1) EC themselves.
754 Thus, the German Supreme Court (BGH) has established that, as a matter of principle, a separability or 
“salvatory” clause that contravenes the scope (Schutzzweck) of the prohibition of Art. 81 EC or the equivalent 
national provision, will be null. The prohibition and nullity of anti-competitive agreements cannot be 
circumvented through the inclusion of such a clause into the contract on purpose: see BGH, 8.2.94, KZR 2/93 -  
Pronuvtia II, 44 WuW 547 (1994).
7”  Some national competition laws, however, although inspired by the Community model, contain specific 
provisions on the nullity of acts that constitute an abuse of a dominant position (e.g. Art. L420-3 of the French 
Code de commerce; see also the more specific Art. 442-6(2)).
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legal acts will have to considered void, otherwise one would be led to the paradox of a 
prohibited and illegal conduct punished through severe administrative sanctions, which 
would nevertheless give rise to rights and obligations enforceable through civil law.
Therefore, the question arises as to the Community or national law character o f such a 
nullity.756 While it is true that eventual agreements or other legal acts that are incompatible 
with Article 82 EC will be considered illegal and, therefore, void under national law,757 one 
cannot exclude discrepancies that compromise the effectiveness of the nullity o f such acts 
and by implication of the Article 82 EC prohibition. Such discrepancies do not serve the aim 
o f  the uniform and consistent application o f EC competition law.
To give an example of the risk of discrepancies arising as a result of the application o f 
national law, under German and Greek law, contracts that are incompatible with a legal 
prohibition will be null “unless the law provides otherwise”.758 There are two legal problems 
involved here. The first and least difficult is whether Article 82 EC is such a legal 
prohibition. The answer to this question is positive.759 The second and more complex legal 
problem is whether all contracts falling foul of Article 82 EC will be considered void, or 
whether ‘the law provides otherwise” in some cases.760 This has given rise to different 
theories in Germany with some authors in favour of the outright nullity o f such agreements 
and others in favour of their validity, unless the contract in question, apart from introducing, 
complementing, or otherwise supporting the abuse of a dominant position, also contradicts 
bonos mores.761 Under French and Italian law', on the other hand, the nullity of such contracts 
is outright and derives from the general provisions of the respective Civil Codes, because o f 
the illegal character of the contracts and of their contrariety w ith a rule of mandatory nature 
(such as Article 82 EC is) and the notion o f public policy (ordre public)762
756 The legal basis o f the nullity of contracts incompatible with Art. 82 EC has not attracted substantial 
analysis so far. Most commentators tend to accept that this is a matter for national law. See e.g. Lenaerts and 
Gerard, supra (2004), p. 314, fn. 4.
751 See e.g. Iliopoulos, supra (2000), pp. 251 and 303; Mail-Fouilleul, supra (2002), p. 140, fn. 993; 
Wincklcr, supra (2003), p. 121.
58 S, 134 BGB and A rt 174 of the Greek Civil Code respectively.
759 See Koutsoukis, op.cit. (1993), p. 346.
700 In this respect, it can be argued that the law' "provides otherwise” by providing for detailed 
administrative sanctions (or even criminal sanctions, at least in Member States that impose such sanctions for 
violations of EC competition law).
701 Thus being contraiy to § 138 BGB and to Arts. 178-179 of the Civil Code, in German and Greek law, 
respectively (see L.E. Kotsiris, Competition Law (Free and Unfair) (Athens/Thessaloniki, 2000) [in Greek] p. 
543). A third, more nuanced, approach is in favour of the nullity, unless in exceptional circumstances the latter 
does not seive the effectiveness of the Art. 82 EC prohibition.
702 On France, see Arts. 6 and 1131 Code Civil, see further Winckler, supra (2003), p. 122. On Italy, see 
Tesauro, ‘Competition Authorities and Private Rights”, in: Andenas, Hutchings & Marsdcn (Eds.), Current 
Competition Law, Vol. II (London, 2004), p. 185.
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However, we submit that any difference of treatment of the nullity under Articles 81 and 82 
EC must not have been intended. The Treaty did not contain a specific provision on nullity in 
Article 82 EC only because the prohibited behaviour therein does not usually take the form of 
an agreement. In those exceptional circumstances, where an agreement or any other juridical 
act introduces, complements or supports the abuse o f a  dominant position, it must be accepted 
that under Community law such an agreement or act will be void. This comes by way of 
analogy with Article 81(2) EC.763 Any other interpretation would be incompatible with the 
“system” of the two basic competition rules o f the Treaty and might impair the effectiveness 
and efficiency o f  Article 82 EC. As we have shown, the delegation of the issue of nullity to 
national law' can be in some cases detrimental to the consistent enforcement of the Treaty 
competition rules. Therefore, agreements falling under Article 82 EC will be considered void, 
the voidness being automatic, no prior decision to that effect being required.764 Indeed, the 
recent judgment o f the Swedish Supreme Court in the Luftfartsverket case followed exactly 
this approach and, relying on Articles 82 and 10 EC, concluded that an agreement in breach 
of Article 82 EC is null and void, this flowing directly from that Community provision.765 
A sensitive issue, however, regards the absolute or relative character of this voidness. While 
prohibited agreements that introduce or otherwise support an abuse o f a dominant position 
will be void and unenforceable by the dominant undertaking, the rights of parties, which are 
the victims of the abuse of the former should be protected. In Greenwich Film Production, 
the Advocate General had touched upon this question and stressed that “it would be 
unthinkable that Article [82] should be used indiscriminately to avoid contracts in a manner 
detrimental to the victims of the abuse or to third parties”.766 Thus, it seems that the nullity of 
an agreement that infringes Article 82 EC cannot operate to the detriment of the victim of the 
abuse, when it operates to protect the latter from exploitation.767
b. Damages Actions
703 Nullity by analogy has also been accepted with regard to agreements that introduce or otherwise support 
an abuse of a dominant position in national competition law's. Thus, under Italian competition law such 
agreements would be null by analogy of Art. 9(2) of the Legge 18 giugno 1998, n. 192 that declares the nullity 
of contracts, through which an abuse of economic dependence is realised. See further Libertini, supra (2002), p. 
456.
7i>4 Compare also A rt 1 Reg. 1/2003, which makes no distinction in prohibiting agreements falling under 
Aits. 81(1) and 82 EC. Of course, the value of this provision is merely declaratory, since it is the Treaty 
provisions themselves and their direct effect that lead to the same result.
05 See Bemitz, “The Arlanda Terminal 2 Case: Substantial Damages for Breach of Article 82”, 2 Comp.LJ 
195 (2003), p. 197.
700 AG Warner’s Opinion in Greenwich Film Production, op.cit.t [1979] ECR 3275, at 3296.
707 See in this sense Jones and Sufrin, supra (2004), p. 1203.
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aa. From Inexistence to the Awakening of EC Private Enforcement
Damages actions have personified private antitrust enforcement, particularly if one studies 
the oldest and most developed antitrust system of the world. Their primary aim is to 
compensate victims o f anti-competitive practices but they also increase the overall deterrent 
effect of the law. In addition, defendants themselves become instrumental in implementing 
the competition rules and the general level o f compliance with the law is raised.76*
It has long been debated why Europe is left so far behind to the extent that one can even 
totally ignore the role o f damages actions and awards in view of their practical inexistence.769 
According to former Advocate General Van Gerven, who has been an instrumental 
personality for the enhancement of EC private antitrust enforcement, the underdevelopment 
o f  private actions in Europe is due to a variety o f obstacles, notably the following:770
(a) absence of an express statutory basis for bringing EC competition law-based suits;
(b) institutional problems, basically lengthy proceedings and absence of specialisation o f 
national courts;
(c) limitations on standing and on the aggregation of damages claims;
(d) difficulties in proving causation and the extent of harm;
(e) uncertainty as to the existence and scope of the so-called “passing-orf defence;
(f) existence o f contributory fault-related defences;
(g) uncertainties as to the calculation o f damages and as to their scope (i.e. whether they 
should only compensate the harm or also aim at restituting to the victim the illegal 
gains);
(h) absence of punitive damages;
(i) short limitation periods
0) problems in fully recovering costs and fees;
(k) absence of contingency fees;
(l) restrictive and antiquated evidence rules
68 See above on the general qualities o f private enforcement and on the “private attorney-general” model. 
m  See e.g. Meade, supra (1986), p. I l l ;  Kon, “The Commission’s White Paper on Modernization: The 
Need for Procedural Harmonisation”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy ¡999, Annual 
Proceedings o f  the Fondham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2000), p. 247; Harding and Joshua, supra 
(2003), p. 239. See also Monopolkommission, Sondergutachten von 30-10-01 gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GIVB, 
Folgeprobleme der europäischen Kartellverfahrensreform, para. 66.
10 See Van Gerven, “Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules”, Paper Presented at the International 
Bar Association and European Commission Conference: Antitrust Reform in Europe: A Year in Practice 
Brussels (9-11 March 2005), p. 1.
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(m) lack o f binding effect of competition authorities’ infringement decisions.
One may agree or disagree with the characterisation o f  some o f  these parameters as obstacles 
to private enforcement, yet it is clear that the EU compares very poorly with the US in this 
regard. This may not be, of course, a  cause o f concern, since the US system o f private 
enforcement is not universally admired in all its details. Indeed, there has long been a 
powerful current in the US to restrict private antitrust enforcement because of its excesses.771 
The problem, however, in Europe is that there has been almost total inexistence o f private 
enforcement. The aim should be to reverse that, without importing the US excesses. It is 
therefore inappropriate to resist the introduction and enhancement of private enforcement in 
Europe merely because of the US problems. Indeed such a line o f argument would not be 
very different from totally denying a developing country the possibility to industrialise itself 
on environmental grounds.
To the long list o f deficits presented by former Advocate General Van Gerven, one may add 
the supranational, multilingual and multi-jurisdictional structure of Europe and the state of its 
competition legal profession. Thus, firstly, unlike the case of the US, there is no system of 
“federal” courts of full jurisdiction in Europe where “federal” claims based on EC 
competition law could be brought. Secondly, the Europeans avail themselves of neither a 
common language nor a common or at least a similar legal tradition. Thirdly and most 
importantly, the competition legal profession is still utterly oriented towards public 
enforcement. The Brussels-based bar is not moved by the idea of a developed system of 
private enforcement, because this would mean loss o f business which would necessarily be 
redirected to the Member States (in the absence o f centralised or even decentralised 
Community courts of general jurisdiction). At the same time, the nationally-based lawyers 
usually lack the experience of Community' or antitrust litigation and see rather suspiciously 
the introduction o f a foreign body into their national legal traditions. Meanwhile, other 
interlocutors that could be instrumental in favouring private antitrust enforcement, such as 
consumer groups, remain rather disinterested, since they prefer employing other tools that are 
dearer and more familiar to them, such as consumer protection law's.
This state of malign or benign neglect can, how ever, no longer be allowed to continue. Apart 
from being detrimental to an efficient competition law enforcement based on economic 
actors’ constant awareness of the severe risks if  they break the law, it is also incompatible 
with Community7 law in general, since the rights that Articles 81 and 82 EC grant to
771 See e.g. Wils, supra (2003), p. 485 et seq.
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individuals become essentially a dead letter, or Papierrecht, at least as far as national civil 
litigation is concerned. Indeed, this constitutional parameter was not missed by the ultimate 
federator in Europe, the European Court o f Justice, which in a powerful ruling of principle in 
2001 decided that as a matter of Community law damages should be available to any victim 
o f anti-competitive conduct and that the existence of such a right strengthens the working o f 
the Community competition rules and discourages their breach, thus making “a significant 
contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the Community”.772 
The Courage ruling set the principle of Community law-based individual civil liability for 
antitrust violations in an undeniable way and gave the Commission the appropriate legitimacy 
to proceed to detailed and groundbreaking proposals to adopt secondary Community 
legislation on damages claims, thus enhancing -  if not indeed introducing -  private antitrust 
enforcement in Europe.773 It is not clear whether in the absence of Courage the Commission 
would have been able to attempt such an over-reaching project.
bb. The Brussels Way to Courage
The Treaty of Rome did not include a provision on the award of damages to victims of anti­
competitive practices, unlike US antitrust law and some European national competition 
laws.774 At the time o f the introduction o f Regulation 17/1962 the Deringer Report for the 
European Parliament had accepted the desirability and necessity o f private actions for the 
effective enforcement o f EC competition law and had proposed a study of the national laws
772 Courage, op.cit, para. 27. See below for a thorough analysis of this case.
773 On the Commission’s Green Paper on damages, see below.
774 S. 7 of the original Sherman Act, superseded by s. 4 of the Clayton Act. The fact that some national 
competition laws may not mention the possibility of damages actions is not conclusive, since it is usually 
through the general provisions of civil law (usually in tort or exceptionally in contract) that such actions will be 
possible. For examples o f national competition laws expressly mentioning the possibility of damages actions, 
sees. 33 of the German Competition Act (GWB); s. 14(5 Xb) Irish Competition Act of 2002; Art. 12(l)(b)ofthe 
Swiss Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition (KartG) of 1995; Art. 13(2) of the Spanish Act for the 
Protection of Competition (LDC) of 1989 (as subsequently amended); Art 33(1) of the Swedish Competition 
Act of 1993 (as subsequently amended); and Art. 18a o f the Finnish Act on Competition Restrictions of 1992 (as 
subsequently amended). Compare also Art. 33(2) of the Italian Legge 10 ottobre 1990, n. 287 (Norme per la 
tutela della coneotrenza e del mercato), where the possibility of damages claims is implicitly accepteded, and, 
in France, Art. L442-6 Code de commerce, which is o f more limited scope and provides for a specific legal basis 
for damages claims in case of harm caused by the commission of certain enumerated acts. It should be noted 
that these national laws are no longer exceptional, in that national competition laws adopted or amended in the 
post-modernisation era increasingly contain express provisions on damages actions. Finally, reference should 
also be made to the 2000 UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, which favours under the Title “Possible 
Elements for Article 12: Actions for Damages” legal actions for the recovery of the amount of a loss or damage 
that a person or enterprise suffers by an act or omission in violation of competition law.
of the then Six in order to identify the relevant issues for further action.775 Indeed, in 1966 the 
Commission published a specific study examining the remedies in national laws for damage 
caused by the infringement of the Treaty competition rules,776 7
Thereafter, there was a long period, in which the Commission was rather silent on that 
matter. This may be explained by the Commission’s desire to retain as much control as 
possible over antitrust enforcement at these early stages.778 After the very important rulings in 
Delimitis and Automec II the Commission adopted in 1993 its Notice on co-operation with 
national courts, which, admittedly, aimed at the more procedural aspects of the enforcement 
of the competition rules by national courts and its co-operation with them, but nevertheless 
also touched on the issue of substantive remedies in national courts. The Notice, being the 
product of a soft law approach, was certainly not the ideal instrument to deal with this 
sensitive matter, since it did not bind national courts.779
With reference to the specific issue o f national remedies, the Notice was criticised as timid 
and conservative.780 On the one hand, emphasis was placed on the importance of damages 
awards, since “companies are more likely to avoid infringements of the Community 
competition rules if  they risk having to pay damages or interest in such an event”,781 but on
775 See Assemblée parlementaire européenne, Documents de Séance 1961-1962, Rapport Deringer, 7 
septembre 1961, Document 57, para. 123. See also Deringer and Tessin, “Das erste Kartellgesetz des 
Gemeinsames Marktes”, 15 AWD (1962) 989, p. 993.
770 See La réparation des conséquences dommageables d ’une violation des articles 85 et 86 du Traité 
instituant la CEE, Série Concurrence No. 1 (Bruxelles, 1966). The conclusions of that study were that in 
principle existing national laws of the then Member States were in a position to provide for remedies in antitrust 
violations. See further, Jacobs, supra (1987), p. 227.
777 See also European Commission, Xlllth Report on Competition Policy - 1983 (Brussels, 1984), pp. 135- 
136, where the Commission cautioned against the erroneous but widespread notion that the then Articles 85 and 
86 EEC could only be enforced by it, stressing the practical advantages o f private antitrust enforcement in 
national courts and the desirability “that the judicial enforcement of Articles 85 and 86 should also include the 
award o f damages to injured parties, because this would render Community law more effective”. On these early 
attempts o f the Commission to sensitivise private litigants as to private antitrust enforcement and damages, see 
Verstrynge, “Current Antitrust Policy Issues in the EEC: Some Reflections on the Second Generation of 
Competition Policy”, in: Hawk (Ed.), Antitrust and Trade Policies in International Trade 1984, Annual 
Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New' York, 1985), pp. 686-687. According to Temple 
Lang, supra (1999), p. 267, the Commission during Commissioner Sutherland’s mandate (1985-1989) had 
considered the possibility of proposing a regulation on the application of EC competition law by national courts, 
but the reactions of national legal experts were discouraging. Indeed, the then Commissioner alluded to such an 
initiative by referring to a study that the Commission had prepared on damages and interim measures available 
under national law for breach of Articles 81 and 82 EC: see Sutherland, “EEC Enforcement Policy: Recent 
Developments and Future Prospects”, in: Hawk (Ed.), United States and Common Market Antitrust Policies 
1986, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 1987), p. 337.
778 This is the view e.g. of Jones and Sufrin, supra (2004), p. 1190.
779 See criticism in this respect by Von Meibom and Zinsmeister, “Verbesserung der europäischen 
Wettbewerbsverfahren”, in: Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1991/92, Verwaltungs- und Rechtsprechungs­
praxis, Referate des 20. FlW-Seminars 1992 und der 11. Brüsseler Informationstagung 1992 
(Köln/Berlin/Bonn/Milnchen, 1993), p. 62.
780 See e.g. Wesseling, supra (2000), pp. 198-200.
781 1993 co-operation Notice, para. 16.
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the other hand, all references to remedies were seen in the light o f national rather than of 
Community law.782 Surprisingly enough, there was an unfortunate reference to one of the 
Rewe cases which states that the Treaty did not intend to create new remedies at the national 
level to ensure the observance o f Community law other than those already laid down by 
national law.783 This specific case has widely been considered superseded by subsequent case 
law of the Court o f Justice.784 Even more surprisingly, the Notice seemed to content itself 
with the principle of equality' of treatment or non-discrimination, thus ignoring the second 
and most important Community law limit to national remedial/procedural autonomy, which is 
the requirement that the national rules in question must not make it impossible in practice to 
exercise effectively the relevant Community right (principle of adequacy/effectiveness).785 
The 1999 White Paper on modernisation placed the whole issue o f the application of the 
Treaty- competition rules by national courts on an entirely different basis. In particular, the 
question of damages awards by national courts seemed to be quite central to the mind of the 
Commission. The Commission recognised that national courts, whose task is to protect the 
rights of individuals, “can grant damages and order the performance or non-performance of 
contracts [and] are the necessary complement to action by public authorities”.786 However, all 
relevant references did not expound on the damages’ possible Community or national legal 
basis. It is noteworthy that this rather reserved approach was also followed post -Courage in 
Regulation 1/2003, which states in Recital 7 that national courts “have an essential part to 
play in applying the Community competition rules” and that ‘When deciding disputes 
between private individuals, they protect the subjective rights under Community law, for 
example by awarding damages to the victims o f  infringements”. Be it as it is, both the White 
Paper and Regulation 1/2003 do not miss the effectiveness point.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, modernisation and decentralisation did not result in 
harmonisation of national sanctions or remedies. At that stage, it was thought that the general 
principles o f Community law under the supervision of the Court of Justice w-ere sufficient
783 See also European Commission, Dealing with the Commission, Notifications, Complaints, Inspections 
ami Fact-finding Powers under Articles 85 and 86 o f  the EEC Treaty (Brussels/Luxembourg, 1997), p. 11, 
where the same rather timid approach is followed.
783 1993 co-operation Notice, para. 10. The reference is to case 158/80, Rewe-IIandelsgesellschaft Nord 
mbH and Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Ilauptzollamt Kiel (Butter-buying Cruises), [1981] ECR 1805. At the time of 
the co-operation Notice it would have been much more preferable to cite the Rewe/Comet formula (see above), 
as further expounded by subsequent case law.
84 See Shaw, supra (1995), p. 132. See also below.
'85 See supra.
786 See p. 5 of the Explanatory- Memorandum preceding the text of the regulation proposal (emphasis 
added). For other references to the national courts’ power to grant damages see paras. 46 and 100 of the White 
Paper, and the article-by-article Explanatory Memorandum preceding the regulation proposal, under Ait. 6.
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safeguards. This minimalist approach was up to a certain degree justified, although the 
discussions that followed made clear that, at least as far as private antitrust enforcement is 
concerned, no boom in Europe was to be expected, without a  minimum of harmonisation of 
some national substantive and procedural rules.787
cc. The Luxembourg W ay to Courage
Going now to the context of the Court o f Justice, we have to note that during all that period 
until 2001 the Court never had the opportunity to rule on the issue of civil liabilities arising 
from the violation of EC competition rules, although in some instances it has referred to 
possible damages and other civil claims that private parties can pursue before national 
courts,788 without however touching upon the question o f the Community or national legal 
basis.789
Outside the area o f competition lawF, how ever, the Court incrementally imposed severe limits 
on national institutional and remedial/procedural autonomy, firstly stressing the Community 
law requirements o f non-discrimination/equality and adequacy/effectiveness and ultimately 
recognising the existence, as a matter o f Community law, o f Community remedies available 
to individuals.790 Thus, there was an impressive development from the early case law, where 
it was stated that Community law imposed no duties on national laws and courts to introduce 
newr remedies,791 to a  more pro-active approach notably w ith rulings dealing with remedies in
787 This was the general conclusion of the majority of the participants in the Florence Sixth EU Competition 
Law and Policy Workshop of 1-2 June 2001 (see C.D. Ehlermann & I. Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition 
Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003). See also Basedow, 
“Who Will Protect Competition in Europe?: From Central Enforcement to Authority Networks and Private 
Litigation'", in: Einhom (Ed.), Liber Amicorum E.J. Kiestmacker, 2 EBOR (2001) 443 etseq. Compare in this 
regard the initial cautious position of Ehlermann as to the need of further harmonization (Ehlermann, supra 
(2000a), pp. 582-583 and 586) and his subsequent opinions advocating the need of additional initiatives in the 
area of national substantive and procedural law (Ehlermann and Komninos, supra (2001), p. 782 etseq.).
788 This was already implicit in BRT  v. S.4BA\f 1, op.cit., paras, 16 and 22. Reference should also be made 
to case C-242/95, GT-Link ,4 S v. De Dattske Statsbaner, [1997] ECR 1-4349, para. 57; case C-282/95, Guerin 
Automobiles v. Commission, [1996] ECR 1-1503, para. 39.
789 It is noteworthy that the CFI in Automec II, op.cit., para. 50, had expressed itself in favour of the national 
law basis of such claims: “The other consequences attaching to an infringement of Article [81] of the Treaty 
[apart from the nullity of Article 81(2)], such as the obligation to make good the damage caused to a third party 
or a possible obligation to enter into a contract ... are to be determined under national law.” It is beyond the 
scope of this study to explain the occasional failures of the CFI to grasp the more general picture of Community 
law in some of its rulings on competition law. See also below on the CFI’s ruling in Atlantic Container, which, 
in our view, misread Courage.
790 See above.
791 Butter-buying Cruises, op.cit.
188
the fields of social policy and sex discrimination,792 interim protection,793 and ultimately state 
liability for breaches o f  EC law.794 In particular, the Community principle of state liability for 
breaches of EC law by Member States, established in Francovich, increasingly led 
commentators to argue that a right in damages in cases of EC competition law infringements 
was a matter of EC and not of national law. It was thought that there was no compelling 
reason to differentiate between state and individual liability for damage caused by 
infringements of Community law, since the basis for such liability, which is the principle of 
effet utile or effectiveness of Community law, is not affected by the identity of the 
perpetrator, i.e. whether it is the state or individuals.795
Meanwhile, a powerful boost to that line of argument was given in 1993 by Advocate 
General Van Gerven in his Opinion in Banks,796 in which he aigued extensively in favour of 
recognising a Community right to obtain reparation in respect of loss and damage sustained 
as a result o f an undertaking’s infringement o f the directly effective Community competition 
rules.797 The Advocate General in his carefully structured Opinion considered that the general 
basis established by the Court in Francovich also applied to the case o f “breach o f a right 
which an individual derives from an obligation imposed by Community law on another 
individual”.
“The full effect of Community law would be impaired if the former individual or 
undertaking did not have the possibility' of obtaining reparation from the party' w ho 
can be held responsible for the breach of Community law - all the more so, evidently, 
if  a directly effective provision of Community law is infringed.”798
792 See e.g. case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordhein-Wes falen, [1984] ECR 
1891; case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen 
(i'JV-Centrum) Plus, [1990] ECR 1-3941; case C-271/91, M.H. Marshall v. Southampton and South West 
Hampshire Area Health Authority (11), [1993] ECR 1-4367 (the latter decided after the publication of the 1993 
co-operation Notice). All these cases stressed the principle according to which sanctions for enforcement of 
Community law must be able to guarantee real and effective judicial protection to the discrimination victim and 
must have a real deterrent effect on the employer that has breached the pertinent rules.
793 See in particular Factortame I, op.cit. See, with regard to this case, V.A. Christianos, Overruling o f  
Prior Judgments in the Case Law of the Court o f  Justice o f  the European Communities (Athens/Komotini, 
1998) [in Greek], p. 69, speaking in this context of a clear case of departure from the Butter-buying Cruises 
case.
794 Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich et al. v. Italy, [1991] ECR 1-5357; Brasserie du 
Pècheur/Factortame III, op.cit.
795 For the first attempts to deduce a Community principle of individual civil liability in EC competition law- 
cases from Francovich, see Smith, “The Francovich Case: State Liability and the Individual's Right in 
damages”, 13 ECLR (1992) 129, p. 132; Hoskins, “Garden Cottage Revisited: The Availability of Damages in 
the National Courts for Breaches of the EEC Competition Rules”, 13 ECLR (1992) 257, p. 259,
796 Case C-128/92, op.cit.
797 Banks, op.cit, AG’s Opinion, paras. 37 et seq.
798 Op.cit., para. 43.
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In competition law, in particular, the Advocate General observed that such a Community 
right in damages would make the Treaty antitrust rules “more operational”, adducing an 
argument from the US system o f antitrust enforcement, where civil suits for damages have 
played a dominant role.799 Interestingly enough, he then went on to draw “detailed rules 
governing an action for damages in respect of breach o f the rules of Community law” and, 
more specifically, ‘̂ uniform conditions o f liability”, relying on the Court’s case law on the 
non-contractual liability of the Community (Article 288(2) EC).800
In Banks, however, the Court declined to address all these fundamental issues, because it 
reached the conclusion that the only applicable set of rules to the facts, Articles 65 and 66 
ECSC, did not have direct effect.
Notwithstanding this missed opportunity, the advocates of a Community remedy of damages 
for antitrust violations drew further support from the progressively more elaborate 
jurisprudence o f  the Court o f Justice on state liability, notably in Brasserie du 
Pêcheur/Factortame III, but also from the Court’s shift towards a more remedies-oriented 
case law, where effective judicial protection acquired a  central role, as a complement of or 
corollary' to the fundamental principle o f  direct effect. In 1999, a groundbreaking monograph 
written by Clifford Jones persuasively argued in favour of a private enforcement system in 
Europe, after demolishing many of the misconceptions o f European scholars as to the 
exceptionality' and non-transposability of the mature US system of private antitrust 
enforcement.801 A point central to that study was the view that there was a right under EC law 
allowing to claim damages from undertakings which have violated Articles 81 and 82 EC, in 
the line of the Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III judgments. This 
monograph was to be quite influential with the Court o f Justice.
dd. Courage y. Crehan: The Celebration of a Community Right in Damages
The fundamental issue of the Community or national law basis o f the right in damages in EC 
competition law violations was finally addressed by the Court o f  Justice in its Courage ruling
799 Op.cit., para. 44.
800 Op.cit., paras. 46 et seq. According to AG Van Gerven there were three conditions for liability in 
damages to arise: damage, causal connection between breach and ensuing damage, and illegality of the conduct 
alleged. It should be stressed that at that time the Court had not yet accepted the transposability of the then Art. 
215(2) EC case law to the liability o f Member States, as it did later (Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III, 




o f 20 September 2001.802 The issues involved were o f such importance that competition and 
general Community law specialists in Europe were eagerly awaiting the Court’s judgment.803 
In Courage the Court recognised a right in damages as a matter of Community rather than of 
national law and stressed the fundamental character of the EC competition rules in the overall 
system o f the Treaty.
The dilemma for the Court was to choose between the “traditionalist” and the more 
“integrationist” approach. It could either consider the whole question of damages in the 
context of national remedial and procedural autonomy, i.e. as a question of national law, 
subject to the Community law minimum requirements of equivalence and effectiveness, or 
proceed to the recognition o f a Community right in damages, as AG Van Gerven had 
previously proposed in Banks.
It is noteworthy that the ‘traditionalist” approach had basically been represented by 
continental textbooks and articles, notably by German and French (competition law-specific) 
literature. It is not an exaggeration to say that the w hole issue o f the Community or national 
legal basis for a right in damages had been ignored by the majority of this part o f the 
literature, or, at best, had been considered in the context of the national remedial-procedural 
autonomy and its Community law limits,804 On the other hand, English and Irish sources had
802 We prefer to refer to this case by the name of the original plaintiff, thus following the established 
tradition in Community law literature. We use, however, the defendant’s name, Crehan, to refer to the UK cases 
in that litigation.
803 See Roth, “The New UK Competition Act - The Private Perspective”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International 
Antitrust Law and Policy 2000, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 
2001 ), pp. 85-86; Gy seien, “Comment from the Point of View of EU Competition Law”, in: Wouters & Stuyck 
(Eds.), Principles o f Proper Conduct fo r Supranational. State and Private Actors in the European Union: 
Towards a lus Commune, Essays in Honour o f Walter van Gerven (Antwerpen/Groningen/Oxfoid, 2001), p. 
135 et seq.\ Van Gerven, supra (2003a), p. 58 etseq.
804 See e.g. Koutsoukis, supra (1993), p. 335 et seq:, A. Toffoletto, II risarcimento del danno nel sistema 
delle sanzioni per la violazione della normativa antitrust (Milano, 1996), pp. 114-115 (speaking of the 
Commission's and of other Community institutions’ reference to the necessity of an effective remedy of 
damages as a mere “wish”); Schmidt, in: Immenga & Mestmäcker (Eds.), EG-Wettbewerbsrecht, Kommentar, 
Vol. 1 (München, 1997), p. 58 et seq:, Poillot-Peruzzetto and Luby, Le droit communautaire appliqué à 
l'entreprise (Paris, 1998), p. 270; Tavassi and Scuffi, supra (1998), p. 301; Maitz-Strassnig, “Rapport 
autrichien”, in: XVIII congrès FIDE (Stockholm. 3-6 juin 1998), Vol. Il, Application natiomle du droit 
européen de h  concurrence (Stockholm, 1999), pp. 31-32; Schapira, Le Tallec, Biaise and Idot, supra (1999), p. 
299; M. Waelbroeck and A. Frignani, European Competition Law (Vol. /T  o f  the J. Mégret Commentary) 
(Arsdley, 1999), p. 527 et seq:, Schröter, in: Von der Groeben, Thiesing & Ehlermann (Eds.), Kommentar zum 
E U-/EG-1 "ertrag, Vol. 2/1, Artikel 85-87EG V (Baden-Baden, 1999), p. 2/268 etseq. and p. 2/767; Ritter, Braun 
and Raw linson, supra (2000), p. 926; Mestmäcker, supra (2000b), p. 421 et seq.; Mestmäcker, supra (2001), pp. 
233, 236; Schröter, supra (2003), pp. 309, 327; Tavassi, supra (2004), p. 332. See, how-ever, Mail-Fouilleul, 
supra (2002), pp. 580-582, who seems to accept the Community lawr basis; C. Nowak, Konkurrentenschutz in 
der EG, Interdependenz des gemeinschaftsrechtlichen und mitgliedstaalichen Rechtsschutzes von Konkurrenten 
(Baden-Baden, 1997), p. 230 et seq., referring to Banks and to the state liability case law of the ECJ and 
supporting the Community law basis of the right in damages; Weyer, “Gemeinschaflsrechtliches Verbot und 
nationale Zivilrechtsfolgen - Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der Artikel 81, 82 EG-Vertrag”, 7 ZEuP (1999) 
424, pp. 437-439, addressing this issue but rejecting the Community basis. More perceptive to the Community
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shown an extreme awareness and conviction as to the existence of a Community remedy o f 
damages not only de lege ferertda, but also de lege lata.m  This difference of philosophy is 
not due to the continentals’ lack o f judgment but rather to more systemic differences between 
the common and the civil law worlds.
The facts o f Courage were rather undistinguished. Breweries in Britain usually own pubs, 
which they lease to tenants, while the latter are under contractual obligations to buy almost all 
the beer they serve from their landlords. In 1991 Mr. Bernard Crehan signed a 20-year lease 
with Courage Ltd. whereby he had to buy exclusively from Courage a fixed minimum 
quantity of beer while the brewery undertook to supply the specified quantities at prices 
shown in the tenant’s price list. The rent was initially lower than the market rate and it was 
subject to a regular upward review', but it never rose above the best open market rate. In 1993 
Mr. Crehan and other tenants fell into financial arrears, basically blaming for this Courage’s 
supply of beer in lower prices to other non-tied pubs, “free houses”. In the same year Courage 
brought an action for the recovery from Mr. Crehan of sums for unpaid deliveries o f beer. 
Mr. Crehan alleging the incompatibility with Article 81(1) EC of the clause requiring him to 
purchase a fixed minimum quantity o f  beer from Courage, counter-claimed for damages.805 06
basis of the light in damages appear to be some Austrian commentators (see Stillfricd and Stockenhuber, 
“Schadenersatz bei Verstoß gegen das Kartellverbot des Art 85 EG-V”, 9 WB1301 + 345 (1995), p. 345 etseq.). 
See also Bastianon, “Il risarcimento del danno per violazione del diritto antitrust in Inghilterra e in Italia”, 3 
Danno e Responsabilità (1998) 1066, p. 1067, who, referring to the recent Community case law' (though not to 
AG Van Gerven’s Opinion in Banks), makes an interesting distinction between recovery of damages 
(risarcimento) and recoverability of damages (risarcibilità). According to this author the latter should rather be 
a principle of Community law, since its basis lies directly in the rights that EC law confers on individuals.
805 See e.g. Maitland-Walker, “Editorial: A Step Closer to a Definitive Ruling on a Right in Damages for 
Breach of the EC Competition Rules”, 13 ECLR 3 (1992); Shaw, supra (1995), p. 138 et seq.; Winterstein, “A 
Community Right in Damages for Breach of EC Competition Rules?”, 16 ECLR (1995) 49; Francis, 
“Subsidiarity and Antitrust: The Enforcement o f European Competition Law in the National Courts of Member 
States”, 27 Law & Pol’y IntTBus. 247 (1995), pp. 254,273; Vaughan, supra (1995), p. 27; Weatherill, “Public 
Interest Litigation in EC Competition Law”, in: Micklitz & Reich (Eds.), Public Interest Litigation Before 
European Courts (Baden-Baden, 1996), p. 185; Tickle and Tyler, “Community Competition Law, Recovering 
Damages in the English Courts: New' Era? False Dawn”, in: Lonbay & Biondi (Eds.), Remedies fo r  Breach o f  
EC Law (Chichester, 1997), p. 137 et seq:, Whish, “The Enforcement of EC Competition Law in the Domestic 
Courts o f Member States”, in: Gormley (Ed.), Current and Future Perspectives on EC Competition Law, A 
Tribute to Professor M.R. A fok (London/The Hague/Boston, 1997), pp. 81-82; Anderson, “Damages for Breach 
of Competition Rules”, in: Andenas & Jacobs (Eds.), European Community Law in the English Courts (Oxford, 
1998), p. 185 et seq:, Rodger and MacCulloch, “Community Competition Law' Enforcement, Deregulation and 
Re-regulation: The Commission, National Authorities and Private Enforcement”, 4 Columbia JEL 579 (1998), 
pp. 599-600; Kerse, supra (1998), pp. 439-441; Taylor, supra (1999), p. 267; Lane, supra (2000), pp. 203-204; 
P.M. Roth (Ed.), Bellamy & Child European Community Law o f  Competition (London, 2001 ), pp. 801-809. See 
also Green, “The Treaty of Rome, National Courts, and English Common Lawr: The Enforcement of European 
Competition Law after Milk Marketing Board", 48 RabelsZ (1989) 509, W'hose views at that distant time, before 
Francovich and other cases on remedies had been decided by the ECJ, are very “modem” indeed.
806 There is some uncertainty as to the exact nature of Mr. Crehan’s claim of damages. The question is 
whether this was a claim in tort (breach of statutory duty) or in restitution. This uncertainty might be 
accentuated by the fact that the recovery that Mr. Crehan sought is of limited extent. He basically asked the 
national court to put him in the condition he would have been, had he not entered into the agreement. He did
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There were two specific obstacles to Mr. Crehan’s success. The first one was that according 
to earlier case law, Article 81 EC had been interpreted as protecting only third parties, i.e. 
competitors or consumers, but not co-contractors, i.e. parties to the illegal and void 
agreement.807 Then, the second issue was that under English law a party to an illegal 
agreement, as this was considered to be so by the Court of Appeal, could not claim damages 
from the other party. This was as a result of the strict construction English courts were giving 
to  the nemo auditur turpitudinem propriam (suam) allegans or in pari delicto potior est 
conditio defendentis or ex dolo malo non oritur causa rule,808 which in essence meant that 
Mr. Crehan’s claim in damages would fail, because he was co-contractor in an illegal 
agreement. That seems to explain the link between these two central issues.809 
The Court of Justice, following word-by-word in some instances the ruling in Francovich, 
that had recognised the principle of state liability as a principle of Community law, stressed 
the primacy o f Article 81 EC in the system of the Treaty, since it “constitutes a fundamental 
provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community 
and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market”.810 81It also stressed, with 
particular reference to ‘the possibility o f seeking compensation for loss caused by a contract 
o r by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition”, the task of national courts to ensure the 
full effect (plein effet) of Community rules and the protection of individuals’ rights conferred 
by those rules. The full effectiveness (pleine efficacité) of the Treaty competition rules and, in 
particular ‘the practical effect [effet utilej of the prohibition laid down in Article [81(1)]” 
would be put at risk, if  individuals could not claim damages for losses caused by the 
infringement of those rules. The instrumental character of such liability for the effectiveness 
o f  the law as such is more than evident in this passage, exactly as it was the case with state 
liability in Francovich.m  And finally the Court dispelled any doubt as to its pronouncement:
not, therefore, claim damages for consequential losses or lost profits. In this respect, his claim, albeit in tort, was 
of a merely restitutionary nature. See on the issue Gyselen, supra (2001), p. 139. Van Gerven speaks of 
“restitutionary damages”, which are in the borderland between damages (in tort) and unjustified enrichment 
(Van Gerven, supra (2003a), p. 60. It seems, however, that the action in this case was, or in any case wras stated 
by the referring national court to be, one in tort (breach for statutory duty).
807 Gibbs Mew pic v. Gemmell (CA), [1998] EuLR 588. The Court o f Appeal in this case had proceeded in 
the interpretation of Article 81 EC “without considering it necessary to seek a ruling from the Court of Justice 
on the point”, as the ECJ explains in para. 12 of its Courage ruling, thus implying a certain criticism of this 
unilateralist approach.
808 See on all these rules with subtle distinctions, Virgo, “The Effect of Illegality on Claims for Restitution 
in English Law”, in: Sw'adling (Ed.), The Limits o f  Restitutionary Claims: A Comparative Analysis (London, 
1997J, p. 150 et seq.
809 See further Komninos, supra (2002), pp. 462-463. The in pari delicto defence applies to restitutionary, 
as well as to tortious claims and has invariably drawn staunch criticism.
810 Courage, op.cit, para. 20.
811 Courage, op.cit., para. 26, very close to the text of para. 33 of Francovich.
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“Indeed, the existence o f  such a right strengthens the working of the Community 
competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, which are frequently 
covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. From that point o f view, 
actions for damages before the national courts can make a significant contribution to 
the maintenance o f effective competition in the Com m unity'*12 
This last quote makes clear that the meaning of effectiveness in Courage has a  double 
facet.* 813 It refers not only to Community law in general, but also to the specific field of 
antitrust. This is clear by the term “significant contribution” used by the Court to refer to the 
role of damages claims for the efficiency o f  antitrust enforcement in Europe, with a view to 
maintaining effective competition. More authoritative words in favour of private enforcement 
and o f the “private attorney-general” role o f the civil litigant could hardly be pronounced.
ee. Courage Seen between Community and National Law
The importance of Courage is that it sets the principle.814 815This has symbolic, but also 
practical consequences. The recognition o f a right in damages by the Community judge 
eliminates a state of uncertainty and gives national courts an important signal. The saga on 
whether damages can be awarded for violation o f the Treaty competition rules has now ended 
once and for all. Indeed, to use the example o f English law, it was a very unfortunate 
situation to wonder at the end o f the 1990s on the existence o f a right in damages as such,816 817
and always to revisit die Garden Cottage*17 dicta*1* Although it is true that certain European 
legal systems have availed themselves of clear legal bases for damages claims in case of 
antitrust-related harm,819 we fail to see how this reality could be an obstacle to the
8,2 Courage, op.cit., para. 27 (emphasis added), another text that can be read in parallel to para. 34 of 
Francovich.
813 See above on these two facets.
814 See e.g. S. Weatherill, Cases and Kfeterials on EU Law (Oxford, 2003), p. 606, speaking of the Court's 
“anxiety to promote the effectiveness of private enforcement”.
815 See Goyder, supra (2003), p. 560.
810 See e.g. M. Coleman and M. Grenfell, The Competition Act 1998, Law and Practice (Oxford, 1999), p. 
288, who were still writing that “it is not absolutely certain that third parties do in fact have a right in damages 
in the English courts under Articles 81 and 82”. See also Beard, “Damages in Competition Law Litigation”, in: 
Ward & Smith (Eds.), Competition Litigation in the UK (London, 2005), pp. 257-258.
817 Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board (HL), [1983] 2 AU.ER 770.
818 This state o f uncertainty has been described and castigated by Jones, supra (1999), p. 97.
8,9 A German commentator, while the Court's judgment was expected, had emphasised that the “invention” 
of a Community right in damages would offer nothing at all in the German context, since German law already 
provided for appropriate remedies (see Basedow, supra (2001), pp. 46M 62). See also Mestmacker, supra 
(2000b), p. 426, who, arguing against the thesis of Clifford Jones on the Community nature of the right in 
damages, considers that “new Community law remedies for a breach of competition rules are not self- 
explanatory nor self-executing and do not define themselves”. It is unclear, however, what this highly respected
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development o f Comm unit}' law, which has its own exigencies and aspirations. It has been 
rightly pointed out that even if there is no clear gap in the effective judicial protection o f 
Community competition law-based rights in those legal systems, still the recognition of a 
Community remedy in damages makes a valuable contribution towards the uniformity, 
consistency and maximum effectiveness-efficiency of the application of EC (competition) 
law at the national level.820
The enunciation of a Community right in damages and, by implication, of a principle of civil 
liability of individuals for breach o f Community law, is a logical consequence of the Court’s 
abundant case law on state liability, and reflects a more general principle of Community law 
that “everyone is bound to make good loss or damage arising as a result of his conduct in 
breach of a legal duty“ (neminem la e de re)*21 That principle is utterly connected with the 
very nature o f the Community and actually reflects the “dogmatic-developmental history' o f 
the Community legal order” {dogmatische Entwicklungsgeschichte der 
Gemeinschaftsrechtsordnung).822 The extension of this principle to liability of individuals 
makes it possible to speak o f a system of civil liability' for Community law infringements,823 
irrespective o f the perpetrator of the latter.824 This is exactly what Advocate General Van 
Gerven had argued for in Banks and what has also been proposed by other authors in the
^  . 825past.
commentator means by this aphorism. He goes on to stress that the only way to provide for such remedies would 
be through approximation, in other words through a directive.
820 See Stillfried and Stockenhuber, supra (1995), p. 350. See also in this sense, Kerse, supra (1998), pp. 
440-441.
821 See Edward and Robinson, “Is there a Place for Private Law Principles in Community Law?”, in: 
Heukels & McDonnell (Eds.), The Action fo r  Damages in Community Law (The Hague/London/Boston, 1997), 
p. 341, referring to para. 12 of AG Tesauro’s Opinion in Brasserie áu Pêcheur/Factortame III, op.cit. In that 
passage the AG had reached the conclusion that “in so far as at least the principle of state liability is part of the 
tradition of all the legal systems, it must be able to be applied also where the unlawful conduct consists of an 
infringement of a Community provision” (ibid, para. 13 of AG’s Opinion). The AG had started from the premise 
that the idea of state liability formed part of a more general principle of non-contractual liability (neminem 
laedere). See also Stathopoulos, “The Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Unification of 
Civil Law” 23 RHDE 511 (2003) [in Greek], p. 528.
822 See Metaxas, supra (2005), pp. 23-24, with further references to German literature.
823 See also Drexl, “Do We Need ‘Courage’ for International Antitrust Law? Choosing between 
Supranational and International Law Principles of Enforcement”, in: Drexl (Ed.), The Futttre o f Transnational 
Antitrust - From Comparative to Common Competition Law (Beme/The Hague/London/New York, 2003), p. 
339.
924 This has not been missed by the Commission, w hich in para. 10, fn. 26, o f its new co-operation Notice, 
lists together the remedy of damages in case of an infringement by an undertaking, referring to Courage, and the 
remedy of damages in case of an infringement by a Member State or by an authority which is an emanation of 
the State, referring to Francovich.
823 See in this sense Edward and Robinson, supra (1997), p. 340 et seq:, W. Van Gerven, J. Lever and P. 
Larouche, Common Law o f  Europe Casebooks: Tort Law (Oxford/Portland, 2000), p. 895. See also Saggio, “La 
responsabilità dello stato per violazione del diritto comunitario”, 6 Danno e Responsabilità 223 (2001), p. 242, 
according to whom, the exigency of effective judicial protection which forms to an extent the basis of the 
Community nature of the principle of state liability for violation of EC law must also apply to civil liability of
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Meanwhile, the Court’s approach in Courage to recognise this Community law principle in a 
non-celebrative way and without defining, at least at that time, specific uniform conditions, 
created some confusion. While the majority of commentators grasped the fundamental 
importance o f  this ruling,* 82026 others failed to see the basic principle and merely speak of 
national remedies, which are adapted by having recourse to the classical minimum 
effectiveness proviso 827 Such resistance to accept the Community law-basis of the civil 
liability principle should not, however, come as a surprise, since, in the past, there have even
individuals for Community law violations. See further Stathopoulos, supra (2003), p. 526, who stresses that 
there is nothing “exceptional” with state liability. Indeed, the principle that lies behind state liability is the same 
as the one lying behind individual liability. The author rejects the argument that state liability, contrary to 
individual liability, pertains to the public interest, since the public interest is also taken into account in the 
resolution of private disputes.
820 On the French side see, among the commentaries, Poillot-Peruzzetto, 12(1) Contr.Conc.Consomm. 
(2002) 28, p. 29, who senses the foundations o f a Community law principle, which, however, is not yet 
constructed; Klages, 2 RDUE (2001) 1003, p. 1005, according to whom “if Member States are charged to
regulate the procedural modalities, the right itself to claim damages exists already at the Community leveF
(emphasis added); Blaise and Idot, supra (2002), p. 144, speaking of a judgment of principle. On the Italian side
see Bastianon, 7 Danno e Responsabilità (2001 ) 1153, p. 1155, speaking o f  a “leading case” that pushes aside in 
a summary way any doubt as to the Community law basis and conditions of the damages remedy in competition
cases; Rossi, 125 II Foro Italiano (2002), IV, 90, p. 91, who stresses the Court’s tacit depart from earlier case
law towards a communitarisation of the liability rules in EC competition cases; Palmieri and Pardolesi, 125 II 
Foro Italiano (2002), IV, 76, p. 77, who see the case in the light of general judicial haimonization of European 
contract law. On the German side see Nowak, 12 EuZW (2001) 717, who, after stressing the judgment’s
similarities with Francovich, stresses the primary Community law basis of the right in damages, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Court did not explicitly speak of a Community principle (as in Francovichy, C. 
Joerges, Sur la légitimité d'européaniser le droit privé, Plaidoyer pour une approche procédurale, EUI 
Working Paper, Law No. 2004/4, pp. 21-22, 36, speaking of the creation of a “new private law that the Member 
States must incorporate as their ‘national law”’. For an Austrian comment see Hintersteininger, 
“Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Schadenersatzpflicht bei Verstoß gegen Art. 81 EG”, 16 WB1 (2002) 554, p. 556, 
according to whom the result of Courage is that it is no longer in the discretion of national legal systems to 
provide or not a remedy in damages and that national courts are now bound under Community law to grant such 
damages.
827 See Weyer, 51 GRUR Int. (2002) 57, p. 58; Rodger, supra (2002), p. 234 et seq. and p. 242 in particular, 
Schröter, supra (2003), p. 327, who see the whole case from a procedural autonomy-Community limits angle. 
See also in this sense Albors-Llorens, supra (2002), p. 149, idem, “Courage v. C relut»: Judicial Activism or 
Consistent Approach?”, 61 CLJ 38 (2002), p. 40; Tesatilo, supra note (2004), p. 185, fin. 3; who consider that 
the Court did not follow AG Van Gerven’s Banks Opinion and that it confirmed that the right to compensation 
in EC competition law cases remains a matter of national law. Suiprisingly enough, the same approach is 
followed by the CFI in case T-395/94, Atlantic Container Line AB et al. v. Commission, [2002] ECR 11-875, 
para. 414, where reference is made to para. 29 of Courage, i.e. to the Rewe/Comet formula on national 
procedural autonomy and on its two Community provisos, non-discrimination and effectiveness (see above): "... 
the case-law establishes that the consequences in civil law attaching to an infringement of Article [81] of the 
Treaty, such as the obligation to make good the damage caused to a third party or a possible obligation to enter 
into a contract, are to be determined under national law ... [references to para. 29 of Courage and to para. 50 of 
Automec II\ ... subject, however, to not undermining the effectiveness o f the Treaty”. This reference completely 
ignores the preceding paragraphs o f Courage and constitutes in our view a misreading o f that fundamental 
judgment The language of Courage - we should not forget - should be seen in the Art 234 EC context of 
“dialogue” betw een the Community court and the juges communautaires de droit commun and it, therefore, 
serves the exigencies of its context, which the CFI - a court of a  different context - may have totally missed.
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been voices doubting the Community law-basis of the principle of state liability, 
notwithstanding the Court’s much clearer language in Francovich,828 
Courage in this context is similar to restitution cases, where individuals claim recovery o f 
charges for sums levied in violation of Community law by public authorities.829 Exactly as in 
Courage, in these cases the Court follows a more reserved approach. It has stressed that 
repayment or restitution of unlawfully levied charges is required and that this right has a 
Community law basis.830 But then, it delegates the issue and the conditions of the exercise of 
the right to restitution to national law, while stressing the Community law requirements of 
equivalence and effectiveness. In the last years, in fact, the Court has gradually laid down a 
growing number o f  uniform conditions, albeit in a negative way, i.e. by reading national 
provisions basically through the proviso o f effectiveness o f Community law.831 
Furthermore, both in Francovich and in Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame 111 the Court 
introduced some flexibility by stressing that the conditions under which liability arises 
“depend on the nature o f the breach o f Community law giving rise to the loss and 
damage”.832 In reality, Courage is a Francovich and not a  Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame 
III  type of case. We mean by this that it was only the first case, setting the principle. In other 
words, the Court left it open to proceed in an appropriate way to draw in more detail the
828 See e g. Nettesheim, “Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Vorgaben für das deutsche Staatshaftungsrecht“, 45 
DÖV 999(1992).
829 After the outcome in Courage, it would not be difficult to say that under Community law there is also in 
principle a right of individuals as against other individuals to restitution for sums paid in violation to 
Community law. This is so, because the requirement of effective judicial protection should not have a different 
function in such private disputes. On restitution and Community law, see A. Jones, Restitution and European 
Community Law (London, 2000).
830 Compare e.g. case C-l 47/01, Weber’s Wine World IJandels-GmbH et al. v. 
A bga ben be rufungskomm ission Wien, [2003] ECR 1-11365, para. 93; “Individuals are entitled to obtain 
repayment of charges levied in a Member State in breach of Community provisions. That right is the 
consequence and the complement of the rights conferred on individuals by Community provisions as interpreted 
by the Court. The Member State in question is therefore required, in principle, to repay charges levied in breach 
of Community law5' That the right of restitution is based directly on Community law is made clear by the 
following statement of the Court regarding the passing-on defence and the principle that unjust enrichment 
should be avoided: “As that exception is a restriction on a subjective right derived from the Community legal 
order, it must be interpreted restrictively” (op.cit., para. 95, emphasis added). On the Community principle and 
the national conditions (plus the Community provisos) in such cases see Dougan, “Cutting your Losses in the 
Enforcement Deficit: A Community Right to the Recovery of Unlawfully Levied Charges?”, 1 CYELS (1998) 
233, p. 235 et seq:, J. Beatson and E. Schrage, Casebooks on the Common Law o f Europe, Unjustified 
Enrichment (Oxford/Portland, 2003), pp. 10-11; Bouchayar, “Recovery of Illegaly Levied Indirect Taxes that 
Have Been Passed on the Consumers under the New Case Law of the ECJ”, 10 Dikaio Epicheiriseon kai 
Etairion 519 (2004) [in Greek], p. 521 et seq.
831 According to Van Gerven, supra (2000), p. 517, although the remedy of restitution is in principle a 
matter of Community law, the Court has nevertheless left a lot of space to national law and courts, while 
imposing limits on the latter when Community requirements make it necessary. Interestingly enough, many 
recent judgments of the Court provide for increasingly detailed limitations to national procedural autonomy. See 
eg . case C-62/00, Marks & Spencer pic v. Commissioners o f Customs & Excise, [2002] ECR 1-6325, para. 40 et 
seq.
832 Francovich, op.cit., para. 38; Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame 111, op.cit., para. 38.
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conditions o f the remedy,833 either in a positive way, by defining itself, to use form er 
Advocate General Van Gerven's scheme,834 the pertinent ‘‘constitutive conditions”, or in a  
negative one, by checking whether the “executive conditions” governed by national law are 
offending against the principles o f equivalence and effectiveness-adequacy. This is certainly 
a sign of maturity of the Community-national law interrelationship. It is also a sign o f a m ore 
“deliberative”, rather than a hierarchical mode o f interaction with national courts.835 As one 
author observes, “since the general principles of the law governing remedies have now been 
established, the Court can entrust national courts to apply those principles and be m ore 
selective with regard to the national mles with which it takes issue”.836
ff. Manfredi
Indeed, as predicted by commentators,837 in the recent Manfredi ruling, the Court o f Justice 
proceeded further to deal with the “constitutive” and “executive” conditions o f the 
Community right in damages.838 This was a preliminary reference case from Italy, where 
insurance companies had been sued for damages by Italian consumers for prohibited cartel 
behaviour previously condemned by the Italian competition authority.839 The ECJ w as 
basically called to decide:
(a) whether consumers enjoy a  right to sue cartel members and claim damages for the 
harm suffered, where there is a causal relationship between the agreement o r 
concerted practice and the harm;
853 See Van Gerven, supra (2003b), p. 12; idem, Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other a t the 
European Level (January 2005), in: http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/ccle/pdf/2005-OI-
18_WvG_.Impact_courts_on_private_law.pdf, p. 20.
834 See above.
833 On this point of the relationship between the ECJ and national courts, especially in private law cases, see 
Joerges, “The Bright and the Dark Side of the Consumer’s Access to Justice in the EU”, 1(2) Global Jurist 
Topics, Article 1 (2001), p. 9.
830 See Tridimas, supra (2000), p. 466; idem, “Judicial Review and the Community Judicature: Towrards a 
New European Constitutionalism?”, in: Wouters & Stuyck (Eds.), Principles o f  Proper Conduct fo r  
Supranational, State and Private Actors in the European Union: Towards a I us Commune, Essays in Honour o f  
Walter van Gerven (Antwerpen/Groningen/Oxford, 2001), p. 77, speaking of “selective deference” to national 
remedial and procedural autonomy.
837 Compare Komninos, supra (2002), p. 478.
838 Cited supra.
839 Italian courts had earlier sent similar preliminary references to Luxembourg, but these were held 
inadmissible by the ECJ because the Court thought that the referring courts did not include enough information 
as to the purpose and necessity of the references: case C-425/03, Prowidenza Regio v. AXA Assicurazioni SpA, 
Order of 19 October 2004, unpublished; joined cases C-438/03, C-439/03, C-509/03 and C-2/04, Antonio 
Cannito et al. v. Fondiaria Assicurazioni SpA et al., Order o f 11 February 2004, [2004] ECR1-1605.
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(b) whether the starting time of the limitation period for bringing an action for damages is 
the day on which the agreement or concerted practice was put in effect or the day on 
which the agreement or concerted practice came to an end;
(c) whether a national court should also award of its own motion punitive damages to the 
injured third party in order to make the compensable amount higher than the 
advantage gained by the infringing party and deter the adoption of agreements or 
conceited practices prohibited under Art. 81 EC.840
The Court, building on Courage, and after making clear that the basis for individual civil 
liabilities deriving from a violation of Article 81 EC lies indeed in Community law, seems to 
have followed former Advocate General Van Gerven’s scheme of ‘"constitutive”, “executive” 
and simple “procedural” conditions of the Community right in damages. Thus, the Court 
makes a fundamental distinction between “existence” and “exercise” of the right in damages. 
That the “existence” of the right is a matter of Community law is obvious from the fact that 
the Court reiterated the most important pronouncements o f Courage in a solemn way.841 In 
this context, it is also clear that the Court proceeds to define, as a matter of Community law, 
what former Advocate General Van Gerven calls “consitutive” conditions of the right in 
damages:
“It follows that any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where 
there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice 
prohibited under Article 81 EC.”842
In other words, the right in damages is open (a) to “any individual” as long as there is (b) 
“harm”, and (c) there is a “causal relationship” between that harm and the antitrust violation. 
In thus defining the Community law constitutive conditions o f the right in damages, the Court 
has produced a broad rule of standing and has at the same time omitted the requirement o f 
fault, which means that national rules following more restrictive rules on standing or
840 The Court was also called to decide whether the nullity of agreements contrary to Art. 81 EC can be 
relied upon by third parties (its answer was yes; see above) and whether Community law is contrary to a 
national rule which provides that plaintiffs must bring their actions for damages for infringement of Community 
and national competition rules before a court other than that which usually has jurisdiction in actions for 
damages of similar value, thereby involving a considerable increase in costs and time. Another preliminary 
question sent to Luxembourg in this case related to the applicability of Community law to the anti-competitive 
conduct.
841 Manfredi, op.cit., paras. 60, 61, 63, 89-91, citing paras. 25-27 of Courage. In particular, para. 91 of 
Manfredi, quoting para. 27 of Courage, stresses that “the existence of such a right strengthens the working of the 
Community competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, frequently covert, which are liable to 
restrict or distort competition. From that point of view, actions for damages before the national courts can make 
a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the Community” (emphasis added).
842 Manfredi, op.cit., para. 61.
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requiring intention or negligence for an action for damages to be successful, are contrary to 
the Community law constitutive conditions of the Courage/Mcmfredi right in damages.843 
To mark the distinction between the existence of the right and its constitutive conditions, 
governed by Community law, and its exercise and executive conditions, governed by national 
law, the Court stresses again that “any individual ... can claim compensation for [harm 
causally related with an Article 81 EC violation]” but “in the absence of Community rules 
governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to prescribe 
the detailed rules governing the exercise o f that right, including those on the application of 
the concept o f ‘causal relationship’, provided that the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness are observed”.844 We submit that the Court refers here to the “executive” rules 
o f the Community right in damages. In Van Gerven’s scheme, these are separate from purely 
procedural rules which are again a matter for national law'. They are also subject to a higher 
standard o f control under an “adequacy test”, rather than a mere “minimum effectiveness” or 
“non-impossibility” test, which may continue to apply for simple procedural rules.
Indeed, the Court in Manfredi makes a clear distinction in its analysis between specific 
questions pertaining to the causal relationship between harm and antitrust violation and the 
availability o f punitive damages, both seen as “executive” conditions,845 and questions on 
limitation o f  actions and competent national tribunals, both seen as “detailed procedural 
rules”. In addition, the Court seems to share the former Advocate General’s conviction that 
the former affect the very core o f  the exercise o f  Community-based rights and should 
therefore be subject to a more stringent test concerning the Community principle of 
effectiveness, while the latter can be subject to a more relaxed “non-impossibility” test.846 It 
is thus no surprise that the Court uses in Manfredi the “non-impossibility” language only in 
the context o f the mere procedural rules and not in the context o f the “executive” 
conditions.847 This means questions such as causality, nature of harm and damages, and 
defences, which can be characterised as “executive” conditions, will be subject to a more 
demanding test o f effectiveness/adequacy, while questions such as competence o f courts,
843 On these issues, see below.
844 Manfredi, op.cit., paras. 63-64, emphasis added.
845 Manfredi, op.cit., paras. 64 and 92 et s e q as to causal relationship and punitive damages, respectively.
846 Compare case C-255/04, Commission v. France, Judgment of 15 June 2006, not yet reported, para. 40, 
which makes also a clear distinction between conditions affecting the very exercise of a Community right and 
“detailed procedural rules governing actions at law”.
84' Compare paras. 64 and 92, which refer merely to effectiveness, with paras. 71 and 78, which refer to 
effectiveness, seen through the prism of “rendering practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of 
rights conferred by Community law”.
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limitation periods and rules on proof, which are more “procedural” in nature, will be subject 
to a minimum effectiveness/non practical impossibility test.
gg. Excursus: The Importance of Courage for Community Law in General
The attained result is undoubtedly a contribution towards a more consistent system of 
Community law. While the intermediate solitude of the principle o f state liability might have 
justified in the prc-Courage state o f affairs a  reference to “bits and pieces”,848 its extension by 
the Courage/Manjredi rulings to individual civil liability presents a more homogeneous 
picture of the Community law o f remedies. In addition, the final solution assures a certain 
degree of homogeneity and consistency in other areas o f EC law, apart from competition 
law,849 while ensuring individuals’ full access to court.850 The role o f the Court o f Justice in 
the formation through its case law o f a “European private law” is, o f course, outside the scope 
o f the current study,851 but is suffices to stress here that by no means does competition law 
claim exclusivity in a  Community law remedy in damages.
Instead, the latter will also be a suitable remedy for all cases of harm caused by the violation 
o f  other horizontally directly effective EC provisions to persons deriving rights from those 
provisions. Provisions o f horizontal direct effect are not numerous.852 One could conceivably 
speak of a Community right in damages in cases of harm caused as a result of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality (Article 12 EC), or sex discrimination by employers (Article 141 
EC),853
848 Such a situation of “bits and pieces” in the area of liability for violation of EC competition law had 
already existed before Courage. In GT-Link (op.cit.), the ECJ had held that in case of violation of Arts. 86 and 
82 EC by a public undertaking, the Member State concerned must make reparation to individuals according to 
the Brasserie du PecheurFactortame III conditions for any losses incurred as a result of the breach of the 
competition rules. A basic argument in favour of the recognition of Community individual liability has been that 
civil liability under Art. 82 EC must be the same irrespective of whether the perpetrator of the anti-competitive 
act is a state or non-state entity. See e.g. Jones and Sufrin, supra note, p. 1211.
m  On the exigencies of consistency, harmonisation and homogeneity in the area of remedies for the 
protection of Community rights, see Van Gerven, “Toward a Coherent Constitutional System within the 
European Union”, 2 EPL (19%) 81, pp. 96-98.
850 See also Arts. 6 and 13 ECHR; Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Freedoms; Art. 11-107 of the 
European Constitution Treaty. See further Van Gerven, supra (2003b), p. 3.
851 See e.g. Basedow', “Grundlagen des europäischen Privatrechts”, 44 JuS 89 (2004), pp. 93-95.
852 See Steindorff, supra (1996), p. 277 et seq.
853 See Lever, “Mutual Permeation of Community and National Tort Rules”, in: Wouters & Stuyck (Eds.), 
Principles o f Proper Conduct for Supranational, State and Private Actors in the European Union: Towards a 
lus Commune, Essays in Honour o f Walter van Gerven (Antwerpen/Groningen/Oxford, 2001), p. 107. See also 
in this direction Ryan, supra (2000), p. 154, according to whom “if an individual is protected against 
discrimination, then it might be thought that liability for an act of discrimination ought to lie with the 
discriminating employer”. Whether Art 12 EC can impose duties on individuals is still debated. See the 
balanced approach followed by W. Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Vol. I, Europäische Grundfreiheiten
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It remains unclear, however, whether the four freedoms can also bind, apart from the state, 
private individuals.854 According to the dominant view, these provisions, especially Articles 
28 to 30 EC on the free movement o f goods, cannot apply as such to outright private 
contractual relationships, unless one party' is a private regulatory body.855 Nevertheless, the 
case law in this area is in a  state o f evolution and it might be that the Court will soon 
recognise the horizontal direct effect o f the four freedoms provisions.856 In particular, Article 
39 EC on the free movement of workers, along with certain provisions of Regulation 
1612/1968,85? should logically be applicable to and bind individual employers.858 The same 
can be argued for freedom to provide services and Article 39 EC.859 The provisions on free 
movement of people are among the most fundamental principles of constitutional nature for 
the Community and the presumption is that in principle they also bind individuals. Indeed, in 
Angonese the Court of Justice recognised that the prohibition contained in Article 39 EC of 
discrimination on the basis o f nationality is also applicable to individuals.860 The Court based 
this conclusion, inter alia, on the consideration that the non-discrimination principle is 
couched in general terms and is not specifically addressed to the Member States. As 
Advocate General Geelhoed puts it in Muñoz, "the fact that some Treaty provisions are 
formally addressed to the Member States [does not] preclude rights from being conferred on 
individuals who have an interest in seeking to ensure compliance with the obligations thus 
laid down”.861 *
(Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 2004), pp. 1108-1109. On Art. 141 EC, see case 43/75, Gab ríe l le Defrenne v. 
Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena (II), [1976] ECR 455, para. 39.
854 See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche, supra (2000), p. 952, fn. 232, who include Arts. 28, 39, 43, and 
49 EC in the Treaty provisions of horizontal direct effect that can give rise to a Community right in damages in 
case of their violation.
855 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 
Royal Club Liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman et a l ,  and Union des Associations Européennes de Football 
(UEFA) v. Jecai-Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR 1-4921, para. 82. See further Snell, “And then there Were Two: 
Products and Citizens in Community Law”, in: Tridimas & Nebbia (Eds.), European Union Law in the Twenty1- 
First Century*, Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. II, Internal Market and Free Movement Community 
Policies (Oxford/Portland, 2004), pp. 56-60. For a rare and perhaps exceptional case where the Treaty 
provisions of free movement of goods were considered horizontally directly effective see case 58/80, Dansk 
Sttpermarked A/S  v. A/S Imerco, [1981] ECR 181.
850 See Cherednvchenko, “EU Fundamental Rights, EC Fundamental Freedoms and Private Law ”, 14 ERPL 
23 (2006), pp. 37-39.
857 Council Regulation 1612/68 o f  15 October 1968 on Freedom o f  Movement for IVorkers within the 
Community, JO [1968] L 257/2.
858 See e.g. Ryan, supra (2000), p. 148.
859 See L. Woods, Free Movement o f  Goods and Services within the European Community 
(Aldershot/Burlington, 2004), pp. 185-187.
860 Case C-281/98, Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR 1-4139. That case 
was one of possible discrimination stemming from a condition laid down by an individual employer on the 
recruitment of staff.
861 Case C-253/00, Antonio Muñoz y  Cia SA and Superior Fruiticola £.4 v. Frumar Ltd and Redbridge
Produce Marketing Ltd., [2002] ECR 1-7289, para. 43 of AG’s Opinion.
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Any other provision o f primaiy or secondary Community law enjoying horizontal direct 
effect, if violated, could give rise to Community individual liability, in case o f resulting 
damage.862 Regulations, in particular, would generally qualify as basis for Community tort 
liability claims. Indeed, soon after Courage, the Court in M uñoz held that generally and 
directly applicable Community regulations, “owing to their very nature and their place in the 
system of sources o f  Community law, ... operate to confer rights on individuals which the 
national courts have a  duty to protect”.863 In fact, the Court’s reasoning in Muñoz echoes that 
in Courage 864 The Court stresses that the availability of tort claims strengthens the 
effectiveness of the rules on quality standards and, in particular, the practical effect {effet 
utile) of the obligations laid down therein. It must, therefore, be possible to enforce such 
obligations by means o f civil proceedings instituted by traders against their competitors. The 
Court was very clear as to the instrumental nature of such claims:
“As a supplement to the action of the authorities designated by the Member States to 
make the checks required by those rules [they help] to discourage practices, often 
difficult to detect, which distort competition. In that context actions brought before 
the national courts by competing operators are particularly suited to contributing 
substantially to ensuring fair trading and transparency of markets in the 
Community”.865
Whether directives can also be relied upon in such Community law based tort actions is 
rather doubtful. It has been suggested that since in Francovich the absence of direct effect o f 
the norm in question did not exclude state liability, the same should be accepted for 
individual liability. Therefore, the argument goes, the violation o f an unimplemented 
directive by an individual can render the latter liable in tort against another individual.866 It 
seems, however, that to accept the above would mean crossing too many artificial bridges. 
While state liability may also exist, even if  the substantive Community rules in question, for 
example some provisions of a non-implemented directive, do not have (vertical) direct effect,
802 See, thus, with reference to secondary Community legislation on consumer protection, Hesselink, “The 
European Commission’s Action Plan: Towards a More Coherent European Contract Law?”, 12 ERPL 397 
(2004), pp. 408-409, who, however, doubts whether the system of private remedies that the Court and the 
Commission will develop in the area of competition, will be inspired by the acquis communautaire of the 
Community legal instruments pertaining to contract law (e g. consumer protection Directives).
803Muñoz, op.cit., para. 27.
864 See in this direction Van Gerven, “Harmonization of Private Law: Do wre Need it?”, 41 CMLRev. 505 
(2004), p. 522; idem, supra (2005a), p. 22.
8tlí Muñoz, op.cit., paras. 30-31. See further Betlem, “Environmental Liability and Private Enforcement -  
Lessons from International Law, the European Court of Justice, and European Mining Laws”, 4 YEEL 117 
(2004), p. 130 et seq.
800 See Betlem, supra (2004), p. 135 et seq.
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the case is different in civil liability o f individuals. H orizontal direct effect is a precondition 
o f the Community principle o f civil liability o f individuals. Any other conclusion would be 
logically impossible. This is so, because the basis o f such liability is the breach o f  the 
applicable Community rules. A relevant claim for damages in a civil trial between two 
natural or legal persons presupposes the direct application by the national courts o f the 
substantive provision in question. In other words, it is not logically possible to separate the 
enforceability o f the Community rules from the question o f liability for their breach.867 Thus, 
for example, when damages are awarded in order to remedy a harm caused through the 
breach of Article 82 EC, this presupposes that the national court must already have concluded 
that this provision applies as to the private parties in question, as a result of its having 
horizontal direct effect. Direct effect might not be conceptually the basis for the 
establishment of a general Community principle o f  civil liability for breach o f  EC 
competition rules, since the basis of this principle in the Court’s words is the full 
effectiveness of Community law.868 * Direct Effect is, however, a logical precondition, a 
necessary first step, before the question o f damages arises. *'
Finally, the fact that in certain cases directives may indirectly bind or impose burdens or 
obligations upon individuals under the principles o f consistent interpretation and indirect 
effect870 does not suffice to lead to private enforcement o f  directives against individuals, 
since the provision of the directive in question is not in reality directly applied as betw een 
individuals. It is therefore not possible to speak of a Community right in damages in those 
cases.
hh. Post-Courage Developments: The Commission Green Paper on Damages
As already mentioned, the Court of Justice's Courage ruling provided for the impetus for the 
Commission to adopt a more pro-active stance in the whole question of private enforcement. 
The opportunity was indeed unique. Modernisation was now a reality and there were ma\be 
for the first time serious debates in Europe as to the desirability to introduce further measures
80' See in this direction Shaw, supra (1995), p. 145; Komninos, supra note (2002), p. 471.
868 The full effectiveness of Article 81 EC and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down 
in Article 8l( 1) EC was considered by the Court to be the basis of the Community law principle of liability in 
Courage (op.cit., para. 26), in the same way as the same full effectiveness of the Community rules farmed the 
basis of state liability’ in Fnmcovich (op.cit., paras. 33-35).
809 See case C-l 06/89, Kiarleasing 5,4 v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA, [1990] ECR I- 
4135.
870 See case C-l 94/94, CIA Security International 5/1 v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL, [1996] ECR I- 
2201.
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to enhance private antitrust enforcement. Soon after the Court o f Justice delivered its 
Courage ruling, the Commission commissioned a study on the conditions of claims for 
damages in the Member States in case of infringement of EC competition rules.871 The results 
o f  that study, known as the “Ashurst Study” were published on the Commission’s website in 
2004.872 Predictably, the study showed an “astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment” 
o f  civil antitrust actions in the Member States. Up to mid-2004, there were apparently around 
601 judged cases for damages actions (12 on the basis of EC law, around 32 on the basis of 
national law and 6 on both). Of these judgments, only 28 had resulted in a damages award 
having been made (8 on the basis of EC competition law, 16 on national law and 4 on 
both).873
After digesting the results of the Ashurst Study and reflecting further on the appropriate w ay 
to move forward, the Commission published on 19 December 2005 for public consultation a 
Green Paper and a Commission Staff Working Paper on damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules.874 The purpose o f the Green Paper, which sets out a  number of possible 
options to facilitate private damages actions, is to stimulate debate and facilitate feedback 
from stakeholders. The public consultation ran until 21 April 2006 and all received comments 
have now been posted on the Green Paper’s webpage.875
The Commission is in favour of increased private enforcement as it believes that this will 
have a number of advantages for private parties. In particular:
(a) victims of illegal anticompetitive behaviour are compensated for loss suffered;
(b) deterrence against antitrust infringements and compliance with the law is increased;
(c) a competition culture amongst market participants, including consumers, will further 
develop, and awareness o f the competition rules will be raised;
Open Procedure COMP/2003/A1/22, available in:
http: //europa.eu. int/comm/dgs/competition/proposals2/study_tender_specifications. pdf.
872 The study is made up of a comparative report (Waelbroeck, Slater and Even-Shoshan, “Study on the 
Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case o f Infringement of EC Competition Rules: Comparative Report”, 31 
August 2004), a report on economic models for the calculation of damages and 25 national reports. See 
http: //ec. europa. eu/c omm/com petiti on/antitrust/others/ac tion s_for_dam age s/study. html.
873 See Waelbroeck, Slater and Even-Shoshan, supra (2004), p. 1. These statistics are only indicative, since 
in some Member States not all judgments are published and the comparative report necessarily relies on the 
national reports, whose quality varies. One must also bear in mind that these statistics do not include cases that 
have been settled with significant damages awarded to plaintiffs.
874 Both cited supra.
875 See http: //ec. europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/index_en.html.
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(d) the Commission and the national competition authorities do not have sufficient 
resources to deal with all cases o f anticompetitive behaviour, and in any event an 
administration has discretion to  pursue other priorities.876 
The Green Paper lists a variety of options in rather detailed form on ways to enhance private 
actions and to establish a more litigation-based system o f private antitrust enforcement in 
Europe. The Commission has not given any official indication as to the follow-up to the 
Green Paper and insists that it has not yet decided on how to proceed. There are three 
possible alternative options for the Commission:
(a) to propose or take no action at all and defer to the laws of the Member States, while 
hoping that the Green Paper will have an impact on the latter;
(b) to proceed to the adoption o f a  “soft law” instrument at the Community level, such as 
a notice, a communication or guidelines, that will not be legally binding;
(c) to propose Community legislation (“hard law-”), in the form of a regulation or a 
directive (or both).
It seems that the Commission will probably propose a hard law legislative measure at 
Community level, most probably a  Community directive, perhaps coupled with a  more 
general regulation. Indeed, former Advocate General Van Gerven, who offered advice to the 
DG-COMP stuff that worked on the Green Paper, has proposed that a regulation should be 
used to “set out the basic substantive conditions of the remedy in compensation” and a 
directive should accompany the regulation by laying down ‘"the procedural aspects of the 
remedy’.877
The Commission has not indicated on what legal basis it might use to implement its proposal. 
This could be based on either Article 83(2) EC, which concerns measures to give effect to the 
competition law provisions o f  the EC Treaty, or Article 65(c) EC, which concerns measures 
in the field o f  judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications. These 
are the two legal bases that best coincide with “the aim and the content of the measure” that is 
contemplated, as the European Court o f  Justice requires for the adoption of Community 
legislative measures.878 Certain commentators contend that Article 83(2) EC would be the
876 See Commission MEMO/05/489, op.cit., under the title “What in the Commission’s view are the 
advantages o f private actions for damages?”.
877 See Van Gerven, supra (2005b), p. 5.
878 Case C 300/89, Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide), [1991] ECR 1-2867, para. 21; case C- 
269/97, Commission v. Council, [2000] ECR 1-2257, para. 43; case C-211/01, Commission v. Council, [2003] 
ECR 1-8913, para. 38. The Commission cannot base its proposal on a combination of the two because each legal 
basis provides for a different legislative procedure (co-decision under Article 65(c) EC, consultation under 
Article 83(2) EC). See Titanium dioxide, op.cit., paras. 17 to 21.
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most appropriate legal basis for Community secondary legislation in these matters.879 This 
Article provides for the adoption by the Council of the appropriate measures to ensure the 
enforcement of EC competition law. However, whether an Article 83 EC-based measure 
could impose changes on national remedies and procedures is open to question. Of course, 
the text of Article 83(2) EC is quite open-ended in so far as it merely gives five examples of 
areas where the adoption of regulations or directives may be necessary to give effect to the 
principles set out in Articles 81 and 82 EC and does not set out an exhaustive list. As a result, 
while the Commission could to an extent rely on the w ording of Article 83(2)(e) EC which 
provides for the adoption of such regulations and directives ‘to  determine the relationship 
between national laws and the provisions contained in this section or adopted pursuant to this 
article” the open-ended nature of Article 83(2) EC means that it is under no obligation to base 
its proposed measure on this specific subsection.880
Alternatively, the Commission could use, as legal basis, Article 65(c) EC which provides for 
measures “eliminating obstacles to the good functioning o f civil proceedings, if necessary' by 
promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States”. 
This provision, the product of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, is sufficiently general to be an 
appropriate legal basis, but the Commission will doubtless choose its preferred legal basis 
mainly on strategic considerations that ensure the final succesful adoption of a Community 
measure. It is more likely that the Commission will opt for Article 83 EC because this 
provision requires only support from a qualified majority in the Council and the European 
Parliament is not brought into the legislative process with powers o f co-decision but must 
only be consulted. The use of this provision will also mean that the legislative measure will 
be adopted by the Council in a configuration that is more accustomed with and friendlier to 
competition policy.881
However, apart from these strategic considerations that the Commission may have in its 
mind, the choice o f Article 83 EC and the presentation to the legal community of a more 
competition law-specific regulation or directive makes better sense from a systematic point of 
view. Any envisaged measure in the area o f competition law' is bound to create a sectoral 
regime at the national level, which in most cases is going to be quite separate from and lie 
outside the main body of national substantive and procedural civil law. While some 
commentators have criticised this rather inelegant state of disintegration and “bits and pieces”
819 See Van Gerven, supra (2003a), pp, 53-93 at 81-82; idem, supm (2005b), p. 5.
880 Besides, Art. 83(2 Xe) refers to the relationship between national competition laws and Arts 81 and 82 
EC.
881 Ministers of National Economy and Finance (ECOFIN) or Competitiveness.
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at the national law level, especially with reference to continental legal systems that are 
invariably based on systematic pices o f  legislation like codes,882 this unfortunate result is the 
necessary evil of the supranational structure of the EU and o f the whole relationship between 
Community and national law. To the extent that Community law necessitates such inroads 
into national legal systems, it becomes more legitimate, in our view, to use exactly those 
specific legal bases that refer to the specific area o f Community law in question, rather than 
using more generic legal bases that are more vulnerable from a legitimacy point o f view.
In the particular area at stake, the introduction of a highly specific system o f private antitrust 
enforcement will have profound consequences for national substantive and procedural laws. 
Especially with regard to substance, the Green Paper and the system it aspires to must be seen 
in the broader context of civil law harmonisation or unification in Europe, which has always 
existed as an over-ambitious aim but obviously cannot in the short or mid term lead to any 
concrete results.8*3 To defer, however, to those developments would not have been prudent 
on the part o f  the Commission, as far as private antitrust enforcement is concerned.
At the same time, the Green Paper must be seen as a follow-up to the Court o f Justice’s 
recent case law on individual civil liability for antitrust violations. In Courage and Manfredi 
the Court clearly set the principle as to the existence of a  right in damages and its basic 
“constitutive” conditions but deferred to secondary Community' legislation, in order to 
address the more detailed problems in an express and systematic way.884 This is obvious from 
the Court’s language in Manfredi in dealing with the “executive” and “procedural” questions 
for the “exercise” of the right in damages. These were to be subject to national law, but only 
“in the absence of Community' rules governing the matter”.885 Of course, any secondary’ 
Community legislation that would provide expressly for the right in damages in cases o f harm 
caused by EC competition law violations, would not add much, as far as the existence of the 
right itself is concerned, since according to Courage and Manfredi this right has a Treaty' law 
basis, deriving from the principle o f effectiveness o f  Community' competition law'.886 The
882 See generally Joerges, “Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty”, in: Dehousse (Ed.), 
Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (München, 1994), p. 29 et seq.
883 See above.
m  See Van Gerven, supra (2003a), pp. 90-93, producing a draft of a possible regulation on the substantive 
law aspects o f private enforcement before national courts; idem, supra (2003b), p. 12. See, in addition, already 
Forrester and Norall, supra (1984), pp. 44-45, who alternatively proposed the publication by the Commission of 
a notice on this matter. The option of a notice on damages is supported by Siragusa, “Panel Two Discussion: 
Procedural Issues”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective 
Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), pp. 178-179.
885 Manfredi, op.cit., para. 64.
880 At this point a parallelism can be made with Directive 89/665/EEC on public procurement, op.cit. Art. 
2( 1 Xc) of this Directive refers to the setting-up of national procedures that should lead to the award of “damages
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main aim of such Community legislation would be to deal with the more specific issues o f 
substance and procedure.
Indeed, the Commission's Green Paper on damages of December 2005, which may be a 
prelude to Community secondary legislation on this matter, clearly must be seen in the 
context described above. The Commission leaves no doubt that ‘"the right to claim damages 
suffered from an infringement o f Treaty competition law is ... derived from the EC Treaty 
directly”.887 What the Green Paper on damages aims at, is to build upon this principle of 
Community law and “to render the exercise o f  that [Community law] right more effective”,888 
by concentrating upon “the detailed rules for bringing damages actions” and by identifying 
and remedying, possibly through secondary Community legislation, the main obstacles to a 
more efficient system o f damages actions.889
ii. Post -Courage Developments: National Level
Modernisation and decentralisation o f Community competition law enforcement and the 
related European debate on private enforcement, as well as the 2001 Courage mling by the 
Court of Justice, led to important developments at the national level. The UK and Germany 
fully amended their legislation and, among other reforms, introduced provisions aimed at 
enhancing private antitrust enforcement of national and Community' competition law. Other 
recently amended or adopted national competition laws contained for the first time provisions 
on the availability' o f damages for violations of competition law.890 At the same time, there
to persons harmed by an infringement”. However, it is rightly stressed that this provision of this rather advanced 
legislative instrument (in the sense of “intrusion” into national procedural autonomy) “does in fact not add much 
to the principles expressed by the Court of Justice in Francovich, Brasserie du Pêcheur, and others which laid 
down the principle that individuals are entitled to claim damages before their national courts for violation of 
Community' lawr”, since this requirement derives “from the very essence of Community law and from its effet 
utile” (see H G. Schermers and D.F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union (The 
Hague/London/New York, 2001), p. 214). The same holds true for an eventual secondary Community 
instrument dealing with EC antitrust private enforcement, as far as the Courage principle of civil liability itself 
is concerned.
887 Commission MEMO/Ö5/489, op.cit.y under the title “What has the European Court of Justice said in its 
case-law on the right in damages for breach of EC Treaty competition law?”. Compare, however, Moch, 
“Private Kartcllrechtsdurchsetzung -  Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven”, 56 WuW 39 (2006), p. 40, who reports 
from a conference in Germany, organised by the Bundeskartellamt, that Director General Lowe thought that the 
Courage jurisprudence did not entail a requirement of uniform conditions of tort liability throughout the 
Community. This statement, if reported corcectly, must refer to the detailed conditions of that liability and not to 
the principle itself, which emanates from Community law.
888 See Commission MEMO/05/489, op.cit, under the title “What has the European Court of Justice said in 
its case-law on the right in damages for breach of EC Treaty competition law?” in fine , emphasis added.
889 See Green Paper, under sections 1.2 and 1.3, emphasis added. On the specific proposals of the Green 
Paper see below the pertinent parts.
890 See above.
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has been a  recent surge o f damages actions and awards in the national courts, most o f them 
being cases o f  follow-on claims, i.e. actions relying usually on prior decisions by competition 
authorities. Whether this last development indicates an increased awareness of plaintiffs or 
changing judicial attitudes is still unclear but it certainly confirms that the European 
‘‘awakening calls” are reaching the Member States.
Starting with the UK, the Competition Act 1998 did not contain any direct reference to civil 
actions or actions for damages, though the availability of such actions was implicit in some 
other provisions o f  the Act.891 The absence of an express right was explained, because such a  
right was thought to exist under EC competition law and to provide for it expressly in the Act 
might prevent private litigants from benefiting from possible future Community law 
developments in this respect.892 If  that is indeed the explanation, then the choice o f the 
legislator can be judged as a  posteriori wise. Indeed, the EC interpretation clause o f s. 60 o f  
the Competition Act, which aims at ensuring that UK authorities and courts apply the 
domestic law provisions in a manner consistent with the application of EC competition law, 
makes specific reference also to Community decisions “as to the civil liability o f an 
undertaking for harm caused by its infringement of Community law"’.893 
The situation w as about to change. In 2001 a consultation paper by the Department o f Trade 
and Industry powerfully advocated the desirability o f private damages actions as a “very 
important limb o f an effective competition regime”.894 Such actions were seen as serving two 
basic aims: first, compensation of victims o f anticompetitive practices, and second, drawing 
private resources into the enforcement process, thus allowing public authorities to pursue the 
most important cases. The proposals did not stop here, but included collective suits by 
representative bodies, to be pursued before the CAT, acting on behalf of named and 
identifiable consumers (representative claims). These ideas were put in motion with the 
Enterprise Act 2002, which has transformed the UK system from a purely administrative
m  E.g. ss. 55(3Xb) and 58(2) of the Competition Act 1998.
m  See Coleman and Grenfell, supra (1999), pp. 286-287; P. Freeman and R. Whish, A Guide to the 
Competition Act 1998 (London/Edinburgh/ Dublin, 1999), paras. 4.72-4.73; MacCulloch, “Private Enforcement 
of the Competition Act Prohibitions”, in: Rodger & MacCulloch (Eds.), The UK Competition Act, A New Era 
for UK Competition Law (Oxford/Portland, 2000), p. 100 et seq.\ Middleton, supra (2000), pp. 26-27.
893 S. 60(6Xb) o f the UK Competition Act. Pre-Courage, some commentators had spoken of a “renvoi” that 
this provision led to, assuming that Community law referred the whole question of the availability of civil 
damages back to national law (see e.g. J. F l\nn and J. Stratford, Competition: Understanding the 1998 Act 
(Bemhridge, 1999), pp. 16-19; Turner, “The UK Competition Act 1998 and Private Rights”, 21 EIPR (1999) 
181, pp. 183-184, 186). This is o f course no longer an accurate statement
See HM Treasury, Department o f Trade and Industry, Productivity in the UK: Enterprise and the 
Productivity Challenge, June, 2001; Department of Trade and Industry, Productivity and Enterprise, A World 
Class Competition Regime, July 2001.
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enforcement system to a hybrid one with the private and criminal enforcement limbs far more 
developed than anywhere else in Europe.*95
O f particular interest to private enforcement is the conferral of jurisdiction on the CAT to 
hear claims for damages in competition cases.895 96 This procedure is thought to make better use 
o f existing judicial resources, thus reducing the costs for the parties.897 Damages claims 
before the CAT presuppose the establishment by either the OFT or the European Commission 
that an infringement of competition law has occurred.898 Such a finding of infringement is 
binding and cannot be re-litigated. These actions must be filed with the CAT within a period 
o f two years beginning at the time of the public enforcers final infringement decision or on 
the date on which the cause of action accrued.899 In addition, UK law provides for the 
possibility for ordinary civil courts to transfer to CAT competition issues arising in private 
civil actions.900
Then, section 58A of the UK Competition Act aims at facilitating follow-on civil actions for 
damages brought before the ordinary civil courts. It provides that findings of infringement of 
UK or Community competition law by the OFT (or by the CAT on appeal) bind the courts 
deciding on follow-on civil claims for damages.901 By follow-on claims, the Act is meant to
895 See Middleton, “The Americanisation of UK Competition Law”, 8 Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly 
27 (2003), p. 29. That author expresses concerns with regard to the UK system’s divergence from the 
Community model. However, the Enterprise Act does not affect substantive competition law and the new 
developments refer rather to institutional and procedural issues. At any rate, the introduction of private and 
criminal enforcement contribute to a more effective enforcement not only of national but also of Community 
competition law in the UK.
896 S. 47A of the Competition Act.
897 There are some disadvantages in this solution. Thus, the CAT will be burdened in many cases w ith the 
quantification of damages, a task that, according to some commentators, would be more appropriate for ordinary 
civil courts rather than for a specialised competition tribunal. In addition, parties may rely on competition law' 
by means of a counter-claim in an otherwise non-competition case or converesly there may be a competition law' 
claim but at the same time non-competition counterclaims. In such cases there are problems of conflicts of 
jurisdiction. See further on these problems Lever, “Restructuring Courts and Tribunals Hearing UK and EC 
Competition Law Cases”, 1 Comp.LJ 47 (2002), p 54; idem, “The Competition Appeal Tribunal and the 
Ordinary Courts”, in: Hutchings & Andenas (Eds.), Competition Law Yearbook 2002 (London, 2003), p .  32.
898 See Lever, supra (2002b), p. 51, who approves of this “inelegant” yet necessary solution. The right to 
bring such a claim is without prejudice to the existing right to bring damages claims in the ordinary civil courts 
(i.e. in the Chancery Division of the High Court). It should also be mentioned that the CAT may at any stage of 
the proceedings on the request of a party or of its own initiative direct that a claim for damages be transferred to 
the Chancery Division of the High Court in England or the Court of Session in Scotland. See para. 48 of the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003, SI 2003/1372; Rule 8.7 of Practice Direction -  Transfer, 
supplementing CPR Part 30.
899 S. 47A(7X8) of the Competition Act; para. 31 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003, SI 
2003/1372. See also Rayment, “Practice and Procedure before the Competition Appeal Tribunal”, in: Ward & 
Smith (Eds.), Competition Litigation in the UK (London, 2005), p. 129 etseq.
900 Para. 49 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003, SI 2003/1372; Rule 8.3 of Practice Direction -  
Transfer, supplementing CPR Part 30. See further Lever, supra (2003b), p. 33, approving of this solution.
91 Note that this provision is different from s. 47A of the Act. The former refers only to the UK 
competition authorities’s decisions while the latter extends the binding effect of infringement findings also to 
decisions of the European Commission. In addition, the provision of s. 58A refers to follow-on civil proceedings
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cover “proceedings before the court in which damages or any other sum o f money is claimed 
in respect o f an infringement of competition law”.901 02 Apart from section 47A on follow-on 
civil claims for damages, the new UK system provides for another novelty: Section 47B 
provides for claims for damages brought on behalf o f  consumers by representative 
“specified” bodies.903 These are not meant as US-style class actions and the claim must 
specify the consumers on behalf of whom the claim is brought.904
The recent amendment o f the German Competition Act makes another paradigm worth 
examining. German law has long-provided for antitrust damages actions905 but the new 
section 33 GWB marks an important progress in that it provides for a  legal basis for damages 
claims for violation not only of German but also o f Community competition law. The new 
provision also abandons the previous rather restrictive condition o f standing, which was
for damages before the ordinary civil courts (the Chancery Division of the High Court), while s. 47A refers to 
follow-on claims brought before or transferred to the CAT.
901 See Explanatory Notes to the Enterprise Act 2002, available at 
http: //www.legislation.hmso. gov.uk/acts/en2002/2002en40.htm, para. 87: “Section 20: Findings of
infringements. Subsection (1) inserts a new section 58A in CA 1998. The new section provides that certain 
decisions of the OFT or the CAT regarding an infringement of competition law are to bind the courts for the 
purpose of a subsequent claim for damages”. On the history o f this provision see Roth, “Panel Discussion: UK 
Competition Law”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2000, Annual Proceedings o f the 
Fordhant Corporate Law Institute (New' York, 2001), p. 122; Rodger, supra (2003), pp. 108-109.
903 According to s. 47B(9) of the Act, “specified” means specified in an order by the Secretary o f State. See 
further Specified Body (Consumer Claims) Order 2005, SI 2005/2365.
904 Para. 33 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003, SI 2003/1372.
905 On the situation in Germany before the latest GWB amendment, see Baur, “Schadensersatz und 
Unterlassungsansprüche bei Verstößen gegen die Kartcllrechtsvorschriften des EWG-Vertrags”, 23 EuR (1988) 
257, p. 260 et seq.; Braun, supra (1996), pp. 431, 580-581; Schmidt, supra (1997), p. 57 et seq.; Dieckmann, in: 
Wiedemann (Ed.), Handbuch des Kartellrechts (München, 1999), pp. 1271-1272. Apart from few exceptions 
where national competition laws themselves contain express provisions on the availability of damages (see 
above), national laws usually have referred to general provisions in their civil law for a legal basis for damages 
actions. For Austria, see s. 1311(2) ABGB; further Stillfried and Stockenhuber, supra (1995), p. 303 et seq:, 
Maitz-Strassnig, supra (1999), p. 35; Günther, supra (2001), p. 319. For Belgium, see Art. 1382 of the Civil 
Code; further Noirfalisse, supra (1994), p. 63; Van Bael, supra (2003), p. 57. For Finland, see the relevant 
provisions of the Compensation Act of 1974 ( Vahingonkorvattslaki); further Erämetsä, supra (2001), p. 222. For 
France, see Arts. 1382 and 1383 CC; further Boulanger, supra ( 1997), pp. 194-195 and 293-294; Fasquelle, “La 
réparation des dommages causés par les pratiques anti-concurrentielles”, 51 RTDComm. (1998) 763, p. 769 et 
seq:, Schapira, Le Tallec, Biaise and Idot, supra (1999), p. 299. For Greece, see Art. 914 of the Civil Code; 
further Iliopoulos, supra (2000), pp. 251, 289-290 and 303-304; Koutsoukis, supra (1993), p. 336 et seq:, 
Liakopoulos, supra (2000), pp. 498. For Ireland, see Maher, supra (1994), pp. 270-271; idem, supra (1999), pp. 
63-68, 143, 165, 293-296. For Italy, see Art. 2043 of the Civil Code; farther Ligustro, supra (1992), p. 218; 
Tavassi and Scuifi, supra (1998), pp. 301, 317 et seq:, Libertini, supra (2002), p. 452; Bastianon, supra (1998), 
p. 1073 et seq. ; A. Pera, Concorrenza e Antitrust (Bologna, 2001), p. 58. For the Netherlands, see Art. 6:162 of 
the Dutch Civil Code; further Sevinga, “The Netherlands”, in: Behrens (Ed.), EEC Competition Rules in 
National Courts, Vol. II, Benelux and Ireland (Baden-Baden, 1994), p. 150; R.T. Ottervanger, J. Steenbergen 
and S.J. Van der Voorde, Competition Law o f  the European Union, the Netherlands and Belgium (The 
Hague/London/Boston, 1998), p. 105; Van Reeken and Noë, supra (2000), p. 457; Bos and Struijlaart, supra 
(2003), p. 353. For Portugal, see Art. 483 et seq. of the Civil Code; further Ruiz, supra (1999), p. 234, fn. 38. 
For Spain, see Art. 1902 of the Civil Code; further Navarro Varona and Rating, supra (2000), p. 76. Compare 
also the -  now outdated - study commissioned by the European Commission and co-ordinated by A. Braakman: 
European Commission, DG IV-Competition, The Application ofArticles 85 and 86 o f the EC Treaty by National 
Courts in the Member States (Brussels, 1997).
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conferred only on persons within the “protective scope” o f the statute, and stresses that any 
“person affected”, including competitors and “other market participants” can sue for 
damages.906 The law now also gives standing to associations for the promotion of commercial 
or independent professional interests, including consumer associations.907 One of the novel 
features is the fact that it is now possible for the courts to calculate the damages taking into 
account the proportion o f the profit which the defendant has derived from the infringement.908 
In addition, the passing-on defence is restrained, though not completely banned.909 Finally, 
German law goes even further than the UK law and confers a binding effect not only on 
European Commission and Bundeskartellamt, but also on all other EU Member States’ 
competition authorities infringement decisions. This binding effect is confined to follow-on 
civil litigation, basically aiming at offering incentives to claim damages from convicted 
cartelists.910
As far as national case law is concerned, even before the latest developments, it would be 
exaggerated to deny the existence of tangible evidence referring to private enforcement 
through damages awards. As the Ashurst Study admits, there have been already in the past 
quite a few final judgments of national courts that have awarded damages to victims of anti­
competitive practices911 Then, more importantly, there have been cases, most o f them 
unreported, where, just before the final judgment, parties settled before quantum was 
determined 912 The actual extent o f these settlements may be hard to realise.913
906 S. 33(1) GWB. See further below.
907 See Stockmann, “La réforme du droit allemand de la concurrence”, (2006) RLC n° 6 106, p. 112.
908 S. 33(3) GWB.
909 See below.
910 See Ilempel, supra (2004), p. 371; Moch, supra (2006), p. 41.
911 This appears to have been the case in France. See CA Paris, 30-9-98, Mors, (1998-12) Europe 17, where 
a damages aw ard for FF 34.2 million was granted to the victim of an abuse of dominant position under French 
and Community competition law. The case concerned exclusionary practices that resulted in deterring the 
plaintiff from supplying the brakes system of certain Airbuses. For another case see T. Com. Paris, 22-10-96, 
Ecosystem, op.cit., where the damages awarded amounted to a meagre FF 1.6 million. See further Idot, “La 
liberté de concurrence en France”, Petites Affiches, 23-3-2000, No. 59, 5, p. 7, who notes that French cases of 
non-contractual liability pertinent to violations of EC competition law have been rather rare, but seem to start 
developing. See also cases cited by Boulanger, supra (1997), p. 293; Fasquelle, “Les dommages et intérêts en 
matière anticoncurrentielle”, (2000-5/6) Rev.Conc.Consomm. 14. For a Dutch example, see Rechtbank 
Amsterdam, 14-5-75, Wilkes v. Theal and Watts, cited by Sevinga, supra (1994), p. 201, fn. 248. For an Italian 
case see Corte d ’Appello Milano, 24-12-96, Telsystem v. SIP-Telecom, 2 Danno e Responsabilità (1997) 602, 
where Telsystem was awarded LIT 3 billion in damages for harm it suffered as a result of violations of the 
Italian anti-monopoly legislation by Italia Telecom. Germany too has been a jurisdiction with some success in 
private antitrust enforcement. See e.g. Bomkamm, “Panel Discussion: Administrative Antitrust Authorities: 
Adjudicative and Investigatory Functions”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2002, 
Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2003), p. 422, purporting that the US 
and Germany were probably the jurisdictions with the most private antitrust actions in the w orld.
912 See Jones and Sharpston, supra (1996-97), p. 87; Kerse, “The Complainant in Competition Cases: A 
Progress Report”, 34 CMLRev. 213 (1997), p. 247; Green, “Rapport britannique”, in: AT III congrès FIDE 
(Stockholm, 3-6 Juin 1998), Vol. II, Application nationale du droit européen de la concurrence (Stockholm,
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Irrespective o f  the modesty or significance o f  these precedents, in the last years one can even 
speak of a boom of private antitrust enforcement in Europe.913 14 *As explained above, this 
undoubtedly is connected with the decentralisation o f EC competition law enforcement and 
the expected more active role o f national courts, but also with the more general drive in 
Europe for the enhancement o f private enforcement. It thus seems that Regulation 1/2003 
along with the Courage judgment o f the Court o f Justice constituted the “awakening call” 
that many proponents of private enforcement were expecting.913
It is interesting to note that many o f  the recent cases, some o f which are still pending, are 
follow-on cases. The Vitamins case is the most prominent source o f such actions and there are 
already damages awards and settlements in Germany, England, Sweden and other 
jurisdictions.916 A famous example has been the Provimi judgment decided at the 
admissibility stage by the English High Court, where apart from English parties, one German 
part)’ was also claiming antitrust damages.917 The Vitamins litigation provided also for the
1999), p. 61; Jones, “Litigating Competition Cases in the UK”, in: Lawyers' Europe, Spring 2002, 2. The 
financial implications of settlements can be quite similar to damages awards. For an English example, see An 
Boni Bainne Co-operative Ltd. (Irish Dairy Board) v. Milk Marketing Board (QB), [1984] 1 CMLR 519; on 
appeal [1984] 2 CMLR 584, where a breach o f A rt 82 EC was alleged, but the matter was settled by the 
payment of a substantial amount to the plaintiff. For a German example see the Global One case, where after the 
national court had accepted a claim of damages in its merits, the litigants settled (OLG Düsseldorf, 16-6-98, 
British Telecommunications pic and VIAG Interkom GmbH & Co. v. Deutsche Telekom AG and ATLAS 
Deutschland, 48 WuW (1998)713).
913 In the United States a study on private enforcement has found that between 1973 and 1983 more than 80 
% of cases were settled, before any final damages award had been given by the courts. See Roach and 
Trebilcock, supra (1996), p. 466, referring to the Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project
914 See e g. Desai, “Antitrust Compliance Programmes: Act Now”, in: The European Antitrust Review 2004, 
Global Competition Review Special Report (London, 2003), pp. 11-12, who also stresses the importance of 
compliance programmes with a view to minimising claims for damages in increasing private lawsuits.
15 See Jones, supra (2003), p. 97; Goyder, supra (2003), p. 560.
916 See Braun and Bader, “German Competition Law: Overview and Recent Developments”, in: The 
European Antitrust Review 2004, Global Competition Review Special Report (London, 2003), p. 98.
Provimi Ltd. v. Aventis Animal Nutrition SA et a i  (QB (Com.Ct.)), [2003] ECC 353. Judgment was 
given only as to the jurisdictional issues and subsequently the parties settled. There, it was established that 
where there is an English connecting factor in the private international law sense, i.e. an English element to a 
cartel, other non-English claimants may also bring claims in London in respect of their non-English based 
losses, instead of having to pursue separate claims in other jurisdictions. Provimi follows a more permissive 
approach than that adopted recently by the US Supreme Court There, in some cases of follow-on litigation, the 
District of Columbia and the Second Federal Circuits had held that under some conditions foreign plaintiffs 
could seek treble damages in US courts, even though injured exclusively outside the US: Empagran SA et ai v. 
F. Hoffinan La Roche, Ltd. et al., 315 F.3d 338 (DC Cir. 2003); Krugman v. Christie's International pic, 284 
F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002). The main policy argument behind the granting of jurisdiction and standing in these two 
cases was the need to guarantee efficient deterrence. This was criticised as another example of US antitrust 
extraterritoriality. It was also viewed negatively in Brussels, because it would not leave space to the 
development of a European system of private enforcement. See e.g. Palmieri, “Tribunale mondiale antitrust a 
Washington?”, 3-4 Inf ILis (Autunno 2003) 140, pp. 143-144; Van Caenegem, “The Long Arm of the US 
Courts: The Empagran Decision”, in: Liber Amicorum Jean-Pierre de Bandt (Bruxelles, 2004), p. 645 et seq\ 
Guersent, “Table ronde : Les conséquences civiles et pénales dans un contexte d’internationalisation des 
programmes de clémence”, in: Clémence et transaction en matière de concurrence, Premières experiences et 
interrogations de la pratique, 125 GP n* 287-288 7 (2005), p. 56. Other US Circuits had rendered conflicting 
judgments. Thus, the Fifth Circuit in De« Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac v.o.f. et a i, 241 F.3d 420
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first claims that were brought before the CAT as follow-on civil claims for damages under 
the special procedure of s. 47A o f the UK Competition Act. These cases, however, did not 
lead to final judgments, since they were settled.918
In Germany, the initial rejectionist approach of courts has now changed and the first 
successful follow-on damages claims in the Vitamins litigation are a  reality. It is noteworthy 
that certain German courts adjudicating claims for damages in the post ‘Courage era refused 
to grant damages to direct purchasers o f vitamins on passing-on grounds and because the 
cartel was not specifically directed at them but at all market participants.919 This built on a 
very restrictive reading of standing under German law that was certainly incompatible with 
Community law and the Courage ruling in particular, which accepted no such limitations but 
granted a right in damages to all individuals harmed by the anti-competitive conduct.920 
Recent German judgments, however, have reversed this restrictive approach and have 
rendered the first damages awards.921
Important successful damages claims have also been reported in Austria, France,922 923
Denmark, Spain, and Italy where the Corte di Cassazione after long tribulations
(5th Cir. 2001) denied US forum access to foreign plaintiffs, the Third Circuit in Turicentro SA et al. v. 
American Airlines Inc. et aí., 303 F.3d 293 (3rd Cir. 2002) held that they even lack standing in the first instance 
to file the action, while according to the Seventh Circuit in United Phosphorus Ltd. et al. v. Angus Chemical 
Company et a l 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003X US courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, unless the anti­
competitive conduct had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce. See on 
all these cases Pallek, “L’avemr de la coopération Euro-américaine dans le domaine de la concurrence”, 40 CDE 
95 (2004), pp. 103-104. The US Supreme Court finally resolved this question finding against US jurisdiction. 
According to the Supreme Court’s ruling in F. Hoffhian La Roche, Ltd. et al. v. Empagran SA et a l ,  542 US 1 
(2004), US courts lack jurisdiction over antitrust civil damages claims involving foreign injuries which are not 
related to domestic injuries arising out of the same anti-competitive act The critical point is whether the foreign 
anti-competitive conduct causes independent foreign harm and whether that foreign harm alone results in the 
plaintiffs damage.
918 See Deans Foods Limited v. Roche Products Limited, F. Hoffman-La Roche AG and Aventis 5.4, Case 
No. 1029/5/7/04, CAT Consent Order of 11 February 2005; BCL Old Co. Ltd. DFL Old Co. Ltd. and PFF Old 
Co. Ltd. v. Aventis SA, Rhodia Ltd., F. HoJJman-La Roche AG and Roche Products Ltd., Case No. 1028/5/7/04, 
CAT Consent Order of 24 November 2005. See further Randolph and Robertson, “The First Claims for 
Damages in the Competition Appeal Tribunal”, 26 ECLR 365 (2005). Currently, there is another case pending 
before the CAT: Healthcare at Home Ltd. v. Genzyme Ltd., Case No. 1060/5/7/06. This is based on previous 
infiingement decisions of the OFT/CAT in an abuse of dominance case concerning margin squeeze and rebates 
in the pharmaceutical sector. Interestingly, the plaintiff has also claimed exemplary damages.
919 LG Mannheim, 11.7.03,7 O 326/02 -  Vitaminkartell, 106 GRUR 182 (2004); LG Mainz, 15.1.04, 12 
HK O 56/02 (Kart) -  Vitaminpreise, 54 WuW 1179 (2004).
920 See belowr on the issue of standing.
921 LG Dortmund, 01.04.04, 13 O 55/02 (Kart) - Vitaminpreise, 54 WuW 1182 (2004). The damages 
awarded in this case amounted to the difference between the price paid as a result of the cartel and a 
hypothetical market price. In addition, the court ruled that the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff had
passed on his damage.
922 CA Versailles, 24-6-04, n° 02/07434, SA Verimedia v. SA Mediametrie et al. The court awarded 6 
100,000 to the victim of an anti-competitive agreement (on the basis of French competition law). The damages 
awarded were rather low because inter alia of the plaintiff’s contributory fault.
923 GT Linien v. Danish Railway’s, (Global Competition Review, Electronic Newsletter, 11 May 2005). The 
aw'ard of damages amounted to DKK 10 million plus interest and was upheld by the Danish Supreme Court
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established that consumers could claim damages from a cartel of insurance companies 
previously convicted by the Italian competition authority.924 25 In short, the picture is changing 
and the adoption of the Green Paper by the Commission is bound to further raise the 
awareness o f  courts, market participants and consumers.
kk. The Conditions of Civil Liability
i. Standing
The specific question who has standing to sue for damages in case of harm caused by an EC 
competition law violation is fundamental. It is also utterly connected with the broader 
question of the goals of competition law and policy, in particular whether competition law 
aims at safeguarding effective competition in the market or at protecting one’s economic 
freedom. As we have explained above, even though the main scope o f the Treaty competition 
provisions is the protection o f free and undistorted competition in the common market, this 
has an indirect and reflexive bearing on private parties.
At the same time, the Treaty competition rules are enshrined in a text of constitutional nature 
and, together with the four freedoms, make up the Community ’s “economic constitution”.926
924 Juzgado de lo Mercantil n° 5 de Madrid, 11-11-05, n° 36/2005, Conduit Europe SA v. Telefónica de 
España SAU. In that case, the court awarded the plaintiff, an Irish communication services provider, € 639,000 
for losses incurred as a result o f the defendant’s abuse of dominant position, consisting of giving defective and 
incomplete information in order to block the plaintiffs entry into the market for subscriber directory enquiries. 
This was a “stand-alone” civil action.
925 Corte di Cassazione, 4-2-05, n° 2207, Compagnia Assicuratrice Unipol SpA v. Ricciarelli, 11 Danno e 
Responsabilità 495 (2005). This judgment was decided by the Sezioni Unite (a special chamber of an increased 
number of judges) of the Corte di Cassazione. It reversed a previous ruling of the same court that had denied 
standing to consumers in the same cartel (Corte di Cassazione, 9-12-02, n° 17475, Soc. Axa Assicurazioni v. 
Isvap and Larato, 9 Danno e Responsabilità 390 (2003)). See the heated debate in Italy between Libertini (in 
favour of consumers’ standing) and Castronovo (in favour of a restrictive reading of the competition rules’ 
protective scope): Castronovo, “Antitrust e abuso di responsabilità civile”, 10 Danno e Responsabilità 469 
(2004); Libertini, “Ancora sui rimedi civili conseguenti a violazioni di norme antitrust”, 10 Danno e 
Responsabilità 933 (2004); Castronovo, “Responsabilità civile antitrust: Balocchi e profumi”, 10 Danno e 
Responsabilità 1165 (2004); Libertini, “Ancora sui rimedi civili conseguenti ad illeciti antitrust (II)”, 11 Danno 
e Responsabilità 237 (2005).
9 0 See inter alia J. Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement, The Economic Constitutional 
Law o f  the European Community (Oxford/Portland, 2002). See also K.T. Yannakopoulos, The Opacity Required 
by the Effective Competition in EC Public Procurement Law (Athens/Komotini, 2003) [in Greek], p. 12; Oliver, 
“Les quatre libertés et les droits fmdamentaux”, in: Vandersanden & de Walsche (Eds ), Melanges en hommage 
à Jean-Victor Louis, Voi. I (Bruxelles, 2003), p. 357; Nowak, “Das Verhältnis des Wettbewerbsrechts und der 
Grundfreiheiten im Binnenmaikt”, in: Hatje & Terhechte (Eds.), Das Bitmenmarktziel in der Europäischen 
Verfassung (Baden-Baden, 2004), p. 82 et seq\ Briand-Mélédo, “Droit de la concurrence, droit constitutionnel 
substantial de la communauté europécime”, 57 RTDComm. 205 (2004), pp. 205-208. It is interesting to note that 
US antitrust, though formally not part of the US Constitution, is also considered to enjoy such “constitutional” 
status by the US Supreme Court. Compare United States v. Topeo Associates Inc., 405 US 596 (1972), at 610, 
referring to the Sherman Act as “the Magna Charta of free enterprise”.
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Indeed, this pre-eminence of the competition rules was left untouched during the drafting o f 
the new European Constitution. It was initially thought that such provisions had no place in a 
programmatic constitutional text, but there were fears that omitting the competition and free 
movement rules from that text might be construed as a  shift away from those classic 
Community priorities, and thus as a “devaluation”.927 The approach finally followed defers to 
the long-standing constitutional importance of competition law; indeed, there are good 
reasons to speak of an ‘‘up-grading”.
Thus the new European Constitution lists competition law among the guiding principles and 
objectives o f the Union. Article 1-3(2) of the Constitution stresses that “the Union shall offer 
its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal 
market where competition is free and undistorted”92* Including the principle of free 
competition among the Union’s paramount objectives certainly goes further than the 
equivalent provision of Article 3(l)(g) EC.929 Then, the constitutional nature of competition 
law is now celebrated in the primary principles of a formal constitution 930 In addition, the 
new text constitutes progress because it refers to the principle of free competition positively 
(“where competition is free and undistoried”), rather than negatively as in the current EC 
Treaty (“a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted”). A further 
extremely important innovation of the Constitution is the portrayal o f  competition policy as 
the “fifth freedom” in the chapter on the internal market931
This short introduction to the constitutional parameters of EC competition law serves in order 
to define the rules on standing for damages claims. A restrictive view' of standing would 
offend against the constitutional status of the Treaty competition rules and would create 
obstacles to individuals’ reliance on rights derived from a constitutional text. Indeed, as
927 See Oliver, supra (2003), p. 357; idem, “Competition and Free Movement: Their Place in the Treaty”, 
in: Tridimas & Nebbia (Eds.), European Union Law in the Twenty-First Century, Rethinking the New Legal 
Order, Vol. II, Internal Market and Free Movement Community Policies (Oxford/Portland, 2004), p. 159, 
quoting the Former President of the ECJ Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias.
928 Emphasis added.
929 See e.g. Nowak, supra (2004), p. 92. See, however, Poillot-Peruzzetto, “Concurrence et constitution”, 
15(5) Contr.Conc.Consomm. 3 (2005), arguing that the constitutional status of the competition rules may have 
been diminished or “relativised” in the European Constitution. See also Behrens, “Das 
wirtschaflsverfassungsrechtliche Profil des Konventsentwurfs eines Vertrages tlber eine Verfassung fttr 
Europa”, in: Fuchs, Schwintowski & Zinner (Eds.), Wirtschafts- und Privatrecht, 1m Spannungsfeld von 
Privatautonomie, Wettbewerb und Regulierung, Festschrift fiir Ulrich Immenga zum 70. Ge hurts tag (Mtinchcn, 
2004), pp. 25 and 32-33, stressing also the reference in Art. 1-3(2) of the Constitution to “soziale 
Marktwiitschaft” , which seems to depart from a purist competition law approach.
930 See Terhechte, supra (2004b), p. 125.
931 See former Commissioner Monti’s last official speech, “A Reformed Competition Policy: Achievements 
and Challenges for the Future”, Speech Delivered at the Center for European Reform (Brussels, 28 October 
2004), in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ speeches.
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Clifford Jones has persuasively explained, EC competition law is in this sense different from 
US antitrust law and the latter s prudential mechanisms and its restrictive rules on standing 
cannot be automatically transposed to the EC context.932
This is important because many national laws have contained restrictive rules on standing for 
competition law-related damages actions. We have already seen that English courts followed 
a  rather restrictive approach o f  the persons that had such a  standing to sue. Co-contractors 
were excluded, while the position o f consumers was equally unclear. In continental legal 
systems, the question of damages for competition law infringements has more or less been 
clear in jurisdictions following the unitary norm system o f the French Civil Code (Article 
13 82),933 where the sweeping and general nature o f  the national rule on civil liability allows 
for a liberal approach with regard to standing, but problems have existed in countries 
following the German doctrine o f Schutznorm ,934 whereby plaintiffs claiming damages have 
to belong to a  group of persons that the legislator intended protecting.
The question whether Articles 81 and 82 EC can be considered as statutes for the protection 
o f individuals and private interests - or as analogous to such - has been answered in the 
affirmative both by courts935 and commentators.936 The real question is which persons fall 
under this protective scope. While the position o f competitors has been clear, some o f the 
legal systems belonging to the Germanic legal family (as far as tort liability is concerned) 
have encountered difficulties with the position of purchasers and consumers. Thus, until the
932 Indeed, that author would prefer national courts to engage in an approach, which would follow the 
“legitimate interests” test incorporated in the old Reg. 17/1962 with reference to complaints (Jones, supra 
(1999), p. 190).
933 The position of French law is unique because it provides for a separate specific legal basis for damages 
actions: Art. L442-6 Code de commerce. This is of limited scope and is applicable to harm caused by the 
commission of certain enumerated acts. It is a rather atypical provision, since it gives title to sue for damages, 
apart from the victims, to the public prosecutor, the Minister of the Economy and the president of the Conseil de 
la concurrence, acting on behalf of the victims. This extraordinary' provision that has been characterised a 
“bizarrerie juridique” stresses, nevertheless, the will o f the French legislator to view damages suits as an 
instrument of market policing (see further Boulanger, supra (1997), p. 197; Claudel, “Concurrence : Projet de 
loi sur les nouvelles régulations économiques”, 53 RTDComm. 606 + 877 (2000), pp. 896 and 898; Lucas de 
Leyssac and Parleani, supra (2002), pp. 955, 975). A question is whether these damages actions can be brought 
also in cases of harm caused by the violation of Community competition law, when the anti-competitive practice 
takes the form of one of the enumerated acts in Art. L442-6. While Art. L470-6 empowers the Minister of the 
Economy and the French competition authority to use all means provided for by the law to enforce Community 
law, it appears that the atypical action of Art. L442-6 is not covered.
934 This doctrine is also followed by Austrian, Dutch, and, up to a certain extent, Italian and Greek law, The 
question concerning the protective scope (Schutzzweck) of Arts. 81 and 82 EC is one of Community law and the 
EC J has the ultimate competence to interpret this, See in this direction Schröter, supra (2003), p. 328.
935 In Germany see BGH, 23.10.79 - KZR 21/78, 30 WuW 191 (1980).
936 See e g. Temple Lang, supra (1984), p. 221 et seq:, Waelbroeck and Frignani, supra (1999), pp. 529- 
530; Steindorff, “Aufgaben und Zuständigkeiten im europäischen Kartellverfahren”, 162 ZUR (1998) 290, pp. 
306-309; Maitz-Strassnig, supra (1999), p. 35; Günther, supra (2001), p. 320; Lever, “Substantive Remedies: 
The Viewpoint o f an English Lawyer”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 
2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 109.
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latest amendment o f the German Competition Act, standing to sue for damages was conferred 
only on persons within the “protective scope” o f the law. This w as the case both for German 
and Community competition law .937 As already mentioned, the new s. 33(1) GWB, which 
now applies both to German and to Community competition law, has relaxed the rules on 
standing by referring to “affected persons”, including competitors and “other market 
participants”, although it is still not entirely clear that consumers will always be admitted. 
Consumers w ere also excluded until recently from the category o f persons having title to sue 
for antitrust damages in Italy, due to a restrictive reading o f the protective scope o f national 
tort law provisions, but again this has been remedied. Then, some other national laws contain 
equally restrictive provisions. Thus, Article 18a of the Finnish Competition Act, which has 
since 2004 been made applicable also to Article 81 and 82 EC infringements, gives standing 
to sue only to “business undertakings”, therefore, consumers are excluded.
Irrespective of these national provisions dealing with standing to sue, we submit that 
Community law in the post-Courage/Manfredi era defines itse lf the constitutive conditions of 
the right in damages. The rules on standing clearly fall under these conditions. Indeed, in 
Courage, the Court had no difficulty in finding that Article 81 EC did not only protect third- 
party competitors, in that case third-party beer suppliers foreclosed by a specific network o f 
exclusive beer supply agreements, but could also be relied upon by “any individual”,938 
including co-contracting parties, in that case tenants.939 Manfredi, as we developed above, 
built on Courage and defined in detail the Community lawr constitutive condition o f standing, 
explicitly recognising that consumers enjoy standing to sue for harm caused to them by anti­
competitive conduct940 Such a principle can also be adduced from the letter of Article 81(3) 
EC, which speaks of “allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”.941 
Therefore, if the unequivocal wrords used in Courage as to the very existence of a right in 
damages in Community law for all harmed individuals had rendered redundant942 any effort 
to make a distinction, based on the “protective scope” of Articles 81 and 82 EC, between co­
contractors,943 competitors, consumers, purchasers (direct or indirect)944 and other third
937 The old s. 33 GWB provided so for damages claims based on German competition law, while s. 823(2) 
BGB led to the same result for claims based on Community competition law.
938 Courage, op.cit,, para. 26.
939 See Brealey, “Adopt Pertna Life, but Follow Hanover Shoe to Illinois'? Who Can Sue for Damages for 
Breach of EC Competition Law”, 1 Comp.LJ 127(2002), p. 128.
940Manfredi, op.cit., paras. 60, 61,63.
941 Emphasis added,
942 See Van Gerven, supra (2005b), p. 8.
943 Bar cases where a co-contrator bears a significant degree of responsability for the violation of
competition law' (Courage, op.cit, para. 31). This however is not a question of standing, falling under the
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parties,* 94145 following Manfredt, we can now indeed say that such distinctions are incompatible 
with Community law and, pursuant to the principle o f supremacy, should be set aside. The 
current state o f the law is that, irrespective of the protective scope of the competition law 
provisions, all private parties that have been harmed by an anti-competitive practice enjoy a 
Community law-based right in damages.946 Community law itself elevates these private 
parties into the guardians o f free competition in the European Union, i.c. into a  “private 
attorney-general”.
ii. Fault
Another basic question is whether liability for damages for breach of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
presupposes fault or whether it is strict. The answer to this question is clearly that it is only 
strict liability that renders meaningful the prohibitions of those Articles 947 The Treaty rules 
on competition do not generally require subjective intent to contravene the relevant 
prohibitions,948 therefore civil liability for EC competition law breaches should not be based 
upon such a condition.
Community law-defined constitutive conditions of the right in damages, but rather one of contributory fault, 
falling under the -  for the time being -  national law-defined executive conditions of the right in damages.
941 As to the so-called “indirect purchasers’” standing, see below.
945 Whether shareholders or other persons related to a company that has breached the antitrust rules, such as 
employees, can sue for damages, is debated. See Brealey, supra (2002), p. 134. In our view, the broad language
in Courage should cover these persons, too, assuming they can identify and prove harm and, more importantly, 
causation. Compare, however, indicatively case T-12/93, Comité Central d'Entreprise de la Société Anonyme
Vittel et al. v. Commission, [1995] ECR 11-1247, para. 50, denying standing to challenge a merger clearance 
decision to the employees of an entity that would be divested by one of the merging parties, as part of a 
structural commitment. According to the CFI, a decision authorising a merger on the basis of Community 
competition law, even if it makes that merger subject to the sale by one o f the undertakings in question of part of
its activities to a third undertaking, does not in itself have any effect on the own rights of the representatives of 
the employees of the undertakings concerned.
940 The ECJ case law, starting from BRT  v. SABAXI I, does not allow for differentiations based on the 
protective scope o f Arts. 81 and 82 EC. See also GT-Link, op.cit., para. 57 and Guérin Automobiles, op.cit., 
para. 39, where clearly the ECJ considered that individuals enjoyed rights conferred upon them by the direct 
effect of the Treaty competition rules and not because the pertinent provision was specifically designed to 
protect them. See, in this direction, Steindorff, supra (1996), p. 307, who rightly stresses that Community law 
never centres on the protective scope of a provision, but rather on whether that provision has direct effect and 
gives rise to rights and obligations. On the broader question see Ruffert, “Rights and Remedies in European 
Community Law: A Comparative View”, 34 CMLRev. 307 (1997).
9 ,7 See in this sense Temple Lang, supra ( 1999), p. 277; Jones and Sufrin, supra (2004), p. 1219.
948 With regard to Art. 81 EC, the critical factor is the objective meaning and purpose of the agreement in its 
economic context, while the subjective intention o f the parties is immaterial. Vice versa, an agreement might not 
have as its object the restriction of competition merely because the parties subjectively aimed at this. In Art. 82 
EC, again, abuse is an objective concept and the intention of the dominant undertaking is irrelevant. However, 
exceptionally, intention may play a role in establishing an abuse of dominant position in predatory pricing cases 
and in cases, where the abuse takes the form of vexatious litigation, which is part of a systematic campaign or 
strategy of the dominant undertaking to intimidate, harass, and exhaust competitors by raising unreasonably
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O f course, we must distinguish conceptually between fault in the context o f the anti­
competitive conduct and fault in the context of civil liability and civil damages. Although 
interconnected, the two questions are different. The Court o f Justice in Courage stressed this 
conceptual difference in the following terms:
“Contrary to the submission of Courage, making a distinction as to the extent of the 
parties’ liability does not conflict with the case-law of the Court to the effect that it 
does not matter, for the purposes o f the application of Article [81] of the Treaty, 
whether the parties to an agreement are on an equal footing as regards their economic 
position and function. That case-law concerns the conditions for application of Article 
[81] of the Treaty w hile the questions put before the Court in the present case concern 
certain consequences in civil law o f a breach of that provision.”949 
It is the second context that we deal with here, i.e. whether culpability should play a role for 
the establishment o f civil liability flow ing from a proven antitrust violation, and the answer is 
that it should not. In all such cases, liability for EC competition law violations is strict. 
Indeed, the requirement of intention or negligence for the imposition o f fines and periodic 
penalty payments by the Commission or national competition authorities in the context of 
administrative public enforcement should be distinguished, because such penalties do not aim 
at compensating the victims of the anti-competitive practices but rather at punishing and 
deterring their perpetrators.950 Civil liability, on the other hand, while also containing 
deterrence and punitive elements, predominantly compensates the harm caused by anti­
competitive conduct, and this harm should not be compensated only in cases of the 
perpetrator’s fault.
This differentiates individual civil liability for violation of Community' competition law from 
its older sibling, state liability, which arises only where the Member State has committed a 
“sufficiently serious breach” of Community law 951 There is, how ever, no compelling reason 
for accepting such a requirement in individual liability' cases. Indeed, as some authors argue, 
there are inherent features in state liability, which justify and necessitate the “sufficiently 
serious breach” condition, but that cannot be transposed to individual liability for Community
their costs. For another recent Art. 82 case where intention seems to play an important role as a constituent 
element of the abuse, see Commission Decision of 15 June 2005 (AstraZeneca).
949 Courage, o p .c i tpara. 35. The Court was o f course dealing in that specific case with the issue of the 
plaintiffs contributory fault (see below'), but its clear distinction between fault for the establishment of the 
antitrust violation and fault for the civil liability is of general importance.
950 See Ait. 23 Reg. 1/2003 with regard to fines. The same is accepted also for periodic penalty payments.
951 Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III, op.cit., paras. 51,55 etseq.
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law violations.952 Such a limitation has been imposed on public policy grounds in order to 
limit the liability o f Member States when acting in their sphere o f legislative discretion. On 
the other hand, when Member States do not enjoy legislative discretion, liability according to 
the Court o f Justice is strict.953 Therefore, strict liability is more adequate for all breaches o f 
the Treaty competition rules.954
This principle is followed in the Commission’s Green Paper955 and has recently been 
solemnly recognised by the Court o f  Justice in Manfred], which enumerated the constitutive 
conditions o f individual civil liability but left the requirement of fault ou t956 This sits in stark 
contrast to some national laws, such as the German and Swedish Competition Acts, which 
require intention or negligence for a right in damages to arise.957 Some form of fault is also 
required in Finnish 958 Austrian,959 Danish, and Greek law. While national law can provide 
for detailed “executive” rules o f the right in damages, these rules cannot go as far as affecting 
the constitutive conditions o f individual civil liability, as set out in Courage and M anfredi, by 
adding stricter ctriteria based on the nature or degree of the infringement or fault. Such 
restrictive conditions are plainly incompatible with the specific constitutive conditions of the 
Community right in damages. This is not really a question of national remedial/procedural 
autonomy, to be dealt with under the Community principle of effectiveness, but rather a 
direct question o f supremacy o f Community over national law.
The recent Traghetti del M editerraneo case which deals with Member State liability for 
infringement o f Community law by national supreme courts, is indicative o f this importance 
difference 960 There, the Court of Justice had to decide on the compatibility with Community
952 See Saggio, supra (2001), p. 242.
953 Case C-5/94, Regina v. Ministry o f  Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Hedlev Lomas (Ireland) 
Ltd., [1996] E C R 1-2553, para. 28.
954 See in this sense Mail-Fouilleul, supra (2002), p. 592; Winckler, supra (2003), p. 128; Van Gerven, 
“Harmonization o f Private Law: Do we Need it?”, 41 CMLRev. 505 (2004), p. 522. See also T. Com. Paris, 22- 
10-96, Ste Ecosystem v. SA Automobiles Peugeot, commented by Idot, (1996-12) Europe 17, where the 
existence of fault resulted from the mere fact that Arts. 81 or 82 EC were infringed. See also T. Com. Nanterre, 
11 -5-06, Arkopharma v. Roche SA and Hoffmann La Roche SA, n° RG 2004F02643, reported by Debroux, Sept. 
2006, Vol. I, e-Competitions, in: http://Avww.concuirences.fr. The claim eventually tailed because of the 
passing-on defence and of absence of causal link, but it is interesting that the court considered that the 
Commission’s infringement Decision in the Vitamins cartel was enough to establish the defendant’s fault. It is 
not clear from this judgment whether the court merely confused the separate concepts of fault as to the 
infringement o f  the competition rules and fault as to the harm, or whether it implied that the second kind of fault 
is not one of the conditions for civil liability to arise in such cases.
955 Staff Working Paper, paras. 101-108.
956 Manfredi, op.cit., para. 61.
957 S. 33(3) GWB; Art. 33( 1) of the Swedish Competition Act.
958 Art. 18a( 1) of the Act on Competition Restrictions of 1992, as amended in 2004.
959 See Eilmansberger and Thyri, supra (2004), p. 54.
900 Case C-l 73/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Repubblica Italiana, Judgment of 13 June 2006, not 
yet reported.
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law o f an Italian rule that limited state liability solely to cases of intentional fault and serious 
misconduct on the part of courts. Rather than examining the Italian rule though the dual 
system national autonomy-Community law effectiveness, the Court stressed that national law 
could not interfere with the Community principle established by Köbler, according to which 
the manifest infringement of the applicable Community law by a national supreme court 
exceptionally leads to state liability for damage caused to individuals by reason o f that 
infringement.961 Thus, according to the Court, “under no circumstances may [national] 
criteria impose requirements stricter than that o f a manifest infringement of the applicable 
[Community] law, as set out in paragraphs 53 to 56 of the Köbler judgment”.962 In other 
words, when Community law itself defines the constitutive conditions of a specific 
Community right, it is not open to national law to restrict the exercise of that right. 
Transposing these principles to the case o f individual civil liability for EC competition law 
violations, national requirements or conditions o f  fault are incompatible with Community law 
and must therefore be set aside by national courts.
iii. Defences
A further issue that should be examined here is the extent to which individual civil liability 
may be blocked by having recourse to general principles that in all legal systems allow the 
defendants to invoke specific legal defences. Most of these legal defences have to do with the 
degree of the plaintiff’s contributory fault or with force majeure,963
As mentioned above, while neither the anti-competitive conduct as such nor the 
establishment of civil liability is dependent on fault, in some cases the degree of the 
plaintiffs culpability may affect the degree o f the defendant’s civil liability. We stress again 
that the significant or non-significant responsibility of a plaintiff (e.g. a co-contractor) in 
view of the assessment of his contributory fault in the context of the liability in damages (a 
question of civil law), should not be confused with the question o f participation of each 
undertaking in an anticompetitive agreement (question of competition law). Indeed, the fact 
that a party may claim damages against his co-contractor because he may not have the same
901 Köbler, op.ciL, paras. 53-56.
902 Traghetti del Mediterraneo, op. cit., para. 44.
90 This question is not usually addressed by the competition law littérature. For a rare exception see 
Winckler, supra (2003), p. 130 et seq.
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degree of responsibility is immaterial for the establishment o f a violation of Article 81 EC 
and the finding o f an anti-competitive agreement.964
Of course, damages claims as between co-contracting parties have been made easier after the 
Court of Justice recognised in principle in Courage that under Community law there is a right 
in damages for any harm caused by anti-competitive conduct, notwithstanding the fact that 
plaintiff and defendant may have been parties to the illegal agreement. However, national 
laws may take into account in this process the plaintiffs or a  third party's fault. The victim of 
the anti-competitive behaviour must, therefore, diligently make an effort to minimise his 
damage.965 Contributory fault as a  bar to civil liability is, indeed, a principle that already 
exists under Community law and indeed in most Member States’ legal systems.966 
The Court o f Justice in Courage has made a reference to the legal systems of the Member 
States to derive therefrom a common principle precluding a litigant from profiting from his 
own unlawful conduct. The Court has stressed, however, that the responsibility o f  the person 
concerned for the violation o f Community law must be “significant',.967 In assessing a party's 
responsibility, the national court could, according to the Court o f Justice, take into account a 
series of parameters: the economic and legal context of each case, the respective bargaining 
power and conduct of each o f  the co-contractors, whether a party is in such a substantially 
weak position that it cannot negotiate the contractual terms freely, and the cumulative effects 
on competition o f any other similar contracts, if parts o f a network.968
904 Some commentators confuse these tw o questions and see Courage as incompatible with earlier case law 
on the concept of agreements, See e g. Mertikopoulou, “The Shift o f the Treatment of Cartel Participants 
Infringing Article 81 EC and the Recent Tendencies of the Fining Policy of the European Commission”, 9 
Dikaio Epicheiriseon kai Etairion 43 (2003) [in Greek], p. 50. According to standard ECJ, CFI and Commission 
case law, an undertaking may bear responsibility (in the competition law sense) and foim part of an anti­
competitive agreement, irrespective of the degree of its participation in all or some cartel meetings or of its 
specific intention, as long as the former took part in one or some of the cartel’s constituent elements, thus being 
part of an overall plan to restrict competition (see e.g. cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-313/94 to T- 
316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV et a l v. 
Commission, [1999] ECR 11-931, paras. 772-773; upheld on appeal in cases C-238/99, C-244/99, C-245/99, C- 
247/99, C-250/99 to C-252/99 and C-254/99, Limburgse Vinvl Maatschappij NV (LI M) et al. v. Commission, 
[2002] ECR 1-8375, paras. 520-522, 586-587).
9ti Efforts to minimise damage must be distinguished from efforts to defend oneself against specific 
behaviour, as wrould be the case, for example, with a competitor that is being excluded from a specific market by 
a dominant undertaking. If such successful defence were possible, then this might mean that there was no 
dominant position in the first place, since the competitor could ahvays use alternative channels to enter that 
specific market.
9M> See Van Gerven, supra (2003a), p. 59. Indeed, the fact that the Köhler state liability principle is only 
limited to violation of Community law by supreme courts, can also be seen as recognition by the ECJ of the 
principle of contributory fault in the sense that individuals should not be able to seek damages in cases w here 
they did not try to challenge in a higher court the lower court’s violation o f Community' law\
90' Courage, op.ctL, para. 31.
908 Courage, op.cit., paras. 32-34.
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Apart from cases of contributory fault, damages claims may in certain circumstances fail, if  
they are exercised in an abusive manner. Indeed, the prohibition o f abusive exercise of rights 
is a principle that is common among EU Member States in one form or the other. On this 
issue, the Court o f Justice was seized with a  series of cases referred by Greek courts.969 The 
Court's response has been that, while a  national doctrine o f prohibition of the abusive 
exercise of rights must not be an obstacle to the exercise o f  Community law rights, the abuse 
o f  rights is also prohibited under Community law. In that sense, such a doctrine constitutes a 
general principle o f Community law 970 Therefore, in such cases, it is not appropriate to speak 
o f  a conflict between national and Community law, but rather of a conflict between two rules 
o f  Community law, i.e. the general principle of the prohibition o f the abusive exercise of 
Community law rights and the specific Community rule at issue.971
A Community law-based right will be exercised in an abusive manner, if the right holder has 
not acted in good faith and he disproportionately and unreasonably restricts other persons’ 
rights and if  the exercise of that right does not correspond to the objective pursued by the 
relevant Community provision (teleological interpretation).972 While the primary 
responsibility for the adjudication of this point remains at the hands of national courts, the 
latter cannot employ the abuse of rights doctrine in order to essentially weaken the 
effectiveness of Community law. In all such cases they are well advised to seize the Court of 
Justice through an Article 234 EC preliminary reference, so that the supremacy of EC law is 
not impaired.
A further defence that can be raised against an action for damages is that there may have been 
a national regulatory rule that approved of, encouraged or even imposed the problematic 
conduct in question. While the existence o f  such a national regulatory framework does not 
affect a finding o f infringement under the Treaty competition rules, it certainly affects 
liability for losses occurred as a result o f such anti-competitive conduct.973 In other words,
909 See e.g. Case C-367/96, Alexandras Kefalas et al. v. EUiniko Dimosio and Organismos Oikonomikis 
Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon, [1998] ECR1-2843; case C-373/97, Dionisios Diamonds v. EUiniko Dimosio and 
Organismos Ikonomikis Anasinkrotisis Epikhiriseon AEt [2000] ECR 1-1705.
970 See Stathopoulos, supra (2003), p. 523.
971 See in this sense A.S. Georgiades, General Part o f Civil Law (Athens/Komotini, 2002) [in Greek], pp. 
270-271; Engsig Sorensen, “Abuse of Rights in Community Law: A Principle of Substance or Merely 
Rhetoric?”, 43 CMLRev. 423 (2006), pp. 439-440.
972 See I. Karakostas and E. Yannopoulou, Community Law Rules and National Civil Law, Problems- 
Legislation (Alliens, 1997) [in Greek], pp. 43-44. See also case C-l 10/99, Emsland Stärke GmbH v. 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, [2000] ECR I-11569, which seems to require two elements for a finding of abuse 
of right: one objective (i.e. it must be evident that the intended objective of Community law cannot be achieved) 
and one subjective (i.e. subjective abusive intention). See further Weber, 31 LIEI 43 (2004), p. 51 etseq.
973 See in this sense Temple Lang, “European Competition Policy and Regulation: Differences, Overlaps, 
and Constraints”, Speech Made at the 3rd Antitrust Conference Organized by Ecole des Mines de Paris (Cema)
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interference by national regulatory rules does not mean that Articles 81 and 82 EC will not be 
applicable, possibly in combination with Article 10 EC, but national regulation can be a 
defence against actions for damages.
iv. Passing-on Defence
Certainly the most-discussed defence that can be put up against a damages action is the so- 
called passing-on defence, whereby the defendant claims that the plaintiff has passed his 
losses on to his customers and perhaps ultimately the consumers, so an award for damages 
would amount to unjustified enrichment. The passing-on defence, if given a broad reading, 
can be a fatal blow to any private antitrust enforcement action and some competition laws 
have taken a policy position to disallow or restrict it. This has been the case in US974 and 
recently in German law, although the German position is more nuanced.975 
General Community law, on its part, is not particularly receptive to the passing-on defence. 
In cases concerning unduly paid sums by traders to Member States in violation o f  
Community law, the national authorities invariably aigue that a repayment order would 
amount to unjustified enrichment because the traders have passed these charges on to the 
consumer. Thus, the Court o f  Justice has held that although in principle the passing-on claim 
may indeed have sound grounds, "‘as that exception is a restriction on a subjective right 
derived from the Community' legal order, it must be interpreted restrictively, taking account 
in particular o f the fact that passing on a charge to the consumer does not necessarily 
neutralise the economic effects of the tax on the taxable person” 976 Thus,
‘ihe existence and the degree of unjust enrichment which repayment o f a charge 
which was levied though not due from the aspect o f Community' law- entails for a 
taxable person[,] can be established only following an economic analysis in which all 
the relevant circumstances are taken into account”.977 
Advocate General Tesauro has encapsulated the Community judicature’s negative 
predisposition towards this specific defence in the following terms:
and University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Paris, January- 12th-] 3th, 2006), p, 31, fn. 43, stressing 
that no claim for damages can be made for loss caused by conduct that was not prohibited by a regulatory rule 
when it occurred.
974 See the US Supreme Court's landmark judgment in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machines Corp., 392 
US 481 (1968).
975 See below-.
970 Weber’s Wine, op.ciL, para. 95.
977 Ibid, para. 100.
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“I do not in fact believe it can be right to describe as unjust enrichment the profit 
derived by an individual from the reimbursement o f a charge unduly required and 
levied by the authorities. More especially, I do not believe that the State, which itself 
has actually obtained unjust enrichment by levying - for years, even - an unlawful 
charge, may then specifically rely on a principle o f  that kind to refuse to repay the 
sums unduly paid.”978
The question of the link between the passing-on defence and unjustified enrichment was 
recently given a fresh look by Advocate General Geelhoed, again in a case involving 
restitution o f unduly paid taxes and levies.979 The Advocate General followed an economic 
analysis and reached the conclusion that it is very difficult in a dynamic maricet environment 
to demonstrate a direct link between a chaige increasing the cost price and the price. Besides, 
even if this were possible, it still does not mean that the taxpayer is compensated fully for the 
extra costs o f the charge. In other words, passing on the charge is different from passing on 
the economic loss or damage caused to the trader as a consequence o f the unlawfully imposed 
charge. Such a loss might relate, in particular, to loss of competitiveness and to a drop in the 
volume of sales and thus in market share and profit.
According to the Advocate General, the degree to which amounts are passed on depends 
primarily on the price elasticity of demand. Only in the extreme event that the price elasticity 
o f  demand amounts to zero, will it be possible to pass on the chaige to the customer in full by 
means of a price increase. However, in the case of the vast majority o f products demand is 
more or less price elastic. The Advocate General concluded:
“These considerations lead me to the conclusion that it will be virtually impossible to 
demonstrate the degree to which the economic burden resulting from the chaige has 
been passed on. In order to do so it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of the 
market, taking into account a  large number of variables such as the structure of the 
market concerned (more or fewer providers) and the availability o f possible 
substitutes for the product affected by the charge. Account must also be taken of the 
fact that market conditions are dynamic in nature and that prices fluctuate according 
to changes in supply and demand. This makes it particularly difficult to establish what 
effect a charge has on the level o f the retail price. In order to establish that effect it
978 Cases C-192/95 to 218/95, Sté Comateb et a i  v. Directeur Général des Douanes et Droits Indirects, 
[1997] ECR 1-165, AG's Opinion, para. 21. Compare also para. 14 of AG Mancini’s Opinion in San Giorgio, 
op.cit.
979 Para. 73 et seq. of AG’s Opinion in case C-129/00, Commission v. Italy, op.cit.
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would ultimately be necessary' to establish how the prices and the sales would have 
developed if  no charge had been imposed.”980
This analysis can be easily transposed to the situation where the passing-on defence is raised 
between private litigants in a private antitrust enforcement action. There is no reason to 
protect the perpetrator of a serious competition law violation, who has for some time enjoyed 
the anti-competitive gains, to the detriment o f the victim o f the anti-competitive practices, 
just because the surcharge may have been passed on. There is an element o f deterrence here 
that should not be missed. Besides, as Advocate General Geelhoed rightly stresses, “the fact 
that the causal link between recovery and enrichment is relative where an amount is passed 
on is also clear from the opposite situation, that is to  say that it cannot be ruled out that the 
economic operator concerned will likewise be able to pass on the advantage o f  recovered 
charges to the final consumer by using the recovery' to reduce prices with a view to 
maintaining or strengthening his market position.”981
The above, however, does not mean, in our view, that the passing-on defence is or should be 
prohibited as a matter of Community law or that the mere existence of such a defence runs 
counter to the principle of effectiveness of Community law generally or o f competition law 
enforcement specifically.982 Unlike the US where the passing-on defence is expressly barred 
by the Hanover Shoe line of cases,983 the -  admittedly non-competition law-specific - case 
law of the European Court o f Justice is more nuanccd and prefers to deal with the issue on an 
ad hoc basis.984 In reality the Court’s approach is to refer to national law, while stressing that 
a general principle of prohibition o f unjustified enrichment exists also under Community' law, 
and to subject this defence to the demanding Community law limits of equivalence and 
effectiveness.985 In sum, the words o f  Advocate General Jacobs in Weber’s Wine can be
980 Ibid, para. 78.
981 Case C-129/00, Commission v. Italy, op.cit., AG 's Opinion, para. 79.
1)82 See in this direction Beard, supra (2005), p. 274.
983 The main reasons for the US Supreme Court’s rejection of the passing-on defence are (a) the fact that 
private actions and litigation would be extremely complicated, since it would be an insurmountable task to trace 
the exact effects of the anti-competitive overcharge, and (b) the risk that the offender might, at the end of the 
day, retain its unlawful profits.
984 Compare cases 331/85, 376/85 and 378/85, SA Les Fiis de Jules Bianco and J. Giranî Fils SA v. 
Directeur Général des Douanes et Droits Indirects, [1988] ECR 1099, para. 17: “Even though indirect taxes are 
designed in national law to be passed on to the final consumer and in commerce are normally passed on in 
whole or in part, it cannot be generally assumed that the charge is actually passed on in every case. The actual 
passing on of such taxes, either in whole or in part, depends on various factors in each commercial transaction 
which distinguish it from other transactions in other contexts. Consequently, the question whether an indirect tax 
lias or has not been passed on in each case is a question or fact to be determined by the national court which may 
freelv assess the evidence.”
985 Compare case 68/79, Hans Just I/S v. Danish Ministry fo r  Fiscal Affairs, [1980] ECR 501, para. 26: 
“The protection of rights guaranteed in the matter by Community law does not require an order for the recovery 
of charges improperly made to be granted in conditions which would involve the unjust enrichment of those
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transposed to this situation: Community law does not allow an unqualified passing-on 
defence but for such a defence to be successful ‘'it must also be established that unjust 
enrichment would ensue”.986 987In the same direction, the Commission's Green Paper on 
damages goes on to say:
“It can be said that there is no passing on defence in Community law; rather, there is 
an unjust enrichment defence which requires (1) proof o f passing on (which can be 
difficult in itself) and (2) proof o f no reduction in sales or other reduction to
• »*987income.
A  similar approach is followed in the latest amendment of the German Competition Act. The 
new section 33(3) GWB, instead o f totally excluding the passing-on defence, merely provides 
that “if a good or service is purchased at an excessive price, a damage shall not be excluded 
on account o f the resale of the good or service”. In reality, German law provides that the 
burden of proof falls on the defendant.
From the above it is clear that the recognition o f the passing-on defence by national law is not 
in principle incompatible with Community law and does not offend against its effectiveness. 
It is rather restrictive national rules imposing a heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs in this 
regard that may impair the effectiveness of Community law. More interesting is the question 
o f  the interrelationship between the possible permission o f the passing-on defence and the 
standing of so-called “indirect purchasers”.
v. Standing o f Indirect Purchasers and Consumers
The question of the standing o f indirect purchasers988 is closely connected with the 
prohibition or permission of the passing-on defence. Standing of indirect purchasers is indeed 
referred to at times as “offensive passing-on”.
entitled. There is nothing therefore, from the point of view of Community law, to prevent national courts from 
taking account in accordance with their national law of the fact that it has been possible for charges unduly 
levied to be incorporated in the prices of the undertaking liable for the charge and to be pased on to the 
purchasers”.
986 IVeber’s IVine, op.cit., AG’s Opinion, para. 49.
987 Commission Staff Working Paper, para. 173.
988 A more basic distinction can be made between primary and secondary victims. A primary victim is the 
person that did not buy at all because the anti-competitive price was above his reserve price. A secondary victim 
is a person that did buy albeit at the anti-competitive price. An attempt to identify the first is futile and it seems 
that even in the US there has never been a case where damages were awarded to a primary’ victim. So the 
question of compensation arises mainly with regard to secondary victims. Indirect purchasers belong to this 
second category. A further class of tertiary victims can finally be identified and refers to other parties that are 
injured as a result of an anti-competitive price, e.g. suppliers of the perpetrator o f the anti-competitive act that 
suffer damage as a result of reduced sales. Compensation of these victims would probably fail because of
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Under US antitrust law, indirect purchasers, for example traders that have purchased from 
retailers rather than from the manufacturer, cannot recover damages.989 The same applies to 
ultimate purchasers or consumers, notwithstanding the fact that the harm may have been 
passed on to them. US law clearly favours compensation only of direct purchasers and, 
indeed, it disallows the passing-on defence in this case.990 There is a powerful policy 
rationale behind this rule, that the direct purchaser is a more “efficient” plaintiff, ultimately 
preferable to indirect purchasers as “private attorney-general” . In general terms, the US rule 
seems to take into account certain prudential considerations such as the burden on the judicial 
system that would result if  the private right of action were available in an unlimited way to 
remotely injured plaintiffs.991 Denying indirect purchasers standing is also a direct 
consequence o f the exclusion of the passing-on defence, since the defendant and perpetrator 
of the antitrust violation should not be vulnerable to multiple actions referring to the same 
acts, while at the same time it is not open to him to rely on the fact that the damage may have 
been passed-on. In other words, the US system bans the defensive use o f the passing on 
principle by defendants, while at the same time banning its offensive use by indirect 
purchasers that base their claims exactly on the fact that the overcharge was passed on to 
them.
In the European context of damages claims, how ever, the constitutional status o f  the Treaty' 
competition provisions and the fact that they form the basis o f  rights for individuals, means 
that the US theories should not be uncritically adopted. This ‘Treaty' right” parameter o f 
private EC antitrust enforcement means that compensation o f victims o f anti-competitive 
practices cannot be ignored as easily in Europe as in the US.992 Therefore, the a priori 
exclusion o f indirect purchasers and consumers from the ambit o f the persons that can claim 
damages would not be compatible with Community law993 and, in addition, any allocative 
objectives o f  EC competition law would be undermined.994
difficulty to prove causation. On these categorisations see Calvani, “Competition Penalties and Damages in a 
Cartel Context: Criminalisation and the Case for Custodial Sentences”, Paper Presented in the Conference 
Organised by the Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics on Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy 
(Amsterdam, 17-18 February 2005), pp. 18-22.
989 Note, however, that state antitrust laws in the US may allow for indirect purchaser suits.
990 See the Supreme Court’s judgments in Hanover Shoe, op.cit., and Illinois Brick Co, v. Illinois, 431 US 
720 (1977). See further Rodger and MacCulloch, supra (1998), p. 602 et seq.
991 See Davis, “Standing on Shaky Ground: The Strangely Elusive Doctrine of Antitrust Injury”, 70
Antitrust LJ 697 (2003).
993 See Jones, supra (1999), ch. 16, who also considers that the ban of the passing-on defence should not be 
thought that it requires the simultaneous denial of standing to indirect purchasers.
993 See Temple Lang, supra (1999), p. 292; Brealey, supra (2002), p. 133.
994 See in this sense Toffoletto, supra (1996a), pp. 127-129. Compare the position taken by Norberg, supra 
(2003), p. 28, who stresses the importance of damages actions for the interests of the consumers.
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At the same time, from a practical point of view, the US and the Community system of 
private antitrust enforcement are in a quite different stage o f  development. Civil claims in the 
former make up the vast majority o f antitrust enforcement and private litigants with incentive 
offered by treble damages act as “private attorney-generals” thus increasing the deterrent 
effect of the law. While the compensatory function of such claims is not lost, it sometimes 
acquires a secondary place. On the other hand, in the Community system of competition law 
enforcement, civil claims - at least those where EC competition law is raised as a “sword” - 
have not been particularly numerous and damages awards are extremely rare. Prudential 
mechanisms therefore, aimed at curving private actions, at least at the current stage of 
development of private antitrust enforcement in Europe, may not represent the optimal 
solution from a policy perspective.
Besides, the Court o f Justice in Courage stressed that it is open to “any individual to claim 
damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition”.995 This was made clearer in Manfredi, where the Court o f Justice rendered the 
debate about indirect purchasers obsolete, by stressing, while defining the constitutive 
conditions o f the right in damages, that all affected individuals enjoy standing to sue, derived 
directly from the Treaty.996
The conferral by the Court of Justice of such a standing to direct and indirect purchasers alike 
would not lead to the unjust enrichment o f direct purchasers, since, as Community law 
currently stands, the passing-on defence would still be in principle available to deal with 
problems posed by the defendant’s unjustified enrichment.997 It is, nevertheless, true that 
some form of compromise can be attained so that multiplicity o f actions and plaintiffs is 
avoided, thus safeguarding the efficiency o f the whole system. The Green Paper seems 
conscious o f this and stresses de lege ferenda  the following:
“It is suggested that the determining factor could be the effective enforcement o f 
Community law. If limiting the rights o f certain individuals to claim is necessary' to 
ensure a system which is more effective in safeguarding the enforcement of Articles 
81 and 82, then it is submitted that such limitations should be acceptable under 
Community law. Therefore, it might be necessary to determine what rights must be 
facilitated to ensure an effective enforcement system rather than insisting on the
995 Courage, op.cit., para. 26, emphasis added. AG Mischo had been even more specific in this point, 
stressing in para. 38 of his Opinion that “the individuals who can benefit from such protection are, of course, 
primarily third parties, that is to say consumers and competitors who are adversely affected by a prohibited 
agreement” (emphasis added).
990 See above.
997 Compare Option 21 of the Green Paper.
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absolute protection o f all private rights. For the protection o f the rights o f consumers, 
a specific small claims procedure or collective action might be an efficient form o f 
redress given the very low level o f individual damage suffered in many o f the
” 998cases.
It would not be the first time, o f course, that the principle of effective judicial protection may 
be at odds with the principle of effectiveness of Community law and, indeed, commentators 
have long stressed that in such cases the instinctive approach of the Court of Justice would be 
to favour the latter over the former.98 99
Community law has, indeed, on occasions taken the policy decision to favour one particular 
plaintiff or defendant over another plaintiff or defendant. The Court of Justice in a recent 
case, interpreting the defective products liability Directive1000 seemed aware o f this 
problem.1001 It held there that the Directive had made a conscious choice to allocate liability 
to the producer of the defective products rather than to the suppliers. While acknowledging 
that the possibility of holding the supplier o f a defective product liable in accordance with the 
provisions o f the Directive would make it simpler for an injured person to bring proceedings, 
the Court felt that this would lead “to a  multiplicity of actions, with the supplier seeking 
recourse in turn against his own supplier, back up the chain as far as the producer”. The Court 
defended the Community legislator's choice that concentrated liability for defective products 
on the producer “after weighing up the parts played by the various economic operators 
involved in the production and distribution chain”, since, in the great majority o f  cases, the 
supplier does no more than sell the product in the State in which he bought it and only the 
producer is able to influence its quality. This show's that the allocation of liability can be quite 
a complex issue. It also shows that “weighing up the parts played by economic operators 
involved in the production and distribution chain” is better performed by the legislator than 
by courts.
In another recent case that concerned again the defective products liability Directive, the 
Court of Justice was asked to provide guidance on defendant-substitution, in particular, 
whether in case of an action brought against a company mistakenly considered to be the
998 Staff Working Paper, para. 180.
999 See, in particular, Prechal, “EC Requirements for an Effective Remedy”, in: Lonbay & Biondi (Eds.), 
Remedies fo r  Breach o f  EC Law (Chichester, 1997), p. 13; idem, Directives in European Community Law 
(Oxford, 2005), p. 144.
ioo° Qouncn [ ) jy ect ive 85/374/EEC o f  25 July 1985 on the Approximation o f the Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions o f the Member States Concerning Liability fo r  Defective Products, OJ [1985] L 
210/29.
1001 Case C-402/03, Skov s.Eg v. Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisi’arehus A/S v. Jette Mikkelsen 
and Michael Due Nielsen, [2006] ECR1-199, paras. 28-29.
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producer o f a defective product, it is open to the national courts to view such an action as 
being brought against the real producer and to substitute the latter, as defendant to the action. 
The Court preferred to defer to the principle of procedural autonomy and to the national 
court’s assessment but did specify that the national court, while examining the conditions 
governing such a substitution must, ensure that due regard is had to the personal scope of the 
Community legislation in question.1002 In the case of competition law-related actions, the 
courts would have to take into account the personal scope o f  Articles 81 and 82 EC, both w ith 
regard to plaintiffs and with regard to defendants.
From the above, it is obvious that, as Community law currently stands, it is open to any 
affected individual to bring a claim for damages on the basis of Articles 81 and 82 EC. That 
does not mean to say that the Community legislator could not make a policy decision and 
favour one particular class of plaintiffs over another, if  that would be beneficial to the 
effectiveness of the whole system o f private antitrust enforcement.1003 In so doing, however, 
the legislator should bear in mind the personal scope o f Articles 81 and 82 EC, which 
specifically mention consumers as the ultimate beneficiaries o f antitrust through the notion o f 
consumer welfare.1004 Indeed, it is encouraging that the Commission’s Green Paper itself has 
already made a clear policy choice in favour of consumers’ standing. Even under the most 
restrictive of the options that are considered, consumers are always conferred standing to 
sue,1005 and the Commission clearly sees the development of private antitrust enforcement 
partly through the consumers’ perspective.1006
vi. The Nature of Harm and Causation
In order for a damages claim to be successful, the existence of harm must first be established. 
Such harm must be certain, specific, proved, and quantifiable.1007 An intriguing question in 
competition law is how far can certain harm attract liability on antitrust grounds. In other
1002 Case C-127/04, Declan 0  'Byrne v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd. and Sanofi Pasteur SA, [2006] ECR I- 
1313, para. 39.
1053 If the Community legislator were to pursue such an option, it would inevitably have to deal also with 
the passing-on defence for those limited cases where a specific class of indirect purchasers will have been 
denied standing. In these circumscribed cases, the passing-on defence will have to be disallowed as against the 
preferred direct purchasers, otherwise the perpetrator would be able to retain his illegal profits.
1004 Of course, “consumer welfare” is certainly a different notion from “consumer protection” but the 
analysis of the two concepts lies outside the scope of this study.
1005 Staff Working Paper, section VI.
1006 See e.g. Wezenbeek, “Consumers and Competition Policy; The Commission's Perspective and the 
Example of Transport”, 17 EBLR 73 (2006), p. 82.
1007 See Van Gerven, supra (2005b), p. 9.
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words, should every kind o f harm of the victim o f an anti-competitive practice qualify under 
this specific liability in damages?
In the United States the courts address this issue through the concept of “antitrust injury”, A 
private plaintiff must prove an injury caused by anti-competitive conduct that is o f the type 
that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent. Such an antitrust injury does not exist, if the 
parly is damaged only by increased or continued rather than by decreased competition (for 
example by aggressive non-predatory competition) or if  the damage is the consequence o f 
conduct, to which antitrust law is indifferent.1008 However, the introduction of such a theory 
in EC competition law would not be appropriate and, indeed, the Commission's Green Paper 
has preferred to ignore “antitrust injury”. This was a wise choice because this US theory 
would offer nothing at all to the European context. Firstly, because that theory was employed 
in the US in order to deal w ith conduct which under EC competition lawr would not amount to 
a violation o f the rales in the first place. In other words, substantive law itself deals with the 
problem that the US doctrine was employed to address. A Brunswick kind of case in Europe 
would not have been dealt w ith as a  competition law violation.1009 Secondly, causation w ould 
block any remaining unmeritorious claims that could perhaps be based on a real violation of 
the competition rales yet resulted in no harm connected with that violation. Rather than 
importing another foreign notion, it is therefore preferable to deal with such claims on the 
basis of the standard conditions o f liability.
Going back to the plaintiff s burden to prove loss sustained as a result o f the breach of the 
antitrust rules, one may distinguish between proving the extent of the damage itself and 
proving the causal link between the latter and the antitrust violation.
The damage sustained by a victim o f  anti-competitive behaviour may first correspond to the 
difference between the price paid as a result o f a cartel or an abuse of a dominant position and 
the price that w ould otherwise be payable in the absence o f the former {damnum emergens). 
Problems with the quantification o f damages are more acute, when a firm is damaged in its 
commercial reputation or w hen it has lost potential clients, owing for example to a refusal to 
supply or to a collective boycott (lucrum cessans).1010
1008 See the following Supreme Court cases: Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 US 477 
(1977); Blue Shield o f Virginia v. McCready, 457 US 465 (1982), Associated General Contractors o f  California 
v. California State Council o f Carpenters, 459 US 519 (1983); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort o f  Colorado, Inc., 479 
US 104 (1986); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 US 328 (1990).
1009 In Brunswick, the owners of three bowling alleys sued for damage allegedly suffered because the 
defendant had acquired several competing bowling centres that, in the absence of the acquisitions, wrould have 
failed. Thus, the harm referred in reality to the fact that competition wus maintained and not eliminated.
1010 See also below.
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An early interesting proposal1011 that aimed at surpassing this problem was to follow the 
example of the law o f industrial property or unfair competition o f some legal systems 
(notably of France and Germany), where the loss is usually identified by reference to some 
criteria that have as one of their objectives to make it easier for the plaintiff to prove his loss 
while stripping the wrongdoer o f any profit derived from the infringement. Similarly, 
restitutionary damages,1012 which are known in some legal systems, can also be a useful 
remedy especially in cases where large groups o f consumers claim damages from a producer. 
These damages are calculated on the basis o f the profits derived by the violating entities 
rather than o f the actual harm caused to the victims of the anti-competitive practices. Such a 
remedy would better correspond to the Community principle o f effectiveness.1013 
Indeed, the new Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights follows this path 
and provides for the possibility o f damages to take into account “any unfair profits made by 
the infringer” or to be set as “as a  lump sum on the basis o f elements such as at least the 
amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorisation to use the intellectual property right in question”.1014 This approach is also 
followed in the new s. 33(3) of the German Competition Act, which provides that the award 
o f  damages for violation of German or Community competition law may take into account, in 
particular, the proportion of the profit which the undertaking has derived from the 
infringement. From the text employed, it seems that profit-skimming in this case does not 
refer to all the profits o f the perpetrator but only to that “proportion” directly derived from 
and associated with the antitrust violation. Time will tell whether this new provision 
introduces a covert causal link, which complicates rather than simplifies matters.
Basing the burden of proof by means of Community legislation would certainly provide for 
an appropriate solution to all causation-associated problems. Thus, a  drop in the plaintifFs 
turnover in the relevant market and a simultaneous rise of the defendant’s turnover could be 
rebuttable evidence that the losses incurred were caused by the anti-competitive practice in
1011 See Basedow, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: Ehlermaim & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Anmial 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 
2003), p. 34.
,0li On restitutionaiy damages see Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche, supra (2000), p. 872.
1013 See Jones, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: Ehlennann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 
26.
1014 Directive 2004/48/EC, Art. 13(1). See further Huniar, “The Enforcement Directive: Its Effects on UK 
Law”, 28 EIPR 92 (2006), p. 98. It is true that these damages resemple a lot the notion of exemplary damages, 
although the deterrent-punitive element here recedes before the elements of “fairness”.
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question.1015 Another idea is for the Commission to provide some guidance to national courts 
by publishing guidelines on damages that would define for example the core violations o f EC 
antitrust rules and the types of loss incurred by third parties and consumers, and that would 
also include model-cases dealing with the causation problem.
Indeed, the latter problem is by far the most serious. It is worth-noting that in most o f the 
cases where damages actions wore brought before national courts the plaintiff has 
encountered grave problems in proving the causal link between damage and unlawful 
conduct. The most acute problem lies in determining profit losses {lucrum cessans), i.e. 
whether such losses are due to the anti-competitive practise o f  a competitor or to external 
conjectural economic factors.1016 Likewise, it is also difficult to prove causation in suits 
brought by consumers. This is so, because the causal link between the anti-competitive 
conduct and the damage suffered by the end-consumer is usually considered tenuous.
English law', employs notions of foreseeability and remoteness and provides that the plaintiff 
has the burden to prove that the defendant’s unlawful conduct caused the harm and that it is 
the predominant cause of the plaintiff's loss.1017 Other national laws follow similar notions, 
depending on the legal tradition to which they belong. By way o f example, modem German 
civil law is based more on the theory o f  imputation, referring to the protective scope o f the 
law (Schutzzweck), than on the causa adequata theory, referring to the normal course o f 
events. According to the former theory; in order to establish a causal link between the 
damage and the harmful event, one must refer to the purpose of the rule violated and all 
possible consequences that are not covered by the protective scope of that rule must be 
eliminated.1018
It is also worth mentioning that the protective scope theory in the determination of the causal 
link has not found favour in the state liability case law o f the European Court o f Justice, 
which follows the direct causal link theory .1019 According to this theory the harm must be 
regarded as a normal or natural consequence o f the anti-competitive conduct, based on
1015 See Basedow, supra (2001), p. 464.
1016 See e.g. T. Com. Paris, 22-10-96, Ecosystem, op.cit, where the plaintiff failed to prove his damage 
based on lost profits. See further Mail-Fouilleul, supra (2002), p. 609; Winckler, supra (2003), pp. 134-136.
10,7 Compare Atkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd. et a l (IV) (QB (Com.Ct.)), [2003] EWHC 687, a case 
concerning liner conferences and the alleged violation of Art. 81 and 82 EC, where the court decided that the 
plaintiff s own irrational pricing policy w'as the predominant cause of his business failure. This case raises, 
however, some concerns about the effectiveness of the right in damages in Community competition cases, since 
the UK court found that the conduct of a plaintiff that continues trading wrongfully, although he knows that his 
business is evaporating, may break the chain of causation and thus exclude the defendant’s liability.
1018 See Mestm&cker, supra (2001), p. 235, w ith references to case law.
1019 See e.g. cases C-178/94 to C -l79/94 and C -l88/94 to C-190/94, Dillenkofer et al. v. Germany, [1996] 
E C R 1-4845, para. 21. See further Stathopoulos, supra (2003), p. 532; Van Gerven, supra (2005b), p. 8.
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common experience. Whether these notions are so different as to affect the effectiveness of 
Community law, remains unclear. The Commission in its Green Paper appears to take a less 
interventionist approach and considers that all these various national notions of causation are 
equivalent.1020 A similar approach has been taken by the European Court o f Justice in 
Manfredi, which enumerated the causal link as one of the constitutive conditions of 
individual civil liability but deferred to the national laws for the more detailed or “executive” 
conditions of that causal link.1021
vii. Nature and Measure of Damages
In order for a private action for damages to lead to effective antitrust enforcement, the 
measure o f damages must be of such a proportion that it can have a deterrent effect for the 
perpetrator of the anti-competitive acts and that it can represent a credible remedy for all 
future victims. Thus, damages must cover not only the direct damage, but also any indirect 
damage suffered in such a way, that the damages award contributes to deterrence.1022 
In this respect, it is firstly of fundamental importance that the victim gets fully compensated. 
This may not be evident, because many EU Member States legal systems do not allow for tort 
claims for pure economic loss. Yet, this kind o f loss is very likely to result from an anti­
competitive action. It is true that, depending on the legal system, damages may sometimes be 
asked according to the law’ of contract (contractual liability), if between the perpetrator o f the 
anti-compctitivc act and the victim exists a contractual relationship.1023 In such cases and 
unlike the case o f  tortious liability, in principle damages would cover also pure economic 
loss.1024 However, the exclusion of the reparation of pure economic loss, be it under tort or 
under contract, is certainly not compatible with the Community law basis o f the right in 
damages.
1020 Staff Working Paper, para. 273 et seq.
1021 In other words, the Court in Manfredi stresses that, as a matter of Community law, causal link is one of 
the conditions of civil liability for antitrust-related injuries (op.cit., para. 61), while at the same time accepting 
that it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to prescribe “the detailed rules governing the 
exercise of that right, including those on the application o f the concept o f  ‘causal relationship provided that 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed” (op.cit., para. 64, emphasis added).
1032 See Canivet, supra (1997), p. 26.
1023 This, however, is only possible in those legal systems, typically in the continental ones, where 
contractual liability is wide enough to encompass such claims. Common law, on the other hand, treats such 
claims under tort.
1024 This is the case for example under Austrian (see Günther, supra (2001), p. 319) and Finnish law (see 
Erämetsü, supra (2001), p. 222, fn. 257).
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As it is rightly pointed out, “if tortious liability for breaches o f Community law is to have any 
meaning, such losses must be eligible for compensation”.1025 Indeed, the Court o f Justice in 
Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame 111 has stressed that ‘total exclusion o f loss o f profit as a  
head for damage for which reparation may be awarded in the case of a beach o f  Community 
law cannot be accepted. Especially in the context o f  economic or commercial litigation, such 
a total exclusion of loss o f profit would be such as to make reparation o f damage practically 
impossible”.1026 The Court o f Justice placed particular emphasis on these principles again in 
Manfredi and, although it was not specifically requested by the referring courts to pronounce 
itself on this particular issue, it held:
“It follows from the principle of effectiveness and the right of any individual to seek 
compensation for loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition that injured persons must be able to seek compensation not only for 
actual loss (damnum emergens) but also for loss o f profit (lucrum cessans) plus 
interest ... Total exclusion o f  loss o f  profit as a head of damage for which 
compensation may be awarded cannot be accepted in the case of a breach o f  
Community law since, especially in the context o f  economic or commercial litigation, 
such a total exclusion o f loss o f profit would be such as to make reparation of damage 
practically impossible ... As to the payment o f interest, ... an award made in 
accordance with the applicable national rules constitutes an essential component o f  
compensation.”1027
A further issue of some complexity is quantification o f damages. The Commission in its 
Green Paper has presented certain econometric models that aim in one form or the other at 
bringing the plaintiff in the situation he would have been “but for” the illegal conduct (the 
counterfactual). In this context, the current situation o f the plaintiff is taken into account and 
the difference between the two covers actual losses and lost profits.1028 Whether such models, 
however, can be helpful, is unclear. In Arkin,1029 the court was provided, with detailed expert 
econometric evidence as to the position the plaintiff would have been in but for the anti­
competitive conduct of the defendants, but apparently it was not enthusiastic about that and 
adopted what can be called a “common sense approach”. This will most likely be the
1025 See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche, supra (2000), p. 893.
1026 Brasserie du Pêcheur Factortame III, op.cit, para. 87.
1027 Manfredi, op.cit., paras. 95-97. On the requirement to include compensatory interest in the damages 
award, see also Van Gerven, supra (2005b), p. 10, and paras. 122-124 of the Commission’s Staff Working 
Paper.
1028 Staff Working Paper, para. 125 etseq.
1029 Cited supra.
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approach of other national courts, and indeed, it is preferable for the Commission not to 
proceed in an eventual legislative proposal to such complex econometric models, at least in 
the short and mid-term, but rather wait for the national judges to acquire experience and 
acquaintance with this area. An over-optimistic set of guidelines with complex models might 
estrange national judges and give rise to defensive attitudes.
With regard, finally, to the nature of damages, the absence of punitive damages in Europe 
means that the primary function of civil claims remains the compensatory one, and only 
indirectly does deterrence come forward. While awards of purely compensatory damages 
certainly also create a psychological impact,1030 it is also true that the sole compensatory 
character o f damages does not constitute a sufficient incentive for the victim of the breach to 
bring a private action and a sufficient deterrent for the tortfeasor not to engage in anti­
competitive practices.1031 As it is rightly pointed out, this deficit has a negative impact upon 
compliance incentives and ultimately upon the efficiency of EC competition law enforcement 
itself.1032 Thus, while the introduction in Europe of all the incentives used by US law in 
private antitrust enforcement, such as pre-trial discover}', class actions, and contingency 
fees,1033 would neither be possible in the short ran,1034 nor indeed desirable (especially with 
regard to class actions and contingency fees), a considerable number of commentators 
increasingly views the possibility to recover punitive damages, at least in cases o f  eggregious 
violations of the competition rules, in particular in cartel cases, as the only alternative that 
would energise private antitrust enforcement in Europe and would really transform the 
private litigant to a  “private attorney-general”.1035
1030 In the words o f a commentator “the single most useful event might be for some bold Community 
plaintiff to win a significant damages judgment which really ‘bangs the bell”’ (see Jones, supra (2003), p. 106). 
This view' is also expressed by Faull, “Future Competition Law - Working Paper IF’, in: Ehlermann & Laudati 
(Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 1997: The Objectives o f  Competition Policy (Oxford, 1998), p. 508.
1031 Staff Working Paper, para. 112.
1032 See Norberg, supra (2003), p. 28.
1033 incentives for more private enforcement include one-way fee shifting, according to which if 
plaintiff prevails, defendant must pay the plaintiffs costs, but if defendant prevails, plaintiff is not required to 
pay the defendant’s costs, and joint and several liability of each defendant for the whole amount of trebled 
damages combined with the “no contribution rule”, according to which a defendant who has paid all damages 
cannot seek indemnity by other co-defendants. See further Venit, supra (2003), p. 572.
1034 See Norberg, supra (2003), p. 29.
1095 See Basedow, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 
2003), p. 35; Siragusa, “Panel Discussion: Modernization of EC Competition Law”, in: Hawk (Ed.), 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 1999, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 
(New York, 2000), p. 326. Compare also the public statements of Commissioner Kroes on 17 October 2005 
foreshadowing the Green Paper on private enforcement. See, however, Jones, supra (2003), pp. 102-105, 
according to whom, while treble damages are a powerful incentive for private enforcement in US law, their non­
availability in European law might have been overstated by European lawyers. According to this author, whose 
proposals have proved very influential in EC competition circles, the European legal systems provide for a very'
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Punitive damages, however, have traditionally been seen unfavourably in European 
jurisdictions,1036 while the sole compensator)7 function of civil damages has been considered 
a general principle permeating private law as a whole. According to this line o f thinking, the 
punitive or penal character of damages offends against the principle of proportionality, leads 
to the enrichment of the victim, and encroaches upon the value of human dignity o f every 
person, in casu o f the debtor.1037 Indeed, in the past, foreign judgments or arbitral awards that 
have awarded punitive damages in contractual or non-contractual liability cases have been 
denied enforcement in Europe on grounds of violation o f public policy, although there are 
many signs that this negative approach might be slowly changing.1038 Surprisingly, the utterly 
negative European predisposition vis-à-vis punitive damages is echoed in the recent 
Commission “Rome I f ’ regulation proposal on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations,1039 which includes an express provision in Article 24 on punitive damages 
awards, considered to be against the “Community public policy”.1040 
Notwithstanding this faux pas, it has been persuasively argued that there is already 
Community legislation, the late payments Directive,1041 which establishes a legal interest rate 
o f a punitive character, in order to deter late payment.1042 Punitive or exemplary damages for
useful alternative that US law lacks: prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest could in many cases reach the 
level of trebled damages.
1056 See e.g. Van Caenegem, supra (2004), p. 637, who refers to the US ‘‘monstrous” damage awards in 
antitrust cases.
1037 See e.g. Stamatis, “Recognition of a Foreign Judgment Awarding Punitive Damages”, 51 Nomiko Vima 
1553 (2003) [in Greek], pp. 1554-1557.
1Q3g In Greece, for example, the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) has lately accepted, as a principle, that 
foreign punitive damages awards are not p e rse  incompatible with public policy (onire public international), but 
it has invited lower courts to check on an ad hoc basis the disproportionate character of such awards, which 
under certain circumstances may be unacceptable (Areios Pagos n° 17/1999, 6 Koinodikion 69 (2000), 48 
Nomiko Vima 461 (2000); Areios Pagos n° 1260/2002,51 Nomiko Vima 1020 (2003)). While this jurisprudence 
is certainly the sign of a less dismissive attitude towards punitive damages as such, the minimum proportionality 
control amounts to a revision au fond, prohibited under private international law. Sec further Panagopoulos, 
“Punitive Damages and Greek Public Policy (or towards a Reevaluation of the Objectives of Civil Liability)”, 
2000(2) Kritiki Epitheorisi 195 [in Greek], p. 207 et seq. On the more restrictive attitude of German courts see 
Zekoll and Rahlf, supra (1999), p. 387 et seq:, P. Müller, Punitive Damages und deutsches Schadensersatzrecht 
(Berlin/New York, 2000), p. 17 et seq:, Wurmnest, “Recognition and Enforcement of US Money Judgments in 
Germany”, 23 Berkeley' JInt’lL 175 (2005), pp. 196-197.
1039 Commission Proposal fo r  a Regulation o f  the European Parliament and the Council on the Law 
Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations ("Rome II"), COM(2003) 427 final.
1040 According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the draft regulation, “Article 24 is the practical 
application of the Community public policy exception provided for by the third indent of Article 23(1) in the 
form of a special rule ... The effect o f Article 24 is accordingly that application of a provision of the law 
designated by this Regulation which has the effect of causing non-compensatory damages, such as exemplary or 
punitive damages, to be awarded will be contrary to Community public policy.” For critical comments against 
this unfortunate text see Stone, “The Rome II Proposal on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations”, 
4 ELF 213 (2004), p.222.
1041 Directive 2000/35/EC, OJ [2000] L 200/35.
1W2 According to Art. 3(1 Xd) of the Directive, the debtor is obliged to pay as interest the sum of the interest 
rate applied by the European Central Bank - or of the national central bank in case of Member States not
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competition law violations are also available under certain national laws1043 and this means 
that they must also be available for violations of EC competition law, further to the principle 
o f equivalence.1044 It is noteworthy that the Court of Justice in Manfredi did not exclude the 
possibility of awarding punitive damages. The Court clearly saw a possibility for the 
Community legislator to adopt rules on such damages and did not follow the approach of the 
“Rome II” regulation proposal to consider such awards contrary to Community public policy. 
Indeed, the Court stressed that
“as to the award of damages and the possibility o f an award o f punitive damages, in 
the absence o f Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic system of 
each Member State to set the criteria for determining the extent of the damages, 
provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed”.1045 
If the Court had shared the view of the drafters of the “Rome IP  regulation proposal that such 
damages awards are contrary to Community public policy, it would have said so expressly 
and, in any event, it would have certainly avoided to use the expression “in the absence o f 
Community rules governing the matter”, which implies that Community law can indeed 
proceed to the introduction of such awards without running the risk of legislating against a 
fundamental principle of Community public policy.1046
At any rate, if punitive damages were to be introduced by Community legislation, this would 
render obsolete the discussions as to their compatibility not only with Community' public 
policy but also with the public policy notions of the Member States, and the principle o f 
supremacy o f Community law would fully apply.1047 It is interesting that in the 2001 Florence 
Workshop on private enforcement former Advocate General van Gerven had drawn a draft 
regulation that contained a rule on exemplary' damages, according to which damages 
recoverable could exceed the payable compensation to the harmed person, though for not 
more than half o f it.1048 The Green Paper follows this course and includes in one o f its options 
the possibility' to award double damages “in case of the most serious antitrust infringements,
participating in the EMU - to its most recent main refinancing operation plus at least seven percentage points, 
unless otherwise specified in the contract. See Basedow, "Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: 
Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC 
Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 35.
1043 See s. 14(5Xb) of the Irish Competition Act.
im  Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III, op.cit, paras. 89-90; Manfredi, op.cit., para. 93.
1045Manfredi, op.cit., para. 92, emphasis added.
1046 It is now clear after Manfredi that the relevant text of the regulation proposal and, in particular, its 
Explanatory Memorandum will have to be amended accordingly.
104' Such Community legislation may have as its indirect consequence a shift in the perception of public 
policy in the EU Member States with regard to foreign judicial and arbitral decisions that award punitive 
damages, since the latter will no longer offend against the fundamental values of these legal systems.
1048 See Van Gerven, supra (2003a), pp. 90-93.
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i.e. horizontal cartels”.1049 It is interesting that the Commission, perhaps being prudent in an 
over-sensitive area does not view such damages awards in their punitive nature but rather as 
“a clear incentive for claimants to bring antitrust damages cases”. While, indeed, the  
introduction o f double damages will be a powerful incentive for plaintiffs, it would m ake 
better sense if  the Commission abandoned its timidity and declare in open terms the punitive 
nature o f these awards. Such an approach would enhance the deterrent effect and the 
effectiveness o f this instrument. If the Community judges in M anfred l did not shy away from 
addressing this question, the Commission should not feel constrained either.1050
c. Injunctions
Apart from damages, other civil remedies may prove equally efficient from a p lain tiffs 
perspective in an EC competition private action. Injunctions, i.e. court-ordered measures 
requiring the defendant to cease any anti-competitive conduct and to desist from such 
conduct in the future, are the most important, especially when an anti-competitive behaviour 
would be better fought with an injunction, rather than with an eventual damages award.1051 
An injunction can contain detailed negative and positive orders aiming at changing the 
competition law infringer’s conduct in the market generally and vis-à-vis the victim o f  the 
anti-competitive conduct specifically.1052 Although the recent Commission Green Paper 
regrettably does not deal with all remedies pertaining to private enforcement, including 
injunctions, but is limited to damages, there is no doubt that injunctions should also be seen 
as part of private antitrust enforcement.1053
1049 Option 16 of the Green Paper. The specific text seems to refer to horizontal cartels in an indicative 
manner. It is unclear, however, whether the Commission considers the possibility of introducing such punitive 
damages in other serious infringements o f competition law, e g. in serious abuses of dominant position. 
Nevertheless, public statements by Commission officials seem to indicate that double damages would be 
introduced, if at all, only for horizontal cartels. Such an option would make better sense in terms of legal 
certainty and predictability, since it is not always easy to categorise an abuse of dominance as “serious”, while 
horizontal cartels are clearly identifiable as such.
1050 There may be strategic concerns behind this “timidity” of the Commission, having to do with the 
legislative process. In other words, presenting double damages as an “incentive” rather than as “punitive”, may 
enhance a potential Community measure’s chances in the Council and the Member States and may indeed even 
affect the choice of the appropriate legal basis (see above).
1051 It should be stressed that s. 4 of the US Clavton Act, apart from damages, provides also for injunctive 
relief to any person injured by a violation o f  the antitrust law's. However, the common law principle that an 
injunction cannot be obtained if the plaintiff can be fully compensated w ith damages, applies to that case, too.
1052 See Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, supra (2000), p. 927, and the cases cited in fn. 1054. According to 
those authors, injunctions represent the most common civil remedy in national court proceedings for violation of 
competition law'.
2053 Indeed, the Green Paper sees interim and permanent injunctive relief as one of the different forms that 
private enforcement of EC competition rules can take (Staff Working Paper, paras. 16-17).
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An injunction may prove a particularly valuable remedy in Article 82 EC cases and in cases 
involving intellectual property rights.1054 Usually the victim of an abuse of dominant position 
seeks to enjoin the dominant undertaking to cease the abusive behaviour, through a positive 
or negative act. A positive act can be the continuation o f contractual relationships (in case of 
a refusal to supply) or even the conclusion of a new contract by the dominant undertaking 
with the victim of the abuse (Kontrahierungszwang).
Most legal systems recognise the remedy o f  injunction in competition law cases,1055 but 
inconsistencies do exist. Thus, under English law an injunction will only be granted, if 
damages are unlikely to be an adequare remedy.1056 This principle, however, seems to be at 
variance with Community law, if applied as absolute bar to the right to an injunction. 
Continental legal systems, on their part, make injunctions available irrespective of the 
availability of damages.1057
The position in German law has been until recently that a duty to contract 
{Kontrahierungszwang) and a claim to be supplied (Belieferungsanspmch) exists only in 
abuse of dominance cases, since these remedies are considered incompatible with the
1054 E.g. in a Dutch case a patent holder was ordered against payment of royalties to refrain from measures 
which could impede the use of its patent by a third party (Court of Appeal of Den Bosch, 18-1-77, Heidemij v. 
Brottbemalitig, (1977) Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 463; [1978J1 CMLR 36, cited by Sevinga, supra (1994), pp. 
177-178, 200).
1055 A direct national legal basis for injunction claims is provided for by s. 14(5Xa) of the 2002 Irish 
Competition Act and s. 33(1X2) of the German Competition Act, as recently amended. Other legal systems 
arrive at the same result by employing non-competition law-specific provisions in their civil laws.
1056 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon (HL), [1975] AC 396. In England it seems that no permanent 
injunction has ever been ordered by the courts, possibly as a result of an inclination of the litigants to settle, but 
there is no reason to doubt that English courts would deal with a claim for a permanent injunction differently 
than with a claim for an interlocutory injunction. See Kerse, supra (1998), p. 436; Lane, supra (2000), p. 203; 
Tritton, Davis, Edenborough, Graham, Malynicz and Roughton, supra (2002), p. 939. On interlocutory 
injunctions in English courts, see below.
1057 Under German and Greek law, the violation or the risk of violation o f a specific right means that the 
court can make a cease and desist order, notwithstanding the possibility of a damages claim. In Greece, where 
there is no specific provision in the Competition Act on injunctions, unlike the new s. 33(1X2) of the German 
Competition Act, an injunction for specific performance (including the conclusion of a new' contract) can have 
the form of in natura compensation and may find its legal basis in Arts. 914 and 297, or alternatively in Arts. 
914, 281 and 288 of the Greek Civil Code. On German law, see Braun, supra (1996), pp. 431, 580, with 
references to case law, and on Greek law, see Koutsoukis, supra (1993), p. 343; Diopoulos, supra (2000), pp. 
251-252, 289; Liakopoulos, supra (2000), p. 499. In France it is accepted that injunctions are possible (see 
Boulanger, supra (1997), p. 196), even injunctions ordering the conclusion of a contractual relationship (see A. 
Tercinet, Droit européen de la concurrence, Opportunités et menaces (Paris, 2000), p. 121). See also the sui 
generis provision of Art. L442-6(3Xb) Code de commerce, which gives locus standi to request an injunction 
also to the public prosecutor and to the Minister of the Economy. In Belgium an injunction (action en cessation) 
can be based upon unfair competition law (Art. 54 o f the 1971 Act on Commercial Practices); see Noirfalisse, 
supra (1994), p. 63, with references to case law. The same is accepted in Austrian law, w'here an anti­
competitive conduct is also considered to fall under s. 1 of the Unfair Competition Act (UWG) (see Maitz- 
Strassnig, supra (1999), p. 34; Günther, supra (2001), p. 320), and in Italian law, where parties can rely on Art. 
2599 of the Civil Code (see Ligustro, supra (1992), pp. 219-221).
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protective scope (Schutzzweck) o f  Article 81 EC.1058 German courts seem to feel entitled to 
detect the Schutzzweck of that provision, in excluding the possibility o f injunctions ordering 
positive measures, although such an authoritative and final interpretation is clearly reserved 
only to the Community Courts.1059 It is unclear whether the new text of s. 33(1) GWB, which 
makes injunctions available also to Article 81 EC cases, is a departure from that approach.
It is interesting that this question has also arisen in the context of administrative enforcement 
by the Commission. The Court o f  First Instance was confronted with this question in 
Automec II.1060 There, the complainant had been refused an injunction by the Commission 
requiring BMW to supply it with vehicles. Freedom of contract was according to the Court 
the basic rule, therefore the Commission could not order a party- to enter into a contractual 
relationship “where as a general rule the Commission has suitable means at its disposal for 
compelling an enterprise to end an infringement”.1061 In the Commission’s view such purely 
positive measures may be more justifiable in Article 82 EC cases,1062 
These Community pronouncements, however, are not conclusive for the proposition that a  
duty to contract can never be a remedy in Article 81 EC private enforcement cases.1063 First, 
the Court o f First Instance and the Commission qualify their position by stating that such 
measures are excluded “in principle” , thus leaving the possibility' of exceptions. Second, they 
both refer to Community administrative and not to national civil proceedings. Indeed, the
1058 See the judgment of the Federal Supreme Court in the Depotkosmetik case, BGH, 12-5-98, City' 
Parfümerie Jürgen Rathjen GmbH v. Deutsche Lancôme GmbH, 53 BB (1998) 2332. See further on this issue 
Birk, “Belieferungsanspnlche bei Verstoß gegen Ait. 81 EG?”, 11 EWS (2000) 485, p. 486 et seq.\ Roth, 
“Europäisches Kartellrecht - Terra IncognitaT\ 53 NJW (2000) 1313, p. 1314. ln Greece, too, the equivalent 
national provision of A rt 81 EC, Art. 1 L. 703/1977, is thought not to provide for a right to be supplied or for a 
duty to contract, unlike the provision of Art. 2 L. 703/1977, equivalent to Art. 82 EC. See e.g. Monomeles 
Protodikeio Athens n° 18743/1992, in: D. Koutsoukis and D. Tzouganatos, The Application o fL . 703/1977 ‘on 
the Protection o f  Free Competition Vol. HI, 1990-1995 (Athens, 1996) [in Greek], p. 323 etseq.
1059 See the critical comments of Von Winterfeld, “Zum Schutzzweck des Art. 81 EG-Vertrag und zu den 
Rechtsfolgen eines Verstoßes nach nationalem deutschen Recht”, in: Bradner, Hagen & Stümer (Eds.), 
Festschrift fü r  Karlmann Geiß zum 65. Geburtstag (Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, 2000), p. 669, as to the 
national court’s usurpation of the ECJ’s exclusive competence to interpret the protective scope of Treaty rules.
1060 An argument against the possibility of an injunction ordering the continuation of a contractual 
agreement under Art. 81 EC is also sometimes derived from the ECJ judgment in cases 228/82 and 229/82, Ford 
o f  Europe Incorporated and Ford-Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission, [1984] ECR 1129, where the Court 
annulled the Commission’s interim measures decision (Commission Decision 82/62S/EEC of 18 August 1982 
{Distribution system o f Ford Werke AG - interim measure), OJ [1982] L 256/20) ordering Ford to supply its 
distributors in Germany right-hand drive cars. However, this happened as a result of procedural irregularities 
and not because such a positive measure cannot be ordered in principle in Art. 81 EC cases. See further on this 
case Idot, “Les mesures provisoires en droit de la concurrence : Un nouvel exemple de symbiose entre le droit 
français et le droit communautaire de la concurrence”, 29 RTDE 581 (1993), p. 595.
1061 Automec II, op.cit., para. 51. The other means are presumably the prohibition of an agreement, the 
withdrawal o f the benefit of an individual or block exemption and fines and/or periodic penalty payments.
1062 See the Commission's arguments in Automec II, op.cit., para. 43.
1063 See the critical comments of Idot, “La situation des victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles après les 
arrêts Asia Motor et Automec IF , (1992-12) Europe 1, pp. 3-4. For a more general outlook of the injunctive 
remedies granted by the Commission, see Mail-Fouilleul, supra (2002), pp. 85-100,
Court o f First Instance specifies that it is incumbent upon the national courts, where 
appropriate, in accordance with the rules o f national law, to order one trader to enter into a 
contract with another.1064 A duty to contract, therefore, as a civil remedy in Article 81 EC 
cases should not be excluded. Indeed, national courts in many jurisdictions have been 
accustomed to such remedies, which may contradict the 19,h century concept o f freedom o f 
contract, but have been readily available in the last century.
An injunction may be an efficient remedy not only in its permanent, but also in its 
preliminary form. Such preliminary injunctions can be attained by national courts,1065 
notwithstanding any parallel competence o f  the Commission1066 or national competition 
authorities to take similar provisional measures. The former are o f civil nature and are aimed 
at the protection o f private interests by provisionally securing civil claims, such as a claim for 
damages in case o f alleged anticompetitive harm,1067 whereas the latter are of administrative 
nature and are basically aimed at safeguarding the public interest - at least as far as the 
Commission is concerned1068 - at avoiding the continuation o f the illegal practice, and at 
restoring the status quo ante. However, it is true that in some cases this distinction becomes 
less apparent with both kinds o f interim measures leading to the same result.
Interim measures have been ordered on many occasions by national courts in EC competition 
law cases.1069 In some jurisdictions the judge enjoys wide powers and may order ad hoc
1064 Automec II, o p .c i tpara. 50.
1065 See Canivet, “Aspects stratégiques du procés en droit de la concunence”, in: Les aspects contemporains 
du droit de la distribution et de la concurrence, Actes du colloque de l ’Université de Toulouse I  (24 et 25 mars 
1995) et conférences de doctorat (Paris, 1996), p. 104.
1006 In Rcg. 17/1962 there had been no explicit reference to the possibility of the Commission to take 
interim measures. This gap w as filled by the ECJ in case 792/79, Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, [ 1980] ECR 
119, para. 19. The Commission could adopt interim or interlocutory measures in urgent cases, in order to avoid 
a situation likely to cause serious and irreparable damage to a complaining party or harm to the public interest. 
However, Art. 8(1) Reg. 1/2003 excludes the protection of private interest as such from the scope of 
Commission-ordered interim measures (see reference to “serious and irreparable damage to competition”). 
Interim measures with the sole aim to protect the private interest o f a complainant or plaintiff can only be 
adopted either by NCAs, if their national law so provides, or by national courts. O f course, it is very likely for 
an anti-compelilive practice that damages a specific person to harm the public interest in general. For a critical 
comment of this restriction of the conditions for the granting of provisional measures by the Commission see 
Idot, supra (2004c), pp. 125-126. Compare also the Press Release of the Greek Competition Committee of 24 
October 2005 on the availability of interim measures. There, the Greek authority makes clear that it will follow 
the EC approach, referring to Ait, 8(1) Reg. 1/2003, and w ill no longer entertain interim measures applications 
by private parties.
100' See e g. Koutsoukis, “The New Institution of Interlocutory Relief in Competition Law Cases (L. 
703/77)”, 48 Epitheorisi Emporikou Dikaiou 153 (1997) (in Greek], p. 161, on the discussion of the relationship 
between interim measures in the Greek Competition Act - that can be taken only by the Competition Committee 
- and ordinary interim measures of civil procedural law - that are ordered by civil courts.
1008 On the new text of Ait. 8(1) Reg. 1/2003, see above.
1069 For a Dutch preliminary injunction to resume supply in an Art. 82 EC case, see Pres. Rechtbank 
Amsterdam, 5-4-79, Van Gelderen Import BV v . Impressum Nederland BV, (1981) NJ 129, discussed by Visser 
’t Hooft, “Japanese Law and the Unilateral Termination of Distribution Agreements: A Comparison with Dutch 
Law”, in: Grosheide & Boele-Woelki (Eds.), Europees Privaatrecht 1995 (Lelystad, 1995), p. 194. See also the
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measures, such as an announcement in the press or to the victims of an anti-competitive 
practice regarding the illegality o f  that practice.1070 In some legal systems it is even possible 
for a court to award “provisional damages”, if  it appears certain, already at a preliminary' 
stage, that an unlawful act has taken place that has causally led to harm being inflicted upon 
another.1071
Problems may be encountered in legal systems, where courts are not willing to enter into the 
assessment of very complicated factual circumstances at such an early stage o f the trial, 
without entering into the substance o f the case.1072 However, the task o f a national court may 
be far easier, in case the illegality o f  a certain practice has already been established by the 
Commission or by the Court of Justice. In such circumstances, there is no doubt that at least a 
prim a fa c ie  case exists as to the anti-competitive nature o f  the practice in question.1073 
Irrespective o f the legal bases for permanent and interim injunctions provided by national 
laws, Community law has now' sufficiently progressed to provide itself such a remedy. Thus, 
an injunction on grounds o f violation o f  Community' competition law is based on Community’ 
law itself, exactly as the right in damages derives from the Treaty. The Court o f  Justice has in 
the past dealt with the case o f  preliminary' injunctions vis-à-vis the Member States in 
Factortame / ,1074 *but this principle is considered to apply to permanent injunctive relief,
Irish case Patrick Dunlea & Sons v. Nissan (Ireian) Ltd., cited by Maher, supra (1999), p. 293, where the 
defendant had terminated its distribution agreement with the applicant, who had started to sell imported second 
hand cars of the same brand. The latter alleged that the notice for the termination of the agreement was too short 
and that the conduct of the defendant amounted to an abuse of dominant position. The Irish High Court granted 
the injunction as requested. For English cases see Cutsforth v. Mansflield Inns (QB), [1986] A11.ER 577; 
Holleran v. Daniel Thwaites pic. (Ch.), [1989] 2 CMLR 917. See also Shawr, “United Kingdom”, in: Behrens 
(Ed.), EEC Competition Rules in National Courts, Vol. 1, United Kingdom and Italy (Baden-Baden, 1992), p. 
85.
1070 For a Dutch case, see e g. Pres. Rechtbank Utrecht, 11-2-92, FNKSCK, cited by Sevinga, supra (1994),
pp. 200-201.
1071 See e.g. Braakman, supra (2000), p. 171.
1073 This is the case for example in Denmark (see Fejo, “Denmark”, in: Behrens (Ed.), EC Competition 
Rules in National Courts, Vol. VI, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Austria (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 63), in 
France (see Boulanger, supra (1997), p. 226 et seq.), and in Holland (see Sevinga, supra (1994), p. 153). On 
some weaknesses of such provisional measures of civil nature, in particular with regard to specific areas of 
competition law, such as to essential facilities, see Hatzopoulos, supra (2002), pp. 170-172.
1073 See Boulanger, supra (1997), p. 228, referring to the requirement in French law of a trouble 
manifestement illicite. It appears that the Cour de Cassation has adopted a less restrictive interpretation of the 
above criterion w ith regard to Community lawr(see Cass.com., 10-7-89, Bodson v. PFRL, Bull.Civ., 1989, IV, 
n° 216).
10 4 It should not be missed that the juge-rapporteur in Factortame I  w as Judge Kakouris, who has argued 
against the existence of a principle of national procedural autonomy. See further Diez de Velasco, “L’acquis 
communautaire : La contribution de Monsieur le Juge Kakouris à son développement”, in: Problèmes 
d'interprétation à la mémoire de Constantinos N. Kakouris (Athènes/Komotini/Bruxelles, 2004), pp. 96-97.
10 3 See in this sense Beneyto, supra (1994), p. 312. Compare, in that context, the existing Community 
legislation on injunctive relief in consumer protection (Directive 98/27/EC). For a critical overv iew' of that 
Directive see Van Gerven, supra (2003b), p. 13.
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Thus, returning to the scheme o f former Advocate General Van Gerven on the existence of 
Community law remedies, injunctive relief is one of the specific remedies that are available 
to individuals for violations o f Community law.1076 It is indeed expected that the Community 
Courts’ jurisprudence will further build upon the Courage principles and recognise the 
Community law basis not only for the damages claim but also for injunctife relief claims as 
between private individuals, as expounded by the Former Advocate General Van Gerven,1077 
Advocate General Jacobs in a recent Opinion follows this course. InAOKBundesverband the 
Advocate General stressed that “both damages and injunctive relief would as a matter o f  
Community law be available to anyone suffering loss as a consequence of [anticompetitive] 
conduct, subject to such national procedural rules as were compatible with the principles o f 
equivalence and effectiveness.”1078 According to the Advocate General, the Courage 
principle would equally apply to injunctive relief. This is now also accepted by the 
Commission Green Paper, which stresses:
“Whereas nullity as a sanction for infringements o f Article 81 EC has been explicitly 
foreseen by the EC Treaty itself (Article 81(2) EC), damages actions or actions for 
injunctive relief can be deduced from Article 10 EC. In addition, according to the 
case-law of the Community Courts, the full effectiveness of directly applicable 
Community law requires national courts to have jurisdiction to grant interim 
relief.”1079
d. Restitution and Declaratory Actions
Other civil remedies for the purposes o f private antitrust enforcement include restitution and 
declaratory actions. Restitution may be a convenient remedy for the victim of the anti­
competitive conduct, because, rather than proving the harm and the causal link between harm 
and prohibited conduct, which can be too onerous a task for a private litigant, it is enough to 
prove that a company has become richer in an unjustified manner to the detriment of the
1076 See above.
10 7 See Van Gerven, supra (2003a), pp. 63-66.
1078 Para. 104 of AG’s Opinion in cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband 
etal. v. Ichthyol-Geselischaji Cordes e t a l [2004] ECR1-2493.
1079 Staff Working Paper, para. 17, with references to AG Jacobs’s Opinion in AOK Bundesverband. See 
also in this direction Stuyck, “The Specificity of Consumer Law in the Process o f Europeanization of European 
Contract Law”, Paper Presented at the EUI Conference on the Europeanisation of Private Law (Florence, 24-25 
October 2003), p. 2.
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plaintiff. Most legal systems provide for such a remedy,1080 although relevant court decisions 
are quite rare.1081 In competition law, this specific remedy takes the form of a claim aimed a t 
the restitution of a benefit that is passed on to and enjoyed by the defendant because o f  his 
anti-competitive behaviour. The recent Luftfartsverket case in Sweden is perhaps the m ost 
well-known example of a successful restitution claim on EC competition law grounds. There, 
the airline SAS obtained restitution o f sums close to € 100 million for losses caused by the 
Swedish Board of Civil Aviation’s abuse of dominance through discriminatory pricing.1082 
As mentioned above, restitution is, in the current stage o f development o f Community law, a  
remedy provided in principle by Community law itself.1083 There is abundant Community' 
case law that refers to restitution o f charges and taxes levied in violation of Community' law 
by public authorities. The Court has stressed in all these cases that repayment or restitution o f  
unlawfully levied charges is required as a matter o f Community law,1084 while delegating the 
conditions of the exercise of this right to national law, subject to the Community law 
requirements of equivalence and effectiveness. Post Courage Marfredi. it is not a novelty to 
say that under Community law there is also in principle a right of individuals as against other 
individuals to restitution for sums paid in violation to Community' law. This is so, because the 
requirement of effective judicial protection should not have a different function in such 
private disputes.
Finally, as to the remedy of declaratory action (Feststellungsklage), most national legal 
systems recognise the possibility o f  a  judicial declaration o f the legality or illegality attached 
to certain facts that the plaintiff alleges.1085 A declaratory judgment may be quite useful for a  
litigant, because it states clearly the legal situation at a specific point in time with a res 
judicata effect inter partes. In the context of competition law, such judgments may declare 
that a certain agreement or conduct is legal or illegal according to the Treaty competition
1080 For Greece see Art 904 of the Civil Code; further Iliopoulos, supra (2000), pp. 303-304. In France 
compare the specific and atypical provision of Art. L442-6(3)(b) Code de commerce, according to which 
restitution may be claimed on behalf of the victim of certain anti-competitive practices by the public prosecutor 
and by the Minister of the Economy.
Id81 For a Greek case, see Eirmodikeio Thessaloniki n° 722/1983, 4 RHDE 187 (1984), where the court 
considered that a dominant undertaking (in that case, Olympic Airways, a legal monopolist at that time) had 
abused its dominant position in imposing an unfairly high cancellation fee covering the whole price of an air 
ticket to an individual. The court ordered Olympic Airways to restitute to its client a certain percentage of the 
ticket price, to the extent of this constituting unjustified enrichment. For further national cases see Ritter, Braun 
and Rawlinson, supra (2000), p. 928, fo. 1055.
1082 On this case, seeBemitz, supra (2003), p. 198.
1083 See above on former AG’s Van Gerven’s system o f Community law remedies.
1084 See above.
1085 Declaratory claims are always filed against a specific defendant, i.e. they introduce inter partes 
proceedings.
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provisions.1086 To give an example, under the new system of enforcement they may declare 
that an agreement is legal, either because it does not fall under Article 81(1) EC or because it 
satisfies the conditions of Article 81(3) EC.1087 More specifically, they may also declare the 
validity or nullity o f an agreement on the basis of Article 81(2) EC.1088 In this context, 
reference is made to the actions en nullité, recognised in some Romanic legal systems.1089
2. The Procedural Law Framework
a. National Procedural Divergences and the Challenge for an Effective System of EC 
Private Enforcement
As mentioned above, Community law does not in principle deal with the detailed procedural 
questions pertaining to its application by national courts. Those questions are subject to 
national procedural laws, pursuant to the principle of institutional or procedural autonomy of 
the Member States.1090 Yet, this reference to national law does not mean a carte blanche 
delegation. Again, national procedural autonomy finds its limits in die Community law 
principles of equivalence or non-discrimination and effectiveness.
National procedures may differ a lot among the EU Member States, especially between civil 
and common law systems. Indeed, at times there is not even agreement as to what constitutes
1086 See on such declaratory civil claims Eriimetsa, supra (2001), p. 220; Grbning, supra (2001a), p. 582. 
See also s. 14(5Xa) of the 2002 Irish Competition Act, which explicitly refers to such civil claims.
1087 It should be stressed that, in the public enforcement context, such a declaratory “positive” decision can 
only be taken by the Commission and not by NCAs. This, however, does not affect national courts’ power to do 
so under their national procedural laws (see also Ehlermann, supra (2000b), p. 3). It should be stressed that such 
civil proceedings presuppose the existence of a genuine dispute between the parties and should not be 
considered as ex parte. Neither should they been seen as alternative to the old system of notification and 
exemption, in other words, it is not possible for undertakings to seek declaratory judgments on the application or 
non-application of Art. 81(3) EC. This concern has been raised by Whish and Sufrin, supra (2000), p. 151. As 
already explained, the concepts of negative clearance and exemption are obsolete in the new system of 
enforcement. Thus, courts will simply apply Art. 81 EC as a whole to a dispute before them and declare inter 
partes the applicability or inappicability of that provision to an agreement. To speak of a competence to apply 
distinctively Art. 81(3) EC, no longer makes sense.
1088 On Austrian law see Gunther, supra (2001), p. 319; Reidlinger and Thalhammer, “Austria”, in: 
Modernisation in Europe 2005, Global Competition Review Special Report (London, 2005), p. 13. On 
Potuguese law, see Ruiz, supra (1999), p. 237. See also the national cases cited by Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, 
supra (2000), p. 927, fn. 1051.




substance and what procedure.1091 Such divergences are quite familiar to comparative 
lawyers, though not always apparent to EU lawyers.1092
The most relevant procedural questions that arise in the enforcement o f the EC competition 
concern the following areas:
• Ex officio raising o f Community law issues during the proceedings: This is another 
example of how national procedural rules may facilitate or hinder the enforcement o f  
Community rights. It is also an area, which EC competition law has already 
confronted, with a certain degree of success.
• Rules of evidence: These may vary considerably in each national procedural system. 
Such provisions are usually the product o f the historical development o f a given legal 
system and, though domestic lawyers might feel at ease with them, Community 
lawyers might find them inadequate for such complicated issues like the proof o f  
antitrust injuries. Such rules are of utmost importance for civil antitrust cases, where 
complex factual situations have to be dealt with.
• Rules on time limits: Such procedural rules usually limit the time in which an action 
or a third-party intervention is made, or an argument may be raised before an on­
going civil proceeding, or an appeal maybe filed, etc.
• Rules on collective or representative claims: This is a question of particular 
importance for private antitrust enforcement because antitrust violations usually affect 
a multiplicity o f market participants and indeed at times large classes o f  consumers. It 
must therefore be possible for such claims to be brought in an efficient way for the 
judicial system in order to serve the whole effectiveness of private enforcement.
• Procedural mles on third party interventions or on the filing of amicus curiae briefs, 
etc. can also have a great impact on effective enforcement.
While difficulties arising from such disparities or divergences can be dealt with, up to a 
certain extent, by having recourse to the Community law principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness under the guidance o f the Court of Justice (negative integration), there are 
problems that necessitate some form of sectoral procedural harmonisation (positive 
integration). Equivalence and effectiveness and the ‘'■reactive” approach o f the Court o f  
Justice have their limits and cannot guarantee a level-playing field in private antitrust
1091 The problem from a private international law angle is treated by Panagopoulos, “Substance and 
Procedure in Private International Law”, 1 JPIL 69 (2005).
1092 To give an example, provisions on prescription or extinction of rights are considered to form part of 
substantive law in civil law countries and are usually included in Civil Codes. On the other hand, in common 
law, such provisions are thought of as procedural.
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enforcement in Europe. Therefore, a  more “pro-active” approach is necessary in order to 
ensure a  more balanced, consistent and effective enforcement o f  EC competition law in 
national courts.
b. The ex officio Application of EC Competition Law
A specific principle of procedural law that has long attracted attention in the decentralised 
enforcement of Community law by national courts is the principle o f “party-initiative” in the 
civil trial, which prescribes a rather passive role for the judge, according to which the civil 
procceedings are based on the parties’ initiative, who have the task to put forward their 
c ^ e  1093 Pursuant to this principle, a court cannot raise points not raised by the parties and 
cannot grant relief other than what has been sought by the latter. Another similar principle o f 
procedural law that affects judicial protection of Community' rights before national courts is 
the limited degree o f review in appeal proceedings. These principles are invariably present in 
all Member States’ judicial systems and their aim is to provide for the overall sustainability 
o f the judicial system.
National principles on the party-initiative principle and on the passivity' of the judge in civil 
proceedings seem to constitute a more serious obstacle for the application of EC competition 
law in common law jurisdictions, where the adversarial system o f adjudication functions in 
such a way, as to make counsel the dominant figure, who raises all relevant issues. Thus, 
English and Irish1094 courts have proven quite reluctant in raising Community' law' points ex 
proprio motu. On the other hand, continental courts may find it easier to raise the EC 
competition law point ex officio, because o f the more active role o f  the judge throughout the 
proceedings, which, though in principle adversarial, follow the principle iura novit curia. 
Thus, it is increasingly accepted that courts should take up EC competition issues even ex 
officio, in the same way as they are entitled or even obliged to do with equivalent national 
rules of binding nature.1095 *
1093 See Braakman, supra (2000), p. 169.
1094 See Maher, supra (1994), p. 276.
1095 On the situation in Italy, see Ligustro, supra (1992), p. 256. On Austrian law, see Günther, supra
(2001), p. 354 et seq. In France, courts have often reached inconsistent decisions as to the extent of the judge’s 
duties to take up questions of EC competition law that have not been raised or proved by the parties, though in 
general it is accepted that such questions constitute movens d'ordre public and that, while the courts cannot rely 
on facts not brought forward by the litigants, they still have the power to raise legal issues ex proprio motu, 
pursuant to the principle iura novit curia. See further Boulanger, supra (1997), pp. 224-226. Belgian law, on its 
part, imposes upon the judges the duty to raise of their own motion legal questions pertaining to ordre public 
(Art. 774 Code judiciaire). EC competition law would fall under the definition o f such public policy, therefore,
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There is a rather well-developed case law by the Court o f Justice on this question. The Court 
has recognised on numerous occasions that there are situations when the function of such 
national principles may be an obstacle to the effectiveness o f Community law and to effective 
judicial protection. Starting with Verholen,1096 the Court initially followed a rather reserved 
approach.1097 Dealing with the question whether Community law precludes a national court 
from assessing of its own motion whether national rules are in conformity with a directive, 
for which the implementation period has elapsed, when the person concerned has not relied 
on that directive before the court, the Court, perhaps due to the formulation o f the preliminary 
question itself, adopted a rather negative and defensive formula. It held that the recognised 
right o f an individual to rely before a national court on a directive where the period for 
transposition has expired, does not preclude the power for the national court to take that 
directive into consideration even if  the individual has not relied on it.1098 
This question was further clarified in Van Schijndel1099 and Peterbroek.1100 In the former case 
the Court of Justice distinguished three situations under national procedural law: duty, 
discretion and incompetence o f national courts to apply ex officio binding rules o f national 
law.1101 The Court held that in the first two situations, national courts are under a duty to 
apply binding rules of EC law, such as competition law, even ex officio. Only in the third case 
are they exempt o f such a duty. Perterbroeck, decided on the same day as Van Schijndel,1102 
emphasised an additional element to be taken into account: the access o f a national court to 
the preliminary reference procedure. This possibility was indeed treated by the Court as an 
additional criterion for the effective judicial protection o f rights conferred by Community
it is accepted that Belgian courts would have to raise such issues even ex officio. See further Spiritus Dassesse, 
“On the Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds ), European Competition Law 
Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 615, fn. 5. In Greek law the 
position is that national courts are under a duty to apply Community law as a whole even ex officio, in the same 
wav as they are under such a duty when mandatory national law is concerned. See Georgiades, supra (1997), p. 
85. In Danish law it is accepted that Community law' principles have limited the scope of certain principles of 
Danish civil procedural law' concerning ultra petita, the passivity o f the civil judge, and party initiative. While 
under s. 338 of the Administration of Justice Act the court can only consider arguments relied upon by the 
parties, s. 339 mitigates this rule by allowing for the court to invite parties to express their position as to legal or 
factual questions of relevance. It is accepted that Danish judges are now' under a duty to draw the parties’ 
attention and to give them guidance as to arguments based on Community lawr. See Biering, “The Application of 
EU Law in Denmark: 1986 to 2000”, 37 CMLRev. 925 (2000), p. 966, who, however, acknowledges that 
Danish judges are not particularly accustomed to this more active role.
1090 Cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90, Verltolen etal. v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam, [1991] 
ECR1-3757, paras. 12-16.
109' See Vilaras, supra (2004), p. 44.
1098 Verholen, op.cit., para. 15.
1099 Cited supra.
1100 Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck, Van Campcnhout & Cie SCS v. Belgian State, [1995] ECR M599.
1101 Van Schijndel, op.cit., paras. 13, 14 and 22.
1102 On the tw'o judgments, see Canivet and Huglo, “L ’obligation pour Íe juge judiciaire national d'appliquer 
d'oftice Íe droit communautaire au regard des arrets Jeroen Van Schijndel e\Peterbmek'\ (1996-4) Europe 1.
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law. In Peterbroeck, it was stressed that if  a national court is the first court or tribunal that 
can refer a preliminary question on Community law to the Court o f Justice, then that court 
must raise questions of Community law o f its own motion, even if  the parties failed to raise 
such questions before another tribunal of a lower instance that is however considered not as a 
"‘court or tribunal” under Article 234 EC.1103
It should be mentioned that Van Schijndel did not directly touch upon the question whether 
the EC competition rules are “binding rules” that presumably must be taken into account ex 
officio under the majority of national procedural laws. Most civil law systems consider that 
courts can raise ex proprio motu such binding rules, as a matter of public policy (moyens 
d'ordre public). The Court’s hesitance to touch upon this question might be explained by the 
absence o f similar notions in the much more “adversarial” common law systems. Indeed, 
Advocate General Jacobs did not favour the invariable recognition o f the EC competition 
rules as moyens d  ordre public under Community law, especially as there was no agreement 
among the legal systems of the Member States as to what constitutes a matter of public 
policy.1104
That issue was not clarified in Kraaijeveld,1105 although appearances may be that the Court o f 
Justice considers all Community law rules as “binding”, therefore giving rise to a duty for 
national courts to raise them ex officio, when there is a similar duty or even a discretion under 
their national law. Such an inference, however, ought to be resisted because the question thus 
far put to the Court of Justice by these preliminary references was not whether and which 
Community rules are “binding rules”, but rather whether national judges must raise 
Community law questions ex officio when there is a discretion under national law to do so 
with regard to certain categories of national law. In other words, what can be attributed to the 
Court is not so much a finding that all Community rules are “binding rules” but rather a sort
1103 Peterbroeck, op.cit., paras. 11-21.
1104 Van Schijndel, op.cit., AG’s Opinion, para. 37. Compare Lenaerts, “De quelques principes généraux du 
droit de la procédure devant le juge communautaire”, in: Vandersanden & de Walsche (Eds.), Mélanges en 
hommage à Jean-Victor Louis, Vol. I (Bruxelles, 2003), p. 246, who, while recognising that the notion of 
moyens d'ordre public is not well-defined in Community law, stresses that the conditions of the admissibility of 
direct actions for annulment, vices or gaps in the reasoning of Community acts, and infringements of essential 
procedural requirements and certain fundamental principles of Community law are usually raised ex officio by 
the Community Courts and can well be considérai to be such moyens d'ordre public. See e.g. case T-243/94, 
British Steel pic. v. Commission, [1997] ECR 11-1887, para. 68, where the CFI considered that the principle of 
the protection of legitimate expectations is “a matter of Community public policy”. See further Vesterdorf, “Le 
relevé d’office par le juge communautaire”, in: Colneric, Edward et al. (Eds.), Une Communauté de droit, 
Festschrift fu r  Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias (Berlin, 2003), p. 551 et seq.
1105 Case C-72/95, Acomemersbedrijft P.K. Kraaijeveld BV v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-IIolland, 
[1996] ECR 1-5403, paras. 55-62.
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o f  “most favoured treatment” for Community law in the procedural context o f the EU  
Member State courts.
However, the explicit recognition in Eco Swiss o f  the competition rules as of public policy 
{ordre public)1106 and the powerful statements both in Eco Swiss and in Courage as to the 
constitutional importance o f  those rules,1107 lead to the conclusion that, indeed, the Court o f  
Justice now sees the EC competition rules as pertaining to public policy. Reading the Van 
Schijndel and Peterbroeck judgments in light o f Eco Swiss and Courage, means that those 
national legal systems that recognise the raising ex officio o f  moyens d  'ordre public, should 
do exactly the same with regard to EC competition law, without it being necessary to refer to  
the three situations of Van Schijndel,1108 This approach has very recently been followed b y  
the Court o f Justice in M anfredi, which stresses that “Articles 81 EC and 82 EC are a matter 
o f  public policy which must be automatically applied by national courts”.1109 10In so holding, 
the Court referred only to Eco Swiss and not to Van Schijndel and to the latter ruling’s more 
elaborate conditions on the ex officio  application o f Community competition law7 by national 
courts. Indeed, Manfredi seems to go even further in recognising an unqualified duty o f  
national courts to raise EC competition law questions ex proprio motu, even if  the legal 
system in question is not familiar with the concept o f moyens d'ordre public or follows a very  
strict view7 o f the judge’s power to raise legal questions ex officio.
Before concluding on this question, we should mention that Regulation 1/2003 has affected 
only slightly the Van Schijndel state of affairs, although other commentators are of the view 
that Article 3(1) of the new Regulation, which deals with the relationship between 
Community and national competition law s, imposes now a  general duty upon national courts 
to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC and, thus, by implication to raise these provisions ex  
officio}110 We respectfully disagree and stress that Article 3, a provision that must be seen in 
its particular context, aims primarily at imposing a duty upon national competition authorities
I1W Eco Swiss, op.cit, para. 39. Admittedly, the Court refers here to a different notion of “public policy”, to 
ordre public international for the purpose of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Yet, the reasoning used to 
reach that conclusion means that EC competition law pertains to public policy, also when the latter notion is 
used in different contexts. See infra on the many notions of public policy.
1107 See supra.
1108 See further Ehlermann and Komninos, supra (2001), p. 780, fn. 90; Niboyet, “La réception du droit 
communautaire en droit judiciaire interne et international”, in: Berge & Niboyet (Éds.), La réception du droit 
communautaire en droit privé des États membres (Bruxelles, 2003), p. 176; Broomhall and Goyder, supra 
(2005), p. 6.
1109 Manfredi, op.cit., para. 31.
1110 See Idot, supra (2003c), p. 6; idem, supra (2004c), p. 39; Biaise and Idot, supra (2003a), p. 296; 
Poillot-Peruzzetto, “Mise en œuvre des articles 81 et 82 sur le fondement du règlement n° 1/2003”, 14(6) 
Contr.Conc.Consomm. 29 (2004), p. 31. Compare also para. 28 of AG Geelhoed1 s Opinion in ASNEF- 
EQUIFAX, op.cit., who seems to think that Art. 3(1) Reg. 1/2003 has changed the legal reality and the “faculty' 
to apply Community law has been transformed to an obligation” (unofficial translation).
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and national courts to cumulatively apply EC competition law - even ex officio - only where 
they apply their national competition law to conduct falling under Articles 81 and 82 EC. In 
other words the ultimate aim o f this provision is to ensure the supremacy of EC competition 
law, and not to regulate the procedural conditions for the application of such law by national 
courts.
Thus, the Van Schijndel principles continue being relevant,1111 if  a national court is not 
applying its national competition law. In this case, if  national procedural law allows, the 
national court in question would be under a Community law duty to raise EC competition law 
ex officio. In addition, it is possible that national competition rules may not be considered 
public policy rules,1112 unlike the Community competition ones. In such a case, Article 3 o f 
Regulation 1/2003 would not, by itself, impose a duty over the courts to apply EC 
competition law, if  those courts do not have to apply o f their own motion national 
competition law. Yet, this may not necessarily be so under the Van Schijndel case law, which 
may lead to the ex officio application o f Community competition law. Article 3, however, 
may provide for a  solution and fill a gap, if  the national court applies its national but not EC 
competition law and if  Van Schijndel cannot help, because the national procedural principles 
(such as the principle o f passivity o f justice in civil litigation) prescribe a very limited role for 
the judges in the direction of the proceedings and, thus, do not allow for the ex officio 
application of EC law.
In any event, as we mentioned above, if  the Van Schijndel principles are supposed to have 
been rendered obsolete, this is so not because of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, but rather as 
a result o f the latest development of the Court of Justice’s case law in Eco Swiss, Courage 
and Manfredi, which points to an unqualified duty by national courts to apply the Treaty 
competition rules ex officio, because of the Community public policy nature of these rules.
c. Rules of Evidence
One of the most important limitations o f  litigating antitrust disputes is that litigation follows 
the adversarial system, unlike administrative authorities that follow the inquisitorial system. 
This means that civil courts rely on the information provided by the parties and have no tools 
to have access to information held by third parties such as the Commission or administrative
1111 This appears to be the view of the Commission, which restates in para. 3 of its new co-operation Notice 
the Van Schijndel principles.
1112 As was the case in Eco Swiss with the previous Dutch Competition Act w hich according to the lloge  
Raad did not qualify as a matter of public policy.
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authorities have. In addition, competition law disputes arc characterised by vast information 
asymmetries between the litigants. Usually, most o f the inculpatory’ information will be in the 
hands o f  the defendant(s) while the plaintiff will be merely relying on indicia. These 
problems are particularly grave for stand-alone actions.
Although competition law is not unique in this regard, and other areas o f  law that pertain to  
the public interest, such as corporate or labour law are routinely adjudicated before civil 
courts,1113 competition law presupposes an extensive degree of market information. This is 
true of Articles 81(1) and 82 EC, and more so o f Article 81(3) EC. The four conditions o f the 
latter provision may be particularly demanding and may require a substantial degree o f  
market information. Particularly the two positive conditions, i.e. the improvement o f the 
production or distribution o f goods or the promotion of technical or economic progress, and 
the allowance of a fair share of the resulting benefit to consumers, are certainly not easy to  
apply and the courts have to rely heavily on the parties for the necessary information and 
evidence.1114
The problem of proof is the most serious obstacle towards an effective private 
enforcement.1115 This becomes more evident, as some national courts seem to require a high 
standard o f proof in competition cases.1116
An “institutional” approach to that problem would be to introduce specific competition 
courts, whose members would possess the requisite expertise to deal with the relevant 
disputes.1117 This is a course that up to a certain extent has been taken up in some countries, 
though not only with regard to competition law, but rather with regard to commercial law' 
disputes in general.1118 The introduction of specialised courts would entail high costs and
1113 See Bunichter, jwpra (2001), p. 541.
1114 See Hirsch, supra (2003), p. 239.
1115 See WiBmann, supra (2000), p. 132.
1116 This is the case in England, where the High Court has suggested that a high degree of probability should 
be required in Art. 81 EC cases. See Shears on Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd. (QB), [1989] 
3 CMLR 429; contra Georgios Panayiotou (George Michael) et al. v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Limited 
(Ch.D), [1994] ECC 395. The CAT has confimed, however, that the balance of probabilities remains the 
applicable standard in cases of infringements of the Competition Act (Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd. v. 
DGFT, [2002] ECC Ml,AttheracesLtd & Anr v. The British Horseracing Board & Anr (Ch.D), [2005] EWHC 
3015). In interlocutory proceedings the balance of convenience remains the required test (see Easyjet v. British 
Airways (QB), [1998] EuLR 350). In Ireland the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities (see Maher, 
supra (1999), p. 81).
111' See Goyder, supra (2001), pp. 575-576; GrOning, supra (2001a), p. 588; Canivet, “Concurrence : entre 
droit et poltique”, Les Annonces de la Seine, 13-6-2002, No. 36,1, p. 5.
1118 This is the case in France, where a certain degree of specialisation has been attained following recent 
legislation. An Ordonnance of 4 November 2004 has allocated competition law-related civil claims to 
specialised courts of first instance, commercial tribunals and courts of appeal (see now Art. L420-7 Code de 
commerce). The list of these courts was recently determined by decree. As of January 1st 2006, there are only 
eight civil courts of first instance having competence to hear French and EC competition law cases, while all
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might give rise to problems o f conflicts o f competences,1119 but appears to be an appropriate 
long-teim solution. In this regard, there is o f course a certain contradiction between the recent 
drive of modernisation and private enforcement, if the most effective way to enhance the 
latter is by centralising courts and competition law-related litigation.
Another institutional solution would be to have the Commission fill this gap through the co­
operation mechanism of Article 15 o f Regulation 1/2003, whereby national courts request 
from the former information in its possession or its opinion.1120 However, such an option 
would in essence result in overburdening the Commission and, thus, in cancelling die basic 
stated aim of the recent reforms, to enable the Commission to use its limited resources for the 
persecution of the most flagrant violations o f the Treaty competition rules.1121 In addition, the 
co-operation mechanism of Article 15 of the new procedural Regulation has a different 
rationale than transforming the Commission into an investigator for the benefit of national 
litigation at the request of national courts.1122 Similarly, one must reject an unqualified 
proposal to use the national competition authorities in the above sense, although their 
proximity to civil litigation and the fact that the civil action may be more interesting for the 
public interest at the national than at the Community level, means that such possibilities o f 
assistance do exist.1123
appeals are concentrated at the Paris Court of Appeal. A certain degree o f specialisation is also attained in 
England, where CPR Practice Direction B12 requires plaintiffs in Art. 81 and 82 EC cases to bring their claims 
or apply for the transferral of existing such claims to the Chancery Division of the High Court (see also Rule 
30.8 of CPR Part 30 Transfer). Such specialised courts, however, must be distinguished from the “market 
courts” of some Scandinavian countries, which should be seen more as judicial review courts or even as making 
part of the competition authorities themselves, and not as specialised civil courts of private enforcement. The 
case is different with regard to courts that, apart from having judicial review tasks, are also competent to hear 
civil actions for damages. To our knowledge, the only such example is the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) 
in the UK.
11,9 For an example of such conflicts of competences, compare the state o f affairs in the UK with regard to 
the right to bring a claim for damages before the CAT and the existing right to bring similar claims before the 
ordinary courts (i.e. in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in England and the Court of Session 
in Scotland).
1120 See above on the possibilities for private litigants to request the disclosure of information held by the 
Commission, in order to facilitate their civil claims before national courts.
1121 See also case T-77/95, Syndicat Français de i'Express International et ai. v. Commission, [1997] ECR 
II-1, para. 58, where the CFI upheld the Commission’s decision not to pursue a complaint and accepted that in 
that occasion the object of the Commission pursuing the case would only be “to make it easier for the 
complainant to prove fault in an action for damages in a national court”. The CFI’s judgment wras further 
reversed by the ECJ in case C-l 19/97, UFEX (ex SFEI) et a i v. Commission, [1999] ECR 1-1341, although the 
latter did not refer explicitly to that point made by the former.
1122 Compare, however, the interesting reference to the Commission as “resource-centre for the national 
courts” by former Commissioner Monti, supm (2001), p. 4. See also Temple Lang, supra (2004a), p. 133, 
arguing that the Commission may be under an Article 10 EC duty to provide information to national civil 
proceedings, especially in case of consumer plaintiffs, when it has already adopted a formal decision 
(presumably finding illegal behaviour).
1123 See e.g. Canivet, supra (1996), p. 107.
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A radical solution to address the problem of proof before national courts would be simply to 
follow the US model and introduce a  system o f pre-trial discovery, at least with regard to pre­
trial oral testimony. Such an option is not realistic, however, in view of the particular features 
of civil procedure, especially in continental countries, where proceedings do not terminate in 
one trial that has to be prepared in advance. In addition, such an innovation cannot be sector- 
specific but would have to apply to the whole of civil procedure.1124 The Commission’s 
Green Paper has recognised the difficulties in introducing pre-trial discovery and places 
emphasis on effective case management on the part o f the national courts, through the 
organisation o f case management conferences or pre-hearing reviews.1125 A possibility 
examined by the Green Paper is a  form o f court-ordered discovers’ based on fact-pleading, 
whereby the plaintiff has set out in detail the relevant facts and has presented reasonably 
available evidence in support o f  his allegations.1126 This proposal finds support in the recent 
Community Directive on the enforcement o f intellectual property rights, which provides for a 
degree of discovery based on fact-pleading by reference to evidence that lies in the control o f  
one of the parties.1127 A slightly more advanced proposal is a form of mandatory disclosure o f  
classes o f documents by court order.1128 j.
Information asymmetries, on the other hand, could be remedied through the introduction by 
means o f Community legislation o f  a procedural duty on the defendant (in a case where EC 
competition law is pleaded as sword) to bear the burden o f proof for certain facts that have 
occurred in his sphere of influence. Thus, if the plaintiff advances prima facie evidence o f an 
anti-competitive practice, it would be upon the defendant to prove the lawfulness of the 
practice in question by providing precise information1129 Reversal of the burden o f proof is 
not unknown to Community law. Indeed, it has been adopted by Community Directives in the
1134 See Basedow, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 
2003), p. 34.
1 Staff Working Paper, para. 56.
1129 Option 1 of the Green Paper.
1127 Directive 2004/48/EC, Art. 6(1). See also, in the area of consumer protection, Council Directive 
84/450/EEC o f 10 September 1984 Relating to the Approximation o f the Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions o f  the Member States Concerning Misleading Advertising, [1984] L 250/17 (as subsequently 
amended by Dir. 97/55/EC), Art. 6, according to which Member States’ courts must have the powers to require 
the advertiser to furnish evidence as to the accuracy of factual claims in advertising if, taking into account the 
legitimate interest of the advertiser and any other party to the proceedings, such a requirement appears 
appropriate on the basis of the circumstances of the particular case,
1 8 Option 2 of the Green Paper.
1129 See Basedow, “Panel One Discussion: Substantive Remedies”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 
2003), p. 34.
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area of sex discrimination.1130 The recent Directive on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights also provides for a presumption of authorship/ownership for the author of a 
literary or artistic work if his name appears in that work, in the absence o f proof to the 
contrary.1131
In the competition field, it is even more interesting that the Commission has increasingly 
solicited and accepted commitments by private parties, usually in merger cases1132 but also in 
some Article 81 and 82 EC cases, whereby one of the commitments essentially refers to a 
shift of the burden o f proof in favour o f third parties wishing to challenge certain conduct of 
the undertaking that has offered the commitment. To give an example, in the German book 
price-fixing case, an Article 81 EC case, the Commission decided to terminate proceedings 
and granted a negative clearance through a comfort letter1133 134after accepting commitments by 
German booksellers and publishers that guaranteed the freedom o f direct cross-border selling 
o f German books to final consumers in Germany. The commitments also established an 
exclusive list o f conditions under which German booksellers and publishers could 
exceptionally stop such cross-border sales if  found to be a  circumvention of the book price­
fixing agreements. The listed categories o f circumvention were to be interpreted restrictively 
and the burden o f proof rested with the booksellers and publishers invoking
* . 1 1 3 4
circumvention.
The problems relating to the proof of the anti-competitive conduct in question may recede, if 
there is already a Commission or a national competition authority decision that has dealt with 
the facts of an antitrust infringement. We have already explained in detail above that such 
findings do not produce a positive binding effect on national civil proceedings and that 
Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003 and Masterfoods merely establish a negative duty not to 
contradict and not a positive duty to follow Commission decisions. In any event, there are 
already precedents, where national courts have treated the findings of the Commission as 
conclusive evidence. Thus, in Iberian the English High Court held that if the same parties 
have disputed an issue before the European Commission and have had a  reasonable 
opportunity to challenge the Commission’s decision, they are estopped of pleading anew that
1130 Directive 97/80/EC, Art. 4.
1131 Directive 2004/48/EC, Art. 5.
1132 See e.g. Commission Decision of 25 August 2005 (M.36&7-Johmon&Johnsori/Guidant), section F, 
para. 37(vi) of the attached commitments.
1133 This took place in 2002, i.e. long before Art. 9 Reg. 1/2003 was applicable.
1134 On this case, see Nehl and Nuijten, “Commission Ends Competition Proceedings Regarding German 
Book Price Fixing Agreements Following Acceptance of an Undertaking on Cross-border Sales”, (2002-2) EC 
Competition Policy> Newsletter 35, pp. 36-37.
259
issue and of contradicting the Commission’s view in the civil proceedings.1135 We stress 
again that such pronouncements are based more on the principles of procedural economy and 
prohibition o f  abuse o f process by parties, rather than on a Community law obligation to  
respect the findings of the Commission. Of course, national law may itself introduce such a  
binding effect and this is indeed the solution adopted by the new UK and German 
Competition Acts.1136 1378These rules, which do not establish a general principle o f precedence o f  
public over private enforcement, are meant only to provide an incentive for follow-on civil 
actions for damages when there is already a  final Commission or national competition 
authority infringement decision. The Commission views such solutions positively but, 
in our view, the Commission would be well-advised not to propose secondary Community 
legislation conferring a  positive binding effect on such public enforcement decisions, because 
this would create in the long run a philosophy o f  dependence o f private on public 
enforcement and would lead to the wrong conviction that private antitrust enforcement is ju s t 
about follow-on actions. The Commission could, on the other hand, consider proposing the 
reversal o f  the burden o f proof in such cases, which would still be an important incentive for 
plaintiffs without affecting the current status in the relationship between private and public 
enforcement.
d. Collective and Representative Claims
A more pro-active private enforcement of the Treaty competition rules at the national level 
depends on the possibility of classes of market participants and consumers to pursue their 
Treaty-based rights in a collective manner. This also serves well the efficiency o f the judicial 
system and avoids costs and waste o f  judicial resources. The recent litigation in Italy against 
the members o f a cartel o f insurance companies, where individual consumers brought 
separately hundreds of costly civil suits eventually leading to damages awards of sums close
1135 See the English Iberian case (op.cit. ).
106 See above.
1137 Likewise, in the United States section 5(a) of the Clayton Act allows private litigants to rely on a 
judgment or decree in a pre-existing civil or criminal action by the government and use those as prima facie 
evidence of an antitrust violation. The text o f that provision goes as follows: “A final judgment or decree 
heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States 
under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against 
such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws as 
to all matters respecting w hich said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto...” .
1138 Option 8 of the Green Paper.
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to € 20 for each plaintiff, is neither an example of efficient use o f  judicial resources, nor o f 
deterrence for cartel members.1139
The introduction o f US style class actions does not find favour in Europe. Class action 
lawsuits are usually brought in federal court if the claim arises under federal law (as US 
antitrust law is), or if  any member of the potential plaintiff class and the defendant are from 
different states. Nationwide plaintiff classes are possible, but such suits must have a 
commonality o f issues across state lines. This may be difficult as the civil law in the various 
states has significant differences and thus the set o f claims may have to be handled separately 
in each state or through the device of multi-district litigation (MDL). It is also possible to 
bring a class action under state law, and in some cases the court may extend its jurisdiction to 
all the members o f the class, including out of state (or even internationally) as the key 
element is the jurisdiction that the court has over the defendant. In US class actions, one or 
more persons belonging to a broad class of persons that have been harmed by anti­
competitive practices bring an action on behalf o f the unidentified class of persons, although 
the former might not have asked for the permission of those persons individually. An injured 
party is thus assumed to be included in the class unless he chooses not to be (opt-out). The 
judgment, however, has res judicata effect for all members of the class, even for those that 
did not participate to the process, after some formalities are seen to.1140 
US class actions, coupled with pre-trial discovery, have indeed led to excesses in the US. 
They can lead to blackmailing and extortions of huge sums by class action lawyers from 
companies that wish to avoid the costs and uncertainties (not least because of the jury trial 
system) of protracted litigation.1141 There is no doubt that such a development in Europe must
1139 See above.
1140 See further Ebbing, “Class Action, Die Gruppenklage: Em Vorbild filr das deutsche Recht?”, 103
ZVgl.RWiss. 31 (2004), p. 35 etseg.
1141 To give a telling example, as a result of the Microsoft settlement in Minnesota, customers got vouchers 
worth up to $ 29 to buy new products, while the class action lawyers cashed $ 59.4 million. It is also noteworthy 
that in the California class action against Microsoft the plaintiffs’ lawyers wrere awarded over $100 million in 
fees. In another class action litigation, a defendant had to pay $1,9 million for postage to mail out the notices of 
a class action settlement to those indirect purchasers for whom there were addresses, a minority of the 
theoretical class. If that is what postage costs, one can imagine what the other administrative costs are, like 
printing, stuffing envelopes, buying advertisements, etc. Note, however, that the recent US Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 aims at curbing some of the excesses associated with class actions. Thus, it shifts many 
large class-action lawsuits involving parties from state courts that historically have been more receptive to 
plaintiffs, to federal courts. Business groups had lobbied for the legislation, arguing that class-action lawsuits 
enriched trial lawyers. The Act reduces the likelihood that out-of-state defendants will be subject to excessive 
verdicts, by reducing settlements that may occur in plaintiff-friendly local venues such as California. It also 
enacts procedures for the review of coupon settlements, to reduce lawyers’ fees that are deemed excessive 
relative to the benefits actually passed on to the class members.
261
be avoided at all costs. Indeed, the Commission has made clear in its Green Paper that ‘the  
ultimate objective should be to foster a competition culture, not a litigation culture”.1142 
This bad precedent, however, should not stand in the way of the efforts to encourage 
collective or representative claims, basically brought by consumer unions.1143 Indeed, some 
commentators consider that national courts are already under a duty based on Article 10 EC 
to allow such class actions for injunctions or damages by consumer organisations.1144 
Collective claims have also found favour with a recent Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs: 
“Collective rights of action are a ... common feature o f modem judicial systems. They 
are mostly encountered in areas such as consumer protection, labour law, unfair 
competition law or protection o f the environment. The law grants associations or 
other representative bodies the right to bring cases either in the interest o f persons 
which they represent or in the public interest. This furthers private enforcement o f  
rules adopted in the public interest and supports individual complainants who are 
often badly equipped to face well organised and financially stronger opponents.”1145 
The Commission’s Green Paper proceeds to a  make a useful distinction between (a) 
“representative claims”, brought by a  representative natural or legal person, such as a 
consumer organisation, on behalf o f a group of identified individuals and aimed at protecting 
the individual rights of those represented, (b) “collective claims”, brought on behalf o f  a  
group o f  identified or identifiable individuals and aimed at protecting interests of those 
represented, and (c) “public interest litigation”, aiming at the benefit of the public at large and 
resulting to an award to the natural or legal person who brought the action or to those who 
suffered the damage.1146
The choice of an appropriate model for such claims can be influenced by already existing or 
proposed mechanisms in Community and national law. One of the Community mechanisms 
is the proposed European small claims procedure, which aims at simplifying and speeding up 
litigation concerning small claims and at reducing costs.1147 At the national level, the recently 
amended UK Competition Act provides for claims for damages brought on behalf o f
1142 Green Paper, para. 12.
1143 Compare the public statements of Commissioner Kroes on 17 October 2005 referring to the desirability 
of collective claims in antitrust cases.
1144 See Temple Lang, supra (2004a), p. 133; idem, supra (2004b), p. 1917.
1145 Para. 48 of AG Jacobs’s Opinion in case C~195/98, österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft 
öffentlicher Dienst v. Austria, [2004] E C R 1-10497,
n46_ Staff Working Paper, para. 192.
114 ' Commission Proposal fo r  a Regulation o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council Establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure, COM(2005) 87 final. In reality, if  adopted, this procedure will directly 
apply to EC competition law infringements too and will cover claims for sums not exceeding € 2,000.
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consumers by representative groups “specified” by order of the Secretary of State,1148 while 
the 2002 Swedish Group Proceedings Act, which is not competition law-specific, provides 
foropt-in representative claims.1149
e. Other Procedural Questions
Other procedural rules, such as rules on time limits and third-party interventions may also be 
critical for the effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement. Such rules are subject to 
national law and can give rise to divergences or inconsistencies.
The Court of Justice has on numerous occasions in the past dealt with such rules and has 
followed an ad hoc approach, in determining whether they offend against the Community 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Since these are merely “detailed procedural 
rules” not affecting the core of the exercise of Community rights,1150 the Court follows a 
more relaxed standard of effectiveness, which former Advocate General Van Gerven 
describes as “non-impossibility”.1151 This has also been termed a “procedural mle of 
reason”.1152 153According to this test, which was first pronounced in Van Schijndel and 
Peterbroek,u5i “each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision 
renders application of Community law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed 
by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, 
viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the light o f that analysis the basic 
principles o f the domestic judicial system, such as protection o f the rights of the defence, the 
principle o f legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure, must, where appropriate, be 
taken into consideration.”
One should note that in holding national procedural rules, such as provisions on limitations, 
compatible with the Community requirement of effectiveness, the Court has in reality 
compared those rules with equivalent rules in other Member States. Thus, following a sort o f 
“majoritarian rule”, it has found limitation periods “not excessively short compared with 
those prescribed in the legal systems of the other Member States”.1154 Such a criterion, which
1148 See above
1149 Staff Working Paper, para. 196.
1150 See case C-255/04, Commission v. France, op.cit., para. 40; Manfredi, op.cit., para. 62.
1151 See above.
n?2 See Prêchai, “Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons from Van SchijndeF, 35 CMLRev. 681 
(1998), p. 690 etseq.
1153 Van Schijndel, op.cit, para. 19; Peterbroeck, op.cit, paià. 14.
1154 E.g. Eco Swiss, op.cit, para. 45.
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necessitates a degree of comparative research o f the Member States’ legal systems, makes 
part o f a “reasonableness” test to be applied in such cases.1155
In addition, although the Van Schijndel and Peterbroeck test may not admit this expressly, the 
Court, in balancing national procedural rules against the effectiveness of Community law, 
often attributes a high degree o f deference to Community rules of a higher ranking in the 
constitutional scheme o f the Treaty, such as the competition rules.1156 Both in Eco Swiss and 
Courage there were emphatic references to Article 3(l)(g) EC, which elevates Article 81 EC 
to a fundamental provision, “which is essential for the tasks entrusted to the Community and, 
in particular, for the functioning o f  the internal market”.1157 This means that the Community 
law requirement of effectiveness may be much more demanding, when national procedural 
rules create obstacles to the effectiveness and efficiency o f  private antitrust enforcement.
With regard to limitation periods for bringing actions for damages for violation o f  the 
Community competition rules, such periods vary' considerably between the Member States. It 
cannot be indeed excluded that a  very short limitation period may offend against the principle 
o f effectiveness and make the exercise of the Community right in damages excessively 
difficult. Such cases could be dealt with on an ad  hoc basis by the national courts under the 
possible guidance of the Court o f  Justice. More important than the period itself is, however, 
its starting point.1158 Among the many issues dealt with by the Court o f Justice in M anfredi 
was this specific question. The Court held that “a national rule under which the limitation 
period begins to run from the day on which the agreement or concerted practice was adopted 
could make it practically impossible to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm 
caused by that prohibited agreement or practice, particularly if  that national rule also imposes 
a short limitation period which is not capable o f being suspended”.1159 According to the 
Court, where there are continuous or repeated infringements, such a limitation period might 
expire even before the infringement is brought to an end, in which case it would be
1155 That such a criterion may be, at least implicitly, decisive, may be adduced from Peterbroek, where the 
Belgian procedural rule in question was extrajudicially described by AG Jacobs as “rather restrictive by 
comparison with equivalent rules in other Member States” . See Jacobs, “Enforcing Community Rights and 
Obligations in National Courts: Striking the Balance”, in: Lonbay & Biondi (Eds), Remedies fo r  Breach o f  EC  
Law (Chichester, 1997),p. 32.
1156 See De Burca, “Differentiation within the Core: The Case o f the Common Market”, in: De Burca & 
Scott (Eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU, From Uniformity to Flexibility (Oxford/Portland, 2000), p. 149.
1157 Eco Swiss, op.cit., para. 36; Courage, op.cit., para. 20.
1158 See Staff Working Paper, para. 261 et seq. The Green Paper has not included an option to harmonise 
limitation periods but deals only with the question of their starting point. This means that time limits are most 
likely to continue being subject to national law in the foreseeable future.
lm  Manfredi, op.cit., para. 78.
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impossible for any individual who has suffered harm after the expiry of the limitation period 
to bring an action.
The Commission Green Paper had already identified this particular problem and includes an 
option to suspend the limitation periods from the moment proceedings are instituted by the 
Commission or national competition authorities, thus facilitating follow-on civil claims for 
damages.1160
1160 Option 36 of the Green Paper. Compare also s. 33(5) of the German Competition Act, as recently 
amended.
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D. ARBITRATION AND EC COMPETITION LAW
I. A rbitration and Community Competition Law: Contradiction and Complementarity
Any discussion o f private antitrust enforcement and application of EC competition rules by  
courts cannot ignore arbitration. Arbitration is a very ancient institution, used by individuals 
and recognised by States as a dispute resolution mechanism alternative to litigation. At the 
same time, arbitration is the creation of the private autonomy o f the parties, who withdraw 
the regulation o f their disputes from state justice through a contract, the arbitration 
agreement. The arbitrators are called upon to resolve a certain dispute that has been submitted 
to them by the parties and do so by applying the law that is applicable to the merits o f the 
dispute.1161 The agreement to arbitrate is an enforceable contract that binds the parties and 
excludes the courts’ jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. The arbitrators’ final decision, the 
arbitral aw ard, produces the same fundamental effects like judgments: it enjoys res judicata  
and, subject to certain formalities, is enforceable. In most developed legal systems, courts 
may not review' arbitral aw-ards in their substance (révision au fond), unless for very narrow 
grounds, and may set them aside or refuse their recognition or enforcement, if  certain 
conditions are met, which are rather exceptional, especially in the case o f international 
commercial arbitration.
In today’s highly commercialised world an ever growing number of business disputes is 
submitted to arbitration, which is considered to be a much more preferable forum than state 
justice in many respects, most notably due to its globally perceived independence, neutrality; 
impartiality, flexibility, confidentiality, time and cost efficiency, and technical expertise.1162 
In the international level, in particular, it is rare for a commercial contract o f a certain 
economic significance not to contain an arbitration clause,1163 while the very successful
1161 This may be the law of a state, but also legal principles not connected to any particular state, of a 
transnational nature. Such can be the lex mercatoria or the international law merchant, or the UNIDROIT 
Principles o f  Contract Law. Arbitrators may also be bound to decide by reference to no law whatsoever, usually 
ex aequo et bono or as amiables compositeurs. Again this is hardly the space for a further discussion of those 
questions. For more details see K.P. Berger, The Creeping Codification o f the Lex Mercatoria (The 
Hague/London/Boston, 1999); Rubino-Sammartano, “Amiable compositeur (Joint Mandate to Settle) and ex 
bono et aequo (Discretional Authority to Mitigate Strict Law: Apparent Synonyms Revisited)”, 9(1) JInt’lArb. 5 
(1992); E. Gail lard and J. Savage (Eds.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (The Hague/Boston/London, 1999), p. 801 et seq.; Marrella, “Choice of Law' in Third-Millennium 
Arbitrations: The Relevance of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts”, 36 
Vand.JTransnat’lL 1137 (2003), p. 1158 et seq.
1162 Seee.g. Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, supra (1999), p. 1.
1103 Parties to international commercial agreements usually submit their disputes to institutional arbitration 
(as opposed to ad hoc arbitration). In institutional arbitration, arbitral proceedings are administered by an
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United Nations New York Convention o f 1958 on recognition and enforcement o f foreign 
arbitral awards1164 makes it easier to enforce an arbitral award than a court judgment in 
another country.1165 It is indicative o f the importance o f arbitration for the global 
development o f commerce that all newly independent states consider accession to that 
convention an absolute priority.
A commentator has used the following words in this regard:
“Merchants will not conduct business across national boundaries if there is no 
guarantee o f either basic contractual accountability or the provision of remedies for 
material breach of contract. Arbitration civilizes the international marketplace and 
thereby makes it accessible to commercial parties ... [Arbitration] makes the risks of 
transborder commerce palatable”.1166
Arbitration and competition law are quite a  strange pair. They can be regarded as inherently 
contradictory and incompatible, but also as inherently complementary and compatible to each 
other.
Inherently contradictory' and incompatible, because arbitration is the creation o f private 
autonomy. Its basis is the agreement of the parties to submit a future or current dispute to 
private individuals, the arbitrators, whom they themselves choose, thus voluntarily 
withdrawing the regulation of their rights and obligations from the ambit of public justice. On 
the other hand, competition law is the state mechanism, whose function is to restrain 
inappropriate private conduct in the market,1167 in order to maximise the benefits of the
institution in accordance with its rules of arbitration,. Such an institution is par excellence the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), based in Paris. To give some statistics, in 2004 alone, 561 requests for arbitration 
were filed with the ICC concerning 1,682 parties from 116 different countries. The place of arbitration was 
located in 49 different countries throughout the world and arbitrators of 61 different nationalities were appointed 
or confirmed under the ICC Rules. The amount in dispute exceeded $ 1 million in 58.8 % of newr cases (ICC 
Statistics in: http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4198/index.html).
11(>4 United Nations New York Convention o f 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral 
Awards-, entry into force on 7 June 1959; published in: 330 UNTS 38 (1959), no. 4739; in force in more than 
140 countries and territories.
1165 While EU Member States have concluded an international convention on recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments, the 1968 Brussels Convention, which has nowr been transformed to a Community 
Regulation (Reg. 44/2001), such an instrument does not yet exist in the global context. An initiative that wras 
undertaken by the Hague Conference on Private International Law in the mid-1990s came to a standstill in 2001. 
Finally, the Hague Conference adopted in 2005 a less ambitious text applicable only to choice-of-forum 
agreements and not to jurisdiction and recognition/enforcement of foreign judgments. This explains, up to 
certain degree, the preferred status of arbitration as an international business dispute mechanism.
1 lt>‘> See Caibonneau, “The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements”, 36 
Vand.JTransnaf 1L 1189 (2003), p. 1195.
1167 The fact that competition law seeks to restrain private autonomy seems at first side paradoxical. 
How ever, such regulation of competition is necessary in order to avoid collusion among firms in a way that is 
only profitable to them but is detrimental to the competitive process, to consumer welfare and to the society at 
large.
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economic activity of firms for the public good. In that sense, private autonomy is subject to  
control for the public interest. That explains the public policy nature o f such rules.
However, arbitration and competition law are also complementary and compatible with each 
other. First o f all, because arbitration is par excellence an institution that flourishes in a free 
market economy system with freedom of commerce and competition.1168 The more the 
competitive commerce o f goods and services, the stronger the presence o f arbitration. 
Arbitration and Community competition law, in particular, may have even more in common. 
The competition rules of the Treaty o f  Rome have long been considered in their functional 
single market perspective.1169 They were also intended to constitute the most prominent and 
necessary flanking measure, in order to attain a  true common market. Competition-restrictive 
agreements, according to the Court o f Justice, would tend to restore the national divisions in 
trade between Member States, namely to reconstruct trade barriers already abolished by the 
Treaty' o f  Rome. “The Treaty, whose preamble and content aim at abolishing the barriers 
between States ... could not allow undertakings to reconstruct such barriers”.1170 In other words, 
what the Treaty' prohibited among States, could not be made possible by agreements among
• 1171
pnvate parties.
Interestingly enough, arbitration is also a means to attain the objective of a common market. 
If  the possibility to conclude arbitration agreements and to enforce arbitral awards in the 
international context has always been considered a great incentive for the development o f  
trade in goods and services and for the mobility o f persons among different nations, a fortio ri 
this should be the case o f the European Union. Indeed, the Treaty o f Rome had realised the 
importance o f arbitration for a common market by inducing the Member States in Article 293
1108 See e g. Libertini, supra (2002), p. 433, who considers private autonomy and freedom of competition as 
two pillars o f the market economy system. A recognition of a high degree of private autonomy is a sine qua non 
condition for the establishment of effective competition in the market. However, it is also possible that private 
autonomy might be exercised in an anti-competitive way.
1,09 Outside the EU context, free trade and free competition are not, of course, dependent on each other. It is 
perfectly possible for a satisfactory degree o f domestic competition to exist even in a country that is closed to 
the international flows of trade. At the same time, it is possible for a countiy nominally open to foreign trade or 
for a free trade area to be entirely cartelised, so that few competition remains in the market. Ideally, free trade 
and free competition should go together. While this is not always feasible in the global context, in the EU the 
two are correlated and constitute perennial objectives pursuant to Arts. 2 ,3 , and 4 EC.
11 0 Cases 56/64 and 58/64, EtabUssements Consten S.A.R.L and Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbll v. Commission, 
[ 19661ECR 299, at 340.
1171 See also para. 13 of the Art. 81(3) EC Notice, according to which “the creation and preservation of an 
open single market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefit o f 
the consumers".
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EC in fine  to enter into negotiations with each other and to conclude agreements simplifying 
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement o f arbitration awards.1172
2. The Relationship between EC Competition Law and Arbitration: A Developmental
Perspective
a. Introduction
The problem of the application o f EC competition law by the arbitrators is not a new one.1173 
It has attracted attention both from the side o f  Community and competition lawyers and from 
the side o f arbitration specialists. In practice, the relationship between arbitration and EC 
competition law has followed the dual nature o f contradiction and complementarity that wre 
have just described. The initial approach o f both has been rather conflictual. In the early 
stages of EC competition law enforcement, arbitration was seen quite suspiciously by the EC 
antitrust enforcement milieu. This suspicion, not to say hostility, was due to the fear that 
arbitration might be used by companies as a dangerous platform to break the antitrust rules, 
without risking detection by the Commission, national competition authorities or courts. The *13
1172 That provision referred also to recognition and enforcement o f judgments. While the then EEC Member 
States proceeded to the conclusion of the 1968 Brussels Convention, no similar course was taken with regard to 
arbitral awards, because the 1958 New York Convention had come meanwhile into force. See in this context the 
Jenard Report of the 1968 Brussels Convention, OJ [1979] C59/1, p. 13. Hie New York Convention was signed 
by the majority of the then EEC Member States (Italy acceded in 1969) and addressed in a very satisfactory way 
the exigencies of the common market. Currently, all EU Member States are party to that convention.
113 There is an abundant literature on this relationship. See inter alia Steindorff, “Common Market 
Antitrust Law' in Civil Proceedings Before National Courts and Arbitrators”, in: Hawk (Ed.), Antitrust and 
Trade Policy in the United States and lite European Community 1985, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (New York, 1986); the volume published by the International Chamber of Commerce: 
Competition and Arbitration Law, Institute of International Business Law and Practice, ICC (Paris, 1993); Slot, 
“The Enforcement of EC Competition Law in Arbitral Proceedings”, 23(1) LIEI 101 (1996); Idot, “Arbitrage et 
droit communautaire”, (1996) RDAI/IBLJ 561; various contributors, in: Briner, Derains et al. (Eds.), 
L ’arbitrage et le droit européen, Actes du colloque international du CEP ANI du 25 avril 1997 (Bruxelles, 
1997); Komninos, supra (2001), p. 214 et seq.; various contributors, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 
2003). Among the various monographs, see D. Hahn, L ’arbitrage commercial international en Suisse face aux 
règles de concurrence de la CEE (Genève, 1983); C. Baudenbacher and A.K. Schnyder, Die Bedeutung des EG- 
Kartellrechts für Schweizer Schiedsgerichte (Basel/Frankfurt a.M., 1996); W. Abdelgawad, Arbitrage et droit de 
la concurrence, Contribution à l ’étude des rapports entre ordre spontané et ordre organisé (Paris, 2001); N. 
Spiegel, Kartellprivatrecht in der internationalen Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Baden-Baden, 2002); M. 
Blessing, EG/US Kartellrecht in internationalen Schiedsverfahren - 77 Aktuelle Fragen aus der Praxis (Basel, 
2002); idem, Arbitrating Antitrust and Merger Control Issues (Basle/Geneva/Mumch, 2003); N. Shelkoplyas, 
The Application o f EC Law in Arbitration Proceedings (Groningen, 2003); P. Zobel, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und 
Gemeinschaftsrecht, Im Spannungsverhälmi.s zwischen Integration und Exklusion (Tübingen, 2005); P. Landolt, 
Modernised EC Competition Law in International Arbitration (The Hague, 2006); G. Blanke, The Use and 
Utility o f International Arbitration in EC Commission Merger Remedies, A Novel Supranational Paradigm in 
the Making? (Groningen, 2006).
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specific characteristics o f confidentiality, neutrality and finality or arbitration were seen as 
particularly alarming. Such a possibility was basically correlated with anecdotal evidence that 
international arbitrators sitting in non-EU jurisdictions, which were important arbitration 
centres, were not paying due deference to the EC competition rules.1174 
The arbitration milieu, on its part, initially saw EC competition law and the wide powers o f 
enforcement o f the European Commission with some suspicion, if  not fear. The public policy 
nature of the competition rules and the fact that until comparatively recently these rules were 
not considered arbitrable created a rather defensive attitude of arbitrators who were usually 
preferring to avoid dealing with such problematic questions, rather than risk their awards’ 
non-enforcement or annulment on public policy or non-arbitrability grounds. At the same 
time, arbitration specialists rejected what they saw as the Commission’s interventionist and 
disrespectful approach vis-à-vis arbitration.1175
However, this stance has certainly changed in the last decade or so. The Commission has no 
longer obliged the parties to an exempted agreement to notify future arbitral awards, and 
current block exemption regulations do not contain provisions on the withdrawal o f the block 
exemption’s protection in the event o f an offending arbitral award. Indeed, o f late, one may 
even speak o f an embrace o f  arbitration by the Commission as an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism that can be complementary to competition law enforcement. Thus, 
quite surprisingly, there has been a whole series of recent merger decisions, clearing 
concentrations subject to certain conditions or obligations, one of which is recourse to 
arbitration for certain disputes. In those cases arbitration is used as a procedural remedy that 
ensures that parties comply by their - usually - behavioural commitments. The same has also 
happened in the antitrust area with certain old Article 81(3) EC exemption decisions and 
certain new commitment decisions (pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003). This 
“delegation” o f competition law enforcement to private justice constitutes a clear indicator o f  
some complementarity between arbitration and competition law .1176
1174 See the “classical” anecdote used by Jacques Werner, “Application of Competition Laws by Arbitrators: 
The Step Too Far”, 12(1) Jlnt’lArb 21 (1995), p. 23, referring to a real case: Two EC companies had concluded 
an agreement infringing Art. 81 EC. The agreement was subject to Swiss law and arbitration took place in 
Switzerland. Only one copy of the agreement existed, and this was hidden in a Swiss bank. When the dispute 
started, the arbitrators were asked to examine the contract, but not to mention it in their decision.
1175 This refers to the duties imposed by the Commission on private parties, through some old individual 
and block exemptions, to notify to it arbitration proceedings and arbitral awards. The Commission had also 
intervened once in the past to enjoin parties from enforcing an arbitral award that was considered objectionable. 
On all these questions, see below.
1176 The term “delegation” is not used in the strictly legal sense but rather in a political science one.
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The same change o f climate can be sensed in the arbitration side. Arbitrators currently feel 
much more at ease with competition rules and refer to them as a matter of course, indeed, 
exceptionally they even raise them ex officio. Arbitrators and arbitration specialists have also 
seen positively the recent embrace of arbitration by the Commission and the proposed use o f 
arbitration in Commission decisions. This has meant increased opportunities for arbitration in 
an area where its flexibility, informality and swiftness can be critical. The “new” relationship 
between arbitration and EC competition law must also be seen in the context of the recent 
reforms o f competition law enforcement in the EU, where there is a shift from a 
predominantly public enforcement system to a more litigation-based model, which is 
caracterised by an increased role of private enforcement. Since arbitration is an alternative 
forum for the resolution of business disputes, indeed, the dominant forum for international 
business disputes, it is certainly affected by this shift.
b. Conflict and Distrust
aa. Arbitration Clauses/Agreements as Anti-competitive Agreements
A first question is whether the arbitration agreement itself is immune from or subject to the 
EC competition rules. It may be surprising at first sight that a dispute resolution mechanism 
may have an anti-competitive nature, thus being tainted with illegality and voidness. 
Particularly so, since arbitration proceedings are considered as functionally equivalent to 
court proceedings and are recognised as lis pendens, while the decisions that are produced as 
a result o f these proceedings, the arbitral awards, are recognised as equivalent to court 
judgments by national legal systems, are invested with res judicata  effect, and can be 
enforceable. Nevertheless, the fact that an arbitration agreement can be itself subject to the 
rules against restrictions of competition is the mere consequence o f the contractual basis o f 
arbitration. An arbitration agreement is the basis of the arbitration proceedings, but it is also a 
contract and, as such, cannot escape the application of rules limiting or regulating private 
autonomy.
i. The Parallel o f Settlements
At this point it might be useful through an excursus to view from a competition law 
perspective some other agreements that resemble, in the effects they produce, the arbitration
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agreements. Settlements, either judicial or out-of-court ones, are agreements that put an end 
to a dispute as between the parties and in most legal systems can be enforced in a way similar 
to an arbitral award or, indeed, a judgment. Judicial settlements, in particular, can have in 
some jurisdictions res judicata effect between the parties and may even constitute an 
enforceable act or be so declared by a court.1177 Indeed, some jurisdictions encourage the 
conclusion of settlements, as a way to relieve overloaded court dockets.
Notwithstanding these specificities, the Commission has treated invariably such agreements 
as falling under the Treaty competition rules.1178 Thus, in one specific case, the Commission 
intervened directly against the initial version of a settlement that contained certain 
unacceptable clauses. The settlement was between a complainant to the Commission and an 
undertaking, whose conduct was the subject matter of the complaint. It was initially agreed 
that the complainant would receive ECU 4 million as damages, while he should not directly 
or indirectly encourage the Commission to pursue the case. In case the Commission decided 
to proceed to a statement o f objections referring to practices originating in the complaint, the 
complainant had to partially reimburse the undertaking with regard to the damages paid. 
These particular clauses alerted the Commission and were later amended by the settling 
parties, so that the rights o f the complainant w ere safeguarded. According to the Commission 
the settlement in question in its original version would have been contrary to public policy 
and, thus, void.1179
Usually settlements pertain to intellectual property rights cases1180 and in their majority’ 
constitute trademark delimitation agreements.1181 These are agreements, where parties 
owning trademarks liable to be confused agree upon some forms of territorial restrictions in
1177 This is the case for example o f German (§ 794(1X5) ZPO) and Greek law (Arts. 214A(5) and 904(2Xc) 
o f the Greek Code of Civil Procedure).
1178 See e g. Nikpay and Pauli, “Article 81”, in; Faull & Nikpay (Eds ), The EC Law o f  Competition 
(Oxford, 1999), p. 75; Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, supra (2000), pp. 671-673; Tritlon, Davis, Edenborough, 
Graham, Malynicz and Roughton, supra (2002), pp. 693-702; Keeling, supra (2003), p. 358 et seq.\ Treacy, 
“Settlement Agreements: The European Perspective”, 1 JIntell.PL&P 223 (2006).
1179 See Chevalier, “Clauses suspectes dans un accord de rcglement a l'amiable”, 3(1) EC Competition 
Policy Newsletter 8 (1997). O f course, it is not the competence of the Commission to declare the contrariety to 
ordre public or the nullity as such os settlement agreements, as indeed, the Commission in this case did not do. 
The Commission can only intervene as administrative authority against undertakings that conclude anti­
competitive agreements or abuse their dominant position. It is regrettable that the Commission services did not 
disclose more details of this case.
1,80 For a US antitrust perspective see Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley, “Anti-competitive Settlement of 
Intellectual Property Disputes”, 87Minn.LRev. 1719(2003), p. 1721 etseq.
1181 See e.g. Commission Decision 82/897/EEC of 15 December 1982 (Toltecs'Dorset), OJ [1982] L 
379/19, upheld on substance by the ECJ in case 35/83, BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v. Commission, [1985] 
ECR 363. With regard to settlement and non-assertion agreements in technology transfer cases (patent and 
know-how licensing) see Commission Notice - Guidelines on the Application o f Article 81 o f  the EC Treaty to 
Technology Transfer Agreements, OJ [2004] C 101/2, para. 204 et seq.
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the use of the trademarks, thus usually putting an end to protracted litigation. Such 
agreements fall under the prohibition o f Article 81(1) EC, if  their main object or effect is 
simply to partition the markets and not to agree on the trademarks to be used in various 
jurisdictions.1182 Such agreements may be out-of-court settlements, which settle disputes 
before they ever reach the courts,1183 but, quite remarkably, may also be judicial or in-court 
settlements, which put an end to an on-going litigation.
The Court of Justice has treated such settlements with caution, balancing on the one hand the 
principle of private autonomy, as expressed in those agreements, and the public interest 
expressed in the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements. Thus, it has stressed that such 
agreements to settle current or potential litigation, which can be judicial or out-of-court 
settlements, and which may constitute judicial acts in the former case, are capable of falling 
within the prohibition of Article 81(1) EC, since that provision “makes no distinction 
between agreements whose purpose is to put an end to litigation and those concluded with 
other aims in mind”.1184
National courts have also recognised the public policy nature of the EC competition rules in 
subjecting such settlements to the pertinent prohibitions o f the Treaty. Thus, the French Cour 
de Cassation185 quashed a lower judgment that had refused to examine the Article 81(2) EC 
nullity of a patent licensing agreement, because the parties had concluded a settlement having 
the force o f res judicata}196 The French Supreme Court stressed the ordre public nature o f  
the Treaty competition rules and considered, therefore, that the nullity of Article 81(2) EC 
could not be settled.1187 Apart from national provisions which can provide for safeguards
1182 In the Baver/Tanabe case, reported in the Commission Vlllth Report on Competition Policy - 1978 
(Brussels/Luxembourg, 1979), paras. 125-127, the Commission scrutinised a settlement agreement between two 
owners of two potentially confusing trademarks, but concluded that it raised no competition concerns, since it 
only settled the question of the appearance of one of the two trademarks, without partitioning the markets. 
Interestingly enough, in this case too, one of the contractual obligations in the settlement was the withdrawal of 
a complaint to the Commission made by one o f the two parties. The Commission, apparently, because of the 
nature of the case in question, did not pick this issue up.
1183 This is the case of the abovemetioned ToltecsTforset Decision.
1184 Case 65/86, Bayer AG and Maschinenfabrik Hennecke GmbH v. Heinz St'iUhdfer, [1988J ECR 5249, 
paras. 14-15. See also Case 258/78, L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v. Commission (Maize Seed), [1982] 
ECR 2015, paras. 80-89.
1185 Cass.com., 26-3-79, Ateliers de Construction de Compiegne v. Fabry, cited by Loy, “L’application en 
France du droit communautaire de la concurrence”, 16 RTDE 438 (1980), p. 452; Boulanger, supra (1997), pp. 
224 and 292.
186 Ait. 2052(1) Code Civil
1187 Arts. 6 and 2045(1) Code Civil. This case was however decided much earlier than the more liberal 
judgments of French courts with regard to the arbitrability of EC competition law disputes at the beginning of 
the 1990s. It may be that a French court will now accept that such disputes can be settled, but in a way not 
violating ordre public. For a German ruling holding that judicial settlements are not exempt of Article 81 EC 
and of German antitrust law; see BGH, 5.7.2005, X ZR 14/03, 55 WuW 1029 (2005). See further Beater, 
“Kartellverbot und Vergleichsvereinbarung”, 50 WuW 584 (2000), p. 585 etseq.
in
against the courts' sanctioning anti-competitive settlements that contradict ordre public, 
Community law itself, and in particular Article 10 EC, leads to the same result. It is clear 
from that provision that a national court cannot uphold private action that is incompatible 
with the Treaty competition rules.1188
ii. The Principle of Independence o f  the Arhitration Clause/Agreemcnt
After this excursus, we come now to the question whether an arbitration agreement or clause 
can itself be an agreement prohibited by the competition rules. Exactly as with the case o f  
settlements, an arbitration agreement itself cannot be immune to the competition rules. 
However, there are two important distinctions that have to be made.
First, the fact that an anti-competitive and therefore null and void agreement contains an 
arbitration clause has no bearing at all on the civil enforceability and validity o f the 
arbitration clause/agreement itself. Under the globally-recognised doctrine o f separability or 
severability, the arbitration agreement is separate from the main agreement and the illegality 
and vices o f the latter do not affect the former. The arbitration agreement will be affected 
only if  it is itself illegal or if  there are vices that refer to itself, irrespective o f the main 
agreement.1189 This will happen in rather rare circumstances. Thus, as long as the arbitration 
clause itself is valid and worded sufficiently broadly, an arbitrator may declare a contract 
invalid but still retain jurisdiction to decide a dispute as to the consequences o f the invalidity. 
A principle related to separability is the principle of competence-competence, according to 
which arbitrators are judges of their own jurisdiction and are entitled to mle on their own 
competence. Therefore, if the validity o f the arbitration agreement itself and thus their 
competence is at stake, arbitrators do not have to defer to state courts but can continue the 
arbitration and consider whether they have jurisdiction.1190
1188 Compare Commission Proposal fo r  a Directive o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council on 
Certain Aspects o f  Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(2004) 718 final, Art. 5(1), which 
provides that settlement agreements pursuant to mediation must not be contrary to Community law.
1189 In such a case, the arbitrators would have no other option but to declare themselves incompetent.
1,90 On the principles of separability and competence-competence, see inter alia Rogers and Launders, 
“Separability - The Indestructible Arbitration Clause”, 10 Arb.IntT 77 (1994); Rosen, “Arbitration under Private 
International Law: The Doctrines of Separability and Compétence de la Compétence”, 17 Fordham IntTLJ 599 
(1994); Dimolitsa, “Autonomie et ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz”\  (1998) Rev.Arb. 305; Gaillard, “The Negative 
Effect of Competence-Competence”, 17(1) Mealey’s International Arbitration Report 27 (2002); Smit, 
“Separability and Competence-Competence in International Arbitration: Ex nihilo nihil fit? Or Can Something 
Indeed Come from Nothing?”, 13 Am.Rev.Int’lAib. 19 (2002); Barcelô, “Who Decides the Arbitrators’ 
Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective”, 36 Vand.JTransnaflL 
1115(2003).
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Second, unlike settlements which can directly fall under the competition law prohibitions 
because they define the market conduct of the contracting parties and therefore can directly 
affect competition in the market, arbitration agreements can only indirectly fall under Articles 
81 and 82 EC, if they strengthen or put in effect a main agreement which itself directly falls 
under these rules. In other words, it is not the function or the aim of an arbitration agreement 
to define the conduct of the parties in the market, but rather to resolve a dispute, which itself 
may refer indeed to an agreement that defines market conduct and thus affects 
competition.M91 This means that it will only be in exceptional cases that the arbitration 
agreement or clause in question will be caught by Articles 81 and 82 EC. In those exceptional 
cases, the arbitration agreement will be invalid not because the doctrine of civil separability 
recedes but rather because the Article 81 or 82 EC illegality taints the arbitration agreement 
itself. This is an important conceptual point.
iii. Arbitration Clauses/Agreements that Are bv Themselves Anti-competitive
The early years of the tension between EC competition law and arbitration offer some 
examples of arbitration clauses that were considered to be anti-competitive by themselves. 
Thus, in some old Commission Decisions, although arbitration is not usually condemned as 
an institution, the existence of arbitration clauses has been found, in the Commission’s view, 
to have a function supportive of anti-competitive main agreements.
In International Quinine Cartel,19 192 a case concerning price and quota-fixing for supplying 
quinine globally, the parties had expressly excluded the then EEC from the scope of their 
agreement, but had concluded “gentlemen's agreements” extending the anti-competitive 
clauses to the common market. The gentlemen’s agreements were enforceable by arbitration
1191 The only purely theoretical case where an arbitration agreement may directly define market conduct and 
thus affect competition, is when the parties agree in the arbitration agreement to eliminate or distort competition 
with regard to the market fo r arbitration-related sendees itself. In those cases, arbitration would be of interest to 
competition law not as a dispute resolution mechanism but as a market. It is difficult to find an example for such 
a case, because the parties to the arbitration agreement will not have market power in the sense of being able to 
influence in an appreciable way the market for arbitration-related services (a situation of oligopsony or 
monopsony). We leave aside here the question whether the competition rules apply to the market for arbitration- 
related services from the other side (oligopoly or monopoly). Indeed, there is no doubt that the competition rules 
could in principle apply to certain price-fixing arrangements between arbitrators or arbitration institutions. This 
is a question, however, that is of no interest to us here, since it has nothing to do with arbitration agreements or 
clauses. If there is something anti-competitive here, this is not the arbitration clause that makes a dispute subject 
to an arbitration institution but rather the price-fixing arrangements of that institution.
1192 Commission Decision 69/240/EEC of 16 July 1969 (International Quinine Agreement), JO [1969] L 
192/5.
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procedures.1193 The Commission had no difficulty in considering these anti-competitive 
practices as agreements in the Article 81 EC sense, notwithstanding their definition by the 
parties as “gentlemen’s agreements”. In finding an agreement, the Commission relied on the 
facts that they provided for certain obligations for the parties, and, interestingly enough, that 
these obligations could be enforced through an arbitration mechanism.1194 It appears, 
therefore, that the arbitration agreement itself strengthened the effectiveness o f those 
practices and contributed to their qualification as agreements.1195
Reassuringly, in some other cases the Commission has stressed that an arbitration agreement 
or scheme is not normally subject to the prohibition of Articles 81 and 82 EC.1196 The overall 
object and effect of an arbitration clause is to submit certain current or future disputes to an 
independent third party, the arbitrator, instead o f seizing the state courts with these disputes. 
Nevertheless, the Commission could not exclude that the function of an arbitration clause in 
an anti-competitive agreement (e.g., in a  tie-in) can exceptionally be such as to increase the 
competition-restraining function o f the unlawful practice. In such cases it could be with 
certainty foreseen that the arbitral tribunal, when deciding, would violate EC competition 
law. Therefore, the arbitration clause itself would be caught by the Article 81(1) EC 
prohibition and would be void under Article 81(2) EC.
In its Stoves and Heaters Decision the Commission did indeed prohibit a cartel agreement 
that included such an arbitration clause, because in effect the latter constituted a means o f  
dissuading firms from establishing their position on the market through competitive effort, 
thus contributing to the circumvention of the EC rules on competition. In this case, the 
arbitral tribunals were considered as simply an integrated part o f the cartel itself, thus being 
not impartial and independent adjudicatory bodies. Instead they could be expected to render 
awards that would uphold the anti-competitive cartel, thus imposing a coherent and precise 
system o f anti-competitive restrictions.1197
1193 It is not clear from the text of that Decision what was intended by “arbitration procedures”. It seems that 
some of these “gentlemen’s agreements” left it to the parties whether to go to arbitration or whether to submit 
their disputes to ordinary courts.
1194 International Quinine Agreement Decision, op.cit., para. 19.
1.95 The inclusion of an arbitration clause, which is itself an agreement, into a written accord obviously 
reinforces the latter’s contractual nature.
1.96 Commission Decision 72/25/EEC o f 22 December 1971 (Bttroughs-Delplanque), JO [1972] L 13/50; 
Commission Decision 72/237/EEC of 9 June 1972 (Davidson Rubber Co.), JO [ 1972] L 143/31.
1197 Commission Decision 75/358/EEC of 3 June 1975 (Stoves and Heaters), OJ [1975] L 159/22. For 
another similar case see Commission Decision 78/59/EEC 2 December 1977 (Centraal Bureau voor de 
Rij-wielhandel), OJ [1978] L 20/18, where the creation of an arbitral tribunal itself aggravated the restrictive 
effects of an anti-competitive agreement See also Hahn, supra (1983), p. 77 etseq:, Steindorff, supra (1986), p. 
431; Von Zumbusch, “Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Under US, German and EEC Law: The ‘International 
Transaction’ Criterion and Public Policy”, 22 Texas Int’lLJ 291 (1987), pp. 314-315.
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More recently, in Organic Peroxides, the Commission unearthed and punished a cartel that 
dated back to 1971 and included among the various maiket-sharing and price-fixing clauses a 
compensation mechanism for deviations from the agreed quotas, a joint surveillance and 
potentially common reactions against competitors, and an arbitration system. The published 
version of the Decision does not give much information about the nature o f that “arbitration 
system”, but there is no doubt that such an arbitration agreement would itself be invalid.1198 
In such cases, arbitrators themselves may indeed be liable to fines under Regulation 1/2003. 
Arbitrators, like other professionals such as lawyers,1199 are undertakings and would act here 
as an ancillary vehicle that supports, reinforces and facilitates the anti-competitive conduct. It 
is interesting that in the Organic Peroxides case, the Commission did not stop at imposing 
fines upon the cartel members, but actually fined a Swiss-based consultancy which had acted 
as a secretary to the parties and facilitated the implementation of the anti-competitive 
agreement. The Commission found that the consultant’s role in the cartel went much further 
than that of a  secretary': it had played an essential role in organising and implementing the 
cartel, and some o f the additional tasks it performed had involved a certain degree of 
discretion and independent decision-making. In particular, it acted independently from the 
cartel members by undertaking an audit, which was an essential feature of the agreement. It 
also stored documents for the cartel participants, reimbursed travel expenses to avoid any 
traces of illegal meetings and provided legal services, including advice on how to avoid 
detection of the cartel by the antitrust authorities.
There is no doubt that “arbitrators” acting as an integral mechanism of a similar cartel or of 
some other particularly repugnant anti-competitive structure, would be equally so liable.
bb. A rbitral Awards as Anti-competitive Agreements?
While settlements can be compared with arbitration agreements, the same is not true for 
arbitral awards. In contrast to settlements and arbitration clauses, which are agreements 
between private parties and may exceptionally constitute themselves an anti-competitive 
agreement, arbitral awards are not agreements in the sense of Article 81 EC. Even if 
arbitration has a contractual basis, the actual decision of the arbitrators cannot be seen as an
1198 Commission Decision of 10 December 2003 {Organic Peroxides), para. 84.
1199 Case C-35/99, Criminal Proceedings against Manuele Arduino, [2002] ECR 1-1529, paras. 37-38 (by 
implication); case C-309/99, J.CJ. IVouters et al. v. Algemene Raad van de Nederhndse Orde van Advocaten, 
[2002] ECR 1-1577, paras. 48-49. On the definition of lawyers as “undertakings” see further A. Berlinguer, 
Professione forense, impresa e concorrenza, Tendenze e itinerari nella circolazione di un modello (Milano, 
2003), p. 269 et seq.
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anti-competitive agreement, notwithstanding the fact that the award may uphold such a n  
agreement. To subject arbitral awards as such to the concept of “agreement” of Article 81 
EC, even by analogy, would go too far. Such awards will bear the civil consequences that th e  
law provides, namely they will be liable to annulment or non-enforcement on public p o licy  
grounds, but cannot be automatically “prohibited” or declared “void” as such, in the sam e 
way as anti-competitive agreements can.1200
Of course, the Commission may prohibit conduct associated with an arbitration proceeding o r  
an award, but lacks competence to directly “invalidate” the award. Therefore, even in th e  
exceptional case described above, where the arbitration is essentially an integral part o f  a  
cartel and the arbitration clause itself is an anti-competitive and invalid agreement, th e  
antitrust authorities cannot impugn the award itself, though they could enjoin the arbitrators — 
since in this case they would be mere cartel facilitators -  from going on with the “arbitration” 
proceedings and from producing an “award”. A competition authority could also enjoin th e  
parties from participating in the arbitration proceedings and from enforcing the award.1201 
Indeed, the Commission has used this power in at least one case in the rather remote past.1202
cc. Duty to Notify Arbitral Awards in Individual Exemption Decisions
Apart from the above instances, where one can speak of a more direct conflict between th e  
arbitration agreement/proceedings and EC competition law, the European Commission h as  
also treated suspiciously arbitration in a rather indirect way. A number of Commission 
decisions granting, under the old system o f  enforcement, individual exemptions, have 
imposed since the 1970s a duty on the parties to notify arbitral awards rendered in the context
1200 In the competition law litterature there is sometimes confusion and wonl is made of an arbitral award’s 
nullity, which is clearly not the case. See e.g. Goyder, supra (2003), p. 139.
1201 Anti-competitive recourse to dispute resolution proceedings must not be associated only w ith  
arbitration. Indeed, under EC competition law recourse to litigation may under certain circumstances also be 
anti-competitive. This is the case of vexatious litigation, which may constitute an abuse of a dominant position, 
if it is exercised by a dominant undertaking with a view to intimidating and to harassing the defendant. See 
Commission Decision of 21 May 1996 in Complaint No IV/35.268 (ITT Promedia), unpublished, and case T- 
111/96, ITT Promedia v. Commission, [1998] ECR11-2937, paras. 30, 55, 60, 61. For an earlier case, w here the 
complainant had put forward arguments based on vexatious litigation and other harassing tactics see 
Commission Decision 87/500/EEC of 29 July 1987 (BBI/Boosey & Hawkes: Interim Measures), OJ [1987] L 
286/36. On these cases, see Temple Lang, “European Community Antitrust Law': Innovation Markets and High 
Technology Industries”, 20 Fordham Int’lLJ 717 (1997), p. 796; Esteva Mosso and Rvan, supra (1999), pp. 182- 
183.
1202 This was the Preflex'Lipski case (cited supra). The Commission held that an agreement as interpreted 
by an arbitral award was incompatible with the Treaty competition rules. It did not, of course, set the arbitral 
award aside but communicated its objections to the parties and in essence rejected the construction given by the 
arbitral tribunal to tire problematic contractual clause. In essence, the Commission took issue with the agreement 
as interpreted and enforced by the award and not with the award itself. On this case, see below.
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of a contract that is exempted. One illustration is the Transocean Marine Paint Association 
Decision of 1973.1203 In this case the Commission made an individual exemption conditional 
on the parties’ informing it without delay of the results of any arbitration held with respect to 
some specific provisions of the agreement. On appeal, the European Court o f Justice, though 
not specifically referring to the condition on the notification of arbitral awards, upheld the 
Commission’s Decision, as far as the imposition of duties was concerned, stating that “since 
Article [81(3)] constitutes, for the benefit of undertakings, an exception to the general 
prohibition contained in Article [81(1)], the Commission must be in a position at any moment 
to check whether the conditions justifying the exemption are still present”.1204 
This requirement has been included in a variety of individual exemption decisions1205 in the 
form o f an obligation or a condition imposed by the Commission.1206 However, there has not 
been any evidence of an arbitral award falling short of complying with the terms o f an 
exemption decision or of an exemption being revoked or amended because of that reason. 
Meanwhile, at least for the last decade, such a requirement o f notification of arbitral awards 
appeared less often in individual exemption decisions and was usually employed by the 
Commission only in special cases, most notably when arbitration was part o f the internal 
rules o f a business association and there was a pressing need to monitor certain collective 
schemes of those associations. In its International Energy Agency Decision,1207 the 
Commission specified that an individual exemption given to an emergency allocation system 
among oil companies did not extend to arbitral awards, rendered under the auspices o f a 
specified “Dispute Settlement Centre”, and which resolved oil supply transaction disputes 
during the implementation of the emergency scheme. The implicit result of this was that such 
arbitral awards would have to be notified anew to the Commission in order for the emergency 
allocation to be exempted. More recently, in its Eurovision Decision o f May 2000,1208 the 
Commission granted an individual exemption pursuant to Article 81(3) EC, while imposing
1203 Commission Decision 74/16/EEC of 21 December 1973, OJ [1974] L 19/18.
1204 Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v, Commission [1974] ECR 1063, para. 16.
1205 See Commission Decision 72/41/EEC of 23 December 1971 (Henkel'CoIgate), JO [1972] L 14/14; 
Commission Decision 75/494/EEC of 18 July 1975 (Ka be /-A fetal/Luchaire ), OJ [1975] L 222/34; Commission 
Decision 76/172/EEC of 15 December 1975 (Baver/Gist-Brocades), OJ [1976] L 30/13; Commission Decision 
78/253/EEC of 23 December 1977 (Campari), OJ [1978] L 70/69; Commission Decision 83/390/EEC of 13 July 
1983 (RockweiLlveco), OJ [1983] L 224/19; Commission Decision 77/543/EEC of 25 July 1977 (De 
Lavallstork), OJ [1977] L 215/11, renewed by Commission Decision 88/110/EEC of 22 December 1987, OJ 
[1988] L 59/32; Commission Decision 89/96/EEC of 20 December 1988 (EMO), OJ [1989] L 37/11; 
Commission Decision 91/128/EEC of 15 February' 1991 (Sippa), OJ [1991] L 60/19.
1200 Obligations have usually been preferred to conditions (on their differences see infra). If  parties failed to 
adhere to such obligations, the Commission could impose fines or revoke or amend the exemption.
1207 Commission Decision 83/671/EEC of 12 December 1983, OJ [1983] L 376/30.
1208 Commission Decision 2000/400/EC o f 10 May 2000, OJ [2000] L 151/18.
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an obligation to the addressee o f  that exemption, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), t o  
inform it o f “all arbitration procedures under the scheme for EBU non-members’ access t o  
Eurovision sports programmes”. The reference to arbitration procedures rather than to a w ard s  
is unfortunate, although it is doubtful whether this echoes a deliberately more interventionist 
approach o f the Commission towards arbitration. The Eurovision Decision appears to be th e  
last exemption decision in which a  duty to notify aw ards w as imposed.
dd. Duty to Notify A rbitral Awards in Block Exemption Regulations
A certain distrust on the part o f the Commission towards arbitration has also been seen in  
some old block exemption regulations. Thus, Article 9(1) of the old patent licensing b lo c k  
exemption Regulation1209 dictated that if the effects o f an arbitral award w'ere incompatible 
with Article 81(3) EC or the block exemption itself, the Commission could withdraw th e  
benefits accruing from the block exemption for the specific patent license.1210 A s im ila r 
provision was included in the old block exemption Regulation on know-how licensing.1211 
These provisions were much criticised,1212 because it was argued that a losing party in a n  
arbitration could always dispatch a complaint to the Commission alleging the incompatibility 
of the unfavourable award with these Regulations and with Article 81(3) EC. That co u ld  
transform the European Commission to a quasi-appeal tribunal, something, which conflicts 
with the very essence o f arbitration and something that the Commission itself would ra th er 
avoid.
Encouragingly enough, the Commission has subsequently followed a more liberal approach. 
The current1213 and previous1214 block exemption Regulations on technology transfer 
agreements that have replaced the patent and know-how' licensing Regulations, no longer 
included a provision on withdrawal o f the block exemption’s protection in the event o f  a n  
offending arbitral award. A certain caution remained for some time only in some specific
1209 Commission Regulation 2349/1984 o f  23 July 1984 on the Application o f  Article 85(1) o f the Treaty to  
Certain Categories o f Patent Licensing Agreements, OJ [1984] L 219/15.
1210 In the 1979 draft patent licensing regulation (OJ [1979] C 58/12), the Commission had proposed to  
require parties to a patent licence qualifying under the block exemption to communicate promptly to it the term s 
of any arbitral award that bore on the interpretation or operation o f any provision permitted or forbidden by the  
block exemption. This requirement was widely criticised at that time and the subsequent reaction led the 
Commission to delete this provision from the final text o f Reg. 2349/1984.
1211 Commission Regulation 556/1989 o f  30 November 1988 on the Application o f  Article 85(1) o f  the  
Treatv to Certain Categories o f  Know-how Licensing Agreements, OJ [1989] L 61/1, Art. 7(1).
1212 See already the comments made by DVGRUR, 80 GRUR 695 (1978). See further McClellan, 
“Commercial Arbitration and European Community Law”, 5 Arb.Int’l 68 (1989), p. 71.
12,3 Reg. 774/2004, OJ [2004] L 123/11.
1214 Reg. 240/1996, OJ [1996] L 31/2.
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fields, mainly in the maritime transport sector. Thus, a provision that had survived the rather 
suspicious initial attitude o f the Commission was Article 9(4) o f Regulation 823/2000 on 
liner shipping companies (consortia),1215 according to which “arbitration awards and 
recommendations of conciliators, which have been accepted by the parties and which settle 
disputes concerning practices of consortia covered by this Regulation, shall be notified 
forthwith to the Commission by the consortium”. This provision was repealed by Regulation 
463/20041216 and this amendment is a  good indication of the Commission’s more relaxed 
approach towards arbitration.1217 Nevertheless, the new text of Article 12(l)(c) of Regulation 
823/2000, as amended by Article 1(4) o f Regulation 463/2004, retains the possibility for the 
Commission (and now also for national competition authorities) to withdraw the benefit of 
the block exemption if an agreement, as interpreted and given effect by an arbitration award, 
produces effects that are incompatible with Article 81(3) EC.1218
c. Embrace and Complementarity
aa. The More General Positive Approach for Arbitration and ADR in
Community Law
The reversal o f the European Commission’s initial suspicious attitude towards arbitration 
must also be seen in the more general context of the adoption o f a clear Community policy 
favouring alternative dispute resolution (ADR), particularly in areas pertaining to the 
protection of consumers. Already in 1993 the Commission had produced a Green Paper on
1215 Commission Regulation 823/2000 o f 19 April 2000 on the Application o f Article 81(3) o f  the Treaty to 
Certain Categories o f Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices between Liner Shipping Companies 
(Consortia), OJ [2000] L 100/24. This text has last be amended by Commission Regulation 611/2005 of 20 
April 2005, OJ [2005] L 101/10.
1216 Commission Regulation 463/2004 o f 12 March 2004 Amending Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 on the 
Application o f Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to Certain Categories o f Agreements, Decisions and Concerted 
Practices between Liner Shipping Companies (Consortia), OJ [2004] L 77/23, Ait. 1 (2Xa)-
1217 Compare also Art. 5 of Commission Regulation 2843/1998 o f 22 December 1998 on the Form, Content 
and Other Details o f  Applications and Notifications Pro\’ided fo r  in Council Regulations (EEC) No. 1017/68, 
(EEC) No. 4056/86 and (EEC) 3975/87 Applying the Rules on Competition to the Transport Sector, OJ [ 1998] L 
354/22, which made obligatory the notification to the Commission of “awards at arbitration and 
recommendations by conciliators accepted by the parties” with regard to disputes concerning some unfair 
pricing practices in maritime transport. This Regulation has now been repealed by Commission Regulation 
773/2004 o f 7 April 2004 Relating to the Conduct o f  Proceedings by the Commission Pursuant to Articles 81 
and 82 o f  the EC Treaty, OJ [2004] L 123/18.
1218 In particular where: (a) in a given trade, competition from outside the conference within which the 
consortium operates or from outside a particular consortium, is not effective; (b) a consortium fails repeatedly to 




consumers’ access to justice,1219 in which it advocated the use of alternative d is p u te  
resolution methods, including arbitration, for a quick out-of-court resolution of c o n su m e r 
disputes. This was followed up by a Commission Action Plan in 1996,1220 and a C om m ission 
Communication and a Recommendation in 1998.1221 The 1998 Recommendation estab lished  
certain minimum standards that ADR bodies should satisfy, namely im partiality , 
independence, efficiency, procedure based on the adversarial principle, publicity a n d  
transparency.1222 These Commission initiatives were also welcomed by the Council.1223 
The Commission together with the Member States have now established a network o f c o n ta c t 
points or “clearing houses” (HEJ-NET), which provides consumers with information o n  
available ADR schemes, as well as legal advice and practical help in pursuing a complaint b y  
this means. The tasks of the EEJ-NET are to co-ordinate out-of-court-settlement procedures 
for consumers throughout Europe, to provide consumers with easy and informed access t o  
such procedures cross-border, and to facilitate the resolution o f cross-border consum er 
disputes.1224 The network deals with any dispute between a consumer and a business (C 2 B ) 
over goods and services, such as problems over deliveries, defective products, or products o r  
services that do not fit their description. The EEJ-NET is complemented by FIN-NET w h ic h  
is a dedicated network dealing exclusively with consumer complaints about financial serv ices 
(credit, investments, loans etc).1225
The same favourable attitude towards ADR can be seen in the electronic commerce Directive 
which stipulates that Member States should ensure that their legislation does not hamper th e
1219 Commission Green Paper - Access o f  Consumers to Justice and the Settlement o f Consumer Disputes in  
the Single Afarket, COM(93) 576 final.
12:0 Commission Communication -  Action Plan on Consumer Access to Justice and the Settlement o f  
Consumer Disputes in the Internal Market, COM(96) 13 final.
1221 Commission Communication on tlte Out-of-court Settlement o f Consumer Disputes, COM(98) 198 fin a l;  
Commission Recommendation 98'257/EC o f  30 March 1998 on the Principles Applicable to the B odies  
Responsible fo r  Out-of-court Settlement o f  Consumer Disputes, OJ [1998] L 115/31.
1222 The scope of that Recommendation was limited to procedures which lead to the settlement of a dispute 
through the active intervention of a third party, who proposes or imposes a solution. It did not concern 
procedures that merely involve an attempt to bring the parties together to convince them to find a solution by  
common consent. This limitation was remedied with the adoption of a Commission Communication and a  
Recommendation in 2001: Commission Communication on Widening Consumer Access to Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, COM(2001) 161 final; Commission Recommendation 2001/310ÆC o f 4 April 2001 on the  
Principles fo r  Out-of-court Bodies Involved in the Consensual Resolution o f  Consumer Disputes, OJ [2001] L 
109/56.
1223 Council Resolution o f  25 May 2000 on a Community-wide Network o f National Bodies for the Extra­
judicial Settlement o f Consumer Disputes, OJ [2000] C 155/1.
1224 The EEJ-NET's website address is
http: //ec .europa. eu/c o ns um ers/redres s/o ut_o f_c o urt/cej _ne t/index_en. htm.
1225 The FIN-NET’S webside address is http://ec.europa.eu/intcmal_market/finservices-
retail/fmnet/index_en.htm.
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use of out-of-court schemes available under national law, for dispute settlement.1226 The 
rationale is that electronic commerce facilitates cross-border transactions between business 
and consumers. Since such transactions are frequently of low value, the resolution o f any 
dispute needs to be simple, quick and inexpensive. According to the Commission, “new 
technology can contribute to the development of electronic dispute settlement systems, 
providing a mechanism to effectively settle disputes across different jurisdictions without the 
need for face-to-face contact, and therefore should be encouraged through principles ensuring 
consistent and reliable standards to give all users confidence”.1227
More generally, the Commission has recently proceeded to ADR-fiiendly proposals and 
initiatives that are not limited to the consumer protection and electronic commerce fields. 
Thus, in 2002 the Commission adopted a Green Paper that aims at encouraging access to 
ADR in all civil and commercial matters.1228 As a follow-up to the 2002 Green Paper, a 
European Code of Conduct on Mediation was developed in 2004 by a group of stakeholders 
with the assistance of the services of the European Commission. The Code sets out a number 
of principles to which individual mediators can voluntarily decide to commit, under their own 
responsibility. It is intended to be applicable to all kinds of mediation in civil and commercial 
matters.1229 The Commission has also proposed a draft directive on mediation for all civil and 
commercial matters.1230
While these projects are probably oriented not at the kind o f international commercial 
arbitration proceedings that are relevant here, they nevertheless denote a certain general 
positive stance o f the Community vis-à-vis ADR and by implication arbitration.
bb. The Beginning of the Commission's (Awkward) Embrace of Arbitration: The
Motor Vehicles Block Exemption Regulation
The reversal o f the Commission’s negative predisposition towards arbitration in the area of 
competition law enforcement cannot be better evidenced than in its previous and current 
block exemption Regulations on the motor vehicle sector. Indeed, in the previous automobile
1226 Directive 2000/31/EC, OJ [2000] L 178/1, Art. 17.
1227 Commission Recommendation 2001/310/EC, op.cit., Recital 6.
1225 Commission Green Paper o f 19 April 2002 on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil and Commercial 
Law, COM(2002) 196 final. This was following the Council’s Conclusions on 29 May 2000, that had invited the 
Commission to draw up a Green Paper on alternative methods of settling disputes under civil and commercial 
law to take stock of and review the existing situation and initiate wide-ranging consultations.
1229 The Code is available in: http;//ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr ec code_conduct_en.pdf
1230 COM(20G4) 718 final.
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distribution Regulation1231 the Commission actually for the first time encouraged recourse to  
arbitration as a means o f alternative dispute resolution between suppliers and dealers. 
According to Article 5(3) in fine  o f  that Regulation, where two parties in an agreement, 
namely a  supplier and a  dealer, do not fulfil their contractual obligations, in the event o f  
disagreement, they “m u s t... accept a  system for the quick resolution o f the dispute, such a s  
recourse to an expert third party or an arbitrator, without prejudice to the parties’ right to  
apply to a competent court in conformity with the provisions of national law”. Such cases 
concerned either the right of the supplier to terminate the agreement if it is necessary to  
reorganise the whole or a substantial part of the network, or the right of one party to terminate 
the agreement for cause if  the other party fails to perform one of its basic obligations.
Article 3(6) o f the new Regulation 1400/2002 presents the same favourable attitude towards 
arbitration. The possibility to refer a dispute to arbitration is clearly turned to a condition fo r  
the application of the block exemption. According to the text o f that provision, “th e  
exemption shall apply on condition that the vertical agreement provides for each o f the  
parties the right to refer disputes concerning the fulfilment of their contractual obligations to  
an independent expert or arbitrator” . This means that the vertical agreement will be block- 
exempted only if it contains an arbitration clause that covers the kind o f disputes mentioned 
or implied by the Regulation. An express reference in the arbitration clause to those specific 
disputes does not seem to be necessary and a broad arbitration clause would be in our view  
sufficient.
Thus, dealers must have the right to submit to arbitration disputes over supply obligations, the 
setting or attainment o f sales targets including local sales targets,1232 the implementation o f  
stock requirements, the implementation of an obligation to provide or use demonstration 
vehicles, the conditions for the sale o f different brands, and whether the termination o f a  
dealership agreement is justified by the reasons given in the notice.1233 Other disputes that 
will have to be submitted to arbitration (or to independent expertise) relate to the assessment 
of certain quality standards or requirements imposed by suppliers to authorised repairers,
1231 Commission Regulation 1475/1995 o f  28 June 1995 on the Application o f Art 85(3) o f the Treaty to 
Certain Categories o f Motor Vehicle Distribution and Servicing Agreements, OJ [1995] L 145/25.
1232 See Commission Document, Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Application o f Reg. 
1400/2002, in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/car_sector/distribution/faq_en.pdC Question 9.
1233 See the non-exhaustive list of Art. 3(6) Reg. 1400/2002. See also case C-125/05, IW-Audi 
Forhandletforeningen ex parte Vulcan Silkeborg M S  v. Skandinavisk Motor Co, A S, Judgment of 7 September 
2006, not yet reported.
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such as a requirement to make arrangements for replacement vehicles to be available to 
customers, whose own vehicles are being serviced or repaired.1234
If the distribution system in question does not provide for the possibility of arbitration or 
independent expertise, the block exemption is inapplicable and the former will have to be 
examined under Article 81(3) EC, unless it is below the de minimis thresholds.1235 It is clear 
from these provisions that the Commission treats arbitration as an important mechanism that 
ensures the quick resolution of disputes arising between the parties to a car distribution 
agreement that might otherwise hamper effective competition.1236
While the Commission’s positive attitude for arbitration in Regulation 1400/2002 must 
generally be welcomed, the Commission regrettably groups arbitration together with 
individual expertise and refers to them in an alternative way.1237 In so doing, it creates very 
serious doubts as to whether the mechanism that is here envisaged is indeed arbitration.1238 
The two mechanisms are hardly comparable. Arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism, 
alternative to state justice, that eventually leads to a decision that is recognised by law as 
having res judicata effect and as being enforceable not only domestically but also 
internationally. Then, most importantly, an arbitration agreement excludes state court 
competences, while the Regulation 1400/2002 third party-arbitrator mechanism leaves 
unaffected the competence of national courts to hear disputes.1239 Individual expertise, on the 
other hand, is not a dispute resolution method, but only leads to the definition by a third party 
o f a specific act o f performance of a contract or of an obligation/right between two other 
parties. The decision of that third party binds naturally the two parties, but only on the basis 
o f their contract. In other words, the decision of the third party does not constitute res
1234 Frequently Asked Questions, op.cit., Question 12 in fine.
1235 The thresholds are 15% if the distribution system is purely vertical, 10% if it is horizontal, and 5% if 
there are cumulative effects. See Commission Explanatory Brochure fo r  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 
1400/2002 o f 31 July 2002 on the Application o f  Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to Categories o f Vertical 
Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector, in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/car sector/explanatoiy brochure_en.pdf Question 7.
1336 See Recital 11 Reg. 1400/2002.
1237 See the critical comments of Du Jardin, “Arbitrage v. expertise en droit de la distribution”, in: 
Arbitration and Commercial Distribution, Reports o f the Colloquium o f  CEPAN1 (November 17* 2005) 
(Bruxelles, 2005), p. 164 etseq.
1238 Note that the Spanish text of the Regulation uses the term “mediador”.
1239 See Schlenger and Hinrichs, in: Liebscher, Flohr & Petsche (Eds.), Handbuch der EU~ 
Gruppenfreistellungsverordnungen (Mtinchen/Wien, 2003), p. 518. Note that Art. 3(6) in fine Reg. 1400/2002 
provides that the arbitration envisaged in that provision is “without prejudice to each party’s right to make an 
application to a national court” (emphasis added). It is not clear whether the Community legislator’s aim was to 
exclude non-EU state courts and non-EU choice-of-forum clauses but the text is very problematic and inelegant. 
Compare also s. 5.3.2 in fine of the Explanatory Brochure (op.cit. ), which states that “agreements must provide 
for the parties to have the right to refer any disputes on this subject to an independent expert or arbitrator or to a 
national court” (emphasis added). This reference seems to imply that the block exemption will indeed not be 
available to agreements containing non-EU choice-of-forum clauses.
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judicata and is not an enforceable title. Its respect can only be attained through an action o f  
breach o f contract before a court or - possibly - an arbitrator.1240
In addition, some of the disputes that Regulation 1400/2002 aims at referring to "arbitration”  
are not exactly the typical disputes that arbitrators would hear but are rather technical 
questions o f economic and marketing nature that would ideally be submitted to a technical 
expert. Conversely, some other kinds of disputes, for example those relating to the fulfilm ent 
o f  the parties’ contractual obligations, are indeed more appropriate for arbitration yet the te x t  
o f Regulation 1400/2002 refers to arbitration and third-party expertise in an alternative 
manner, although a third-party' technical expert is hardly a suitable dispute resolution 
forum.1241 These and other confusions have led some commentators to hold that it is n o t  
arbitration the mechanism that Regulation 1400/2002 refers to but rather third-party expertise 
with some elements o f  dispute resolution.1242 Without going so far, it seems to us that th e  
question whether this mechanism is arbitration in the sense of producing awards o f r e s  
judicata that can be enforceable as such domestically and internationally, can only b e  
answered on an ad hoc basis.1243
cc. Failing in Love: A rbitration in M erger Clearance Decisions
i. The Commission’s Practice in Accepting Commitments in Merger Clearance Cases
1240 Occasionally, it may be difficult to distinguish between the two. See e.g. Efeteio Athens n° 174/2002, 
51 Norniko Vima 1638 (2002), where the Athens Court of Appeal declared non-existent an arbitral award that 
had been rendered in a third party-expertise case. See also Kantonsgericht Schwyz, 24.6.03, KG 331/02 ZK, 24 
Bull.ASA 115 (2006), where a Swiss cantonal court held that expert determination (Schiedsgutachten) is no t 
subject to the arbitration rules.
1241 Indeed, the Commission in its Explanatory Brochure (op.cit.), under Question 70 and with regard to  
disputes on the termination of the car dealership, refers only to arbitration and litigation and excludes any role 
for third-party experts: “In the event of dispute, it will be for the arbitrator or national court to decide whether 
the reasons given justify the termination of the dealer agreement and, amongst other things, to choose an 
appropriate remedy if the reasons given do not justify the termination. In coming to a decision as to whether the 
reasons for termination are well-founded, the arbitrator or judge may have regard to a number of elements 
including the dealer agreement itself, the requirements of national contract law, as well as the text of the 
Regulation.” This is a step in the right direction but does not remedy the problem created by the alternative 
reference to experts and arbitrators in the text of the Regulation. Compare also the recent Vulcan Silkeborg 
ruling of the EC J (op.cit.) where there are many references to arbitration as a real dispute resolution mechanism, 
in particular with regard to disputes concerning the termination of a car distribution agreement.
1242 See e.g, Du Jardin, supra (2005), p. 165.
1243 See below' the more detailed discussion of this problem in the context of merger control.
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The real revolution in the whole relationship between arbitration and EC competition law can 
be seen in merger control, at first sight a rather unlikely area for a role for arbitration,1244 
Since 1992 the Commission has embraced arbitration as a credible procedural mechanism to 
resolve disputes related to commitments given by the merging parties to the Commission.1245 
In such cases, the Commission accepts a commitment1246 by companies to submit disputes 
with third parties, or exceptionally disputes between the merging parties themselves, to 
independent arbitration and then may either (a) proceed to directly impose on them a 
condition or obligation to that effect in its clearance decision1247 or (b) just clear the merger 
referring to the commitments but without transforming them into conditions or obligations.
In the first o f these rivo cases, the conditions or obligations intend to directly ensure that the 
undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into vis-à-vis the 
Commission,1248 The legal consequences of a breach or non-fulfilment of obligations and 
conditions differ, although in the early stages of EC merger control the distinction was not 
very clear and the rivo instruments were used in an alternative way. Gradually, the 
distinctiveness o f conditions and obligations has been clearly affirmed in the Commission 
decisional practice and more importantly in its Notice on Remedies.1249 Conditions usually 
refer to measures contained in commitments that structurally change the market (structural 
remedies), whereas obligations refer to implementing measures that aim at fulfilling the 
commitments relevant to behavioural remedies.
In case the undertakings concerned commit a breach o f an obligation attached to the 
compatibility decision, the Commission, if  the breach is serious, may revoke its decision.
1244 Compare Idot, “Une innovation surprenante : L’introduction de l’arbitrage dans Ie controle 
communautaire des concentrations", (2000) Rev.Arb. 591.
1245 Compare in this context StofFregen, in: Schröter, Jakob & Mederer (Eds.), Kommentar zum 
Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht (Baden-Baden, 2003), who makes an interesting distinction between 
substantive and procedural-technical commitments. Arbitration would belong to the latter.
1246 We prefer the term “commitments” to the term “undertakings”, which is also used inter-changeably, in 
order to avoid confusion, since the latter term has become a technical term in EC competition law and refers to 
firms.
1247 This possibility exists both for the first phase and for the second phase of the merger clearance 
procedure. See respectively Arts. 6(2Xb) and 8(2Xb) Reg. 139/2004. It is noteworthy that before the 1997 
amendments of Reg. 4064/1989 there was no explicit power for the Commission to accept commitments offered 
by the parties and to attach conditions and obligations to its first phase decisions, but it had accepted such 
commitments in practice. On the enforceability of such commitments, see B.E. Hawk and H.L. Huser, European 
Community Merger Control: A Practitioner's Guide (The Hague/London/Boston, 1996), p. 325.
1248 Conditions and obligations may also be used by the Commission, when the latter grants a derogation 
from the obligation to suspend putting into effect a merger under Article 7. See A rt 7(3) Reg. 139/2004.
1249 Commission Notice on Remedies Acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 and under 
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 447/98, OJ [2001] C 68/3.
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This is applicable to both first and second phase decisions.1250 Under the previous M e rg e r  
Regulation, on the other hand, the Commission had the power to impose fines and p eriod ic  
penalty payments only in case of a breach of obligation attached to a second p h a se  
decision.1251 Thus, in case o f a breach of first phase obligations, the only possibility for th e  
Commission was the rather radical step to revoke its decision.1252 The new M erg er 
Regulation remedies this gap. Articles 14 and 15 o f  the Regulation, among the other very ' 
important amendments, provide for fines and periodic penalty payments also in cases o f  
breach o f first phase-imposed obligations.
If, on the other hand, the commitment has been transformed to a condition for the clearance 
o f the merger, any breach o f this condition means that the authorisation decision will n o  
longer be valid, thus, the merger will be considered prohibited ab initio1253 Heavy f in e s  
under Article 14(2)(b) of the Regulation may also be imposed.1254 Alternatively, th e  
Commission may by decision require (a) the undertakings or assets brought together to  b e  
separated or (b) the cessation o f  joint control or (c) any other action appropriate in order t o  
restore conditions of effective competition.1255
As mentioned above, apart from formally integrating commitments in conditions o r  
obligations, in certain cases the Commission refers in the grounds o f its decision to  
commitments given by the parties without however making such commitments obligatory 
upon them.1256 In such cases the commitment in question does not have the character o f  a  
condition or obligation and the Commission usually simply ‘takes notice” thereof. T h e
1250 Respectively Arts. 6(3Xb) and 8(6)(b) Reg. 139/2004. In case of breach of an obligation attached to  a  
first phase clearance decision the Commission may alternatively order the commencement of the second phase 
(Art. 6(4) Reg. 139/2004).
Arts. 14(2Xa) and 15(2Xa) Reg. 4064/1989. A fine or a periodic penalty payment could - and still can - 
also be imposed in case of breach of an obligation imposed with a derogation from suspension decision o f  th e  
Commission under Art. 7(3) Reg. 139/2004 (old Art. 7(4) Reg, 4064/1989).
1252 See D'Ormesson and Kerjean, “Le développement de la pratique des engagements en matière d e  
contrôle communautaire des concentrations”, 34 RTDE 479 (1998), pp. 484-485.
1253 See Stoffregen, supra (2003), pp. 1638-1639. According to Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, supra (2000), 
p. 510, the condition has a suspensive effect We respectfully think, however, that the condition, instead of being 
suspensive (precedent), may be resolutory (subsequent), if the facts of the case so require. For example this m ay 
be the case where the condition imposed refers to divestiture of assets that is expected to take a longer tim e 
period. Ultimately, this is a question of interpretation. See further Idot, “À propos des engagements en droit d e  
la concurrence : Quelques réflexions sur la pratique communautaire et française”, 35 CDE 569 (1999), p. 607, 
who stresses that the question of the condition’s being suspensive or resolutory is merely theoretical.
1254 I f  a condition is breached or not fullfilled and, as a result, the merger authorisation decision becomes 
void, then the prohibition o f Art. 7(1 ) Reg. 139/2004 resurrects and the merged undertakings can be fined under 
Art. 14(2Xb) for having put into effect a concentration in breach of Art. 7(1).
1255 Art. 8(4) Reg. 139/2004. Again, if the undertakings fail to comply w ith such measures they are subject 
to fines and periodic penalty payments under Arts. 14(2XC) and 15( 1 Xd) respectively. For examples of decisions 
based on Art. 8(4) of the Merger Regulation, see Commission Decision 2004/103/EC of 30 January 2002 
(M.2416-Terra LavalSidel), OJ [2004] L 38/1; Commission Decision 2004/276/EC of 30 January 2002 
(M.2283-Sc/ineiderLegm/td),OJ [2004] L 10Î/I34.
1250 See D ’Ormesson and Kerjean, supra (1998), p. 509 etseq.
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question whether such a commitment has legal effects, in the sense that a breach of its terms 
can affect in some way the authorisation decision of the Commission, is not always obvious. 
The fact that such a commitment may not formally be the subject of a condition or obligation 
within the meaning of Articles 6 and 8 of the Merger Regulation may not be decisive. 
Commitments that are mentioned in the grounds of the authorisation decision may yet entail 
legal effects. Thus, according to the Court of First Instance, in order to determine whether 
such a commitment produces legal effects, “it is necessary to consider whether the 
declaration that the notified operation is compatible was affected by it in the sense that, in the 
event of breach o f its terms, the Commission could revoke its decision”.1257 
Arbitration commitments given during the procedure (first or second phase) of a merger 
clearance are usually aimed at securing the enforcement of certain behavioural remedies and 
are mostly transformed by the Commission to obligations, rather than to conditions. While 
conditions are more suitable for commitments offering structural remedies that aim at 
eliminating the creation o f a dominant position, which means that, in case o f breach, the 
clearance decision will no longer stand, obligations are more appropriate for commitments 
offering behavioural remedies and for commitments that regard measures that belong to the 
sphere of influence of the meiging parties, such as the appointment of trustees or “hold 
separate” obligations.1258 In case of breach of the latter obligations, fines and the risk of 
revocation of the clearance are more efficient measures.
Recourse to arbitration on the one hand appeases the objections of the Commission by 
providing for a procedural framework which offers a remedy to competitors or other 
concerned persons worthy o f  protection, thus relieving the Commission of the burden to 
constantly monitor compliance and intervene in every single case of dispute, while on the 
other hand, because of its confidentiality and informality, it is accepted more willingly by the 
companies that are interested in getting their business arrangement through in a time-efficient 
way. Based on the Commission’s practice, we can see that arbitration has mostly been used in 
cases involving access to networks, important technologies, infrastructure, film and media 
content and other facilities that are deemed important for the entry of a third party to a 
specific market.
ii. Examples o f Merger Clearance Decisions Referring to or Imposing Arbitration
1257 Cases T-125/97 and T-l27/97, Coca-Cola, op.cit.y para. 97.
1258 See Stoffregen, supra (2003), p. 1639.
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An exhaustive reference to and analysis of all cases where arbitration has been used a s  a  
procedural remedy in merger clearance decisions lies outside the scope o f the c u r re n t 
study.1259 It is nevertheless interesting to refer to some important examples o f these cases, in  
order to understand how arbitration is intended to function and to also note some p ro b lem s 
that some of these cases raise.
We can in fact distinguish two periods in the Commission’s decisional practice: The f i r s t  
period covers most of the 1990s and references to arbitration in that period are usually s h o r t  
and in some instances “awkward”. During a second more recent period, clearance dec isions 
refer to commitments which contain extensive, detailed and better-drafted provisions o n  
arbitration.
The first case where arbitration was used as a procedural remedy refers to arbitration in  a  
very short text: “Arbitration by mutually agreed independent experts will be provided in c a s e  
of disputes relating to the application of the agreement” .1260 This first reference to arbitration 
also epitomises some the problems associated with this first period. This has to do basically  
with the confusion of the Commission about the concept of arbitration, shown by t h e  
reference to the awkward term “arbitration by independent experts” .1261 While so m e  
subsequent decisions avoid this confusion and have short references to “arbitration” , 
“independent arbitration”, “independent arbitrators” or “arbitration body”,1262 some o th e r  
decisions introduce a different problematic element, the involvement of DG-COMP or D G -  
IV, as it then was, in some o f the arbitration-related questions, such as nomination a n d  
confirmation of arbitrators.1263 Meanwhile, from 1997 and onwards, we see the f ir s t
1259 See the more extensive reports by Blessing, supra (2003), p. 91 et seq.\ Blanke, supra (2006), p. 203 e t
seq.
1200 For the first such case, see Commission Decision of 4 September 1992 (M.235-Elf Aquitaine- 
ThyssenMinot), OJ [1992] C 232/1, para. 13.
1201 See above on the same confusion in the context of Reg. 1400/2002.
1262 Compare Commission Decision of 30 September 1992 (M.214-Z)w Pont'ICI), OJ [1993] L 7/13, para. 
48; Commission Decision of 21 June 1994 (M.430-Procter & Gamble/TT Schickedanz (II)), OJ [1994] L  
354/32, para. 187, point 11; Commission Decision of 16 January 1996 QA.623-Kimberiy-ClarkScott), O J  
[1996] L 183/1, para. 233, point 11; Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 (M.S77~Boeing/McDonneII 
Douglas), OJ [1997] L 336/16, para. 117; Commission Decision of 27 May 1998 (M .993- 
Bertelsmann/KirciiPremiere), OJ [1999] L 53/1, paras. 129-132, 139-140; Commission Decision of 27 M ay 
1998 (M. 1027-Deutsche Telekom/Beta Research), OJ [1999] L 53/31, paras. 58-60, 64; Commission Decision 
of 12 July 2000 (M.1813-/«i/usfn ¡Capital (Nordkem/Dyno)), OJ [2002] L 154/41, point 2 of the annexed 
commitments; Commission Decision of 8 May 2001 (M.2268-Pernod Picard/Diageo/Seagram Spirits), O J  
[2002] C 16/13, para. 53 and points 6 and 7 of the annexed commitments; Commission Decision of 20  
December 2001 (M.2530-Südzucker/Saint Louis Sucre), OJ [2003] L 103/1, point 13 of the annexed 
commitments; Commission Decision o f 20 December 2001 (M.2533-BP/E.ON), OJ [2002] L 276/31, point 1 o f  
Annex II; Commission Decision of 2 September 2003 ( M. 3099-.4 revaUrencoETC point 13 of Annex A.
1203 See Commission Decision of 27 November 1992 (M.2S9-British Aim'aysTAT), OJ [1992] C 326/1, 
annexed commitments in fine', Commission Decision of 20 July 1995 (M.616-Swissair Sabena (II)), OJ [1995J 
C 200/10, annexed commitments, point 4.5; Commission Decision of 1 December 1999 (M l 578-
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references to arbitration institutions, such as the ICC and LCIA, and to institutional rules of 
arbitration, which denotes a  better understanding of the nature and function of arbitration on 
the part of the Commission.1264
An interesting early case is Alcatel/Thomson CSF - SCS1,1265 a phase I case. There, the 
Commission concluded that there were risks of vertical effects connected with the leading 
position of Thomson in the upstream market for the supply o f travelling wave tubes for 
satellites, when combined with the proposed joint venture’s significant share in the supply of 
complete satellites. The commitments by the parties to supply other satellite constructors with 
travelling wave tubes on non-discriminatory terms included a clause providing for automatic 
recourse to an independent arbitrator in the event of a dispute. This case has two 
particularities. First, for the first time an arbitration commitment contains detailed rules on 
such questions as the place o f arbitration, the lex arbitri, the power of the arbitrator to order 
discovery and to take conservatory measures, and the timing o f the award (fast-track 
arbitration). Second, the arbitration commitment designates a priori the arbitrator, in this case 
the Directeur de l Administration o f  the European Space Agency or any other competent 
person in that organisation.1266 Finally, there are detailed provisions on the merging parties’ 
compliance with the eventual arbitral awards and on notification to the Commission o f the 
initiation of the arbitration proceedings and of the arbitral awards themselves. Presumably, 
the requirement to notify the Commission of the initiation o f the proceedings, is aimed at 
allowing the Commission to directly or indirectly intervene in the arbitration.
Sanitex/Sphinx), OJ [2000] L 294/1, para. 252, point 20; Commission Decision of 1 December 1999 (M.1601- 
AUied SignaL HoneyweU), OJ [2001] L 152/1, point 32 of the annexed commitments.
1264 Compare Commission Decision of 15 October 1997 (M,93%-Guinness/GrcmdMetropolitan), OJ [1998] 
L 288/24, para. 183(i) (reference to the LCIA Rules with also a reference to the applicable lawr: “arbitration 
under the Rules o f the London Court of International Arbitration applying the law of England and Wales”); 
Commission Decision of 12 April 2000 (M. 1195-Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmatm), OJ [2000] C 141/19, point 
25 of the annexed commitments (reference to the LCIA Rules), Commission Decision of 3 May 2000 (M.1671- 
Dow Chemical/Union Carbide), OJ [2001] C 256/3, point 28 o f the annexed commitments (reference to the 
Rules of Arbitration of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute); Commission Decision of 8 May 2000 (M.1846- 
Glaxo Wellcome/Smithkiine Beecham), OJ [2000] C 170/6, point 64 of the annexed commitments (reference to 
the LCIA Rules); Commission Decision of 13 October 2000 (M.205Q-Vivendi/'Canal+/Seagram), OJ [2000] C 
311/3, para. 78 and annexed commitments (reference to the ICC Rules); Commission Decision of 20 December 
2001 (M.25%9-ShelLT)EA\ OJ [2003] L 15/35, Art. 16 of the annexed commitments (reference to the ICC 
Rules); Commission Decision of 30 April 2003 (M.2%76-\’ewscorp/Telepiit), paras. 225(1) and 259, and section 
15.1 .b of the annexed commitments (reference to the ICC Rules).
1165 Commission Decision of 4 June 1998 (M. 11 &5-AlcatelThomson CSF -  SCS), OJ [1998] C 272/5, paras. 
38,40-41 and annexed commitments.
1266 For two other similar cases where again the arbitrator is proposed to be associated with the European 
Space Agency, see Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 (M.li09-Matra/Aerospatiale), OJ [1999] C 133/5, 
para. 76 and annexed commitment; Commission Decision of 28 April 2005 (M.3680-
AlcatelFinmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Telespazio), para. 118 and detailed annexed commitments.
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Thereafter, increasingly the Commission clearance decisions refer to arbitration commitments 
containing rather detailed rules on many arbitration-related matters, including the grant to th e  
arbitrators o f broad powers of discovery and compulsion.1267 Among the novelties introduced 
is also the reversal in some cases o f  the burden o f proof for the benefit of third parties1268 a n d , 
exceptionally, the power of the Commission to approve the “arbitral process’1 or even to lay i t  
down itself.1269 Another novelty for orthodox arbitration procedure is the provision for a fo rm  
o f “pendulum arbitration” in the Shell/BASF/JV-Project Nicole clearance decision.1270 In th a t  
case, the licensor undertook to submit all eventual disputes with third interested parties to  a  
specific arbitration process, whereby each party' submits a single proposal for th e  
consideration for such a licence to the arbitration panel which can only decide in favour o f  
one of the two submitted proposals in its entirety. This can be explained as a result o f th e  
Commission’s concern to ensure that the commitments are enforced in the shortest possible 
period.1271
Some more recent cases are even more interesting. Thus, the Newscorp/Telepiit Decision 
raises novel issues and brings together arbitration with regulation for the first time.1272 T he  
case has been characterised as a  paradigm for the integration between regulation an d  
competition policy in both substance and procedure.1273 It concerned the acquisition by N ew s
1267 Commission Decision of 9 March 1999 (M.1313-£)a«/5/? Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier), OJ (2000J L  
20/1, paras. 212-213, 223; Allied Signal/TIoneywell Decision, op.cit, para. 128 and points 27 and 32 of the 
annexed commitments; Commission Decision of 25 January 2000 (M. 1CM-Carrefour/Promodes), Annex 2; 
Commission Decision of 8 January 2002 (M262\-SEB/MOULINEX), OJ [2002] C 49/18, para. 148, point 1(f) 
of the annexed commitments.
1268 Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmami Decision, o p .c i tpoint 25 of the annexed commitments; Commission 
Decision of 21 March 2000 (JV.37-BSkyB Kirch Pay 77), OJ [2000] C 110/45, annexed commitments; 
Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram Decision, op.cit., annexed commitments; SheB'DEA Decision, op.cit., Art. 16 of the 
annexed commitments; Commission Decision of 10 July 2002 (M.2803-7>liaSonera), OJ [2002] C 201/19, 
paras. 119, 136, 143 and section F(c) o f the annexed commitments; Newscorp/Telepiu Decision, op.cit., section 
15.1.b of the annexed commitments.
BSfoB/Kirch Pay TV  Decision, op.cit., annexed commitments: “The parties will propose an arbitration 
process to the Commission within two weeks of the Decision. The arbitration process shall comprise the process 
to be used and the appointment of the Arbitrators). The Commission shall decide within one month whether 
they approve the proposed arbitral process. If  the Commission does not approve the arbitral process, the parties 
shall have a further fourteen days to propose alternatives and the Commission a further month to give its final 
approval. If the Commission does not approve any process proposed by the parties it may lay down the arbitral 
process itself.” It is unclear which legal basis in Reg. 139/2004 the Commission would use to lay down, 
presumably dy decision, the arbitral process.
1270 Commission Decision of 29 March 2000 (M. 1751 -ShellBASF/Jl’-Ptoject Nicole), OJ [2000] C 142/35, i
point 2.B.3 of the annexed commitments. i
1271 See Stofiregen, supra (2003), pp. 1656-1657. For other “pendulum arbitration” cases, see Dow  
ChemicaVUnion Carbide Decision, op.cit., paras. 112, 186 and points 28 and 36 o f the annexed commitments; 
Commission Decision of 13 January' 2003 (M.24I6-7e/ra LavaVSidel), para. 120, section C of the annexed 
commitments and point (xiv) of the annexed “Licence Tetra Fast” Term Sheet.
1272 Cited supra.
1273 See Bavasso, “Electronic Communications: A New Paradigm for European Regulation”, 41 CMLRev.
87 (2004), p. 115. The examination of the substance of that case is outside the scope of the current study.
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Corporation o f sole control o f Telepiu and a subsequent merger o f Telepiu with Stream, the 
pay-TV platform controlled by News Corporation. The Commission concluded that the 
concentration would have led to the creation of a lasting near-monopoly in the Italian pay-TV 
market, would have raised barriers to entry in satellite pay-TV and would have created a 
monopoly position in Italy as regards the acquisition o f some types of premium programme 
content.1274 This would have foreclosed third-party access to premium content. The merger, 
however, was cleared, after a package of substantial remedies was offered to the 
Commission. A novelty of the case w as the involvement o f a national regulatory' authority', 
the Italian Communications Authority', whose task would be to deal with eventual disputes 
w ith third parties concerning the above-mentioned wholesale offer, access to the platform and 
any other question pertaining to consumer protection.1275 The arbitration mechanism is 
intended to complement the “resolution of disputes” by the Italian authority, by dealing with 
those disputes that may arise regarding the implementation o f the commitments and that are 
not suitable for the regulatory authority’.1276 *
In Daimler Chrysler/Deutsche Telekom/JV}111 the Commission authorised the acquisition of 
joint control by DaimlerChrysler AG and Deutsche Telekom AG of the newly created joint 
venture Toll Collect.1278 Toll Collect would establish and operate a system for the collection 
of road tolls from heavy tracks in Germany. It could also be used as a platform to provide 
telematics services. The Commission was concerned that the formation of the joint venture 
would lead to a dominant position o f DaimlerChrysler in the emerging market for telematics 
systems for transport and logistics businesses in Germany. In response to the Commission’s 
competition concerns, the parties undertook to form an independent telematics gateway 
company and develop a GPS interface for the Toll Collect onboard unit in order to connect it 
with third-party peripherals and for a toll collection module to be integrated into third-party
1274 In particular, the exclusive rights to certain football matches, which take place every year and in which 
national teams participate, and blockbuster movies.
1275 On the Art. 10 EC-based principle o f co-operation between the Commission and the national regulatory 
authority in this case, see Bavasso, supra (2004), p. 116.
1276 The grouping together of the proceedings before the Italian authority and of the arbitration proceedings 
under the title “Dispute Resolution” is inelegant, to say the least, hi reality the regulatory authority in question 
does not decide civil disputes, in the same way as arbitrators do, but merely applies competition and regulatory 
law. For another unfortunate reference in that Decision, see para. 225(1): “Newscorp has proposed an arbitration 
procedure in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the commitments. This arbitration system includes inter alia 
the jurisdiction of [the Italian Communications Authority] for the matters within its competence under Italian 
[sic], including the wholesale offer” (emphasis added). Presumably, the Italian authority would not agree w ith 
its qualification as “arbitration”.
127' Commission Decision of 30 April 2003 (M.2903-Do/w/er Chrysler/Deutsche Telekom/JV'), OJ [2003] L 
300/62, section V of the annexed commitments.
1278 Commission Decision 2003/792/EC of 30 April 2003 in Case COMP/M.2903-Dmw/er 
Chrysler/Deutsche Telekom/Jl\ OJ [2003] L 300/62 (the commitments are reported only in the German text).
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telematics devices. The commitments also provide for an arbitration mechanism where th i rd  
parties can submit their disputes with the parties as well as with Toll Collect. In the s e c o n d  
case, this mechanism is interesting because the parties are not intended to take part in th e  
possible arbitration themselves, but are rather under a duty vis-à-vis the Commission t o  
obligate Toll Collect to  submit to arbitration with third parties. The arbitration would b e  
conducted in Berlin under the Rules of the Deutsche Institution fu r  Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 
(DIS). The offerors o f the commitments are obliged to agree to the arbitration request w ith in  
very tight time limits. Finally, the European Commission (to be more precise, the th e n  
Merger Task Force) must be promptly informed of the submission of a related dispute to  
arbitration.
Another interesting case is Alcan/Pechiney II, where the parties offered a series o f  
commitments in order to respond to the Commission’s concerns inter alia with regard to tw o  
specific markets (alumina refining technology and aluminium smelter cell technology). In  
their commitment to license the related technologies on terms and conditions comparable t o  
those applied prior to the transaction, the parties included a detailed arbitration scheme th a t  
would be put in effect in case o f  a dispute as to the terms of a licence.1279 The arbitration 
w ould be conducted in London under the ICC Rules. It can also be categorised as one o f  th e  
“pendulum arbitration” cases whereby each third party submits a single proposal for th e  
terms o f the licence to the arbitrators, who should select within a specified time period one o f  
the two submitted proposals in its entirety. The third party7 seeking a licence should o n ly  
provide prima facie evidence that the terms and conditions proposed are not in accordance 
with the commitments’ requirements. In other words, the burden of proof is reversed. T here  
is then a provision that if  the third party7 seeking a licence does not enter into a licence 
pursuant to the terms set by the arbitral award within a time period, the addressee o f  th e  
Commission Decision may request the Commission to relieve it of its obligations under th e  
commitments.
This case is also interesting because o f the rather rare involvement o f the “licensing trustee” . 
Thus, the party wishing to initiate arbitration proceedings must communicate this to th e  
trustee, who has the overall competence to monitor the compliance of the offeror o f the  
commitments. In particular, the licensing trustee must be informed o f  any arbitration 
proceedings commenced and o f  their outcome. The trustee, as w ell as die Commission, m ust
1279 Commission Decision of 29 September 2003 (M.3225-Alcan/Pechiney (11)), sections 1,3.3 to 1.3.5 o f  
the annexed commitments.
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also be furnished without delay with the copies of any arbitral awards made pursuant to the 
arbitration mechanism.1280
Going on with our analysis of some exemplary cases, in Johnson <& Johnson Guidont, a 
Phase II case, the Commission approved the acquisition by the US healthcare group Johnson 
& Johnson (“J&J”) of its competitor Guidant, a US company specialised in cardiovascular 
medical products, subject to conditions. J&J and Guidant were direct competitors in respect 
of a number o f products and the Commission opened an in-depth market investigation 
because it had serious concerns about the proposed transaction. In particular with regard to 
endovascular stents and accessories used in peripheral arteries, the Commission found that 
the merger would give rise to competition concerns in the HEA, given that both J&J and 
Guidant were among the leading suppliers in Europe, the market was very concentrated, and 
there were high entry barriers. To respond to these concerns, the parties offered commitments 
to the Commission, proposing to divest the entire operations (products, logistics, inventory, 
customer list, sales force, brand names, and intellectual property) of Guidant in the EEA. The 
parties also offered to the purchaser an interim original equipment manufacturer supply 
agreement followed by either the continuation of such agreement or the full assistance to 
replicate the US production facility in Europe. It is in the context of that agreement with the 
prospective purchaser that the commitments include a “fast track resolution procedure”, in 
case of disputes arising between J&J and the purchaser regarding the implementation o f any 
term of the technical assistance agreement or the supply arrangement.
The resolution mechanism is typical o f  those cases where wre are really in the margins 
between arbitration and individual expertise.1281 While it is intended to function as a method 
to resolve a rather technical question, the words “arbitration” and “arbitrators” are used and 
in fact there is even an express provision that if the party-appointed arbitrators cannot agree 
on the nomination of a third arbitrator, they shall request the London Court o f International 
Arbitration (LCIA) to appoint the third arbitrator. Again, there is also an express rule that the 
arbitrators will have wide fact-finding powers and that the burden o f proof will be reversed
1280 With regard to the role of the trustee, we must note an unfortunate text in the commitments that he 
“shall arbitrate” certain disputes subject to the Commission’s review (o p .c i tpara. 8 in section 1.3.4). This is 
unconnected with the arbitration mechanism but such language must be avoided because it confuses arbitration 
as a dispute resolution mechanism with third party expertise, which in such cases essentially facilitates the 
Commission’s monitoring role. For another interesting case, where the role of the trustee is intermingled with 
the role of the arbitrators, see Commission Decision of 30 March 2005 (M.3686-Honeywell'Novar), points 14, 
23, and 46(f) of the annexed commitments, point 5(e) of Schedule II (“Trademark License”), and point 2(h) of 
Schedule III (“Technology Transfer Commitment”). In this case, the arbitrators will resolve disputes inter alia 
betw een one of the merging parties and a third party-licensee, on the one hand, and the Monitoring Trustee, on 
the other hand {op.cit., points 14 and 46(f) of the annexed commitments and point 5(e) of Schedule II).
1281 Johnson & Johnson 'Gvidant Decision, op.cit., section F of the annexed commitments.
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for the benefit of the party initiating the arbitration process, who must only produce e v id e n c e  
of & prima facie case. It is also provided that the arbitration procedure shall follow the L C IA  
Rules and shall be conducted in London.
Interestingly, in the event o f disagreement between the parties as to the interpretation o f  t h e  
commitments, the arbitrators must inform the Commission and may seek the Com m ission’s  
interpretation of the commitments before finding in favour of any party to the arbitration. T h e  
Commission may, at any time, make submissions during the arbitration procedure. There a r e  
finally provisions on costs, which will be borne by the prevailing party, on the aw ard ’s  
finality and on reporting duties for the parties vis-à-vis the Commission.
These Decisions show an increased refinement o f the arbitration-related rules contained in t h e  
commitments. Indeed, it is even possible to read through them the shaping of a kind o f  
implicit “Arbitration Mandate”, referring to issues like the scope o f the arb itration  
mechanism, the modalities o f seizing the arbitrators, possible duties to use best endeavours t o  
find a solution through conciliation, the applicable law and the lex arbitri, the language a n d  
site o f the arbitration, the composition of the arbitration tribunal, the procedure followed, t h e  
burden o f proof, the power o f the arbitrators to  order discovery and conservatoiy m easures, 
and possibly the monitoring role o f the Commission, which in some cases has powers to  
intervene in the proceedings.1282
iii. Spill-over to the National Level
The use of arbitration commitments in merger clearance decisions is not met only at the E U  
level but also nationally. Indeed, one could even speak o f  a spill-over effect. Thus, there a re  
recent cases where national competition authorities have accepted commitments that included 
arbitration mechanisms. These commitments were then integrated into the clearance decision.
1282 See in particular Commission Decision of 2 September 2003 (M30&3-GE/Jnstrumentarium), para. 355  
and Annex I to the annexed commitments; Commission Decision of 11 February 2004 (M.32S0-.4 ir  
France/KLhi), para. 167 and section 12 of the annexed commitments (providing for the possibility for th e  
Commission to make amicus curiae submissions before the arbitration tribunal); Commission Decision o f 22  
November 2004 ( M.3570-Piaggio/Aprilia), para. 68 and Annex 1 (again providing for the possibility for th e  
Commission to make amicus curiae submissions before the arbitration tribunal); A !cate IFinm eccan ica A  Icatel 
Alenia Space & Telespazio Decision, op.cit, para. 118 and detailed annexed commitments (providing a glossary' 
of terms and referring to the cocept of “arbitrator’ as “a natural or legal person, independent from the Parties, 
having the required experience, expertise and independence, who is approved by the Commission and w ho is in  
charge o f the enforcement of the Arbitration Commitment” (emphasis added)); Commission Decision of 4 July 
2005 (M.3170-LuJihansa Swiss), section 13 of the annexed commitments (again providing for the possibility fo r 
the Commission to make amicus curiae submissions before the arbitration tribunal); Commission Decision o f 22 
December 2005 (M.3940-Lufthansa/Eurowings), section 12 (again providing for the possibility for the  
Commission to make amicus curiae submissions before the arbitration tribunal).
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One such case is Sogecable in Spain. There, the Spanish cabinet approved the acquisition by 
Sogecable o f its sole direct-to-home (DTH) pay-TV competitor in Spain, Via Digital of 
Telefónica.1283 The merger had initially been notified to the European Commission, but was 
referred back to the Spanish authorities under Article 9(3)(b) o f the previous Merger 
Regulation.1284 The Spanish authorisation Decision was subject to certain conditions that 
were further specified in a detailed implementation plan that was subsequently submitted to 
the national authorities by the acquiring party.1285 The conditions basically guarantee third 
parties’ equitable, transparent and non-discriminatory access to broadcasting rights. Such 
competitors would also be free to set their own pay-per-view prices. Other conditions 
contained limitations regarding the duration and scope of exclusivity rights. It is noteworthy 
that the arbitration mechanism constitutes one o f the conditions {condiciones) o f the 
authorisation. In more detail, the Decision states that the implementation plan that was to be 
submitted to the Servicio de defensa de la competencia should “include a private arbitration 
mechanism” that Sogecable “must offer to any third party” for the resolution of disputes 
arising out of the implementation o f certain conditions, notably those on access to 
broadcasting rights. It further stipulates that Sogecable must furnish to the arbitrators all 
necessary' information for the correct performance o f their function in conditions of 
confidentiality with regard o f business secrets.1286
Another jurisdiction where there are some signs that arbitration may have found some favour 
in the context o f merger control is the UK.1287 The OFT has accepted commitments including 
an arbitration or adjudication mechanism on at least one occasion, although it is not entirely
1283 Decision of the Council of Ministers of 29 November 2002, available in Spanish in: 
http://www.mineco.es/dgdc/sdc/Acuerdos%20Consejo%20Ministros/N-280_l_ACM.htm. The Decision was 
based on an Advisory Report of the Tribunal de defensa de la competencia of 13 November 2002. For a 
description of the substance of this case, see Ariño, “Digital War and Peace: Regulation and Competition in 
European Digital Broadcasting”, 10 EPL 135 (2004), p. 146 etseq.
284 Commission Decision of 14 August 2002 (M.2845Sogecable/Canalsatélite Dígital/lria Digital). See 
also Commission Press Release IP/02/1216 o f  16 August 2002. The Spanish government had requested the 
referral of the case to the national authorities based on Art. 9(2Xa) of the previous Merger Regulation. The 
Commission referral Decision was appealed by third parties to the CFI, but the appeal was rejected. See Cases 
T-346/02 and T-347/02, Cableuropa SA et al. v. Commission, [2003] ECR 11-4251. This judgment lays down 
important principles on the Commission’s discretion to refer merger cases back to NCAs (para, 174 et seq.).
1285 Commission Press Release IP/03/655 of 8 May 2003. The submission of the implementation plan was 
itself a condition of the authorisation (point 20 of the Spanish Decision).
1286 Point 21 of the Decision. It appears, however, that the arbitration mechanism that was put in effect was 
closely associated with the Spanish Communications Authority. The mechanism was also actually used but it is 
reported to have been complicated and to have produced mixed results.
1287 Under the UK system of merger control, competences are divided between the OFT, the Competition 
Commission and in some rare cases the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry'. If the OFT finds that a merger 
could have adverse effects for competition, it refers it to the Competition Commission. It is in this context that 
the OFT may accept “undertakings in lieu of reference”, i.e. commitments that are intended to remedy those 
adverse effects, as an alternative to reference.
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clear that the specific mechanism can be considered as arbitration.1288 It is interesting to n o t e  
that the OFT is far more nuanced than the European Commission in the qualification o f  s u c h  
mechanisms as ‘‘arbitration”.1289 Thus, it has usually accepted commitments that p ro v id e  
explicitly not for arbitration, but rather for “expert determination”, “valuation” o r  
“monitoring” by independent third parties.1290 Such mechanisms, in the view o f the OFT, d o  
not amount to a delegation o f  powers to third parties, since statutory' duties cannot b e  
delegated, but provide useful assistance to the regulators, thus offering technical e x p e rtise  
when this is necessary and at the same time saving administrative resources.
dd. Arbitration in A rticle 81(3) EC Individual Exemption Decisions
Apart from merger clearance decisions, arbitration has also been used to as a procedural 
mechanism to resolve disputes with third parties in some Article 81(3) EC individual 
exemption decisions. Such decisions are no longer possible under the new enforcem ent 
system o f legal exception, yet it is interesting to refer to these cases, not only because s o m e  
exemption decisions are currently still in effect until their expiry, but also in order to an a ly se  
another instance of favour for arbitration on the part o f  the European Commission.
In this context, firms would give commitments in order to secure an exemption under A rtic le  
81(3) EC. The Commission could transform compliance with a commitment into a condition 
or obligation attached to the Article 81(3) EC exemption decision pursuant to Article 8(1) of* 
Regulation 17/1962. Conditions and obligations, however, could not be attached to A rtic le  
81(1) EC negative clearance decisions.1291 Indeed, the very essence o f conditions o r  
obligations meant that the Commission recognised that there was already a competition 
problem, thus, that Article 81(1) EC applied, but that this problem could be adequately
1288 See the Undertakings given on 27 October 2003 to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in
Carlton/Gnmada, where reference is made to an “adjudication” mechanism which is closely associated w ith  
Ofcom, the national communications authority.
1289 For an overview see the presentation given and the cases cited by the Director of the OFT M ergers 
Branch, Simon Priddis, Enforcing Behavioural Remedies through Arbitration -  Is it still Arbitration?: O F T  
Perspective”, IBC Conference on Alternative Dispute Resolution and Competition (1 March 2005, London),
290 See Atonison Safeway Decision of 26 September 2003 (reference to expert valuation); Undertakings 
given on 29 October 1999 to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in IMS Health/PAfS (reference to  
third-party expertise); CeniricaPhmegy Decision of 7 March 2003 (reference to expert determination but w ith  
some adjudicatory elements; expert was to be appointed by the Law Society in case of no agreement between 
the parties).
1291 Art. 2 Reg. 17/1962.
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remedied through the imposition of these conditions and obligations attached to an exemption
decision.1292
It should be pointed out at the outset that there is a difference between conditions and 
obligations attached to merger authorisation decisions and those attached to the old individual 
exemptions. In the former case only commitments that have been given by the notifying 
parties to the Commission can be transformed into conditions or obligations,1293 whereas in 
the latter case the Commission could attach such conditions or obligations to the exemption 
decision, even ex officio, i.e. even if  the applicant had not offered a commitment to that 
effect.1294 The Commission had wide discretionary powers in imposing these conditions or 
obligations, subject to the procedural requirement o f the parties' being heard1295 and to the 
principle of proportionality.1296
Conditions were usually imposed by an exemption decision in order to ensure that parties 
abandon the anti-competitive clauses and in order to ensure that effective competition is 
restored. Obligations, on the other hand, could require certain conduct o f secondary' 
importance on behalf of the parties and could impose certain reporting duties. The breach of a 
condition had different consequences from the breach of an obligation.1297 A non-fiilfilled 
condition meant that the agreement was no longer considered as exempted. Therefore, the 
agreement would be incompatible with Article 81(1) EC and would fall under the nullity of
1292 See, how ever, below on less formal possibilities.
1293 See E. Navarro Varona, A. Font Galarza, J. Folguera Crespo and J. Briones Alonso, Merger Control in 
the European Union, Law, Economics and Practice (Oxford, 2005), p. 341; A. Lindsay, The EC Merger 
Regulation: Substantive Issues (London, 2003), paras. 9-02, 9-30. It is noteworthy that the Commission in para. 
221 of its Green Paper on the Review o f Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, COM(2001) 745/6 final, had 
considered whether it would be more appropriate for itself to enjoy a more active role in identifying the 
prospective remedies, yet there was no follow-up on this point.
294 See Faull, “The Enforcement of Competition Policy in the European Community: A Mature System”, 
in: Hawk (Ed.), EC and US Competition Policy 1991, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute (New York/Deventer, 1992), p. 145. It is not easy to ascertain whether a condition to arbitrate disputes 
contained in an individual exemption decision has or has not been earlier offered by the addressees of the 
decision in the form of a commitment. Indeed, in the latter case, such imposed arbitration would give rise to 
serious human rights concerns, since it would deprive the undertaking concerned of its natural judge. It might 
also infringe the principle of proportionality, by which the Commission is bound. See also below on the 
impossibility of infringement decisions to impose recourse to arbitration.
1295 In Transocean, op.cit., para. 16, the ECJ stressed that “since Article [81(3)] constitutes, for the benefit 
of undertakings, an exception to the general prohibition contained in Article [81(1)], the Commission must be in 
a position at any moment to check whether the conditions justifying the exemption are still present. 
Accordingly, in relation to the detailed rules to which it may subject the exemption, the Commission enjoys a 
large measure of discretion”. However, the Court went on to say that “an undertaking [mustl be clearly 
informed, in good time, of the essence of conditions to w hich the Commission intends to subject an exemption 
and it must have the opportunity to submit its observations to the Commission. This is especially so in the case 
of conditions [that] impose considerable obligations having far-reaching effects” (para. 15).
I2*[ See Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson, supra (2000), p. 130.
1297 It is true, however, that especially in the past the terms “condition” and “obligation” have been used in a 
rather indiscriminate manner by the Commission. See Kerse, supra (1998), p. 252.
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Article 81(2) EC.1298 The breach o f an obligation, on the other hand, did not affect t h e  
validity o f the exemption, though an undertaking that intentionally or negligently com m itted  
such a  breach was subject to fines according to Article 15(2)(b) of the old R egulation  
17/1962. In addition, the breach o f an obligation could be sufficient grounds for t h e  
Commission to revoke or amend the exemption given (Article 8(3)(b) of Regulation 17).12"  
One o f the few individual exemption decisions where recourse to arbitration was imposed a s  
a remedy is UIP. In that case, the Commission granted an exemption to a joint s a le s  
organisation agreement o f US distributors o f  films that achieved substantial cost sav ings, 
while the latter undertook to set up an arbitration system for unsatisfied dealers and submit t o  
arbitration any disputes concerning product allocation. According to the Com m ission 
arbitration was a practical means o f solving problems common to the cinema industry, s u c h  
as allocation of films and access to the exhibitors’ screens. Arbitration was seen a s  
particularly beneficial to small independent exhibitors.1300 130 The specific arbitration 
commitment that was annexed to the Commission’s Decision contained detailed provisions 
on the applicable law, language, timing and place of arbitration. There was a reference to  th e  
ICC Rules and, interestingly, it was provided that 'to  the extent permitted by national law, a n  
application to the competent judicial authority for preservation or interim measures shall n o t  
be incompatible with the arbitration agreement and shall not imply a renunciation o f  th e  
agreement”.
Arbitration was also used in Atlas In that case, the Commission authorised the A tlas  
project, a joint venture betw een Deutsche Telekom and France Télécom aimed at providing 
telecommunications services to large users in Europe. The two parties had large m arket 
shares in Germany and France, buttressed by a legal monopoly over the supply o f  
infrastructure. In addition, the Atlas project initially provided for the elimination o f  a  
competitor of Deutsche Telekom in Germany, namely France Télécom’s local subsidiary,
1298 A question arises as to the starting point of the incompatibility and of the resulting nullity. This depends 
on the condition’s being suspensive or resolutory (i.e. precedent or subsequent, to use the English legal 
terminology). In the former case there has been no exemption, unless and before the condition is fullfilled, so 
there was never immunity from the nullity sanction or from other civil claims before the fulfillment of the 
suspensive condition (we assume that the agreement was a “new” one in the sense of Reg. 17/1962). In the latter 
case the agreement would be immune from the nullity and from other civil claims for the period between the 
notification and the fulfillment of the resolutory condition.
1299 It should be accepted, however, that the situation arising from the breach of the obligation had to be 
serious enough in order for the Commission to be able to proceed to the more radical measure of the revocation 
of the exemption. Particularly so, since the Commission had in its disposal the less onerous measure to threaten 
and impose fines. See in this respect Kerse, supra (1998), p. 260.
130“ Commission Decision 89/467/EEC of 12 July 1989 (UIP), OJ [1989] L 226/25. See further Toft, 
“Commission Renews the Exemption o f United International Pictures BV”, (1999-3) EC Competition Policy> 
Newsletter 26.
1301 Commission Decision 96/546/EC of 17 July 1996 (Atlas), OJ [1996] L 239/23.
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Info AG. The Commission made its authorisation conditional inter alia on France Telecom's 
agreeing to sell Info AG. Any dispute between France Télécom and the purchaser of Info AG 
with respect to France Telecom's commitment to divest of the Info AG business was to be 
subject to “arbitration by an independent third party1. Another case is British Interactive 
Broad cas tin ^  Open, where the Commission dealt with a co-operative joint-venture agreement 
that would develop digital interactive television services in the United Kingdom. The 
exemption given was subject to numerous conditions, one of them being that the new 
company would procure an “appropriate and independent arbitration procedure” that would 
be made available to third parties in respect of certain clearly defined disputes.1302 
A more interesting case is Eurovision. In the first Eurovision Decision o f 19931303 the 
Commission granted an exemption to the Statutes o f the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU) and to some other regulations concerning the acquisition of television rights to sports 
events, the exchange of sports programmes within the framework of Eurovision1304 and 
contractual access to such programmes for third parties. Under the revised access scheme for 
non-members that EBU submitted to the Commission, non-EBU member broadcasters would 
be granted non-discriminatory extensive access to Eurovision sports programmes, while the 
terms and conditions of such access would be freely negotiated between EBU members and 
these third parties. With regard to the access fee, according to the access scheme submitted to 
and approved by the Commission, if  all other conditions of access have been agreed, at the 
request o f the third party the matter would be submitted to “arbitration by independent 
expert(s)”. The expert or experts would be nominated jointly by the parties or, failing 
agreement, either by the president o f the locally competent national court of appeal, in case of 
national arbitration concerning access for national channels, or by the president o f the ICC, in 
case o f international arbitration concerning access for pan-European channels. The arbitral 
award would fix the access fee and would be final and binding.1305
ee. Arbitration in Informal Settlements in Article 81 and 82 EC Cases
1302 Commission Decision 99/781/EC of 15 September 1999 (British Interactive Broadcasting/Open), OJ 
119991 L 312/1.
I3°3 Commission Decision 93/403/EEC o f 11 June 1993 (EBU/Eurovision System), OJ [1993] L 179/23.
1304 Eurovision is a European network, through which all active members of the EBU are eligible to 
participate in an institutionalised exchange system for television - including sports - programmes. EBU 
members are also eligible to participate in a system of joint acquisition of television rights to international sports 
events (Eurovision rights).
1305 Para. 40 of the EBU.Eurovision System Decision. The actual wording of the access scheme including 
the arbitration mechanism was not attached to the 1993 Decision. The exemption was renewed with the 2000 
Eurovision Decision, op.cit., which itself included the detailed arbitration package at section 5 of Annex I.
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Apart from the case o f commitments that have been integrated in conditions or obligations in  
Article 81(3) EC exemption decisions, the Commission has also accepted in the past, in  a  
informal way, commitments, not only in Article 81(3), but also in 81(1) EC and 82 E C  
cases.1306 With regard to Article 81(1) and 82 EC cases, while it is true that the Commission 
could not under the previous enforcement system include conditions or obligations referring 
to commitments in negative clearance decisions, one could not exclude that the undertaking 
under investigation offered some kind o f comprehensive commitment that withdrew th e  
conduct in question from the ambit o f Article 81(1) or 82 EC.1307 In such cases, th is  
commitment would not be integrated in a  decision, but the Commission could take this in to  
account in closing the file of the case or in granting a negative clearance.1308 
We deal here in essence with informal settlements, which usually take the form o f  a  
"unilateral'’ commitment, offered by a company ‘\vithout prejudice'’.1309 Such commitments 
are not enforceable both in the Community administrative law sense (i.e. they did not b in d  
the undertakings as against the Commission and are not enforceable with fines) and in th e  
private law sense (i.e. they do not create rights as against third parties). The Commission, 
however, could reopen proceedings and adopt a formal decision, if such commitments w ere 
breached or not honoured.
Interestingly, some o f these unilateral commitments, which are rarely publicised, have 
contained references to arbitration. In those cases, the promise to have recourse to arbitration 
has been included in the commitments given to the Commission in order to meet the latter’s 
concerns as to the application o f Articles 81 or 82 EC.
1306 See e g. the commitments offered by The Coca-Cola Export Corporation in Commission Press Release 
1P/90/7, by Microsoft in Commission Press Release IP/94/653, by AC Nielsen in Commission Press Release 
IP/96/1117, by Digital Equipment Corporation in Commission Press Release IP/97/868, by SWIFT in 
Commission Press Release IP/97/870, and by Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. in Commission Press 
Release IP/02/521.
130'  It should be added that the Commission has also accepted commitments in the past, in order to reduce 
the fines imposed upon undertakings for the breach of the competition rules. Reference is made to the Wood 
pulp Decision, op.cit., para. 249 and annexed commitments. See further Idot, supra (1999a), pp. 572-573.
1308 As pointed out by Idot, supra (1999a), p. 581, under Art. 3 Reg. 17/1962 the Commission had 
discretion to order the undertakings to bring their infringement of Art. 81 or 82 EC to an end. This gave it the 
possibility to negotiate settlements with the latter and to informally accept commitments that would remedy the 
breach of the Treaty competition rules.
1309 Such a “unilateral" commitment was offered by IBM in its 1980s long-standing proceeding before the 
Commission. See further Van Bael, “The Antitrust Settlement Practice of the EC Commission”, 23 CMLRev. 61 
(1986), p. 70 et seq:, Lomholt, “The 1984 IBM Undertaking: Commission’s Monitoring and Practical Effects” , 
(1998-3) EC Competition Policy Newsletter 7. However, in practice it may, indeed, be the Commission that 
initially “proposes” remedies to the undertakings, which they may accept and then officially propose anew to tire 
Commission as commitments. This seems to have been the case in the IBM case, where the Commission sent 
IBM a statement of necessary remedies.
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Thus, in 1995 the Commission decided to approve Sony’s pan-European dealership 
agreement after receiving certain commitments by that company. The initially notified 
selective distribution system could not be cleared under Article 81 EC. However, Sony 
agreed, following discussions with the Commission, to introduce some changes to its 
distribution system, as a result of which the Commission issued a  negative clearance comfort 
letter. The first modification was to maintain the authorised wholesaler network in the 
distribution system. In order also to secure parallel trade, an additional protection was 
provided for all authorised dealers, wholesalers and retailers, to which Sony could no longer 
refuse to supply the contract products without written justification. Interestingly, Sony also 
accepted the possibility of appeal for a  dealer who was refused authorisation through “the 
introduction o f an arbitration procedure”.1310
In 1999 the Commission gave a comfort letter to Ecomet, a grouping of European national 
meteorological institutes set up for the joint sale of meteorological products, after reaching a 
settlement on some specific points of the joint sale arrangements. In particular, the 
Commission ensured that the Ecomet rules guaranteed equal treatment of and fair 
competition with independent service providers. To that end, an arbitration procedure was 
introduced for settling disputes between independent service providers and Ecomet members 
on any matter falling within the scope of the notified rules.1311 132
Another case is P & I,n n  where a pooling arrangement among protection and indemnity (P & 
I) marine insurance associations had raised concerns based on Article 82 EC because o f the 
lack of appropriate procedures within the pooling agreement with regard to the possibility for 
a club to provide re-insurance to a third insurer. The amendments proposed by the addressees 
of the Commission’s statement of objections included an arbitration procedure that would be 
available in appropriate cases. As a result o f the amendments, the Commission chose to grant 
a negative clearance as to Article 82 EC.1313
Arbitration has also been encouraged by the Commission for footballer transfer disputes. At a 
meeting of three Commissioners - one being the Commissioner responsible for competition - 
with the Presidents o f FIFA and UEFA in 2001, FIFA and UEFA undertook to adopt new 
transfer rules on the basis of a number o f principles, one of which was the setting up of joint
1310 Commission Press Release IP/95/736.
1311 Commission Press Release IP/99/781.
1312 Commission Decision 99/329/EC of 12 April 1999 {P&l Clubs, IGA and P&I Clubs, Pooling 
Agreement), OJ [1999] L 125/12, para. 28.
1313 The fact that a formal negative clearance was given does not change the fact of the informal settlement 
here. Indeed, the operative part of the Decision has no mention of that but merely proceeds to grant a negative 
clearance to some practices and an exemption to some other - unrelated to the arbitration mechanism - practices.
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arbitration bodies made up o f  representatives of players and clubs.1314 The Com m ission 
subsequently closed investigations into FIFA regulations on international transfer o f  
footballers.1315 A Football Arbitration Tribunal would also be set up as an appeal body, o n e  
chamber of which would also have a joint composition and would resolve international 
transfer disputes. According to the Commission these new arbitration bodies would d e a l  
rapidly with the pertinent disputes. However, provision has been made that players should n o t  
be prevented from seizing the ordinary state courts, if  they so wish. Sport arbitration in  
general has many specific elements that make it not exactly representative of the established 
notion of arbitration. It is in this context that we should also see the preserved option o f  
footballers to seize the state courts instead o f these arbitral bodies. In any case, this case is  
indicative o f a friendlier approach o f the Commission towards alternative dispute resolution 
and arbitration in that area.
From a  competition law point o f  view the setting up o f such arbitration bodies together w ith  
the other principles that FIFA and UEFA undertook to respect, essentially constitute inform al 
commitments accepted by the Commission, in order for it not to open proceedings further to  
Articles 81 and 82 EC.
Informal commitments to arbitrate were also received by the Commission in the BMW  a n d  
General Motors (Opel) cases1316 that were opened in 2003/earIy 2004 and closed in th e  
course o f 2005. The Commission’s competition concerns related to (i) unjustified obstacles to  
multi-brand distribution and servicing, and (ii) unnecessary restrictions on garages fo r  
becoming members o f  these manufacturers’ authorised repair networks. As regards th e  
possibility for dealers to sell competing brands o f cars and in view o f the potential deterrent 
effect o f mechanisms for setting sales targets and evaluating performance on multi-brand 
dealers, GM undertook to mutually agree sales targets with dealers and to make such targets 
subject to arbitration in the case o f dispute.
As mentioned above, these are informal settlements and any ‘‘breach” o f the promise to  
arbitrate a dispute cannot give rise to an actionable right to arbitrate for a third party. In 
addition, the Commission lacks the power specifically to enjoin the company in question to  
have recourse to arbitration or to impose fines on it. Naturally, the Commission could pursue
1314 Press Releases IPA) 1/209 and IP/01/314. See also Commission XXXIst Report on Competition Policy - 
2001 (Brussel s/Luxembourg, 2002), pp. 48-49.
1315 Press Release 1P/02/824.
1316 Case COMPB&.77 \ -Europtiischer BMIV- und Mini Partnerverband eV/BMJVAG; Case COMP/38.864- 
PO'Geneml Motors -  Opel distribution agreements and Case COMP/38.901 -1 erband Deutscher Opel- 
Handler^Adam Opel Both cases are reported in Commission XXXl'th Report on Competition Policy -  2005 
(Brussels/Luxembourg, 2006), para. 161 etseq.
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anew its case, based, however, exclusively on Article 81 or 82 EC, and not on the breach of 
the company’s commitment.
ff. Arbitration in Commitment Decisions of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003
As we just mentioned informal commitments cannot deal in an effective way with a 
competition problem because their breach does not mean that the Commission has the power 
to impose sanctions or that third parties can have recourse to national courts and sue for the 
non-performance of the relevant promises. This particular weakness has, however, been 
remedied in the new system o f enforcement with the introduction o f commitment decisions 
whereby the Commission can accept commitments given by undertakings and then proceed to 
make them binding on the latter.1317
Undertakings not in compliance with commitments declared binding upon them by 
Commission decision, face fines up to 10% of their total worldwide turnover in the preceding 
business year and periodic penalty payments up to 5% of their average daily turnover.1318 In 
addition, in case o f breach o f commitments the Commission may reopen proceedings.1319 In 
the case of arbitration commitments, this possibility makes a very efficient - albeit indirect - 
enforcement mechanism, if  the undertaking concerned does not adhere to its promise to 
arbitrate the relevant disputes. Then, third parties perceived as the beneficiaries o f those 
arbitration commitments will be able to plead these commitments before national courts.1320 
It is interesting to note that the fact that the initiative to offer the arbitration commitments lies 
with the undertakings, means that it is not, legally speaking, the Commission that imposes 
upon the former the obligation to arbitrate future disputes, but rather the undertakings that 
propose this mechanism to the Commission. This is very significant, because if  the 
Commission unilaterally imposed upon the undertakings concerned to submit future disputes 
to arbitration and thus to relinquish their right to seize the state judicial organs, as would 
normally be the case, this may have given rise to serious human rights concerns.
It remains to be seen how often arbitration will be used in the context of Article 9 
commitment decisions. So far, German Bundesliga is the only case where arbitration was 
included in the commitments that were offered to the Commission, which rendered them later
1317 See Paulis and Gauer, supra (2003), p. 68, who see in this weakness the rationale for the introduction of 
the new type of decisions declaring commitments binding.
1318 Aits. 23(2Xc) and24(lXc)Reg. 1/2003. See above.
1319 Art. 9(2Xb)Reg. 1/2003.
1320 See above, on the general question of invocability of commitments decisions by third parties, and below 
on the specific question of invocability of arbitration commitments.
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binding by decision.1321 The commitments concerned the central marketing of the m e d ia  
rights of the Bundesliga matches and the award o f the related exploitation rights. T h e  
arbitration commitment provides for the following:
‘The League Association shall agree to arbitration in the event o f d ispu tes 
with third parties over the award procedure. Similarly, it shall oblige a  r ig h ts  
marketer to do so, if  the latter uses the award procedure after acquiring th e  
exploitation rights. The basis for this is that all interested parties submit to a n  
arbitration procedure when they submit a bid. All such disputes shall be decided  
without appeal according to the arbitration rules of the German Institute f o r  
Arbitration (DIS). Arbitration proceedings shall take place at the headquarters o f  th e  
League Association. The applicable law shall be German law. The arbitration 
proceedings shall be conducted in German.”
It is interesting to note that the commitments offered in the similar FA Premier League c a se  
and the corresponding Article 9 commitments Decision of the Commission include a n  
“independent expertise” mechanism. However, since indeed the tasks of the independent 
expert are merely fact-finding-oriented, it is expressly stated in the commitments that “th e  
Independent Expert shall act as an expert and not as an arbitrator or mediator”.1322 This is a  
useful and welcome specification that stands in contrast with other instances where th e  
Commission or parties offering commitments to the latter seem to confuse individual 
expertise with arbitration.
gg. Arbitration as an Imposed Remedy in a Commission Infringement Decision?
It might be useful to wonder whether there could be a place for an imposed arbitration 
remedy by means of an infringement decision pursuant to Article 7 o f Regulation 1/2003. In  
other words, the question is whether the Commission could order, as a positive measure, 
apart from the discontinuation and avoidance o f a certain conduct, the submission of certain 
disputes with third parties to arbitration.
It is interesting to note that the Commission imposed a duty to submit certain facts to  
individual expertise in its NDC/1MS interim measures Decision,1323 in which it had enjoined
1321 Joint selling o f the media rights to the German Bundesliga Decision, o p .c itpoint 3.8 o f the Annex.
1322 Joint selling o f the media rights to the FA Premier League Decision, op.cit., point 9.5.2 of the Annex.
13:3 Commission Decision 2002/165/EC of 3 July 2001 (NDC HealtlvlkfS Health: Interim Measures), OJ
[2002] L 59/18, suspended by order of the President of the CFI (case T-l 84/01 R, IMS Health Inc. v.
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the addressee, IMS, to license a product to certain undertakings on the payment o f a 
reasonable fee that should be determined ‘"by mutual agreement between IMS and the party 
requesting the licence or failing that, by a Decision of the Commission on the basis of a 
determination by one or more independent experts”, which the Commission defined as a 
“suitably qualified person”. The expert would be chosen by mutual agreement o f IMS and the 
other party, or if  the parties could not agree, it would be appointed by the Commission, and 
the costs of the expertise would be borne by the licensor and the licensee on an equal basis. 
His determination would then be transmitted to the Commission for approval.1324 Even more 
recently, the Commission imposed a trustee mechanism, admittedly with many decisional and 
dispute resolution elements, in its Microsoft Decision.1325
Our view is that the imposition of such mechanisms in an infringement decision are not 
compatible with their consensual nature and with the system o f remedies and sanctions 
provided for in Regulation 1/2003. Then, while such mechanisms can be useful, if based on 
settlements with the Commission, by reducing the Commission’s workload with regard to 
monitoring of compliance, such administrative exigencies cannot justify the imposition of 
these mechanisms through the use of state prerogatives. In other words, the fact that the 
Commission would like to have them cannot mean that it should be free to impose them at 
free will. In the specific context of an infringement proceeding and decision, it is the 
Commission’s own duty to deal with the monitoring o f the infringer’s compliance with the 
competition rules. It would also be inappropriate for the Commission in the context o f the 
exercise of its public enforcement powers unilaterally to “delegate” such enforcement pow ers 
that pertain to ordre public1326 to a third party, expert, trustee or arbitrator. Particularly with 
regard to arbitration, a unilateral imposition o f arbitration by the Commission would offend 
against fundamental rights, since the addressee of the infringement decision and of the 
hypothetical arbitration remedy would be stripped of his right to have access to state courts 
{droit an juge naturel). Indeed, the very nature of arbitration is based on consensus and not 
on compulsion and such a hypothetical mechanism w ould not in reality be arbitration.
Commission, [2002] ECR 11-3193) and subsequently withdrawn by Commission Decision 2003/741 /EC of 13 
August 2003 (jYDC HealthIMS Health: Interim Measures), OJ [2003] L 268/69.
1324 Art. 2 and paras. 215 and 219 of the 2001 IMS Decision, op.cit.
1325 Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Microsoft), Art. 7 and para. 1043 et seq., currently under 
appeal in case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission. Microsoft has also challenged the imposition of the 
trustee mechanism and the CF1 is bound to decide on that point, too. See also Commission Decision of 28 July 
2005 (Microsoft), defining the role and function o f the trustee.
1336 Compare Poillot-Peruzzctto, 15(8/9) Contr.Conc.Consomm. 24 (2005).
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hh. A Critical Evaluation of the Nature and Function of Arbitration in M erger  
and Other Cases
i. Evaluation from the Community Law Standpoint
It might be interesting to speculate on the reasons why the Commission “discovered” 
arbitration as a procedural remedy in the early 1990s, in order to control the post-clearance 
conduct of merging companies. In this regard, a parallelism can be drawn with the increasing 
use o f trustees, who undertake to ensure compliance with behavioural or -  more often - 
structural remedies, usually divestiture commitments. There are many similarities with th e  
case o f arbitration. Thus, the trustee is also a  “third part}”, usually proposed by the merging 
parties. The Commission subsequently approves his appointment and mandate, which can  
either be to oversee the parties’ compliance with preservation orders - in order to maintain the 
independence, economic viability, marketability and competitiveness o f the business in 
question pending its divestiture (“hold-separate trustee”) - or to generally monitor the parties’ 
compliance with commitments (“monitoring trustee”),1327 or even to effectuate compliance 
with the commitments, thus proceeding himself to the implementation o f the divestiture 
(“divestiture trustee”).1328 In the latter case, the divestiture trustee reviews the suitability o f  
the proposed purchaser by the parties, or can even dispose of the business himself within a  
specific deadline at any price according to commercial usages. In all cases the Commission is 
consulted and gives its prior approval.1329
In 2002 the Commission even proceeded to the adoption of a Standard Trustee Mandate, 
which is the recommended model trustee mandate in case of such commitments.1330 The 
model trustee mandate provides for an elaborate system of functions to be performed by the 
hold-separate, monitoring, and divestiture trustees. It is clear that the Commission views the
132 The monitoring trustee may also supervise the hold-separate trustee.
1328 On trustees see D’Ormesson and Kerjean, supra (1998), pp. 491-492; Navarro Varona, Font Galarza, 
Folguera Crespo and Briones Alonso, supra (2005), p. 395; Lindsay, supra (2003), para. 9-01. The trustee is 
usually an investment bank, a management consulting or an accounting company.
l3‘9 See e.g. Commission Decision o f 8 May 1995 (M.5%0-ABB/Daimler-Benz), para. 139, integrating the 
commitment of the parties; Commission Decision o f l 8  April 1995 (M.582-OrA7a To/vo), para. 123; Kimberly- 
Clark'Scott Decision, op.cit, para. 233, integrating the commitment (interestingly enough, there is also a 
reference to arbitration for disputes between the parties and the third party purchasing the divested business after 
the end of the trustee's mandate); Commission Decision of 6 October 1999 (M l 663-Alcan/Alusuisse), paras, 
130, 135, 141; Commission Decision o f 15 December 1999 (M. 1 683-77k? Coca-Cola Company/Kar-Tess Group 
(Hellenic Bottling)), para. 39 and annexed commitments; Commission Decision of 11 July 2000 (M.2032-SCA 
Packaging/Metsa Corrugated), para. 41 and points 5 et scq. of the annexed commitment; Commission Decision 
of 25 October 2001 (M2602-Gerling/KCAf), annexed commitments.
1330 See Commission Press Release IP/02/1091 of 18 July 2002.
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trustees as fully dependent on itself. Commission officials have referred to them as acting on 
behalf of the Commission, indeed as its “eyes and ears”, in order to ensure full compliance of 
the parties with their commitments. Indeed, there has also been discussion as to whether the 
Commission should become a  party to the trustee agreement.1331
This excursus may explain why the Commission might have attempted to view arbitration 
and arbitrators in a similar vein. However, apart from the fact that arbitrators, like trustees, 
have the quality of a third party, any other parallelism is inappropriate. Arbitration is a form 
o f private justice governed by the principles of neutrality and independence, exactly as state 
courts. While there is a contract between the litigants and the arbitrators, this does not mean 
that the latter become the agents or mandatories of the former. Arbitrators are not bound by 
the parties’ will except insofar as this will is expressed in the arbitration clause. By the same 
token, there can be no possibility o f the Commission being a co-signatory o f the arbitration 
agreement as such, because the Commission is not party to the dispute.
While the Commission appreciates these fundamental differences between trustees and 
arbitrators, it is also clear that it sees the function of the two mechanisms in terms of 
competition law enforcement as similar.1332 Thus, the Commission sees as a first advantage 
o f arbitration the fact that it provides for an on-going monitoring of commitments, involving 
potentially an unlimited number of market players. This means that the Commission’s limited 
administrative resources w ill not be wasted in permanent monitoring of the commitments. It 
also means that the Commission will not have to take decisions o f regulatory nature, such as 
decisions on terms and conditions, fees, technical issues o f access and interoperability, etc. 
Indeed, the Commission is not a  regulatory authority to be able to tackle such issues itself.1333 
At the same time, arbitration leads to a  decision - as opposed to a trustee’s or a third party’s 
determination - that is itself enforceable and there is no need for the commission to exercise 
its administrative powers to order compliance.
Arbitration commitments themselves have not received much attention by the Community 
courts, at least with regard to the fundamental question whether the Commission has the 
power to accept them thereby in reality “delegating” some o f its decisional and enforcement 
powers to a third party'. There are, however, a few incidental references by the Court o f First 
Instance to such arbitration commitments which show that they are viewed rather positively.
1331 See Mederer, “Remedies in Merger Cases”, Speech Delivered at the Fifth Annual Competition 
Conference, IBA (Fiesole/Florence, 21 September 2001), in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches, p. 
7.
1332 See for example Lubking, “Enforcing Commitments under the ECMR through Arbitration -  Is it still 
Arbitration?”, IBC Conference on Alternative Dispute Resolution and Competition (1 March 2005, London).
1333 See idem.
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Thus, in a challenge by a third party against the BSkvB/Kirch Pay TV  merger clearance 
Decision, which was subject to conditions referring inter alia to arbitration commitments, t h e  
Court rejected the applicant's argument that the commitments offered did not resolve t h e  
competition problems and noted that if there were no commitments, it would have b e e n  
necessary to pursue an Article 82 EC proceeding at national or Community level, t h e  
outcome o f which would be uncertain and, in any event, more difficult to impose. T rad e rs  
would thus be faced with greater legal uncertainty. The specific commitments, on the o th e r  
hand, imposed “detailed obligations to be met within short periods o f time, compliance w i th  
which is ensured by an effective, binding arbitration procedure which reverses the burden o f  
proof and places it on the [acquirer]”. Commitments thus offered far greater legal certa in ty  
than Article 82 EC.1334 The Court also rejected the applicant's arguments about t h e  
difficulties allegedly encountered by a third party to gain access to a relevant market, n o tin g  
that that party could have used the arbitration mechanism provided in the commitments, y e t i t  
chose not to do so.1335
In sum, the Court saw the arbitration mechanism concerned as an efficient means to sw iftly  
remedy specific problems encountered by third parties but also as an important corollary' t o  
the Commission’s monitoring duties, which by implication reduces the Commission's 
administrative burden to monitor in perpetuity compliance by merging parties with th e i r  
commitments.1336 137The delegation element becomes here very clear. Finally, the Court did n o t  
neglect to note that in the event o f the merging party’s failure to comply with the result o f  th e  
arbitration proceedings, i.e. with the arbitral award, “the Commission would have th e  
possibility of revoking the contested decision pursuant to Article 8(5) o f Regulation N o  
4064/89”.13 37
Similarly, in its recent Easyjet judgment, the Court o f First Instance rejected the applicant’s 
argument against the A ir France/KLM merger clearance Decision that the Commission h ad  
failed to make the contested Decision expressly subject to revocation should th e  
commitments not be fulfilled, and observed that the contested decision laid down a fast-track 
arbitration procedure for resolving disputes with a third party if the latter had reason to
1334 Case T-l 58/00, Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfmkanstalten der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (ARD) v. Commission, [2003] ECR11-3825, para. 203, emphasis added.
1335 Ibid, para. 279.
1330 Ibid, para. 295.
1337 Ibid, para 352. Reference should currently be made to Art. 8(6Xb) Reg. 139/2004.
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believe that the merged entity is not complying with the terms o f the commitments made vis- 
à-vis that party.1338
ii. Evaluation from the Arbitration Standpoint
It can be seriously doubted whether the references to arbitration included in some of the 
Commission decisions referred to above -  particularly in the merger area -  and in Regulation 
1400/2002 refer to the conventional notion of arbitration, as a system of resolution of civil 
disputes by private judges, equivalent to state justice. Indeed, there are many instances where 
such references to arbitration would in reality better describe third-party expertise or the 
determination o f a specific (usually technical) issue by a third party, whose decision is not an 
arbitral award.
If we take as an example the numerous arbitration commitments in the merger area, this is not 
a generalised problem but only arises in those arbitration commitments and clauses that are 
rather atypical or even “pathological”. Such clauses may lack some of the fundamental 
characteristics o f arbitration, i.e. the final resolution o f a legal dispute between the parties to 
an arbitration clause by an independent and impartial private tribunal. That some of these 
clauses provide for a final say for the European Commission, which can have more or less 
broad powers o f intervention in the course o f the arbitration proceedings, or that the arbitral 
award is not intended to be final but may be reviewed by state courts and competition or 
regulatory authorities, may be elements that indicate a non-arbitration mechanism.
Then, in some cases there is a clear confusion on the part o f  the Commission between 
arbitrators, third-party technical experts and trustees. The Commission may be excusable in 
accepting unorthodox arbitration commitments with many regulatory elements, but is 
certainly not excusable in confusing third-party expertise with arbitration. To the extent that a 
remedy is better put in effect through the use of experts or trustees, then the Commission 
should encourage the correct use of those terms in the commitments and should refrain from 
using the term “arbitration”. On the other hand, to the extent that a dispute resolution 
mechanism would be more appropriate, then indeed the Commission should expressly refer 
to arbitration and distinguish this from expertise.
From the above, it is evident that the dispute resolution mechanism in some of these cases is 
quite extraordinary in that it admits a substantial degree of intervention by a public authority,
1338 Case T-177/04, Easy Jet Airline Co. Ltd. v. Commission, Judgment of 4 July 2006, para. 186.
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which is naturally not a party to the arbitration agreement or the arbitration process, y e t i t  
enjoys a wide range of powers with direct bearing upon the arbitration procedure and th e  
arbitral award. Some authors have referred to this kind of arbitration as ‘'regulatory' 
arbitration”.1339 The Commission’s direct or indirect involvement is certainly a challenge f o r  
the most fundamental principles o f arbitration, in particular for its independence and th e  
principles of confidentiality and privity.
This problem, however, must be approached from a  practical rather than a theoretical 
standpoint. What matters is not really the name, but rather the legal consequences o f  th e  
dispute resolution mechanism at issue. Namely, it is important to know whether the sp ec ific  
dispute resolution clause is apt to be relied upon in order to relieve the state courts o f  th e i r  
competence, whether the proceedings initiated can qualify as lis pendens, whether the f in a l  
outcome o f that mechanism, the award/decision, can produce a res judicata effect a n d  
whether it is enforceable under domestic and international law, notably under the New Y o rk  
Convention. This is certainly a review that can only be undertaken on an ad hoc basis.
It can be argued in favour o f  considering such mechanisms as arbitration that i f  th e  
paramount legal basis of the arbitration is the will of the parties, as enshrined in th e  
arbitration agreement, and if  the arbitration agreement itself provides for certain “irritants” , 
there should be no doubt that this is indeed arbitration. The arbitration clause and p riv a te  
autonomy is the “constitution” or the Gnindnorm o f  arbitration. If state constitutions a re  
superior norms overriding any legal provision that runs counter to them, in the same w ay a n  
unusual arbitration clause should be accepted telle quelle by all parties involved in th e  
arbitration, including the arbitrators.
However, there are always limits in what the parties can define as arbitration and to th e ir  
powers to draft the arbitration agreement. While contractual freedom remains the ru le , 
arbitration is a very' specific mechanism which is not just the creation of that freedom, but is  
also recognised by the law as a dispute resolution mechanism with specific legal effects 
attached to it. Providing for unorthodox arbitration clauses might bring into question these 
specific legal effects that legal systems attach to arbitration. This might impair th e  
effectiveness and consistency o f  arbitration as an institution, thus, by implication, impairing 
also the effectiveness o f arbitration as a procedural remedy in the area o f competition law  
enforcement altogether. To give a practical example, an overly unorthodox “regulatory” 
arbitration pursuant to a merger-related commitment might not be recognised as arbitration in
1339 See, in particular, Blessing, supra (2003), p. 3, who views positively this development.
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the domestic context of a Member State or in the international context of the New York 
Convention. Especially in the latter case, a foreign court might not be ready to recognise 
pursuant to the New Yoric Convention an “arbitral award” that has been rendered by 
“regulatory arbitrators”, who in reality acted as technical experts for the Commission, or an 
award that has been “confirmed” or even slightly “varied” by the Commission.1340 Such a 
result would be a serious blow for arbitration in general and for the effectiveness o f the 
arbitration commitments in specific.
Thus, our view is that the involvement o f the Commission in the selection, appointment or 
confirmation o f  arbitrators as well as in the arbitration proceedings in general1341 should be 
disapproved and avoided, since it is does not do justice to the credibility and independence of 
arbitration, as this is a task usually exercised by courts or by institutional arbitration bodies. 
We must equally oppose to the generalised possibility of the Commission’s involvement 
during the arbitration procedure, as is now typically provided for in the recent last generation 
arbitration commitments. While an intervention in the form o f amicus curiae may on an ad 
hoc basis be desirable, it should not be institutionalised. Finally, attention must be paid by all 
parties and mostly by the Commission to make clear distinctions between arbitration and 
third-party expertise.1342
iii. Enforcement of the Arbitration Commitments
It is interesting to analyse the legal mechanics of arbitration provided for in antitrust or 
merger commitments. Although, the existence of an arbitration clause is a pre-requisite for 
arbitration, there are some interesting features of arbitration commitments that differentiate 
this particular kind of arbitration.
First of all, we must stress that it is not critical for the offerors o f these commitments to refer 
explicitly in their commitment to their promise (a) to submit a dispute to arbitration and also 
(b) to comply with the final arbitral award that will transpire out o f the proceeding. To the
1340 For example, there have been long-standing problems with regard to the recognition and enforcement of 
Italian arbitral awards rendered puruant to an arbitrate irrituale, which has many unconventional elements. 
Italian courts have held that it is arbitration and falls under the New' York Convention (Corte di Cassazione, 15- 
12-82, n° 6915, Federal Commerce and Navigation Ltd. v. Rocco Giuseppe e Figli s.n.c., 106II Foro Italiano I- 
2200 (1983)), while other courts such as the German Bundesgerichtshof have held otherwise (BGII, 8.10.81, 
IIIZR 42/80, Compania Italiana di Assicurazioni v. Schwarzmeer und Ostsee Versicherungsaktiengesellschaft, 
35 NJW 1224 (1982)).
1341 Compare for example the arbitration commitment in the BSkyB/Kirch Pay TV Decision, op.cit., where 
the Commision has the power “to lay down the arbitral process itself’.
1311 Indeed, we would recommend an amendment of Reg. 1400/2002 and its accompanying communications 
to remedy this specific problem.
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extent they commit to arbitrate, implicitly they also commit to adhere to the result o f  t h e  
arbitration. Any other argument would be formalistic and would not be in confonmity w i th  
either the effet utile o f Community law or even the effet utile of arbitration as an institu tion . 
The thoughts below therefore refer to both types of compliance.
Enforcement of an arbitration commitment can be attained through two distinct chan n e ls : 
First, through recourse to the administrative enforcement powers of the Commission (or a n y  
other relevant authority that has accepted the commitments), and second, through c iv i l  
enforcement either before the arbitral tribunal itself or before state courts.
A fundamental distinction must be made between the following three cases:
(a) Arbitration commitments made binding bv means of Commission decision on t h e  
addressee o f that decision: These can be contained either in a merger c lea ran ce  
decision subject to conditions or obligations to arbitrate, or in a com m itm ents 
decision pursuant to Article 9 o f Regulation 1/2003. Starting from the enforceability  
of such arbitration commitments in the context of EC administrative law, it is c l e a r  
that the addressee o f  a  Commission decision containing conditions or obligations t o  
arbitrate is under a  duty to have recourse to arbitration, if  the party designed to  b e  
protected comes forward with an arbitration request, otherwise the benefit that t h i s  
person accrues from the Commission decision might be withdrawn by t h e  
Commission or the Commission could impose fines and periodic penalty paym ents  
to impose compliance.1343 By itself, Commission intervention is the most pow erfu l 
means to enforce an arbitration commitment.
From a purely theoretical point of view, however, it is interesting to analyse w h e th e r  
these arbitration commitments can be executed through civil enforcement. In re a li ty  
the third party will not ask for the “enforcement o f the arbitration agreement”  a s  
such. If a third party wishes to resolve a dispute with the offerors of the arbitration 
commitment, he will be able to avail himself o f the arbitration commitment and w il l  
merely accept the promisor's erga orrnes offer to arbitrate the relevant dispute b y  
simply acquiescing in the arbitration and by appointing an arbitrator.1344 At th is
1343 See above on sanctions in this context. In the merger control area, for breach of obligations, see A rts . 
6(3Xb), 8(6Xb), 6(4) Reg. 139/2004, and for breach o f conditions, see Art. 7(1) in combination with A rt. 
14(2Xb), and Arts. 8(4), 14(2Xc) and 15(lXd) Reg. 139/2004. That the Commission can punish non-compliance 
with an arbitration commitment or with the resulting arbitral awrard, has also been explicitly noted by the C FI: 
see ARD y op.cit., para. 352; EasyJei, op.cit., para. 188. For the consequences of non-compliance w ith an Art. 9 
Reg. 1/2003 decision, see Arts. 9(2Xb), 23(2Xc) and24(lXc) Reg. 1/2003.
1344 See e g. the arbitration procedure envisaged in the Shell/DEA Decision, op.cit., Art. 16 of the annexed 
commitments, and in the TeliaSonera Decision, op.cit., section F(c) of the annexed commitments. See also th e
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point, an arbitration agreement will exist as between the parties and in case of the 
promisor’s recalcitrance, the third party will be able to pursue the enforcement o f the 
arbitration agreement before a national court, if  the arbitration commitment does not 
contain anything more specific.1345
Needless to say, since in most of these cases the arbitration commitment has been 
given to the benefit o f third parties, a third party may wish to forego his right to have 
recourse to arbitration and instead seize a civil court with a claim based on the 
commitments in contract or tort. In such a case, the promisor will have no right to 
insist on the arbitration mechanism, since there will be no arbitration agreement as 
such in the first place. In other words, the arbitration commitment is binding only 
unilaterally upon the undertaking that gave the commitment and not upon third 
parties which may choose to go to the civil courts instead o f the arbitrators. In that 
sense these arbitration clauses can be described as similar to so-called “unilateral or 
optional arbitration clauses”, whereby one o f the parties to a contract has an option 
to elect to refer the dispute to arbitration.1346 Usually, such unilateral arbitration 
clauses reflect the stronger bargaining position of their beneficiaries, but in our case 
it is in fact the party that is perceived as “weaker” that such arbitration clauses aim at 
benefiting, in order to satisfy the concerns of a competition authority.
(b) Conditions or obligations to arbitrate contained in the old individual exemption 
decisions: These are clearly binding on the addressees of those decisions. Under the 
old system o f enforcement the Commission had direct powers to enforce them.1347 
Under the new system of enforcement existing old exemption decisions that are still 
in force remain valid until their expiration date.1348
As to civil enforcement, these decisions can be relied upon by third parties and the 
above analysis is valid mutatis mutandis here, too.
last generation arbitration commitments contained in recent Decisions, which are clearer in that respect and 
provide for an erga omnes promise to arbitrate (see above).
1345 On the direct effect of such commitment decisions creating rights for third parties, reference is made to 
the discussion above on the application by national courts of Art. 9 Reg. 1/2003 commitment decisions. This 
analysis is also valid for conditional merger clearance decisions.
1346 The validity of such clauses has been accepted in England, Italy, France and Germany. See further 
Nesbitt and Quinlan, “The Status and Operation of Unilateral or Optional Arbitration Clauses”, 22 Arb.Int’l 133 
(2006), pp. 134, 144-147.
1347 See with regard to the breach of obligations Arts. 8(3Xb) and 15(2Xb) Reg. 17/1962. In case of breach 
of a condition the exemption would no longer stand. See above.
1348 See above. Pursuant to Art. 43(1) Reg. 1/2003, Article 8(3) Reg. 17/1962, which gives the Commission 
the power to revoke an exemption decision in case of breach of an obligation, continues to apply to those 
decisions that are still in force until the date of their expiration.
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(c) ‘‘Informal” arbitration commitments: These can be given to the Commission either in 
the context o f merger control, in which case the Commission clears the merger w ith  
or without conditions or obligations but the arbitration commitment is n o t 
transformed to a  condition or obligation, or alternatively in the course o f application 
of Articles 81 and 82 EC, in which case the Commission decides not to take issue 
with a specific agreement or practice because the informal commitment to arbitrate 
eliminates its related concerns. In the context o f merger control, it is not alw ays 
obvious whether the breach o f such commitments entails no consequences at all. A s  
mentioned above, the fact that a commitment may not formally be the subject o f  a  
condition or obligation within the meaning o f Articles 6 and 8 of the M erger 
Regulation may not be decisive. Commitments mentioned in the grounds o f a n  
authorisation decision or annexed to it may yet entail legal effects.1349 If however th e  
commitments are neither mentioned nor annexed, it is most likely that their breach 
will have no consequence for their offeror.1350 In the context of Articles 81 and 82 
EC, since these commitments are not integrated in conditions or obligations, the on ly  
possibility for the Commission is to reopen proceedings, which is by itself a  
pow erful mechanism to induce compliance.
Finally, since these arbitration commitments are informal communications to th e  
Commission, they cannot be executed by means of civil enforcement. Even if a third 
party wanted to rely on the arbitration commitment and request arbitration or appoint 
an arbitrator, this would not be acceptance o f a valid erga omnes offer to arbitrate 
because the offer to arbitrate was only addressed to the Commission informally and 
not to any third parties. Besides, there would be no formal decision for third parties 
to base direct rights upon, other than a mere informal communication to another 
party (the Commission).
iv. Lessons from the Limited Practice of “Regulatory Arbitration”
It is not easy to identify the cases where arbitration mechanisms have been put in effect in the 
area o f antitrust or o f post-merger clearance when arbitration wras provided for in the
1W Compare cases T-125/97 and T-l 27/97, Coca-Cola, op.cit., para. 97.
I3!i0 Arts. 6(3Xa) and 8(6Xa) Reg. 139/2004 give the Commission the power to revoke an authorisation 
decision obtained on the basis of incorrect information for which one of the merging parties is responsible or by 
deceit, but this would not normally cover breach of commitments that have not been turned to conditions or 
obligations and are neither mentioned nor annexed in the decision.
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commitments accepted by the Commission. There is only disparate evidence about these 
cases but it is certain that arbitration has been used in some instances. DG-COMP has 
recently produced an in-house study on merger remedies, where there is some information 
about this question.1351 Indeed, the Commission officials included a specific question to the 
parties and to trustees as to whether any post-closing matters had been referred to 
arbitration.1352 One reservation is, however, that it cannot be ascertained whether recourse to 
arbitration in those cases was related to the existence o f an arbitration or another dispute 
resolution mechanism in the merger commitments themselves or whether the parties decided 
independently to submit their dispute to arbitration by concluding subsequently an arbitration 
agreement. In any case, these cases can be representative o f how arbitration has worked in a 
post-clearance context.
Thus, in a Phase II clearance case, where arbitration commitments accompanied 
exceptionally a divestiture remedy, the seller and buyer o f the divested business had to 
negotiate on the precise number of personnel to be divested with the business. Following the 
sale, there w as a dispute as to whether the seller had fully complied with the obligation to 
transfer to the bu\er the relevant key personnel. The personnel disputes were not resolved, 
but the purchaser and seller settled their dispute later in an arbitration procedure, which 
resulted in the seller making a monetary compensation to the purchaser.1353 It is interesting, 
however, to note that the Commission’s study deplored the fact that this monetary 
compensation did not resolve “the effectiveness issue o f the remedy in competition 
tenns” .1354
In another case, where again the commitments included a divestiture remedy, the carve-out 
and transfer remedy mainly required the separation of customers from the seller s accounts 
and their transfer to the network of the divested business. The carve-out became complicated, 
as a large number o f customers for the divested business were also customers for the seller's 
other business, and had thus been bundled together in the seller's records. Thus, the 
segregation o f these customers was extremely difficult. The purchaser was not in a position to 
know the extent to which the seller had failed to transfer fully the required customer lists and, 
perhaps also as a result of his underestimation of the requisite transition costs, he lost half of 
the relevant customers. He then filed for arbitration and won a  damages award. However, as
1351 European Commission, DG COMP, Merger Remedies Study, October 2005, in: 
http: //ec .europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/others/remedies_study. pdf
1352 Merger Remedies Study, op.cit., p. 195, Question 62, and p. 203, Question 22.
1353 It does not appear that this arbitral award was ever published.
1354 Merger Remedies Study, op.cit., p. 42, para. 49.
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the Commission study notes, the damage had already been done through the loss of such a  
substantial volume o f customers, and eventually the buyer was almost bankrupt and sold fo r  a  
fraction of its original value.1355
These are telling examples as to the false hopes that the Commission may have placed on  
arbitration and as to its misunderstanding of the nature of arbitration, which is m erely a  
private dispute resolution mechanism and cannot be elevated to a form of antitrust enforcer 
with delegated public enforcement powers. Indeed, the Commission itself has admitted th e  
limitations of arbitration in its GE/Honeywell prohibition decision. There, it rejected th e  
commitments offered by the parties, promising not to bundle GE with Honeywell products 
when making offers to customers, unless a  competitor, acting either alone or as a team, h a s  
bundled similar products or when the customer has requested a bundled offer by G E in  
writing. In order to ensure compliance with those commitments, the parties had proposed to  
set up an arbitration scheme, whereby any affected interested third party could initiate 
arbitration. The Commission, however, rejected this offer because the proposed commitments 
required a significant amount o f monitoring on its part and the arbitration mechanism w ould  
“give rise to endless litigation in which the Commission [would 1 have to participate in its 
capacity as the recipient o f the [commitments]”.1356
On a more positive note, from a competition law perspective, there may be times where th e  
arbitration mechanism provided for in the commitments has never been put in effect yet its  
mere existence is an effective tool of preventive nature that disciplines the parties and thus 
obliges them to fully comply with their commitments. Thus, in a case .involving a Phase I 
remedy to enter into non-discriminatory supply agreements and to grant access to certain 
technology on non-discriminatory terms, the parties had created an “arbitration committee” to 
oversee the implementation o f the commitments. The arbitration panel was never convened, 
because no third party felt threatened by the market position o f the new company and “the 
arbitration protections were adequate to safeguard the few' interested companies in the 
sector”.13”
In any event, practice indeed shows that arbitration is foremostly a civil dispute resolution 
method and nothing more than that. It can o f course be used in many contexts, one being 
competition law, but it is not -  and it should not be -  an alternative to regulation or 
competition law enforcement employed by administrative authorities.
1355 Merger Remedies Study, op.cit., p. 83, para. 9.
1356 Commission Decision o f 3 July 2001 (M.2220-General Electric'Honeywell), OJ [2004] L 48/1, paras. 
499 and 531.
13,7 Merger Remedies Study, op.cit., p. 118, para. 14.
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3. The Power of Arbitrators to Apply EC Competition Law
a. Arbitrability of EC Competition Law
A old and, one would say, ‘'traditional'’ question of equally high theoretical and practical 
significance has been the “arbitrability” of disputes, i.e. whether the parties to an arbitration 
clause can submit to arbitration certain disputes and whether the arbitrators themselves have 
the power to decide them. It is basically the contractual nature o f private arbitration that gives 
rise to this question. Unlike state courts, for which of course there is never an issue of 
“justiciability”, arbitration is the creation of private autonomy. For this reason it has long 
been debated whether certain disputes that pertain to public law and refer also to the public 
interest can be settled and submitted to arbitration.1358
The problems pertaining to the arbitrability o f competition law disputes relate exactly to the 
public interest character of such disputes. The paramount objective of antitrust laws, and 
certainly of EC competition law, is the safeguarding o f effective competition in the 
market.1359 Private interests, as such, are important to the extent that their protection can be 
accommodated in the simultaneous protection of the broader public interest.
In addition, private autonomy has a secondary role in competition law disputes. Indeed, 
competition law places limits upon it.1360 If we take Article 81 EC as our paradigm, the 
nullity of anti-competitive agreements is absolute and must be raised by courts ex officio, 
notwithstanding the will o f the litigants. During the civil proceedings a competition authority 
may wish to intervene as amicus curiae and make submissions if  the protection of the public 
interest so requires. At the same time, parties cannot settle their disputes through an in-court 
or out-of-court settlement that runs counter to competition law. At the public enforcement 
side, the Commission and national competition authorities can initiate proceedings of their 
own motion without the necessity of a complaint. Even if proceedings have been opened 
pursuant to a complaint, the withdrawal of the latter or the settlement of the case by the
1358 There are areas which seem at first sight to be related to the private rather than to the public interest, yet 
are off-limits for arbitration. For example a dispute about the sale of a human organ. In reality, however, the 
public interest -  public policy element is present here too. In that case it is the public interest pertaining to the 
protection of human dignity in a given jurisdiction.
See above on the public and private interests protected by competition rules.
1360 As mentioned above, a recognition o f a high degree of private autonomy is a sine qua non condition for 
the establishment of effective competition in the market. However, it is also possible that private autonomy 
might be exercised in an anti-competitive way. Indeed, competition lawr does nothing more than to impose limits 
on private autonomy in order to protect the public interest.
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complainant would not affect at all the former, which can be continued by the relevant 
authority ex officio.1361 In the only instances, where private initiative played a role, i.e. in th e  
cases of applications for negative clearance and for individual exemption under Regulation 
17/1962,1362 again the public authority had a  decisive role and it acted in the public interest. 
Then, private parties cannot dispose of the antitrust rules or exclude their applicability. F irs t, 
domestically, the Treaty competition rules constitute mandatory' public law provisions,1363 
primarily aiming at safeguarding the public interest. The Court of First Instance has stressed 
that “the public policy nature of competition law is specifically designed to render its  
provisions mandatory and to prohibit traders from circumventing them in th e ir  
agreements”.1364 As a result, private parties cannot conclude a contract and explicitly o r  
implicitly decide that their contract will not be subject to EC competition law. T h e  
application of the prohibitory provisions o f Articles 81 and 82 EC is obligatory’, automatic, 
and independent of the parties’ will (ius cogens).1365 Second, they cannot be set aside by the  
parties’ choice of a foreign law1366 1367since they are mandatory' in die private international law  
sense (lois d'application immédiate)}361
All these elements o f competition law had led in the past to the exclusion o f the arbitrability 
o f antitrust-related disputes, because of their public policy (ordre public) nature.1368 T his 
attitude, however, was reversed in the 1980s and early 1990s and it can be said with certainty'
1 See Norbcrg, supra (1999), pp. 165-166.
1362 The role of private initiative in these cases was limited to the fact that an application for exemption or 
negative clearance was a requirement for a decision of the Commission granting one or the other. Thus, an 
exemption or a negative clearance could not be granted ex officio and the Commission could only grant one o r 
the other, corresponding to exactly what the applicant sought. We should note, however, that under the current 
legal exception system such applications are no longer possible and any inapplicability decisions o f the 
Commission will be taken ex officio, without parties’ having a right to that extent (Art. 10 Reg. 1/2003).
I3°3 See e.g. Schröter, supra (2003), p. 98, referring to “zwingendes öffentliches Recht”.
1364 Case T-l28/98, Aeroports de Paris v. Commission, [2000] ECR11-3929, para. 241. It is noteworthy that 
this general statement seems to attribute a public policy nature to any competition norms, national o r 
Community. See also case T-34/92, Fiafagri and New Holland Ford v. Commission, [1994] ECR 11-905, para. 
39, where it is stressed that “Article [81(1)] of the Treat}* lays down a fundamental prohibition of agreements 
which are anti-competitive in character. That provision, adopted as a matter of public policy, is therefore binding 
on the applicant undertakings...” (emphasis aided). Compare now the express provisions of Eco Swiss, op.cit., 
para. 39; Manfredi, op.cit., para. 31.
1365 Compare also Commission Decision 2002/759/EC o f 5 December 2001 (Luxembourg Brewers), OJ 
[2002] L 253/21, para. 62.
1306 In this case, foreign law means the law of a country that is not an EU Member State, since Community 
competition law is an integral part of all EU Member States’ law's, therefore the choice of any national law 
within the EU would not lead to an application of “foreign” law with respect to the Treaty competition rules.
1367 See e g. Schröter, supra (2003), p. 99; C. von Bar and P. Mankow'ski, Internationales Privatrecht, Vol. 
I, Allgemeine Lehren (München, 2003), p. 256.
1368 The arbitrability has nothing to do, however, with the fact that in some countries competition disputes 
are of administrative nature and are submitted to the competence of administrative authorities and courts (as it is 
put by Kaiydis, “The Impact of Competition Rules on the Institution of Arbitration: Treatment in French, Greek 
and Community Law”, 37 Nomiko Vima 1024 (1989) [in Greek], p. 1031). Indeed, disputes of administrative 
nature have been invariably considered arbitrable.
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that arbitrability of competition law disputes has now been generally accepted in all 
jurisdiction with developed antitrust regimes. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that, 
while arbitrability remains in principle a question governed by state (municipal) law, the 
increased internationalisation of arbitration law and practice and the emergence of 
transnational principles have led to a general transnational principle of favour to arbitrability 
(favor arbitrandi)im
Arbitrability o f  competition law-related disputes can now be considered such a transnational 
principle. This is also supported by the arbitration practice itself, which is quite rich on the 
question of arbitrability of such claims. The plea that a certain dispute is not arbitrable 
because it pertains to public rules on the protection o f free competition has been heard quite 
often by arbitrators and has been invariably rejected, especially in the last decade or so. In all 
of these cases, the usual approach taken by arbitrators is that competition law is arbitrable and 
therefore the arbitration clause itself is fully operative and gives the power to the arbitral 
tribunal to hear arguments and decide a dispute that also involves competition law.1369 370 
It is interesting that the shift in the negative attitudes concerning the arbitrability of 
competition law started in the US with the 1985 ruling o f  the US Supreme Court in 
Mitsubishi,1371 This is important because the US also have the oldest and most developed 
system of competition law with a  strong public policy nature also providing for criminal 
sanctions. That the reversal took place there, was bound therefore to influence other 
jurisdictions that have followed course.
In Mitsubishi the US Supreme Court adopted an extremely favourable attitude to international 
commercial arbitration and held that an agreement to submit antitrust disputes to international
1369 Compare M. Lehmann, Die Schiedsfàhigkeit •wirtschaftsrechtlicher Streitigkeiten als transnationales 
Rechtsprinzip (Baden-Baden, 2003); idem, “A Plea for a Transnational Approach to Arbitrability in Arbitral 
Practice”, 42 Columbia JTransnat’IL 753 (2004).
13 0 A rare and famous exception is a Swiss arbitration case, where the arbitral tribunal declared itself 
incompetent to decide a question of EC competition law. At the setting aside stage, the Swiss Supreme Court 
disagreed with the tribunal’s finding of lack of jurisdiction, considered that finding as infra petita, and ordered 
that the tribunal decide the competition law issue. See Tribunal Fédéral, 28-4-92, G S.4 v. V SpA, 118 II ATF 
193 (1992); [1996] ECC 1, commented by Idot, (1993) RevArb. 128. On remand, the defendant tried to argue 
that the arbitral tribunal had no longer jurisdiction, because of the involvement of the state court. The tribunal, 
however, considered that the Swiss Supreme Court’s judgment had not affected the former’s competence and 
rendered its award after duly taking into account the EC competition law question. See further Dimolita, “The 
Development and the Ensuing Misconceptions of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in Arbitration”, 4 Dikaio 
Epicheiriseon kai Etairion 1181 (1998) [in Greek], p. 1184; idem, “Issues Concerning the Existence, Validity 
and Effectiveness of the Arbitration Agreement (Nullity of Main Contract, Arbitrability, Capacity, Concurrent 
Court Proceedings, Pre-arbitral Conditions Stipulated in Contract, Group of Companies)”, 7(2) ICC Bull. 14 
(1996), p. 21, This author view's such cases as affecting not the existence or validity, but rather the effectiveness 
of the arbitration agreement. In other words, a plea alleging inarbitrability of the dispute aims at rendering 
inoperative the arbitration agreement in that specific context
1371 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. SolerChrysler-Plymouth, I n c 473 US 614 (1985).
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arbitration was enforceable out o f “concerns o f  international comity, respect for the capacities 
o f foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need o f the international 
commercial system for predictability in the resolution o f disputes” .1372 The dispute in th a t  
case involved territorial restrictions in an automobile distribution agreement. The distributor 
attempted to sell outside its assigned territory and refused to arbitrate as specified in th e  
distribution agreement. Mitsubishi then sued to force arbitration. The distributor counter­
claimed that his antitrust-based arguments were not arbitrable. The Court, however, adopted 
an extremely favourable position vis-à-vis international arbitration and reversed e a r lie r  
rulings that had gone to  the opposite direction.1373
Thereafter the US Courts have been particularly arbitration-friendly and have actually  
extended this favourable attitude also to domestic arbitration.1374 They have also considered 
that tort claims for damages based on the US antitrust law provisions could also be heard b y  
arbitrators, if they are under the scope of the arbitration clause. The fact that antitrust la w  
violations, especially horizontal cartels, may give rise to a multiplicity o f complex dam ages 
claims should not be held against the arbitrability o f such claims.1375
As far as European countries are concerned, we can again note the same gradual shift fro m  
non-arbitrability to arbitrability. Continental systems, on their part, follow a variety of criteria  
to establish whether a dispute can be submitted to arbitration. Most countries follow a  
criterion based on the free disposition o f rights. Under this criterion a dispute will b e  
arbitrable if  the rights at stake can be freely disposed o f or settled by the parties. Most o f  
these countries gradually accepted that competition law disputes and, more specifically, th e  
civil consequences flowing from the prohibition rules o f Articles 81 and 82 EC, could indeed 
be arbitrated, notwithstanding their public policy nature.1376 In some other countries, notably
ir2 Ibid, at 629.
1373 Compare e.g, American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2nd Cir. 1968).
1374 See e.g. Kotam Elecs., Inc. v. JBL Consumer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 724 ((11th Cir. 1996); Seacoast 
Motors o f  Salisbury, Inc. v. Daimler-Chrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2001 ).
1375 See e.g. In re Currency’ Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 265 F.Supp.2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); J L X f  
Industries, Inc. et al. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA et a i, 2004 US App. LEXIS 22253 (2d Cir. 2004); XXX YCA 963 
(2005).
13 0 To give some examples, in Belgium Art. 1676 of Code of Civil Procedure permits the submission to  
arbitration of disputes that parties can freely dispose of. Questions pertaining to ordre public cannot b e  
arbitrable. However, Belgian courts have made it clear that arbitrability is the rule and non-arbitrability th e  
exception. Most problems in Belgium have concerned the notorious Loi du 27 juillet 1961 sur la résiliation 
unilatérale des concessions de vente exclusive à durée indéterminée. Initially, Belgian courts refused to accept 
the arbitrability of disputes pertaining to that law which contained mandatory norms for the protection o f  
commercial agents in Belgium. Recent judgments of the Belgian Cour de cassation are more favourable to  
arbitration and in principle accept the arbitrability of such claims. See further Caprasse, “Ordre public sociétaire 
et arbitrage”, in: Poullet, Wéry & Wynants (Eds.), Liber Amicorum Michel Coipel (Bruxelles, 2004), p. 505. 
Belgium seems to follow the distinction between application of competition law à titre incident and à titre 
principal. Since Arts. 81 and 82 EC are considered provisions of public policy, arbitrators can deal with them
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France, freedom of disposition remains a criterion but the law refers also to the public policy 
nature o f non-arbitrable claims.1377 Until the early 1990s, arbitrability o f competition law 
disputes was not accepted by the courts. Thus, the arbitration clause would be void, if  it 
touched upon a question o f ordre public and EC competition law was considered of such a 
public policy character. This state of affairs had been criticised by many commentators, who 
stressed that the exclusion of any possibility of arbitration for all disputes touching upon EC 
competition law was rather excessive.1378 The breakthrough took place in the Labinal and 
Applix cases o f the Paris Court of Appeal,1379 which clearly admitted for the first time the 
arbitrability o f EC competition law disputes, albeit with some limitations.1380 Germany and
only as subsidiary issue (à titre incident), while deciding on the civil consequences of the prohibition enshrined 
therein (nullity and damages claims). See Noirfalisse, supra (1994), p. 80. On the other hand, arbitrators would 
not be competent to apply the Treaty competition rules as a main issue (à titre principal). This seems to exclude, 
therefore, the submission to arbitration of a declaratory claim concerning the application or Art. 81 or 82 EC to a 
given contract. In Greek law, which follows a similar free disposition criterion (Art. 867 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure), there has been no case where the issue of arbitrability of national or EC competition law disputes 
has arisen. The prevailing view in theory is, how ever, that the public policy character of those rules would not 
be an obstacle to the submission to arbitration o f the civil law' aspects of a dispute pertaining to competition law 
(nullity, contractual and non-contractual liability claims). On the other hand, the arbitrators cannot determine 
issues, with which the public authorities have been exclusively entrusted. See Koussoulis, “Procedural Issues 
Before the Competition Committee”, in: Schinas (Ed.), Protection o f Free Competition, The Practice ofEPA/EA 
(Athens/Komotini, 1992) [in Greek], p. 298, fn. 30; Liakopoulos, “The Question of Private International Law in 
the Control of Concentrations”, in: The Control o f  Concentrations o f Undertakings in Competition Law (Athens, 
1998) [in Greek], p. 42. Italian law has also progressed in a parallel way. Italy follows a free disposition 
criterion (Arts. 806 and 1966 of the Code of Civil Procedure) for the determination of the arbitrability of 
disputes. There too, it has recently been accepted that the public policy nature of the competition rules does not 
negate the disposition of rights based thereupon. See Corte di Cassazione, 21-8-96, n° 7733, Telecolor SpA v. 
Technocolor SpA, A l Giust.Civ. 1-1373 (1997), with a comment by Falvella, 47 Giust.Civ. 1-1375 (1997). For 
earlier case law see Tribunale Bologna, 18-7-87, COVEAÍE SpA v. CFI - Compagnie Française des Isolants SA, 
23 Riv.Dir.Int.Priv.Proc. 740 (1987), which had considered invalid an arbitration clause in a restrictive 
agreement containing a non-competition clause because of the incompatibility with the mandatory rules of 
competition law (Art. 81 EC). See, howrever, the reversal of that finding on appeal in Corte d’Appello Bologna, 
11-10-90, COITZME SpA v. CFI - Compagnie Française des Isolants SA, 3 RivArbitiato 77 (1993), with 
comments by Rosi, 3 RivArbitrato 79 (1993); Caporale, 7 Dir.Comm.Int. 725 (1993). In Spain, another country' 
that adopts the free disposition criterion (see Mantilla-Serrano, “The New Spanish Arbitration Act”, 21 
JInt’lArb. 367 (2004), pp. 370, 371), again arbitrability is seen quite favourably, which means that competition 
law disputes would be arbitrable. The same is accepted in Swedish law and in fact the Swedish Arbitration Act 
does not stop at the general provision of section 1(1) which refers to “disputes concerning matters in respect of 
which the parties may reach a settlement” but proceeds in paragraph (3) to a specific rule, according to which 
“arbitrators may rule on the civil law effects of competition law as between the parties”.
1377 Compare Arts. 2059 and 2060(1) Code civil.
1378 See e.g. Loy,supra (1980), p. 451.
1379 CA Paris, 19-5-93, Labinal SA v. Mors and Westland Aerospace Ltd., (1993) RevArb. 645, with a 
comment by Idot, (1993-7) Europe 10, 11; CA Paris, 14-10-93, Sté Aplix v. Sté Velcro, (1994) RevArb. 164, 
with a comment by Idot, (1994-4) Europe 12.
1380 These were that arbitrators could not deal with issues, which were reserved to the Commission’s or to 
public authorities’ exclusive competence. Arbitrators could apply the civil consequences of the prohibitions of 
Arts. 81 and 82 EC, i.e. declare the nullity of agreements or other legal acts contravening these prohibitions, 
award damages and grant injunctions, preliminary or permanent. In other words, an arbitral tribunal w as equated 
to a national court. Prohibition decisions, exemption decisions based upon Article 81(3) EC, and fines were 
outside the ambit o f the tribunal’s competence. Only the Commission and NCAs could deal with these issues. 
See Poillot-Peruzzetto and Luby, supra (1998), p. 255; Putman supra (1998), p. 407; Gavalda and Parleani, 
supra (2002), p. 276.
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Austria, on the other hand, follow an arbitrability criterion based on the economic nature o f  
the dispute.1381 This criterion is more amenable to the arbitrability o f the competition rules. 
Indeed, in German law, competition law-related disputes have generally been considered 
arbitrable.1382
In England finally, where until recently there was no case law on this question, the English 
High Court dispelled any doubts about the arbitrability of the Treaty competition law  
provisions and indeed considered that ‘there is no realistic doubt that ... ‘competition’ o r  
‘anti-trust’ claims are arbitrable; the issue is whether they come within the scope o f  the 
arbitration clause, as a matter of its true construction”.1383 Following an analysis o f th e  
w ording of the arbitration clause in that case, the court concluded that it covered any potential 
disputes concerning the performance or non-performance or interpretation o f the contracts 
and, as such, included antitrust claims, even if the latter were said to be of a  tortious nature. A  
stay o f  the proceedings w as granted and the court confirmed that these claims should also be 
heard by the arbitral tribunal.
This expansion of arbitrability' to cover also tortious claims arising out of the violation o f  the 
competition rules, echoes a more general trend in recent arbitration statutes as well as in 
Article 7(1) of the UNCITRAL Model LawT not to define arbitrable disputes by reference to  
specific contracts, thus restricting arbitrability to contractual claims, but rather to define such 
disputes by reference to legal relationships, thus leaving arbitrability open also for claims that 
are not stricto sensu contractual, but can be formally characterised as tortious, restitutionary 
or otherwise.1384 Thus, with regard to tort claims, it is increasingly accepted that there is no 
compelling reason to exclude arbitrability', if  the arbitration clause is w ide enough to cover 
such claims.1385 The arbitration practice indeed supports this.1386
1381 See Arts. 1030(1) and 582 of the German and Austrian Codes of Civil Procedure, respectively.
1382 See K.H. Schwab and G Walter, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Systematischer Kommentar zu den 
Vorschriften der Zivilprozeßordnung, des Arbeitsgerichtsgesetzes, der Staatsverträge und der Kostengesetze 
über das privatrechtliche Schiedsgerichtsverfahren (München, 2005), p. 32. It is noteworthy that the old s. 91 
GWB that imposed severe limitations on the arbitrability of the German antitrust provisions was abandoned in 
1998, although that provision had never meant the complete non-arbitrability o f disputes that touched upon 
questions of German competition law.
1383 ETPlus SA & Ors v. Welter A  Ors (Comm.), [2006] Lloyd's Rep. 251; [2005] EWHC 2115, para. 51.
1384 See Kreindler, “Arbitral Forum Shopping”, in: Cremades & Lew (Eds.), Parallel State and Arbitral 
Procedures in International Arbitration (Paris, 2005).
1385 See e.g. Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, supra (1999), pp. 306-307; J.-F. Poudret and S. Besson, Droit 
compare de l ’arbitrage international (Zurich/Bale/Gen£ve, 2002), p. 282.
1386 See e.g. the partial award in case ICC 12363/ACS, 24 Bull-ASA 462 (2006).
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From this analysis, it is evident that the arbitrability of EC competition law is no longer 
questioned and should be taken as granted.1387 It is noteworthy finally to stress that the 1999 
Eco Swiss ruling of the Court o f Justice1388 by implication is also supportive o f the 
proposition that EC competition law issues are arbitrable. The Court, by deciding on the 
duties of national courts to safeguard the effectiveness of EC competition law and to refuse to 
recognise or to set aside arbitral awards that offend against the public policy (ordre public), 
as this is expressed by these rules, implicitly ruled on the arbitrability of those rules.
b. Competences of Arbitrators in the Decentralised System of Enforcement
aa. Modalities of EC Competition Law Issues Arising in Arbitration
Arbitrators usually come across competition law issues in an incidental way. In most cases 
there will be a contractual dispute and the competition law question will be raised as a 
defence by the defendant. The contract - typically a distribution, licensing or co-operation 
agreement - will contain an arbitration clause and the plaintiff will advance claims based on 
breach of contract, while the defendant will raise the nullity o f the contract or o f certain parts 
of it.
One cannot exclude, however, the possibility that EC competition law could also be pleaded 
as a sw ord before arbitrators in a contractual law’ dispute. This could happen in case o f a co- 
contractor's damages claim because o f harm incurred through his counter-party’s violation of 
the competition rules or in a similar case involving a member of an illegal cartel and his 
direct purchasers.1389 In most of these rather rare cases, typically, there will be a  pre-existing 
arbitration clause {clause compromissoire). On the other hand, it is rare to see a non­
contractual liability case be decided by arbitrators, if  there is not yet any arbitration clause, 
since it would be almost impossible for the involved persons to conclude an arbitration 
agreement after the dispute has arisen (compromis).
1387 On the arbitrability of the Community rules on state aids and on the possible application of Art. 88(3) 
EC by arbitrators see Slot, supra (1996), p. 110 etseq.; Lenaerts and Pittie, “Conclusions générales”, in: Briner, 
Derains et al. (Eds.), L 'arbitrage et le droit européen, Actes du colloque international du CEP ANI du 25 avril 
1997 (Bruxelles, 1997), p. 196. Naturally, arbitrators, like national courts, have no jurisdiction to determine the 
compatibility of state aid measures or of a state aid scheme with the common market. That assessment falls 
within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Community judicature. See e.g. 
Case C^451/03, Sen>izi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti Srl v. Giuseppe Calaftori, [2006] ECR 1-2941, para, 
71.
1388 Cited above. For a full analysis of that case and its meaning for arbitration, see below.
1389 Compare, for example, the US Stolt Nielsen case (cited supra).
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In sum, the way a competition law-related dispute arises before the arbitrators bears no 
difference at all from the way it comes before the courts.
bb. The Full Power of Arbitrators to Apply Article 81(3) EC
At this point, we should examine the role o f  arbitrators in the new system of decentralised 
enforcement introduced by Regulation 1/2003. The first point to be made here is tha t 
Regulation 1/2003 does not mention arbitration. This should not come as a  surprise, as state 
laws do not normally contain individual rules on the arbitrability o f every single dispute bu t 
rather rely on generalised criteria, as we have just described above. Some degree of surprise, 
however, might be justified with regard to the total absence of any reference to arbitration in 
the other numerous texts that have foreshadowed and later accompanied Regulation 
1/2003.1390
On another occasion,1391 we have argued that the silence about arbitration during the 
modernisation debate was probably a conscious and prudent choice on the part o f the 
Commission, which had already been extremely bold in its proposals and would not have 
liked to imperil their chances of realisation by adding up further points of a certain 
controversy. If the Commission’s proposal to allow national courts to apply Article 81(3) EC 
was one of the points that attracted the staunchest criticism,1392 the application of that 
provision by arbitrators must have seemed in those days an even more sensitive matter.
Until 1 May 2004, arbitrators had been applying Articles 81 and 82 EC on numerous 
occasions, although, like national judges, they did not have jurisdiction to apply Article 81(3) 
EC,1393 which pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation 17/1962 was reserved to the sole power 
of the Commission to apply. There is no doubt that with the abolition o f this Commission 
enforcement monopoly, like state judges, arbitrators are now able to apply the third paragraph 
of Article 81 EC, too.1394
1390 Before the Commission started envisaging the White Paper reforms, it had commissioned a study on the 
application of the then Arts. 85 and 86 of the Treaty by national courts in the Member States. The study, co­
ordinated by August Braakman and foreworded by the then DG IV Commissioner Van Miert, was composed o f  
national reports, which included whole chapters on arbitration, as a separate forum  for the application of Arts. 
81 and 82 EC. See European Commission, DG IV-Competition, The Application ofArticles 85 and 86 o f the EC  
Treaty by National Courts in the Member States (Brussels, 1997). This is quite a contrast with the subsequent 
silence o f the Commission during the modernisation debates.
1391 See Komninos, supra (2001), p. 218.
1392 See above.
1393 In other words, Art. 81(3) was not arbitrable under the Reg. 17/1962 enforcement system.
1394 See also Burrichter, supra (2001), p. 543; Komninos, supra (2001), p. 219 et seq.\ Idot, supra (2003a), 
pp. 316-317; Idot, supra (2003c), p. 11.
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This is, however, a principle that may require some further analysis. It is noteworthy that the 
text o f Article 6 o f the initial regulation proposal o f 20001395 1396had created some doubts, 
because it sounded too exclusive, as if  a prerogative that was so far only in the hands o f the 
Commission was to be shared with the national courts and only with them. It read as follows: 
“National courts before which the prohibition in Article 81(1) o f the Treaty is invoked shall 
also have jurisdiction to apply Article 8 l(3 )'\n96 We have referred above to the criticism o f 
the choice of the regulation proposal text to remain in the “jurisdiction” language, rather than 
to emphasise the shift to a system o f legal exception that results in all enforcers being able to 
apply Article 81 EC as a whole. This had created the impression o f exclusivity, i.e. that only 
national courts by means of “delegation” could apply the third paragraph of that provision, in 
addition to national competition authorities. Under such a reading, it would have seemed that 
arbitrators were left out of the application o f Article 81(3) EC.
The new text o f Article 6 of Regulation 1/2003, however, does not include the word “also”, 
which existed in the draft regulation and which gave the impression of a certain exclusivity. 
The new text also adopted the more correct language that “national courts shall have the 
power to apply Articles 81 and 82 o f the Treaty” . The latter point is very important for 
arbitration. An “exclusive” interpretation allowing only national competition authorities and 
courts to apply Article 81(3) EC would miss the whole point o f  the reforms and would not be 
in conformity with a historical and systematic interpretation o f the Regulation. The basic ratio 
is to align the enforcement of the third paragraph o f Article 81 EC to that o f the first one, so 
that this provision can be applied as a whole by the same enforcer or in the same forum.
The fact that no reference is made in the Regulation to arbitration should not be taken as 
exclusionary o f arbitrators’ jurisdiction to apply Article 81(3) EC.1397 Arbitrators applied 
under the old system the first two paragraphs o f that provision, without having been 
authorised to do so under any provision of EC competition law.1398 Their jurisdiction to do so 
is well established and it has been confirmed by national courts and by implication by the 
Court of Justice alike.1399 If there was an intension for some reason to bar arbitrators from 
applying Article 81(3) EC, an express provision would undoubtedly have been included to
1395 See above.
1396 Emphasis added.
1397 Indeed, the text of the Regulation should also not be taken as exclusionary of non-EU courts, 
notwithstanding its reference to national courts.
1398 As mentioned above, the arbitrability of a dispute referring to a certain legal norni is rarely expressly 
authorised or prohibited by that norm itself, although the granting of exclusive powers of enforcement to a 
particular body may explicitly deny those powers to arbitrators.
1399 See e.g. cases C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo et al. v. Energiebedrijf Ijssetmij NV, [1994] ECR1-1477 and 
Eco Swiss, op.cit., which will be analysed below.
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this end. By not having done so and by emphasising the fact that Article 81 EC will b e  
applied as a whole, the new Regulation has accepted that possibility.1400 *
Any other solution would create serious problems of a procedural nature: Under th e  
administrative authorisation system, when there was an on-going litigation or arbitration a n d  
the possibility of an Article 81(3) EC individual exemption arose, the courts or arb itral 
tribunals were barred from rendering themselves such a constitutive decision and suspended 
their proceedings, so that the agreement in question could be considered for an exemption b y  
the Commission, which was the only competent authority to take such a decision. But w ith  
the adoption of a system o f  legal exception, when arbitrators are called to deal with th a t  
provision, they simply have to apply it themselves. Even if  they could somehow separate 
paragraph (3) out of Article 81 EC, which is no longer possible since Article 81 EC must n o w  
be applied as a procedurally integrated norm, the question would arise as to whom th e y  
would have to send the issue to be decided. Certainly not to the Commission, since the la tte r  
would no longer have jurisdiction to give an individual exemption, neither to the European 
Court of Justice, since the latter ever since the ruling in Nordsee,um lately confirmed in E c o  
Swiss, cannot accept preliminary references from arbitrators. Thus, they would have no o th e r  
option but to send this specific issue to national courts. However, it is no longer possible o r  
meaningful for a court to issue a separate decision of exemption or declaration o f  
applicability o f Article 81(3) EC, other than to apply Article 81 EC as a whole. T ha t, 
how ever, would have led to a  retrogression and would strip arbitrators o f their established 
competence to apply Article 8 1(1)(2) EC.
Leaving aside any legal arguments as to the applicability of Article 81(3) EC by arbitral 
tribunals, one may wonder about the ability' o f arbitrators to get involved in such questions, 
so utterly connected with economic public policy and so prone to complex economic 
deliberations. If courts have now been accepted as full enforcers of Articles 81 and 82 EC, i t  
would be contradictory to treat arbitrators in a  different way. Indeed, what can be held against 
courts, basically that they usually lack the expertise that would allow them to address th e  
complex economic issues involved, may be one of the winning points of arbitration. Parties 
may and usually do select as arbitrators persons with a high level of expertise, thus 
minimising any risks owed to the judge’s possibly limited knowledge of a highly technical
1400 See in this sense Edward, “The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy: Issues for Courts and Judges”, in: 
Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust 
Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 569; Komninos, supra (2001), p. 221.
f401 Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseejischerei Kordstem 
AG & Co. KG and Reederei Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstem AG it Co. KG, [1982] ECR 1095.
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field. At the same time, the increased flexibility of the arbitral procedure, in comparison to 
that o f state justice, suits well antitrust, whose substance might sometimes be at pains w ith 
the straitjacket of a national code of civil procedure. This is particularly true o f national rules 
of evidence, which can be quite a hurdle for an antitrust case in national courts, as opposed to 
arbitral tribunals, which may avail themselves o f much more extensive powers of 
discovery.1402 Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that arbitrators, even before the 
introduction o f the legal exception system, have on some occasions felt quite at ease to base 
their awards on considerations pertaining to Article 81(3) EC, thus positively applying this 
provision ‘‘by the back door”.1403
In sum, the recent procedural reforms and the introduction of the legal exception system have 
reinforced that proposition and have removed the only area where the Commission had 
exclusive competence, i.e. Article 81(3) EC. Arbitrators, exactly as state courts enjoy now the 
power to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC in full.1404 The only remaining area which is not open 
to arbitration, in the same way as it is not open to state courts, is the withdrawal o f the benefit 
of a block exemption. However, as w c have explained, above, this is in reality a public 
prerogative, entrusted to public authorities, and has nothing to do with dispute resolution. In 
that sense, it is not even correct to speak o f inarbitrability.
4. The Institutional Position of Arbitration in EC Competition Law Enforcement
a. A rbitration and European Court of Justice
aa. Direct Preliminary References: The Nordsee Obstacle
Since Community law is primarily applied in a decentralised manner, by national authorities 
and courts, the uniformity element is o f particular importance to its development.1405 *With
1402 See Temple Lang, “Panel Discussion: International Arbitration”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust 
Law and Policy> 1994, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York/The Hague, 
1995), p. 421 et seq. A certain weakness of arbitration exists as to third-party evidence. The latter can be usually 
obtained through the intervention of state courts (see below). On discovery in arbitration in general see Derains, 
“La pratique de l’administration de la preuve dans Tarbitrage commercial international”, (2004) Rev.Arb. 781.
1403 See Fox, “Panel Discussion: EC Competition System: Proposals for Reform”, in: Hawk (Ed.), 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 1998, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 
(New York, 1999), p. 228. Such arbitral awards would of course have been liable to annulment/non-recognition 
for having dealt with non-arbitrable issues.
1404 On this question see the analysis below.
1405 See Christianos, supra (1998), p. 98; Fines, supra (2004), p. 333 et seq.; Louis and Ronse, supra
(2005), p. 262.
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reference to national courts, this necessity is served by Article 234 EC. The system  
introduced by this provision is not hierarchical, but rather one of judicial co-operation, w here  
each layer exercises its own jurisdiction.1406 Joseph Weiler was writing back in 1981 that th e  
concept o f uniformity, which is a dominant feature o f  the European Communities is found  
“substantively, in the notion o f one market, and, proccdurally, in Article [234] o f  th e  
Treaty”.1407 Indeed, the preliminary' reference procedure of Article 234 EC has been the g re a t 
success story of Community law and is by far the most efficient mechanism for encouraging 
national courts to apply Community law, providing at the same time for them assistance in  
the interpretation o f that law. The preliminary reference mechanism is also the m o s t 
important tool for the EU citizen’s access to the Court o f Justice.1408
In the course o f the last twenty' years the Court’s case law has shifted and the conditions fo r  
the admissibility of preliminary references are sometimes interpreted rather restrictively. T h is  
should be seen as a sign o f maturity. We can distinguish cases o f objective from cases o f  
subjective inadmissibility. Objective inadmissibility refers to situations where the preliminary 
reference itself and the questions that the national court refers to Luxembourg are n o t 
considered adequate for the European Court o f  Justice to rule upon. This is usually the case  
when the national court does not explain why the case at issue necessitates a preliminary- 
reference and why Community' law is implicated. There are many examples of references, 
often coming from lower courts, which essentially lack the quality expected in order to have a  
meaningful dialogue between the Community and the national judge. The Court h as  
invariably considered such references as inadmissible.1409
At the same time, the Court o f Justice has laid down specific conditions for subjective 
admissibility. Thus, there has been a rather rich case law with regard to the notion of “a court 
or tribunal” that is entitled or obliged to address preliminary references under Article 234 EC, 
this being a question subject to Community' law. It is true that the Court o f Justice h as  
followed a quite generous approach and has interpreted that criterion broadly, with a view to  
safeguarding the uniform and effective application o f Community law, as well as th e
1400 See P.J.G. Kapteyn, P. VerLoren van Themaat, L.A. Geelhoed, and L.W. Gormlcy, Introduction to the 
Law o f  the European Communities, From Maastricht to Amsterdam (London/The Hague/Boston, 1998), p. 503 
et seq.\ M.K. Vilaras, Effective Protection o f Community Rights by National Courts (Athcns/Komotini, 2000) [in 
GreekLpp. 15-16.
1 7 See Weiler, “The Community System: The Dual Character o f Supranationalism”, 1 YEL 267 (1981), p. 
293. See also Louis and Ronse, supra, p. 73 et seq.
1408 See W. Hakenberg and C. Stix-Hackl, Handbuch zum Verfahren vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof, 
Vol. I (Wien, 2005), p. 63.
1409 See e.g. case 244/80, Pas quäle Foglia v. Marielta Novello, Magltano Alfieri (II), [1981] ECR 3045; and 
most recently, Prowidenza Regio, op.cit.
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effectiveness o f the judicial protection of the Community citizen, thus sacrificing up to a 
certain extent the “form”. As it has been pointed out, the Court “widens the franchise of 
Community law: by making the preliminary reference procedure available to as wide a 
category of bodies as possible, it upholds Community rights at the lower level and increases 
their immediacy and resonance”.1410 In order to do this, the Court takes into account a  series 
o f elements: whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its 
jurisdiction is compulsory,1411 whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules 
o f law, and whether it is independent.1412 Furthermore, a body may refer a question to the 
Court of Justice “only if there is a case pending before it and it is called upon to give 
judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature”.1413 This list is not 
an all-inclusive one, neither are these elements absolute, and it happens that other criteria, 
such as the res judicata effect of the decisions of the referring body, may play a role. 
Arbitrators, however, have not been considered eligible under the above criteria. While the 
Court has sometimes entertained preliminary references from regulatory' bodies termed as 
“arbitration tribunals”, whose jurisdiction is in most cases compulsory;1414 it has nevertheless 
not admitted references from the kind o f arbitration bodies that we deal here with, i.e. private 
commercial arbitration tribunals. Such tribunals, ever since the Court’s Nordsee ruling,1415 do 
not constitute “courts or tribunals o f a Member State” in the sense o f Article 234 EC and this 
jurisprudence is very unlikely to be reversed in the future.1416 Indeed, very recently the Court 
restated its refusal to accept such references in Denuit.1417
In Nordsee, the Court acknowledged that an arbitral tribunal deciding private disputes has 
many similarities with state courts, in respect of the fact that arbitration is provided for within 
the framew ork of the law (national civil procedural laws), in that it decides according to law
1410 See Tridimas, supra (2003), p. 30.
1411 Compulsory in the sense that the parties must be required ex lege or even sometimes de facto to submit 
their disputes to it. See K. Lenaerts and D. Arts, Procedural Law o f the European Union (London, 1999), p. 20.
1412 Case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult Ingenieursgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH, 
[19971 ECR1-4961, para. 23.
1 3 Case C-l 34/97, Victoria Film A fS, [1998] ECR 1-7023, para. 14; case C-l95/98, Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund and Gewerkschaft öffentlicher Dienst v. Austria, [2000] ECR 1-1049, para. 25; case C- 
53/03, Symetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akamanias (Syfait) et al. v. GlaxoSmithKline plc. and 
GlaxoSmithKline AEBE, [2005] ECR 1-4609, para. 35.
14,4 See e g. case 61/65, G. Vaassen (née Göbbels) v. Management o f  the Beambtenfonds voor het 
Mijnbedrijf, [1966] ECR 261; case 246/80, C. Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registmtie Commissie, [1981] ECR 
2311.
1415 Cited supra.
14,0 See Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, “Arbitration and the Court o f Justice of the European Communities”, 4(1) 
ICC Bull. 51 (1993), p. 52; Van Gerven, “L’arbitrage dans le droit européen”, 72 RD1DC 67 (1995), p. 73.
1417 Case C -l25/04, Gwv Denuit and Bettv Cordenier v. Transorient — Mosaïque Vo\>ages and Culture SA, 
[2005] ECR 1-923.
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and its award enjoys res judicata  as between the parties. However, those characteristics w ere  
not sufficient to give it the status o f a “court or tribunal o f  a Member State” in the meaning o f  
Article 234 EC.1418 Since recourse to arbitration is normally freely decided by the parties and  
the Member States are not involved in their decision, nor are they entitled to intervene 
automatically in the arbitral proceedings, it follows that the link between the arbitration 
procedure and the organisation o f legal remedies in the Member State concerned is n o t 
sufficiently close so as to make preliminary references under Article 234 EC admissible.1419 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice, accepting that arbitration covers a wide spectrum of the 
commercial activity, recognised that it would not be proper to deny any access whatsoever to  
arbitral tribunals dealing with disputes that involve an EC law issue. Such access could be 
indirect through the intervention o f national courts. The latter in the context o f their powers 
of supervision and review over arbitral proceedings and awards may examine those questions 
and ascertain whether it is necessary for them to make a reference to the Court under Article 
234 EC.14“
The Nordsee ruling has been criticised severely in the past and continues to be so at present. 
In particular, it has been argued that the restrictive attitude of the Court in the interpretation 
of the “court or tribunal” criterion o f Article 234 EC is not in conformin' with a more general 
positive treatment of arbitration and o f other forms o f alternative disputes resolution (ADR) 
by Community law.1421 The Court of Justice, by excluding arbitrators from the Article 234 
EC mechanism, has essentially excluded the influence that Community' law can exert over a  
wide area of commercial disputes.1422 Within that area, the argument goes, the effectiveness 
of the principle of uniformity o f interpretation of Community rules is weakened.1423 Then, 
there are Member States w'here arbitration is particularly developed and a great number o f  
commercial disputes are submitted to it, certainly much more than is the case in other 
Member States. Some commentators have stressed this discriminatory' effect o f the Nordsee 
jurisprudence and have stressed the risk o f a lesser degree of uniformity and effectiveness o f
I
f
1418 Nordsee, op.cit., para, 10.
1419 Ibid, paras. 11-13.
1420 Ibid, paras. 14-15.
1421 See e g. Edward, supra (2001 ), p. 569.
1422 See Steindorff, “Panel Discussion: EEC Competition Law from the Perspective of the Court of Justice”, 
in: Hawk (Ed.), Antitrust and Trade Policy in the United States and the European Community 1985, Annual 
Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 1986), p. 443.
1423 See G. Gaja, Introduzione al diritto comunitario (Bari, 2000), p. 60.
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Community law in those Member States where arbitrators decide an increasing number of 
disputes, yet cannot seek the Court o f Justice’s authoritative interpretation of the EC rules.1424 
Besides, the alternative routes for an arbitration case to reach Luxembourg through the 
intervention o f national courts, as suggested by the Court o f Justice in Nordsee, are criticised 
as inappropriate, since they cause delay and more expenses. These routes seem also wrongly 
to assume a  high degree o f control exercised by state courts over arbitration proceedings and 
awards, which is, however, not the case in modem times.1425 Then the vast majority of 
arbitral awards are not contested by the parties and, therefore, the state courts will very rarely 
have the opportunity to intervene and seize the Court of Justice with a preliminary 
reference.1426
Perhaps the most problematic situation that arises as a result of the arbitrators’ inability to 
seize the Court o f Justice with a preliminary reference is w here the arbitrators entertain very 
serious doubts as to the legality o f  a  Community measure, for example a Commission 
decision. In such situations, they are definitely under a  intractable comparative disadvantage 
vis-à-vis courts, because clearly they have no other option but to consider the Commission 
measure as valid. The Court of Justice has stressed that it is only national courts of the EU 
Member States that have the power to grant interim measures and possibly to suspend the 
application of the Community measure as to the parties before their proceedings, while being 
bound at the same time to address a relevant preliminary question on that measure’s validity 
to Luxembourg.1427
It is not our purpose to revisit the arguments in favour of or against the admissibility of 
preliminary references of arbitrators. In our view there were two basic concerns that led the 
Court to favour inadmissibility. One concern must certainly have been the “floodgates 
argument”.1428 As the Court of Justice continues to be overburdened, particularly with 
preliminary references by national courts, this concern is as present as ever. The second
1424 See e.g. P.D. Dagtoglou, European Community Law, Vol. I (Athens, 1985) [in Greek], pp. 433-434, 
with reference to Greece.
1425 See e g. Kaissis, “Europarecht und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit; Ein Überblick Über die Rechtsprechung des 
EuGH zu Fragen der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit”, in: Kaissis & Mavromatis (Eds.), Advantages o f Arbitration in 
Greeceand Balkan Countries (Thessaloniki, 1999), p. 121.
1420 See e.g. the critique of Baudenbacher, “Panel Discussion: Administrative Antitrust Authorities: 
Adjudicative and Investigatory Functions”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2002, 
Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2003), p. 444.
1427 Foto-Frost, op.cit., para. 13 etseq.
1428 See e.g. Kaissis, supra (1999), p. 121; Van Gerven, supra (1995), p. 72; idem, “Panel Three Discussion: 
Arbitration Courts”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private 
Enforcement ofEC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), pp. 297-298. See also AG Reischl’s Opinion: "... one 
must reflect the risk that the Court of Justice would be burdened with a w ork-load the extent of which w'ould be 
difficult to estimate if it were to be thus diverted from its own work to deal with private disputes, often of very 
minor significance, involving some aspects of Community law” (Nordsee, op.cit., AG’s Opinion, at 1122).
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concern and one of the fundamental grounds on which the Court relied in order to deny  
access to arbitrators was the absence of a close link between arbitration and the power and  
authority o f a state, that can guarantee that the ruling o f the Court will bind the national 
courts and will not be merely advisory1429 and that the Article 234 EC procedure will not be 
abused by arbitrators or parties in arbitral proceedings. The fact that Nordsee w-as decided 
shortly after Foglia v. Novello1430 has not been missed by commentators.1431 As Lenaerts and  
Arts note, “by declining jurisdiction to answer questions referred for a preliminary ruling b y  
arbitrators, the Court sought to prevent contracting parties from creating ‘courts and  
tribunals’ o f their own and subsequently inducing (obliging) them to seek preliminary' 
rulings”, since “in the Court’s view this mechanism would be endangered if parties to  a  
contract could circumvent it by setting up an arbitration board whose organisation is in n o  
w ay based on action on the part of the public authorities and which is not recognised as th e  
obligatory legal authority for dealing with a particular class o f disputes”.1432 
This argument can be further developed by reference to Article 10 EC. It may be submitted 
that there is a inherent link between Articles 10 and 234 EC. Indeed, Article 234 EC through 
the preliminary reference procedure provides for a judicial co-operation between national and 
Community judiciaries, which is part of the more general principle of loyal co-operation 
between the Community and the Member States, as enshrined in Article 10 EC.1433 In th a t 
sense Article 234 EC is a form o f lex specialis o f Article 10 EC.1434 According to the system 
of the EC Treaty and to Articles 10 and 234 EC, the Member States remain the ultimate
142<) The Court has stressed on numerous occasions that it cannot give advisory opinions and that its 
preliminary rulings bind the national courts to which they are addressed. See e.g. case C-346/93, Klein wo ri 
Benson Ltd. v. City o f Glasgow City Council, [1995] ECR 1-615, para. 24, where the Court of Justice declined 
jurisdiction over a preliminary reference by an English court on the interpretation of the 1982 Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act, which was modelled on the 1968 Brussels Convention and determined the jurisdiction o f  
intra-UK courts. According to the Court, the referring court was not clearly bound in that case to follow the 
preliminary ruling.
1430 Cited supra.
1431 See Hepting, “Art. 177 EWGV und die private Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit”, 17 EuR 315 (1982), pp. 328-
329.
1433 See Lenaerts and Arts, supra ( 1999), p. 24.
1433 See e.g. N, Skandamis, European Law, Voi. I, Institutions o f the European Union, No. 4, Organic 
Constitution o f the European Union (Athens/Komotini, 2003) [in Greek], p. 210. Indeed, it can be argued that 
the principle of loyal co-operation enshrined in Art. 10 EC is an inherent general principle of law in the 
supranational context of the Community and of the European Union. According to AG Kokott’s Opinion in case 
C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, [2005] ECR 1-5285, para. 24, the fact that the TEU 
contained no equivalent provision to Art. 10 EC did not mean that the principle of loyal co-operation did not 
bind Member States vis-à-vis the Union. In other words this is a more general principle of law.
1434 In this direction A. Raclet, Droit communautaire des affaires et prerogatives de puissance puhlique 
nationales (Paris, 2002), p. 130, M.P. Chiti, Diritto amministrativo europeo (Milano, 2004), p. 576. See also 
para. 84 of AG Lenz’s Opinion in cases 143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Silderdithmarschen AG v. 
liauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v. HauptzollamtPaderbom, [1991] ECR 1-415, making the 
Art 10 EC - 234 EC link point.
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interlocutors o f the Community with regard to the enforcement o f Community law in their 
territory and bear the sole responsibility for discharging Community law duties. Thus, the 
Member States and - in our context - their judicial organs are also responsible for the conduct 
o f  private parties, when the latter interfere with the enforcement o f Community law inside the 
territory of the latter.1435
Furthermore, the legitimacy of a body to seize the Court o f  Justice with a preliminary 
reference entails that Community law binds the former through Article 10 EC and that 
ultimately a Member State becomes answerable under EC law for the conduct o f such 
bodies.1436 Thus, the referring body is bound to follow the ruling of the Court o f Justice.1437 It 
would be difficult to reach the same result, if arbitrators were to be granted access to address 
preliminary references to Luxembourg, since, formally speaking, the former would not be 
bound to follow the Article 234 EC ruling. In addition, Article 10 EC imposes certain duties 
on national courts with the ultimate aim to guarantee the effective judicial protection of 
individuals and the uniformity of application and interpretation o f Community law through 
the Article 234 EC procedure. Thus, in Peterbroeck and Eco Swiss national courts were by 
virtue o f Article 10 EC under a duty to raise Community law questions even ex o fficio even at 
a late point in the proceedings, in order to proceed to a preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice, because the first instance body did not qualify to do so itself.
The problem with arbitration is that the duty of co-operation in Article 10 EC is limited only 
to Community institutions and to official authorities and organs of the Member States. 
Arbitrators do not fall under this provision,1438 since, although enjoying jurisdictional and 
quasi-judicial powers, they still remain a creation of private autonomy. In this respect they 
cannot directly bind the Member State in which they sit. Such a responsibility o f the Member
1435 That there is such a connection between Arts. 10 and 234 EC can also be adduced from the letter of 
Nordsee: “the Federal Republic of Germany, as a Member State o f the Community responsible fo r  the 
performance o f obligations arising from Community law within its territory pursuant to Article 5 and Articles 
169 to 171 o f the Treaty, has not entrusted or left to private individuals the duty of ensuring that such obligations 
are complied with...” (Nordsee, op.cit.t para. 12, emphasis added). See further on this issue Dagtoglou, supra 
(1985), p. 432; Lenacrts and Pittie, supra (1997), p. 209; Raclet, supra (2002), p. 44. In this context, it is also 
interesting to note that one of the most important duties flowing from Ait. 10 EC, the duty to interpret national 
law in conformity with Community law, binds national courts only with regard to the interpretation of their own 
national laws and not with regard to the interpretation of other EU Member States ’ national laws that may in 
casu be applicable pursuant to a choice-of-law clause or under the conflict of laws rules of the forum. The link 
between the state that is answ'eiable for Community law' purposes and its organs is clear in this case. See on this 
interesting question Roth, “Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung”, 16 EWS 385 (2005), p. 386.
1436 See case note by Van Haersolte-van Hof, 6 Am.Rev.Int’lArb. 83 (1995), p. 85; Auletta, “Le questioni 
incidentali”, in: Verde (Ed.), Diritto dell’arbitrato rituale (Torino, 1997), pp. 203-204.
1437 See on this binding effect, Synodinos, “Aspects of Supremacy of Community Directives over National 
Law and Relevant Powers of National Courts”, 48 Epitheorisi Emporikou Dikaiou 612 (1997) [in Greek], p. 
629.
1438 See Van Gerven, supra (1995), p. 71 et seq:y Slot, supra (1996), p. 105.
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States can only be indirect through their courts, which on their turn must exercise a certain 
control over arbitral proceedings and awards taking into account Community’ law  
requirements. Being bound by Article 10 EC to ensure the effectiveness o f Community’ law , 
they are precluded from enforcing arbitral awards which are manifestly contrary to  
Community rules of public policy.1439
bb. A Tempering of Nordsee?
Ever since Nordsee, it has been submitted that the Court o f Justice should reconsider its  
ruling1440 by attributing more weight to the fact that arbitrators do apply and, indeed, under 
certain circumstances are under a duty to apply EC competition law, as directly effective 
provisions of Community law, which form part o f national law. As the Court itse lf 
emphasised in Nordsee, “Community law must be observed in its entirety’ throughout the 
territory o f all the Member States; parties to a  contract are not free to create exceptions to  
if’.1441 Therefore, the argument goes, since arbitral tribunals must apply Community 
(competition) law, it is to that extent that they should also have access to the preliminary’ 
reference procedure.1442 In other words, a criterion for the admissibility o f such references 
would not just be the nature o f  the referring body, but also its obligation to apply EC law.1443
1439 Already before Eco Swiss, see Temple Lang, “Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty”, 
27 CMLRev. 645 (1990), p. 649.
1440 It has also been suggested that a new opportunity for arbitrators to directly seize the Community judicial 
organs may be offered by the Treaty of Nice. According to Art. 225(3) EC, as amended by the Treaty of Nice, 
the CFI may have jurisdiction in the future to hear Art. 234 EC preliminary references in specific areas laid 
down by the ECJ Statute. Competition law is one of the areas under consideration. According to one 
commentator this might provide an opportunity for giving arbitrators the right to address such preliminary' 
questions to the CFI rather than to the ECJ. See Baudenbacher, “Enforcement of EC Competition Rules by 
Arbitration Tribunals outside the EU”, in; Ehlermarm & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 
2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 360; idem, “Panel 
Discussion: Administrative Antitrust Authorities: Adjudicative and Investigatory Functions”, in: Hawk (Ed.), 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 2002, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 
(New York, 2003), p. 444. However, we fail to see how the CFI could depart from the standard jurisprudence o f 
the ECJ with regard to the criterion of a “court or tribunal” under Art. 234 EC. Article 225(3) EC does not 
introduce a distinctive new preliminary reference procedure before the CFI. Rather, it refers to Art. 234 EC, 
which remains the applicable Treaty provision that governs that procedure. This means that the CFI would have 
to adhere to the interpretation given to that provision by the ECJ in earlier cases.
1441 Nordsee, op.cit., para. 14. See also Broekmeulen, op.cit., para. 16, according to which “it is incumbent 
upon Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure that within their own territory the provisions adopted 
by the Community institutions are implemented in their entirety”.
14,2 See among others Bebr, “Arbitration Tribunals and Article 177 of the EEC Treaty”, 22 CMLRev. 489 
(1985), pp. 497-498; Komblum, “Private Schiedsgerichte und Ait. 177 EWGV”, 2 JPS 102 (1988), pp. 109-110; 
K.P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration, Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Vol. IX 
(Deventer/Boston, 1993), p. 454; Wcigand, “Evading EC Competition Law' by Resorting to Arbitration?”, 9 
Arb.Int’l 249 (1993), p. 253.
1443 See J.-B. Racine, L 'arbitrage commercial international et l ’ordre public (Paris, 1999), p. 264.
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A more advanced argument o f the same nature, albeit taking into account the Eco Swiss case 
and its implications, has been put forward by professor Jurgen Basedow.1444 According to this 
view, since the Court of Justice recognised that arbitral awards in violation of the Treaty 
competition rules could be set aside or refused recognition or enforcement as contrary to 
public policy, thus de facto  introducing a duty on arbitrators to respect such rules,1445 
conversely, the former should also be able conversely to hear preliminary references from 
arbitrators in those particular cases where ordre public comes into play.1446 
With all due respect, it is difficult to use as a criterion for the admissibility of references by 
arbitrators during the course o f arbitral proceedings the likelihood of a public policy 
violation, since the latter will be decided by the national courts on an ad hoc basis at a much 
later point, after the end o f  the arbitration process. Then another problem is that the whole 
preliminary- reference procedure is too rigid to accommodate the necessary discretion that this 
proposal entails for the Court of Justice’s admission o f preliminary references. There would 
have to be a preliminary prim a facie  examination on its part that there is a valid case 
pertaining to ordre public, before the reference could be admitted, thus introducing a sort of 
certiorari, which the Court currently does not enjoy.
Additionally, in practice there may be no real necessity to proceed in such a tempering of 
Nordsee. The prevailing view considers that there has to be a  certain degree o f seriousness of 
the infraction of EC competition law, in order for an arbitral award to be considered offensive 
to ordre public and to be set aside or refused enforcement.1447 A complete disregard or 
unawareness o f that law by the arbitrators is certainly objectionable, even if non-deliberate. A 
fortiori so, when the agreement or practice in question is particularly repugnant, such as
1444 See Basedow, “Panel Three Discussion: Arbitration Courts”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 
300.
1445 The nature of this duty of arbitrators is debated. According to a balanced reading of Eco Swiss, 
arbitrators, not being bound by Art. 10 EC, are not under a Community law duty as such to apply EC 
competition rules. They rather de facto are inclined to do so, in order to avoid the danger of their award’s 
annulment or non-enforceability on public policy grounds. See among others Komninos, 37 CMLRev. 459 
(2000X p. 475 et seq:, Idot, supra (2003a), p. 314; Deisenhofer, “Panel Three Discussion: Arbitration Courts", 
in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f  EC 
Antitrust Law (Oxford/Portland, 2003), p. 296.
1440 See also the more general view expressed by Paulis, “Panel Three Discussion: Courts and Judges", in: 
Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f ELI Competition 
Law(Oxford, 2001), pp, 517-518; idem, “Panel Discussion: Administrative Antitrust Authorities: Adjudicative 
and Investigatory Functions”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2002, Annual Proceedings 
o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2003), p. 459.
1447 See Weigand, supra (1993), p. 257; Schlosser, “Arbitration and the European Public Policy”, in: Briner, 
Derains et al. (Eds.), L 'arbitrage et le droit européen, Actes du colloque international du CEPÂNIdu 25 avril 
1997 (Bruxelles, 1997), p. 86; Idot, (1999) Rev.Arb. 639, p. 646; Liebscher, “European Public Policy after Eco 
Swiss”, 10 Am.Rcv.Int’lArb. 81 (1999), p. 89 et seq:, Radicati di Brozolo, “Arbitrato, diritto della concorrcnza, 
diritto comunitario e regole di procedure nazionali”, 9 RivArbitrato 665 (1999), p. 687 et seq.
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horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing or bid-rigging. On the other hand, a sim ple 
misapplication or incomplete application o f EC competition law cannot qualify as a violation 
o f ordre public, at least if the arbitrators have acted in an honest and diligent way.1448 
Therefore, if  this is so, we wonder whether the likelihood of an ordre public violation can b e  
a suitable criterion for the admissibility of preliminary' references by arbitrators. There a re  
three scenarios:
(a) The first scenario is that the agreement in question raises no serious competition 
concerns that could lead to a public policy violation, although the arbitrators may s till 
be in doubt as to certain questions. It is clear that in this case, following the line o f  
argumentation above, they could not seize the Court with their questions, because o f  
the remoteness of a public policy violation.
(b) The second scenario is that the agreement contains competition distortions that ane 
considered particularly objectionable by EC competition law, for example a p ric e  
fixing or a market-sharing clause. In such cases, where an ordre public violation o f  
the prospective arbitral award that would uphold such clauses is easy to prove, o n e  
w onders whether the possibility of the arbitrators to request a preliminary' ruling fro m  
the Court o f Justice would be o f valuable assistance to them. Such extremely a n ti­
competitive clauses can already be dealt with by the arbitrators themselves, and e v e n  
if the latter for some reason are not able to do so, there would be no big benefit fo r  
the uniform application o f EC competition law, if the Court of Justice intervened, 
since the issue would hardly be a novel one.
(c) The third scenario is that the arbitrators are faced with a competition law' issue, w h ic h  
is not prima facie  very serious so that it could pertain to public policy, but u n d er 
certain circumstances important public interests might come into play. If  th e  
arbitrators decide the whole issue paying due respect to EC competition law, there a re  
two further possibilities in this grey area: One is that they get the competition issue  
correctly and no further problem arises. The second possibility is that they err in th a t 
application. It seems, however, that this error would not lead to a public po licy  
violation, thus, the admissibility o f a preliminary reference would not be admitted.
Therefore, bar some boundary cases, the de facto  duty' o f arbitrators, as recognised by E co  
Swiss, to apply EC competition law intertwined with their inability to seize directly the 
European Court of Justice might not be such a paradox.1449
1448 On the issue what constitutes a public policy violation by an arbitral award, see below.
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Summing up, it now appears that a certain balance exists between arbitration and Community 
law. This balance can be identified in tw o interconnected levels, one being Article 10 EC and 
the other Article 234 EC:
(a) Arbitral tribunals are not directly bound by Article 10 EC to apply Community law 
and vice versa they cannot base rights on that provision that national courts may 
enjoy.149 450 It is only indirectly that Article 10 EC comes into play, through the 
intervention of state courts assisting or reviewing arbitral proceedings and awards. 
Since the state courts are bound by that provision to review awards on Community 
law grounds, arbitrators are expected in an indirect way to pay due respect to that law, 
at least in cases raising very serious concerns as to the application of mandatory 
Community norms.1451
(b) At the same time arbitrators cannot directly seize the Court of Justice by virtue of 
Article 234 EC, since they are not judicial organs o f the Member States. Again, a 
question of EC law arising in arbitration can reach the Court only indirectly through 
the state courts, while the latter exercise their functions o f assistance and supervision.
This balance o f indirectness, whether satisfactory or not, is now well established and in view 
of the Eco Swiss judgment it is very difficult to vary or abandon altogether.1452 One could 
submit that this indirectness may well be to the favour of the institution of arbitration, since it 
leaves to the latter a wide range o f discretion and freedom to deal appropriately with 
Community law. At the same time, the delay that the preliminary reference procedure entails 
is not certainly something good for arbitration and the whole purpose of arbitrating disputes 
in order to arrive at a speedy outcome would be defeated.1453 The current flexibility entails of 
course also a higher degree of responsibility on the part of the arbitrators.
Having these points in mind, it seems to us that the possibility of an indirect preliminary 
reference through national courts remains at the current stage o f development o f the law by 
far the best solution.1454
1449 See in that respect the thorough analysis made by Radicati di Bnozolo, supra (1999), pp. 692-693.
1450 See infra on the question of co-operation between arbitrators and the European Commission.
1451 See also below on the a t officio application of EC competition law by arbitrators.
1452 See Van Gerven, supra (1995), p. 73, who refers to this interconnection between Arts. 10 and 234 EC in 
regard to arbitration. He rightly concludes that any change of attitude on behalf of the Court in considering 
arbitrators as ‘courts or tribunals’ in the sense of Art. 234 EC would by implication mean that they would also 
be considered as such under Art. 10 EC, thus being directly bound to ensure the effective judicial protection of 
individuals relying on their Community law rights.
14'<:3 See in this sense, T.C. Hartley, European Union Law in a Global Context, Text, Cases and Materials 
(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 195-196.
14i4 According to an eminent academic, the current state of affairs is satisfactory, since the EC competition 
rules are nowadays well known to international arbitrators, so that the latter can deal with them without the need
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cc. Indirect Preliminary References through National Courts
i. Existing Possible Mechanisms
As seen above, the Court o f Justice has denied direct access to arbitral tribunals, but it has 
recognised the possibility o f a preliminary question on Community law being brought before 
it indirectly through the national courts. This could happen either while the arbitration is still 
pending in the form o f a request by the arbitrator for assistance from the national courts, o r in  
the course of a review of the arbitral award by the national courts, or at the stage when an 
exequatur of an arbitral award is sought in a national court. It is clear that of all these 
alternatives only the first one could be used in the context of an on-going arbitration. The 
other channels can only be used after an arbitral award has been rendered and one may no 
longer speak of assistance to an arbitral tribunal, but rather o f assistance to a court reviewing 
the award.
However, as opposed to the setting aside and recognition/enforcement procedures, which are  
a common feature o f national procedural laws, specific provisions on assistance by state 
courts to arbitrators during the arbitration proceedings, which could be used as a vehicle fo r 
an indirect preliminary reference, are rather exceptional. In Nordsee, the Court expressly 
referred to two possibilities o f national court interference at this early stage: assistance in 
certain procedural matters and intervention in order to interpret the applicable law.1455 
The only national law that explicitly provides for a specific procedure of indirect preliminary 
references through the intervention of state courts is Danish law. The new Arbitration Act o f  
2005, conscious of the problems created by the arbitrators’ inability to seize the Court o f  
Justice and of the indirect methods advocated by the Court itself in Nordsee, provides in 
section 27(2) that “if  the arbitral tribunal considers that a  decision on a question of European 
Union law is necessary' to enable it to make an award, the arbitral tribunal may request the 
courts to request the Court o f Justice of the European Communities to give a  ruling thereon” . 
Such a  request must be made to the state court that would have been competent to hear the
to request the ECJ’s intervention. I f  under certain specific circumstances such a need arises, the possibility of an 
indirect reference through national courts is sufficient. See Fouchard, “L’arbitrage - Les règles de procédure 
face aux problèmes économiques”, 11 RIDE 237 (1997), p. 252; in the same direction, Bunichter, “Panel Three 
Discussion: Courts and Judges”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2000: 
The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001 ), p. 481.
1455 Nordsee, op.cit., para. 14.
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case if  the parties had not agreed on arbitration and, interestingly, a court fee of DKK 400 is 
payable upon the filing of the request.
Of the national laws that do not expressly provide for such an indirect route to Luxembourg, 
section 45 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act is by far the most suitable national provision 
that can be used for an indirect preliminary reference. Under its wording, the High Court 
“may on the application of a party to arbitral proceedings determine any question of law 
arising in the course of the proceedings which the court is satisfied substantially affects the 
rights of one or more of the parties”. Such an application is made either with the consent of 
all the parties to the arbitration proceedings, or with the permission of the tribunal if not all 
parties agree. In the latter case the determination o f the question must be likely to produce 
substantial savings in costs and the application must be made without delay.
A Community competition law question is certainly an important issue of law that may have 
significant effects not only on the on-going arbitration proceedings but also on a much more 
general scale. In addition, its decision by the Court o f  Justice through the intervention o f the 
High Court at an early stage, as opposed to the review or enforcement stages, produces 
substantial savings in costs. It thus seems that the above provision would in principle be 
available for an indirect preliminary reference to Luxembourg.
It should be noted that the section 45 procedure has its limits in the autonomy o f  the parties to 
determine the law and procedure o f the arbitral process. Thus, an application for the 
determination o f a preliminary point o f law to the High Court can only be made by a party 
and not by the arbitrators themselves. Therefore, at least one party must be willing to use this 
possibility, which means that the arbitral tribunal cannot make use itself o f section 45 ex 
officio. At the same time, the parties can under section 45(1) exclude this reference to the 
state court. However, even in such cases the arbitrators may wish to draw the parties' 
attention to the advantages of this procedure, when a serious EC competition law' question 
arises that requires a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice via the High 
Court. They could argue that it would be less costly, if the parties agreed at this stage to 
address that question through the section 45 procedure. In this case, the efficacy o f the 
arbitral award would be secure, in contrast to an award that risks misapplying mandatory- 
provisions of Community law.
It has been submitted that, since under section 82(1) of the Arbitration Act a section 45 
application can only be made where the law governing the substance of the dispute is the law
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of England, Wales or Northern Ireland, Community law does not fall under this definition.1456 
However, the Community legal system is an integrated system, where EC law is an integral 
part o f each Member State’s legal heritage1457 and it therefore should not be considered as 
foreign to national laws in the private international law or in the comparative law sense. It is 
beyond doubt that this procedure can be used for EC competition law as well.
As was already mentioned, the prevailing pattern in Europe’s arbitration and procedural law s 
is to exclude “dialogues” between state courts and arbitrators and to ensure the full 
independence of the arbitral process.1458 The English solution is rather exceptional and it is 
recognised that it is in marked contrast to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, which does not permit judicial determination o f preliminary' points 
of law.1459 Article 5 of the Model Law expressly prohibits any state court intervention, unless 
specifically and expressly provided so therein.
The new German law on arbitration, in force since 1998, has adopted the Model Law' and 
espouses the independence o f  the arbitral proceedings from any court intervention. Indeed, 
section 1026 of the Code o f  Civil Procedure incorporates Article 5, thus prohibiting court 
interferences. However, section 1050 expressly provides that ‘the arbitral tribunal or a party' 
w ith the approval o f the arbitral tribunal may request from a court assistance in taking 
evidence or performance o f  other judicial acts which the arbitral tribunal is not empowered 
to carry onr”.1460 The latter reference to such judicial acts is a departure from the Model Law 
and echoes the old section 1036 o f the Code o f Civil Procedure, which, some minor 
differences apart, provided for the same possibility. An indirect preliminary reference to the 
Court of Justice through the intervention o f the German courts seems to fit well into this 
procedure. The old section 1036 had been interpreted by commentators to encompass 
applications for preliminary rulings1461 and the same is accepted for the new provision too.1462
1456 See Liebscher, supra (1999), p. 86.
1457 Van Gend en Loos, op.cit, at 12. On the integration of Community into national law, see further K. 
Boskovits, The European Union from  the Viewpoint o f  International Law, Specificity and Extent o f Autonomy o f  
the Law o f  European Integration (Athens/Komotini, 2000) [in Greek], pp. 27-29; Gaudin, “Diversité et 
évolution des champs d'application en droit communautaire”, 13-14 RAE/LEA 7 (2003-2004), p, 13 etseq.
1458 On Swedish law see Magnusson, “A Note on General Principles of Arbitration in Sweden”, 2/2004 
Stockholm Arbitration Newsletter 1, p. 2, stressing that the 1999 Swedish Arbitration Act is strongly focused on 
assisting the arbitral process, which is fully autonomous of any other court intervention.
1459 This is so, because the Model Law does not permit review of awards for error of law. See 
Chukwumerije, “Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1996”, 15 
Arb.Int'l 171 (1999), pp. 180-181.
1460 Emphasis added.
1461 See Kühn, “Die Bedeutung der Gerichte bei der Durchführung von Schiedsverfahren”, in: Böckstiegel 
(Ed.), Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit im Umfeld von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gerichtsbarkeit 
(Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, 1992), p. 66 et seq. and p. 68 in particular, Hermanns, “Public Policy and
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The request to the courts is made either by one of the parties with the arbitrators’ consent or 
by the arbitral tribunal itself. It would therefore seem from the wording that the latter could 
proceed so even ex officio. However, it is recognised that it is preferable in any case for the 
arbitral tribunal, in order to avoid doubts, to hear both parties and to invite them to make a 
corresponding statement authorising the request for a preliminary ruling.1462 463 It is noteworthy 
that a similar provision exists in Austrian law. Under section 589 of the Austrian Code of 
Civil Procedure the arbitrators may request the courts to carry out those judicial acts that are 
necessary' for the arbitral proceedings but the former have no jurisdiction to undertake.
In all these cases of indirect preliminary references through the intervention of state courts, 
the arbitral tribunal must exercise a high degree of prudence and must always use its best 
endeavours so as to attain the consent of the parties, bearing in mind the dramatic effects of 
such a  detour on the privity, confidentiality and ultimately on the duration o f the arbitral 
process.1464 Party authorisation, though not an absolute requirement, should always be 
requested by the arbitrators in all such cases of envisaged indirect preliminary references to 
the Court of Justice.
A final issue remains to be treated at this point. Although the Court of Justice does not 
usually determine whether the preliminary reference is made in accordance with the national 
procedural rules, nor does it examine the reasons that the national judge has when referring, it 
nevertheless requires that the preliminary reference is based on a real dispute and on a 
pending case before the national court. The preliminary reference procedure is not an 
autonomous non-contentious procedure, whose mlings are o f an advisory nature. Instead, it 
was perceived as an incidental procedure, that renders mlings, which are preliminary to the 
final judgment to be rendered by the national court itself. The question then is the following: 
Does the indirect nature o f the particular preliminary' reference, where the main proceedings
Arbitration - Cartel Law”, in: Böckstiegel (Ed.), Acts o f  State and Arbitration (Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München, 
1997), p. 66.
1462 See J.-P. Lachmann and W. König, Handbuch fur die Schiedsgerichtspraxis (Köln, 1998), pp. 188-189; 
R.A. Schütze, Schiedsgericht und Schiedsverfahren (München, 1999), pp. 103 and 153.
1463 See Hermanns, supra (1997), pp. 66-67.
1464 See Goftin, “L’arbitrage et le droit européen”, 67 RD1DC 315 (1990), p. 334; Berger, supra (1993), p. 
456; Erauw, “Reference by Arbitrators to the European Court of Justice for Preliminary Rulings”, in: Briner, 
Derains et al. (Eds.), L arbitrage et le droit européen, Actes du colloque international du CEP AN J du 25 avril 
1997 (Bruxelles, 1997), pp. 129 and 134; Simont, “Arbitrage et droit de la concurrence - Quelques réflexions 
d’un arbitre”, (1998) RDAI/D3LJ 547, p. 554, who are in favour of the parties’ consent in such cases and stress 
the fundamental fact of the delay that the preliminary reference procedure entails for arbitration.
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are before the arbitrators, comply with the character o f the Article 234 EC procedure as  
such?1465
There is no doubt that even where the national court, in the context o f  on-going arbitral 
proceedings, merely transmits the Community law question to the Court o f Justice, su ch  
preliminary references would be admissible, notwithstanding the fact that the referring ju d g e  
is only faced with such a Community question in an indirect way. National courts in th e  
exercise o f their duties of supervision over arbitration proceedings and awards are not to b e  
thought as mere intermediaries between arbitration and the Court o f Justice.1466 Even where a  
national court intervenes only to address a  Community law question, it becomes a  
Community court of its own, a juge communautaire de droit commun, dealing with a real a n d  
pending case of an adversary nature, which deserves to be referred to the Court.1467 In  
principle, the national court enjoys discretion whether to address an Article 234 EC reference 
to the latter, even if the parties to the arbitration or the arbitral tribunal itself have - in th e ir  
application or transmission o f the case - expressly specified the necessity of a  preliminary 
reference.1468 The Court o f Justice will address its judgment to the referring court, since i t  
was through the latter that it was seized with the issue and it will be up to the national court to  
make the preliminary ruling effective in the frame o f its national law, by subsequently 
transmitting it to the arbitral tribunal.
In any case, this “mediation” of the national courts between arbitration and the Court o f  
Justice is nothing but a result o f  the Nordsee ruling which in fact referred expressly to th is  
possibility. Therefore, no issue about the role of the referring court should arise in such 
indirect preliminary references. i '
1465 On this problem, see the analysis of Lenaerts and Pittie, supra (1997), pp. 210-211. See also Hepting, 
supra (1982), p. 330; Bebr, supra (1985), p. 500; De Gryse, “Quelques propos sur l'arbitrage en matière des 
brevets d ’invention”, in: Jura vigilantibus, Antoine Braun, les droits intellectuels, le barreau (Bruxelles, 1994), 
p. 113.
1400 For this reason, the Danish solution whereby the arbitral tribunal’s request to a state court to send a  
preliminary reference to Luxembourg must be accompanied by the payment of a court fee, may not b e  
appropriate or elegant, because it gives the impression of a national court being merely a sort of registry that 
only transmits the reference to the EC J.
1467 See Lenaerts and Pittie, supra (1997), p. 211.
1468 j k at tjie intervening national court does not loose its discretion to refer the EC law issue to the ECJ can 
be deducted from the language of the Nordsee ruling, according to which “it is for those national courts and 
tribunals to ascertain whether it is necessary for them to make a reference to the court under Article [234] of the 
Treaty in order to obtain the interpretation or assessment of the validity of provisions of Community lawr which 
they may need to apply when exercising such auxiliary or supervisory functions” (Nordsee, op.cit., paia. 15, 
emphasis added). Of course, in practice, it will be extremely unlikely for the national court to deal with the 
Community' law question itself without seizing the ECJ, as requested by the arbitrators or by the parties. This 
could happen only if the questions concerned are of a spurious or impertinent nature for the resolution of the 
dispute, or if the issue that has arisen evidently is acte clair.
344
ii. Finding Other Creative Solutions
Unlike the situation in English, German and Austrian law, where existing specific provisions 
could be used for an indirect preliminary reference, it will be much harder to do so, when 
national laws do not provide for such channels and prohibit any state court intervention in 
arbitral proceedings, as prescribed in Article 5 of the Model Law. However, it is recognised 
that complete party autonomy and freedom from any judicial interference should not be seen 
as an absolute principle and might not always be in the best interests of the parties or might 
not even further the efficiency of arbitration in a particular case.1469 Thus, a parallel can be 
derived from section 1(c) of the English Arbitration Act, which is equivalent to Article 5 of 
the Model Law in precluding any court intervention1470 and is interpreted as reducing the 
powers of interference of courts but not as extending to cases of courts’ assistance to 
arbitrators.1471
These arguments apart, it remains a fact that in most EU Member States legal systems no 
parallel provisions exist that could serve as an indirect channel to seize the Court under 
Article 234 EC during the arbitral proceedings.1472 One finds only provisions that usually deal 
with state court interference in the formation of the arbitral tribunal, in the taking o f evidence 
and in provisional measures.1473 Whether such provisions can be relied upon to that end is 
very unlikely, with the possible exception of provisional measures. Of course, it is up to those 
national laws and courts to give a solution to this problem. Among the solutions that have 
been proposed is to provide expressly by means of legislation for such a possibility,1474 as
1469 See Theofrastous, “International Commercial Arbitration in Europe: Subsidiarity and Supremacy in 
Light of the De-localization Debate”, 31 Case WRes.Jlnt’lL 455 (1999), p. 460; Chukwumerije, supra (1999), p. 
171, See also Berger, supra (1993), p. 198, who thinks that the Model Law may have gone too far in adopting 
an excessive degree of party autonomy.
I4̂ ° See Samuel, “Arbitration Statutes in England and the USA”, 8 ADRLJ 2 (1999), p. 24.
141 The Departmental Advisory Committee in its Report on the Arbitration Bill in February 1996 expressed 
its favour for the modem approach of the courts to intervene only in order to support rather than displace the 
arbitral process, See generally Chukwumerije, supra ( 1999), pp. 175-177.
1472 See e g. Moitinho de Almeida, “La notion de juridiction d ’un État membre (Article 177 du Traité CE)”, 
in: Rodriguez Iglesias, Due et a i (Eds.), Mélanges en hommage à Fernand Schockweiler (Baden-Baden, 1999), 
p. 470, with a specific reference to Spanish law.
1473 The latter channel has been suggested in Belgium, where the development of the case law' on 
provisional measures might seem to accommodate this possibility. See Goffin, supra (1990), p. 334, according 
to whom the arbitrators could suggest to the parties to request from the juridiction de référé to submit to the EC J 
questions of EC law. The same possibility seems to exist in Italian law, which does not empower the arbitral 
tribunals to take preliminaiy measures. Those fall under the exclusive competence of the civil courts. If  the 
dispute that necessitates the taking of such measures pertains to EC competition law, the courts o f first instance 
will be competent to proceed to preliminary measures and then possibly to seize the ECJ with a preliminary 
reference.
14,4 In the Netherlands, it has been proposed to add a new Art. 1044a in the Code of Civil Procedure, which 
would require Dutch arbitral tribunals to have an EC law question submitted to the ECJ through the President of
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indeed was recently done in Denmark, or to explore broadening the functions o f the ju g e  
d  'appui or supporting judge so as to include also the transmission o f preliminary references 
by arbitrators to the Court of Justice.1475
Of course, the absence o f a national provision, that could lead to arbitrators seizing the Court 
o f Justice in an indirect way does not offend against EC law or its effectiveness. The only 
bearing that EC law can have here, is in the interpretation of national law by national courts, 
which has to be in conformity to Community law. Thus, a national court interpreting a  
provision of national procedural law, for example a provision that refers to court assistance in  
certain matters, shall have to proceed to that interpretation in conformity with Community 
law and thus also with Article 234 EC and with its interpretation in Nordsee.
This is also a duty based upon Article 10 EC and on the principle o f effective judicial 
protection. The Court o f  Justice has in fact interpreted Article 10 EC and the principle o f  
sincere co-operation as meaning that national courts are required, so far as possible, to  
interpret and apply national rules governing the exercise of rights o f action in a way th a t 
enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts the legality o f any decision o r  
other national measure relative to the application o f  a Community act of general application, 
by pleading the invalidity o f  such an act.1476 This duty o f national courts is intended to  
compensate for the restrictive conditions concerning the admissibility o f direct actions 
against Community acts o f general application under Article 230 EC. The same holds true 
where a natural or legal person invokes a failure to take a decision, within the meaning o f  
Article 232 EC, which it considers it to be contrary' to Community law. Again the Court has 
held that Article 10 EC and the principle of effective judicial protection impose a duty upon 
national courts to interpret their national procedural law in such a matter as to compensate for 
the impossibility directly to seize the Community judicature.1477 *This principle is clearly 
transposable to the question o f indirect preliminary references by arbitrators. Since a direct 
preliminary' reference by arbitrators is inadmissible, national courts are under a duty to
the District Court of Amsterdam (see Berger, supra (1993), p. 457). As recently as 2002, a group headed by 
Professor Albert Jan Van den Berg had again proposed an amendment of the Dutch Arbitration Act, that would 
permit an arbitral tribunal sitting in Holland to request a local court to make a reference to the ECJ on behalf o f 
the tribunal. The rationale behind this proposal is to make the Netherlands a more attractive arbitration seat for 
cases involving EC competition law.
1475 See in the context o f French law, Idot, supra (2003a), p. 318. In Italian law' it is debated whether Art. 
819(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which refers to the decision of incidental questions by state courts, may 
apply by analogy. Arbitrators could stay the proceedings and invite the parties to submit the specific incidental 
question to national courts, which on their turn can refer it to the ECJ (see D’Alessandro, “Pregiudizilita 
comunitaria ed arbitrato intemo”, 7 Riv.Arbitrato 445 (1997), pp. 449-451).
1476 Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, [2002] ECR1-6677, paras. 41-42.
14 7 Case C-511/03, Staat der Nederlanden (Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij) v. Ten
Kate Holding Musselkanaal BV et al., [2005] ECR 1-8979, para. 29.
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interpret their national procedural law in such a manner as to provide at least for the 
possibility for an arbitral tribunal indirectly to seize the Court o f Justice.
Conform interpretation can be an efficient and welcome mechanism in extending court 
assistance for arbitration proceedings to Article 234 EC. But it has its limits and it cannot go 
as far as intruding into the procedural autonomy of the Member States. Notw ithstanding that, 
such an intrusion would be entirely disproportionate, since the effectiveness o f Community 
(competition) law is protected at the later stage of setting aside and enforcement proceedings 
o f arbitral awards.1478 True, the absence o f any mechanism o f indirect preliminary reference 
procedure at an earlier point is disappointing, but not intolerable, in view of the other 
possibilities just mentioned.
By the same token, the existence of an indirect possibility’ to seize the Court o f Justice with a 
preliminary ruling at the stage of the arbitral proceedings does not mean that national courts 
are not under a duty to exercise an adequate degree o f control over arbitral awards at the later 
stage o f recognition and enforcement or in setting aside procedures. Such a view1479 relies on 
the fact that the Court in Eco Swiss specifically justified the necessity' of intensified state 
court over arbitral awards by having recourse to the arbitrators' inability’ to forward 
preliminary’ references on questions o f EC law to it.1480 However, this argument is in conflict 
with the Court’s powerful assertion that EC competition law forms part o f ordre public 
communautaire, which itself is integrated in the notions of public policy o f each national 
legal system,1481 If an arbitral tribunal endorses in its final award a overtly anti-competitive 
agreement of hard core nature, the fact that there was a possibility under the applicable 
national procedural law for an indirect preliminary reference through national courts seems 
immaterial.
b. Arbitration and European Commission
aa. Arbitration and Regulation 1/2003
143 See below the analysis of the Eco Swiss ruling.
149 See Liebscher, supra (1999), pp. 85 and 93.
1480 Eco Swiss, op.cit., para. 40.
1481 Eco Swiss, op.cit., paras. 36-39. Compare Poillot-Peruzzetto, “L’ordre public international en droit 
communautaire : À propos de l’arrêt de la Cour de justice des Communautés du 1er juin 1999 {affaire Eco Swiss 
China Time Ltd.)'\ 127 JDI (Clunet) 299 (2000). See also Radicati di Brozolo, supra (1999), p. 684, who rightly 
submits that the Art. 234 EC argument used by the Court in Eco Swiss does not reduce its ordre public 
communautaire argumentation and, he goes on to say, these arguments could be thought of merely as obiter 
dicta.
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Since, for the reasons explained above, arbitrators are barred from any direct dialogue and co ­
operation with the Court of Justice, the burden falls on the European Commission to fill th is 
gap by providing an informal route o f co-operation with arbitration. It seems however that the  
Commission is not inclined to provide in a clear, unambiguous and generalised manner th is  
kind o f  assistance to arbitrators that it has resolved to provide to national courts.
Naturally, one would have not expected or - indeed - favoured an explicit reference to  
arbitration in the text of Regulation 1/2003. It would not have been appropriate for the  
Regulation, being a hard law instrument o f Community law, to include references to  
arbitration, which - from a strictly legal point o f view - is an institution not directly subject to  
Article 10 EC, in the way that national courts, the judicial organs o f the Member States, arc. 
Indeed, the system o f the relationship between the Commission and national courts that is  
established by Regulation 1/2003 may be less hierarchical than the one between the former 
and national competition authorities, yet it is made up o f specific and direct Community law- 
based powers and duties which echo and are in a sense leges spéciales o f Article 10 EC 
which remains the lex generalis. These duties and powers of the national courts are related to  
their nature as Community judges {juges communautaires de droit commun) and to their co ­
operation with Community institutions, in this case the Commission.1482 
Arbitration, on the other hand, is not ex lege subject to Article 10 EC.1483 This means that 
most o f  the co-operation and co-ordination mechanisms between national courts and the 
Commission provided for in Regulation 1/2003 are not transposable to arbitration.1484 
Thus, neither Article 10 EC nor Article 15(1) o f Regulation 1/2003 can provide for a legal 
basis for a formal co-operation betw een the Commission and arbitrators in the sense of the 
former being bound to offer assistance on a  specific competition-related issue to the latter. 
Arbitral tribunals are not judicial organs o f the Member States, to which Article 10 EC is 
addressed.1485 This means that on the one hand they are immune of any duty o f co-operation 
stemming from this provision, but on the other hand Community' institutions are not bound to  
co-operate with them, as is the case with national courts.
1482 See Temple Lang, supra (1990), p. 646, who considers that the Community status of national courts 
ilows directly from Art. 10 EC.
1483 That arbitration is not formally speaking subject to Art. 10 EC is a generally accepted proposition. See 
e.g. Van Gerven, supra (1995), p. 73; Komninos, supra (2001), p. 228; Idot, supra (2003a), p. 318; Shelkoplyas, 
supra (2003), p. 423.
1484 See in this sense Idot, supra (2003c), p. 11.
1485 According to the Commission’s Explanatoiy Memorandum of the September 2000 regulation proposal, 
Ait. 15 codified “the existing obligation of the Commission, based on Article 10 of the Treaty, to cooperate with 
national courts”.
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Then, under Article 15(2) of the new Regulation, Member States are under a duty to forward 
to the Commission copies o f 'written judgments” of ''national courts”. The letter of this 
provision certainly does not apply directly to arbitral awards and tribunals.1486 It might have 
been tempting to argue that the imposition of this administrative duty to Member States, 
rather than to courts, as was initially proposed by the Commission text of the 2000 regulation 
proposal, might mean that the former have to forward to the Commission also copies o f 
arbitral awards applying Articles 81 and 82 EC. Such an argument, however, fails in view of 
the letter of the text, but also in view o f its ratio, which is to make the Commission aware of 
possible cases o f national litigation, where the former can intervene at a later stage as amicus 
curiae. It wrould also be incompatible with the system of the relationship between the 
Member States (national courts) and the Commission prescribed by Article 15, which is not 
applicable to arbitration. Besides, states do not have in place -  indeed they should not have -  
mechanisms to be notified arbitral awards, so it is impossible for a  Member State to know at a 
given time the number of arbitrations and arbitral awards. In an open and democratic society, 
this would be unthinkable.
Naturally, indirectly arbitration may be affected by Article 15(2), in case state courts have 
exercised a review of an arbitral award, or have given judgment concerning the recognition or 
enforcement o f an arbitral award, or have even intervened in support of the arbitration 
proceedings, for example ordering themselves a provisional measure.1487 148All these court 
judgments will have to be forwarded to the Commission by the Member State in question, if 
Community competition law has been applied by the court. It should be stressed that it is 
neither sufficient nor necessary for such a Community law' duty to exist, if  the arbitrators 
have applied Articles 81 and 82 EC. The national court itself must have applied these
* 1 4 9 0
provisions.
As for the power of the Commission (or of national competition authorities) to submit written 
or oral observations ex officio to national courts pursuant to Article 15(3) of the new
1486 The duty to inform the Commission of judgments that have applied the EC competition rules, imposed 
by Art. 15(2) Reg. 1/2003 upon Member States, should not be confused with the occasional duty that has been 
imposed by the Commission in the past upon undertakings to inform the former of the outcome of arbitral 
awards (see supra). This duty has been included, by way o f condition or obligation, in some individual 
exemption decisions and in certain block exemption regulations. The new' system of enforcement leaves no 
more room for such duty of information, unless it has been included in a commitment given by undertakings to 
the Commission pursuant to Art. 9 Reg. 1/2003 or in the context o f merger control.
1487 This is so, if the wider meaning of “judgment” is followed, which also covers courts’ decisions that are 
final in nature, yet they may be interim or partial. See above.
1488 Article 15(2) Reg. 1/2003 would cover also court decisions that have applied the Treaty competition 
provisions, even if the arbitral tribunal might not have touched upon this issue.
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Regulation, again such a mechanism is neither applicable nor transposable to arbitration.1489 
Any attempt to extend such measures to arbitration proceedings should be avoided not only' 
as being unnecessary and disproportionately restrictive, but also because it would be  
detrimental to the nature o f  arbitration and to the most fundamental principles o f th e  
arbitration process. The danger in that case lies in the intrusion of the Commission to the v e ry  
substance o f arbitration, which is an expression o f the will of the parties providing for a non ­
judicial forum for settling disputes. This intrusion would be contrary to the basic principle o f  
privity, confidentiality1490 and independence o f  arbitration. If competition authorities were to  
demand to become privy to arbitration involving competition issues, many parties might o p t 
to transfer their arbitrations to venues outside o f the EU, especially if  one o f the parties is n o t 
an EU national.1491
The question remains whether the intervention o f a  competition authority would be possible, 
if the arbitration agreement itself provided for such a possibility or if  the arbitrators were to  
give permission to this and both parties gave their consent.1492 In such a case, the flexibility 
of arbitration would advocate in favour of a  positive answer. However, there are good po licy  
reasons that plead against placing too much emphasis on the consent o f the parties. In  
practice, it will be quite difficult for a party to the arbitration proceedings to resist th e  
Commission’s or another competition authority’s intervention without raising its suspicions 
and thus without attracting its “attention”.1493 Therefore, it can be taken for granted that a  
party' would in most cases volem nolens acquiesce in such an intervention. In other words, to  
condition such a mechanism on the parties’ consent would not really be meaningful. Only in 
those cases where the two parties genuinely agree to ask the Commission to intervene in 
order to shed light to some important competition law question, should the arbitrators seek o r  
allow such intervention.
If the above conditions are met,1494 in most cases it will be preferable to allow the European 
Commission to interfere only through the submission of arguments in writing, without
1489 See Idot, supra (2003c), p. 11.
1490 On the principle of confidentiality and its limits from a comparative law perspective, see Misra and 
Jordans, “Confidentiality in International Arbitration: An Introspection of the Public Interest Exception”, 23 
JInt’lArb. 39 (2006). The principle of confidentiality may recede and, thus, allow for amicus curiae briefs by 
third parties only in cases of public-private, i.e. investment, arbitration. See further Mistelis, “Confidentiality 
and Third Party Participation: UPS v. Canada and Kiethanex Corporation v. United States”, 21 Arb.Int 211 
(2005), p. 221 etseq.
1491 See Lew, “EEC Law Restriction on Arbitration”, 47 Arb. 117 (1981-82), p. 119.
1492 In such a case there would be no violation of the fundamental principle of confidentiality. See Müller, 
“La confidentialité en arbitrage commercial international : Un trompe-l’œil ?”, 23 Bull. ASA 216 (2005), p. 223.
1493 “Attention” here means the opening of a public enforcement proceeding.
1494 In other words, if the arbitration agreement allows that or if the arbitrators and the parties consent 
thereto.
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however giving it the power to participate in the arbitration hearings or to have access to the 
file o f the case and to documents produced during the proceedings. This solution has been 
followed in the context of NAFTA arbitration, which is certainly very different from a purely 
private commercial arbitration, but could be considered by analogy, always under the above 
conditions.1495 While it is true that the Commission could, if  it so wished, use its own 
administrative powers of enforcement to request information about the arbitration 
proceedings or access to certain documents, there is no reason to formalise and import this 
practice in the law of arbitration. Thus, arbitrators should not allow an interference by the 
Commission, irrespective o f how the parties choose to react to a possible request for 
information by the Commission under Regulation 1/2003.
Surprisingly, however, the above proposition as to the inapplicability' of the amicus curiae 
mechanism to arbitration, is not shared by all commentators. Indeed, it seems that some 
enthusiasm about the possibility of the Commission’s intervention in arbitration proceedings 
is expressed more by the arbitration milieu than by the antitrust enforcers themselves.1496 If, 
as we will see below, the Commission has excluded the application o f its cooperation Notice 
to arbitration, it is rather difficult to explain this one-sided enthusiasm.
Commentators in favour of that possibility usually refer also to the latest trend o f the 
Commission to accept (in reality to demand) arbitration commitments by parties. Since 
arbitration is used by the Commission as an important monitoring and dispute resolution 
mechanism, then, the argument goes,1497 the Commission has any right and power to 
intervene in that “regulatory arbitration”.
There are at this point two important distinctions to be made:
(a) The first distinction is between the formalised procedures provided for by Article 15 
o f Regulation 1/2003 and the co-operation Notice, and the specific provisions on the 
Commission’s possibility' to intervene as amicus curiae that may be contained in 
arbitration commitments. In our view, the two must not be confused. Indeed, any 
possible amicus curiae intervention by the Commission in the first context would be 
an ex lege one and is therefore inapplicable to arbitration because Article 10 EC and
1495 On this practice in the NAFTA arbitration context see Betto, Fry, Henry, Kleiman and Pinsolle, 
“Nouvelles tendances de l’arbitrage international”, (2006) RDAI/IBLJ 371, p. 378. The authors distinguish 
between transparency and interference. Interference by third governmental or non-governmental parties should 
not be allowed,
1496 See e.g. Abdelgawad, “L’arbitrage international et le nouveau règlement d'application des articles 81 et 
82 CE”, (2004) Rev.Arb. 253, p. 268 et seq.\ Nisser and Blanke, “Reflections on the Role of the European 
Commission as amicus curiae in International Arbitration Proceedings”, 27 ECLR 174 (2006), p. 176 etseq.
1497 See in particulart Nisser and Blanke, supra (2006), p. 179 et seq.
351
Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 do not apply directly to arbitration.1498 On the other 
hand, a possible intervention by the Commission in an arbitration proceeding pursuant 
to commitments would not be based on the law, as above, but rather on the arbitration 
agreement itself. There is, in other words, an important difference in the legal basis 
between the two situations.
In addition, the two situations must not be confused for another, perhaps more 
important, reason: Regulation 1/2003 and the co-operation Notice mechanisms are 
applicable only to those cases where a national court applies EC competition law. 
Their rationale is to enable the Commission to intervene in cases where the 
Community public interest requires in order to inform the court of the Commission's 
position about some fundamental issue of EC competition law, Yet, in the case o f  
arbitration pursuant to arbitration commitments, the arbitrators in reality" do not 
usually apply substantive EC competition law. They do not deal with such questions 
as the applicability o f  Article 81(1) EC, the four criteria of Article 81(3) EC o r 
efficiencies under Article 82 EC. These are questions that will have already been dealt 
with in a definitive manner by the Commission itself before it accepted the 
commitments.1499 The role o f the arbitrators pursuant to the arbitration commitment is 
not to re-litigate competition law issues, but rather to deal w ith technical or peripheral 
legal questions, such as the level of fees and royalties, the conditions of access to a 
network, the commercial conditions o f a divestiture, etc. These can at best be 
described as commercial law disputes, indeed the idea is that these should not be 
decided by the Commission, which should rather concentrate on the competition law 
questions. It is unclear to us why these disputes raise a fundamental concern 
pertaining to the Community public interest, in order to apply -  even by analogy - the 
amicus curme-related provisions referred to above.
(b) The second distinction has to do with arbitration pursuant to commitments. It is a  
distinction between law and policy. In strictly legal terms, if an arbitration 
commitment contains specific provisions about the Commission’s possibility to 
intervene in the arbitration proceedings, the subsequent arbitration agreement will in 
effect integrate those provisions too. So the possibility of the Commission’s 
intervention will be an integral part o f the arbitration agreement. What however is
1498 Besides, the co-operation Notice itself does not apply to arbitration.
1499 O f course, the Commission in the context of merger control does not apply Arts. 81 and 82 EC (ex post 
enforcement) but only Reg. 139/2004 (ex ante enforcement), Then, the Commission uses a different analysis in 
merger control and proceeds on the basis of “competition concerns5' and not of competition law violations.
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possible in law, should be avoided for policy reasons. As expounded above, an 
arbitration procedure that does not give the impression o f independence and privity 
but appears as guided by and dependent on the Commission, may not be perceived as 
an independent dispute resolution method leading to enforceable arbitral awards akin 
to judicial decisions. That would be detrimental to arbitration as an institution and to 
the effectiveness of the arbitration commitment (as a  competition law enforcement 
tool) itself.
bb. The Commission's Ignorance of Arbitration in the Co-operation Notice
Whereas the ignorance of arbitration by the Commission might have been excusable in the 
initial stages of the modernisation process, it now seems less justified. Decentralisation is 
already a fact and it has now been realised - even by the staunchest critics of the White Paper 
-  that national courts are called to play a more active role. To continue ignoring arbitration, 
the “natural judge” of most business disputes, especially in the international context, is 
certainly regrettable.1500
Whereas one would have welcomed at least a reference to arbitration in the accompanying 
soft law measures of modernisation, in particular in the Notice on co-operation between the 
Commission and national courts, regrettably the Notice excludes any possibility o f co­
operation between the Commission and arbitration tribunals, by adopting, in our view entirely 
unreasonably and unnecessarily, a definition of “court” that follows the “court or tribunal” 
criterion o f Article 234 EC, as interpreted by the Court of Justice.1501 Thus, paragraph 1 states 
that “for the purpose of this notice, the ‘courts o f the EU Member States’ (hereinafter 
‘national courts’) are those courts and tribunals within an EU Member State that can apply 
Articles 81 and 82 EC and that are authorised to ask for a preliminary question to the Court of 
Justice o f the European Communities pursuant to Article 234 EC”. It is not clear whether this 
language intended to refer implicitly to arbitration, though there is some evidence that this 
may well have been the intention.1502
1500 See Idot, supra (2004c), p. 81.
1501 Para. 1 of the co-operation Notice.
1502 Thus, see Paulis, “Panel Discussion: Administrative Antitrust Authorities: Adjudicative and 
Investigatory Functions”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2002, Annual Proceedings o f  
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2003), p. 459, who explains that, indeed, the Commission 
was probably ‘’frightened” to grant full access to arbitrators for the same reasons as maybe the ECJ was. The 
exclusion of arbitration from the mechanisms of the co-operation Notice has been criticised by many 
stakeholders in their comments on the Commission’s modernisation package. See e.g. the comments by
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An additional criticism that can be advanced against this unfortunate text is that it is Article 
10 and not 234 EC that should guide the Commission in its co-operation with national courts. 
Indeed, Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003 and, in a certain sense, also the co-operation Notice, 
are leges speciales of the lexgemralis of Article 10 EC. This means that an entity considered 
as a “court” in the national legal order should be able to co-operate with the Commission on 
the basis o f Article 10 EC and o f the Delimitis and Automec principles o f co-operation. In 
other words, the term “court or tribunal” in Article 234 EC may be narrower than what may 
nationally be considered a “court”. In our view, it would be inappropriate for the Commission 
to shut its doors to such a “court”, since the latter, being an organ o f the Member State in 
question, should be able to seize the Commission according to Article 10 EC, 
notwithstanding paragraph 1 o f the new co-operation Notice.
In any event, however, it is reasonable to believe that the Commission intended to exclude 
arbitration only from the specific procedural framework o f the new co-operation Notice, 
which contains also self-imposed deadlines for the Commission’s assistance, while 
entertaining requests from arbitrators on an ad  hoc and fully discretionary basis, rather than 
being bound to engage in a dialogue with arbitrators as it is bound to do so with courts.1503 
The soft law nature of the co-operation Notice means that its mechanism could be used by  
analogy also by arbitrators.1504 Thus, on an informal basis, arbitrators should be able to seek 
the Commission’s assistance, whenever a legal or factual problem arises in regard to a 
question of enforcement o f EC competition law. Any disrespectful attitude of the 
Commission towards arbitration in this regard would run counter to the long-established 
recognition of arbitration in all Member States as an alternative judicial forum. At the same 
time, it would not serve the Commission’s purpose to further the decentralised civil 
enforcement of EC competition law, and it might alienate arbitrators, with the possible 
repercussion that the latter would rather suppress a difficult competition law issue, instead o f  
running the risk to decide it wrongly themselves and consequently to expose their award to 
annulment. Finally, a negative approach towards such requests of assistance by arbitrators
professor Laurence Idot, the Joint Working Party of the Bars and Law Societies of the UK on Competition Law, 
and the law firm Clifford Chance.
1503 See Paulis, “Panel Discussion: Administrative Antitrust Authorities: Adjudicative and Investigatory' 
Functions”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 2002, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (New York, 2003), pp. 459-460.
1504 See in respect of the old co-operation Notice, Slot, supra (1996), p. 112; Radicati di Brozolo, supra 
(1999), p. 676.
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would not be in conformity with the Commission’s central role in the enforcement o f the 
competition law regime of the Treaty.1505
Indeed, there have been many indications that the Commission has been quite open in 
providing assistance to arbitrators applying EC competition law. It has been noted that the 
Commission has on occasions treated arbitral tribunals in the same way as national courts 
under the old Notice on co-operation.1506 In one reported case the Commission received and 
responded to an application for legal information by the Tribunal Arbitral de Barcelona, an 
ad hoc arbitration tribunal.1507 The information sought referred to an alleged dominant 
position of a public undertaking that controlled the bidding and executing of certain 
infrastructure projects in a Spanish region. It is interesting that the arbitration tribunal wanted 
to know whether the undertaking in question occupied a dominant position “in the sense of 
the Court of Justice’s case law”. We can only suppose that this is a question that normally 
would have been addressed to the Court of Justice itself, had the referring body been a court. 
The case, thus, demonstrates how the Commission can remedy in some instances the inability 
of arbitrators to seize the Court o f Justice with a preliminary reference.
As arbitrators will be applying Article 81(3) EC, which admittedly entails more elaborate 
competition-related economic and legal questions, and as arbitration will increasingly be seen 
more favourably by the Commission, the latter is expected to co-operate more often with 
arbitral tribunals in appropriate cases. As for the kind of assistance that arbitrators could 
request, this would not be substantially different from that, which the courts may request.1508 
It covers factual information, for example questions on the identity of the undertakings 
concerned, or information whether a certain case is pending before the Commission, or 
whether the latter has reached a decision or a reasoned opinion in this matter. It may also 
refer to a legal issue of EC competition law, as well as to economic data, such as statistics, 
market characteristics, and economic analyses.
Whether the request of such information or assistance by the Commission is desirable, is, o f 
course, only for the arbitrators to decide. However, it is a question of the law governing the 
arbitral process and of the arbitration clause itself, whether an arbitrator may use such a 
facility sua sponte. This is a sensitive issue, because the privity of the arbitral process
1505 According to Art. 85 EC “the Commission shall ensure the application of the principles laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82”
150d See Temple Lang, ‘Tanel Discussion: International Arbitration”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust 
Law and Policy’ 1994, Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York/The Hague, 
1995), d. 418; De Gryse, supra (1994), p. 114; Simont, jwpra(1998), p. 550.
150 See Joris, supra (1998), p. 48.
Ii08 See e.g. para. 21 etseq. of the co-operation Notice.
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recedes, and arbitrators will have to show extreme diligence. Indeed, according to one view 
arbitral tribunals should abstain from seizing the Commission, since the parties have 
submitted their dispute only to them and the applicability o f Article 81 EC is still a question 
of law, which only they should deal with.1509 Most likely, they could take such an initiative, i f  
one o f the parties has filed a complaint with the Commission, thus having brought the matter 
already to its attention, if  both parties consent, or if  the terms of reference o f the arbitration 
allow that.1510 In any case, specific consultations with and hearing o f all parties seem to be 
necessary.1511 Indirectly an arbitrator could enjoin the parties to supply him with certain legal 
or economic information or data, while stressing to them that this information could be easily 
requested from the Commission, if  they consented to that.1512
It might have been desirable for the Commission to publish a notice on co-operation with 
arbitral tribunals. Such a notice could provide for a  more structured dialogue between the 
Commission and arbitrators, while increasing the transparency of the whole system of co­
operation. It would also raise the EC competition law awareness o f arbitrators and of the 
parties to an arbitration, without encroaching on the flexibility and privity o f the arbitral 
process. In any case the Commission would not be legally bound to provide such assistance 
to arbitral tribunals, although it is evident that it is to its interest to do so.1513 This comes as a  
direct consequence of the non-applicability o f Article 10 EC to arbitrators. Since the latter are 
not under any duty, as a question o f EC law, as against the Community institutions, similarly 
the Commission should not be so bound.
In addition to such ways for arbitrators to seize the Commission, informal and indirect 
channels may equally be as effective. Indeed, the parties to an arbitration proceeding might 
even seize the Commission and request a guidance letter under the Notice on guidance 
letters.1514 For such an attempt to be successful the three positive and two negative
1509 See Goffin, supra (1990), p. 333.
1510 See Simont, supra (1998), p. 550 et seq., according to whom the arbitrators, who are contractually 
bound with the parties, could be personally liable, if they exposed them to proceedings (before the Commission) 
that can lead to lines.
1511 See Blessing, “Introduction to Arbitration - Swiss and International Perspectives”, in: Beiti, Honsell et 
al. (Eds ), International Arbitration in Switzerland, An Introduction to and a Commentary on Articles 176-194 
o f the Swiss Private International Law Statute (Basel/The Hague/London/Boston, 2000), p. 235.
1512 See Simont, supra (1998), p. 550. For such an indirect possibility for the Commission to assist national 
proceedings see para. 42 of the previous Notice on co-operation, which stated that the Commission may be 
seized indirectly to assist the course of a national proceeding, when parties have been ordered by the court 
concerned to provide certain information. However, it should be noted that under the new co-operation Notice, 
parties no longer enjoy such an autonomous right to seize directly the Commission, and it is only open to 
national courts to ask for the Commission’s assistance.
1M3 See Lenaerts and Pittie, supra ( 1997), p. 218.
1514 See above.
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cumulative conditions, set out in the Notice, must be satisfied:1515 (a) the question involved 
must be novel; (b) its clarification must be useful from an economic point o f view; (c) the 
parties must provide the Commission with complete information; (d) there must be no 
identical or similar case pending before the European Courts; (e) there must be no 
Commission, national competition authority or national court pending proceeding involving 
the applicant. The latter condition will be fulfilled even if  the applicant is a party to 
arbitration proceedings, first because arbitration is not mentioned in the Notice and second 
because the rationale of this text is the existence o f a more direct and structured co-operation 
mechanism between the Commission and national courts that Regulation 1/2003 and the new 
co-operation Notice expressly provide for. Since arbitration is not mentioned in Regulation 
1/2003 and is indeed excluded by the co-operation Notice, then there is no reason to deny 
parties to an on-going arbitration the possibility to request a guidance letter from the 
Commission.
In any event, such a channel would be clearly open only to undertakings and not to arbitrators 
deciding a case. Even if the latter could use such a  mechanism, which is not the case, they 
should actually avoid this informal venue because o f the lack o f  any transparency. If, on the 
other hand, a parly to the arbitration proceedings contacted the Commission (or a national 
competition authority) on a specific issue, and if the latter finally issued a reasoned opinion or 
guidance letter in response to such communication, undoubtedly that opinion or letter, though 
formally not binding on the arbitration proceedings, would carry' a certain degree of 
persuasiveness that the arbitral tribunal would welcome and certainly not ignore.
cc. The Special Case of Non-EU-based Arbitral Tribunals
Community competition law may arise in and may be applied by arbitral tribunals sitting not 
only in the territory of the European Union, but also in other extra-EU jurisdictions. The 
question arises as to the possibility o f  these tribunals to receive assistance from Brussels or 
Luxembourg in the application of EC competition law.
A certain issue, which might be difficult to determine is the ‘"nationality” of an arbitral 
tribunal. As has been rightly observed, that is a technical difficulty, with which Article 234 
EC cannot cope with,1516 and sometimes has been used as an argument against the 
admissibility o f preliminary' references by arbitrators altogether. The Court of Justice in
1515 Para. 9 of the Notice. For a detailed analysis of these conditions see above.
1516 See Erauw, supra (1997), p. 127; Lenaerts and Pittie, supra (1997), p. 211.
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numerous occasions of preliminary rulings has stressed the particular importance and  
objective o f Article 234 EC, always using a geographical reference, namely that it is w ith in  
the Community that divergences in judicial decisions on questions of Community law are to  
be prevented.1517 There is hardly any doubt that a  foreign arbitral tribunal, even if N ordsee  
were reversed, cannot proceed to a preliminary' reference to Luxembourg. The same goes fo r  
foreign (non-EU) courts that may be acting in support or supervision of those non-EU arbitral 
proceedings and awards. On the other hand, EU courts reviewing foreign (non-EU) arbitral 
awards can always seize the Court of Justice. Another possibility for a question o f  E C  
(competition) law, arising out of such arbitral proceedings, to reach the Court is when th e  
parties to these extra-EU arbitral proceedings request the assistance of an EU national c o u rt 
outside the seat of the arbitration.1518 That national court could conceivably proceed to  a  
preliminary reference.1519
Be it as it is with regard to the Court of Justice, there is no reason why the Commission 
should not offer its assistance to such arbitral tribunals. In the first place, in today’s 
globalised commercial world it would be futile to distinguish between EU and non-EU  
arbitral tribunals, since it is quite often difficult to identify the “nationality” of an arbitral 
tribunal. Secondly, if  the main duty' and concern o f  the European Commission is to ensure 
that the principles o f Articles 81 and 82 EC are effectively applied and that the conditions o f  
free and undistorted competition are safeguarded in the European Union, it should not be 
important where an arbitration tribunal sits but rather whether some potentially an ti­
competitive agreements or practices might affect the common market.1520 EC competition law  
may be enforced extraterritorially against anti-competitive acts, as long as the latter a re  
implemented or produce their effects inside the EU territory; no matter if they w ere
1517 E.g. Case 107/76, Hojfmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer 
Erzeugnisse mbH, [1977] ECR 957, para. 5 (“in the context of Article [234],..the particular objective o f the 
third paragraph is to prevent a body of national case-law not in accord with the rules of Community law coming 
into existence in any Member State” - emphasis added); case 283/81, Sri CILF1T & Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. 
Ministry o f  Health (I), [1982] ECR 3415, para. 7 (“Article [234] seeks to prevent the occurrence w ithin the  
Community of divergences in judicial decisions on questions of Community law5’ - emphasis added),
1518 An example is a non-EU arbitral tribunal or the parties to that arbitration requesting an English court to  
grant certain provisional measures. According to s. 2(4)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996, the English court has 
discretion to exercise such a pow er, if certain conditions are met.
1519 If an arbitral tribunal is sitting in a non-EU country, which is a signatory of the 1968 European 
Convention on Information on Foreign Law, it may theoretically request a court in that jurisdiction to transmit a 
question on foreign law; presumably also of EC competition law, the latter being part of EU countries’ national 
laws, to a “receiving agency” in an EU Member State. However, there is no way that the receiving agency could 
seize the ECJ.
1520 See A. Rigozzi, L'art. 85 du Traité CE devant le juge civil Suisse : Les contrats de distribution a 
l  egard de l 'art. 19 LDIP et la nouvelle loi fédérale sur les ca He Is, Swiss Papers on European Integration, No. 
2/96 (Bem/Zilrich, 1996), p. 57, who goes even further by suggesting that the Commission, in order to assure 
the effectiveness of EC competition enforcement, should also entertain requests of assistance by Swiss courts,
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concluded in or directed from a third country. By the same token, if there is an on-going 
arbitration outside the European Union, and if an issue arises pertaining to EC antitrust law, it 
would be rather contradictory for the Commission to deny access to its resources to such an 
arbitral tribunal. The Commission should entertain such a request without examining the 
nationality o f  the arbitrators and parties involved or the applicable law of the dispute {lex 
causae). The only concern must be whether there is a genuine dispute, which prima facie 
relates to conduct potentially caught by the EC antitrust rales.
c. Arbitration and Member States Courts
While arbitration tribunals apply EC competition law, they may also turn for assistance to 
national courts. It is common ground that arbitral proceedings in any given legal system are 
dependent on state courts. Notwithstanding a certain global trend of de-localisation and 
autonomy o f arbitration1521 - in particular of international commercial arbitration - a certain 
dialogue with the state judicial power is unavoidable. The balanced relationship between 
courts and arbitrators is considered to be one of the key criteria for the attractiveness o f an 
arbitration site.1522 The complementarity between courts and arbitrators basically centres in 
two diverse circumstances: review and assistance.1523 An arbitral award is reviewed by state 
courts either in the context of a setting aside motion, when a party to arbitration requests the 
annulment o f the award, or in respect of a request for recognition and enforcement. 
Assistance, on the other hand, takes place before the rendering of the award and during the 
arbitration proceedings. Only the latter instance of court intervention will be examined here, 
because it is only during the arbitral proceedings that the question of assistance arises.
The state courts’ intervention during that stage usually takes place in order to remedy the 
arbitrators' lack o f power of coercion, which is attached to state prerogatives. It is true that 
arbitrators possess some powers, which may serve as satisfactory alternatives to the courts’
1521 See Theofrastous, supra (1999).
1522 See Berger, “Das neue Sc hied sv erfahrensrecht in der Praxis: Analyse und aktuelle Entwicklungen”, 47 
RIW 7 (2001), p. 17.
1523 On the complementary roles of judges and arbitrators see e.g. Delaume, “L’arbitrage transnational et les 
tribunaux nationaux”, 111 JDI (Clunet) 521 (1984); Goldman, “Die Complementary Roles of Judges and 
Arbitrators in Ensuing that International Commercial Arbitration is Effective”, in: International Arbitration, 60 
Years o f  ICC Arbitration, A Look at the Future, ICC Court of Arbitration (Paris, 1984); Kerameus, “The 
Examination of an Arbitration Agreement by State Courts while Arbitration Is Pending”, 42-13 RHDI 217 
(1989-90); Carpi, “Les rapports entre l'arbitrage et le juge ordinaire”, 2 ZZPInt. 397 (1997); P. Sanders, Quo 
ladis Arbitration?, Sixty Years o f  Arbitration Practice, A Comparative Shtdv (The Hague/Boston/Dordiecht, 
1999), p. 18 et seq.\ Ball, ‘The Essential Judge: The Role of the Courts in a System o f National and 
International Commercial Arbitration”, 22 Arb.IntT 73 (2006), p. 74 et seq.
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sovereign authority.1524 They issue instructions to the parties by means of procedural orders, 
they may summon witnesses and order the production of documents - in some jurisdictions 
by means of subpoenas, they may even impose fines for the parties’ default, or they m ay 
draw the appropriate consequences of a party’s failure to comply with a procedural order. 
However, there are those instances, where the intervention of a state court is indispensable. 
State courts may, thus, intervene to assist the formation and composition of the arbitral 
tribunal against a defaulting party, usually in ad hoc arbitrations. Recourse to state courts o f  
the seat of arbitration might also be called for in obtaining provisional and conservatory 
measures. Although the modem trend is that arbitral tribunals can grant provisional measures 
themselves,1525 there are still jurisdictions, where this is not possible.1526 Then, there are those 
measures that are inherently connected with the state power of coercion, such as attachment, 
that again may have to be granted by state courts only.1527
Provisional measures might be necessary to be taken in a foreign jurisdiction, different from 
the one of the seat o f arbitration. This transnational element is very likely to exist in a dispute 
involving EC antitrust issues. Such measures can only be ordered by the state courts o f that 
jurisdiction, on the condition that they are allowed by their procedural law to offer such 
assistance.1528 Such an exceptional possibility exists under Regulation 44/2001, which applies 
also to provisional and protective measures, even in case o f arbitral proceedings that have 
been or may be commenced in another signatory’ country .1529 The UNCITRAL Model Law 
does not expressly exclude that interim measures could be ordered by a state court in aid o f  a
1524 See Goldman, supra (1984), p. 276 et seq.\ Derains, “State Courts and Arbitrators”, in: Arbitration in 
the Next Decade - Special Supplement 1999, The ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin (Paris, 1999), 
p. 27.^
1525 See Art. 17 of the Model Law. Indeed, arbitrators are nowadays considered to have the power even to 
grant anti-suit injunctions. See further Lévy, “Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, in: Gaillard (Ed.), 
Anti-suit Injunctions in International Arbitration, 1AI Seminar (Paris -  November 21, 2003) (New York/Bem, 
2005), p. 116 et seq.; Mourre, “Granting Interim Relief Measures: Order or Award?”, Paper Presented at 8th 
IBA International Arbitration Day Conference (Geneva, 18 March 2005), p. 3 et seq.
1520 This is so, for example, under Italian law (Art. 818 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
1527 See e.g. Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, supra (1999), p. 711 et seq.
1528 See on this question Steinbrilck, “German and English Court Orders in Support of Foreign 
Aibitrations”, 6 EBOR 313 (2005), p. 320 et seq.
1529 See also Ait. 24 of the Brussels Convention as interpreted by the ECJ in case C-391/95, Van Uden 
Maritime BV v. Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line et al., [1998] ECR 1-7091, at 1-7132, paras. 28-34. 
According to the ECJ, “provisional measures are not in principle ancillary to arbitration proceedings but are 
ordered in parallel to such proceedings and are intended as measures of support. They concern not arbitration as 
such but the protection of a wide variety of rights. Their place in the scope of the Convention is thus determined 
not by their own nature but by the nature of the rights which they serve to protect ... It must therefore be 
concluded that where ... the subject-matter of an application for provisional measures relates to a question 
falling w ithin the scope ratione materiae of the Convention, the Convention is applicable and Article 24 thereof 
may confer jurisdiction on the court hearing that application even where proceedings have already been, or may 
be, commenced on the substance of the case and even where those proceedings are to be conducted before 
arbitrators” (Van Uden, op.cit., paras. 33-34, emphasis added). See now A rt 31 Reg. 44/2001.
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foreign arbitration, but there are currently plans to provide expressly in the Model Law that a 
state court will have die power to issue interim measures o f protection, irrespective o f the 
country where the arbitration took place.1530
More importantly, the taking of evidence is another instance o f state courts’ intervention. 
Again arbitral tribunals are usually in the position to order the production of documents that 
are in the possession of the parties. Depending on the procedural law, they may also summon 
the parties to provide any relevant evidence and to that effect they may also issue procedural 
injunctions and even attach penalties thereto. However, it is recognised that, since arbitrators 
lack imperium, their procedural orders are less effective than those of the courts.1531 
Furthermore, the privity of the arbitration agreement and procedure means that third parties 
cannot be compelled by arbitrators to produce evidence or to give witness testimony.
Arbitral tribunals dealing with EC competition law might be more dependent on the 
assistance of state courts. Antitrust disputes invariably involve third parties (e.g., trade 
associations, other competitors, etc.). Therefore, evidence in order to prove conspiracies or to 
determine market power as far as these third parties are concerned will always be a weakness 
of arbitration, which necessarily can be remedied only through the intervention o f the 
ordinary courts.1532
Court intervention in order to assist arbitral tribunals in the taking of evidence may also be 
necessary if  the evidence is situated in a third country, something which is the rule rather than 
the exception in cases involving EC competition law. In this case the courts o f the place of 
arbitration - and not the arbitrators themselves - may request the assistance of foreign courts 
or of foreign judicial authorities.1533 In the intra-EU context, Regulation 1206/2001 excludes 
the direct possibility' of arbitration tribunals to seize other Member States’ courts to take
1530 See UNCITRAL, Working Group II (Arbitration), Thirty-ninth Session (Vienna, 10-14 November 
2003), Note bv the Secretariat, Settlement o f  Commercial Disputes, Interim Measures o f Protection, paras. 40- 
43.
1531 See Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, supra (1999), pp. 697 and 727 et seq.
1533 On third party evidence in arbitration see e.g. Webster, “Obtaining Evidence from Third Parties in 
International Arbitration”, 17 Arb.Int’1 143 (2001).
1533 See in particular M. Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration Law and Practice (The 
Hague/London/Boston, 2001), p. 399. The 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil 
or Commercial Matters does not apply to arbitrators, although it appears that in ad hoc cases some of the 
signatory states have granted judicial assistance directly to foreign arbitral tribunals (see C. Btlhring-Uhle, 
Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, Designing Procedures fo r  Effective Conflict Management 
(The Ilague/London/Boston, 1996), p. 67). We should also note that, under US law, arbitrators would probably 
qualify as “tribunals” in the sense of s. 1782 (United States Code 28 U.S.C. 1782), which allows US courts to 
order discovery of evidence within their jurisdiction for use in proceedings before a foreign or international 
tribunal. This appears to have been accepted implicitly also by the US Supreme Court in the recent Intel case 
(see above). Compare Wessel, “A Tribunal by Any Other Name: US Discovery in Aid of Non-US Arbitration”, 
8 Int.ALR 139(2005), p. 145.
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evidence on their behalf,1534 but a balanced reading o f that Regulation would leave it open to  
arbitration tribunals to make such requests via the state courts of the Member State on w hich 
they sit and their juge d'appiti, who could then have recourse to that Regulation.
5. Conflicts of Resolution and the uhimum refugium  of the Public Policy Nature of E C
Competition Law
a. Resolution of Conflicts
aa. Scenarios of Conflicts
Arbitration tribunals, just as national courts, enjoy parallel competences in the application o f  
the Treaty competition rules with the Commission (and other national competition 
authorities). Such parallel competences may give rise to conflicts of resolution. We m ust 
note, however, at the outset that the existence of such conflicts between arbitration and the 
Commission do not give rise to the same concerns and issues arising with regard to national 
courts. While conflicts between national judicial authorities and the Community' institution 
par excellence responsible for antitrust enforcement in Europe are also seen as undesirable in 
terms of legal certainty, the main concern is however related to the more fundamental 
inherent features o f the supranational structure o f the European Union. In other words, as we 
have explained in detail above, such conflicts are seen in the context of the perennial struggle 
between the Community and the national element. Article 10 EC, the principle o f  
effectiveness of Community law and the specific principles of Masterfoods and Article 16 o f  
Regulation 1/2003, must therefore all be seen in this context o f supranationalism. The 
fundamental principle is that national organs must pay due respect to Community organs, 
national law must always give way to Community law, national interests should be 
superseded by the Community interest.
Arbitration tribunals, on the other hand, are not organs of the Member States. They are a 
creation o f private autonomy and constitute a  method for the resolution o f disputes among 
individuals. Their aim is to give right or wrong to the parties and not to safeguard any 
particular public interest o f national or supranational nature. International arbitration
1534 See Art. 1(2) which provides that “a request shall not be made to obtain evidence which is not intended 
for use in judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated”. See also Musger, ‘Taking of Evidence”, in: 
Council of the European Union (Ed.), Civil Law, European Judicial Cooperation 2004 (Luxembourg, 2005), p.
193, making clear that arbitration tribunals are excluded.
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tribunals, in particular, have no forum and are to a large extent unconnected with specific 
legal orders. This does not mean that arbitrators are outside the limits of the law. They base 
their competence on and have to decide pursuant to the arbitration agreement, which itself 
must be within the limits of the law.1535 Then, most importantly, their decision, the arbitral 
award, is subject to a limited yet real review by state courts.
These considerations have to be seriously kept in mind while speaking about conflicts and 
their resolution in the present context. The position o f arbitration tribunals is fundamentally 
different from that of courts and the court-related conflict resolution mechanisms we 
described in the pertinent part above cannot be automatically transposed to arbitration.
Thus, an on-going arbitration will not be affected or terminated by the mere fact that the 
Commission has initiated a proceeding in the same case.1536 Like with the case o f courts, by 
no means should the initiation of proceedings by the Commission entail the suspension of the 
arbitral proceedings,1537 although the arbitral tribunal may wish to stay its proceedings and 
await the Commission’s decision, if  it hears the parties in this regard. This is however a rather 
problematic situation because the primary duty of the arbitrators vis-à-vis the parties is to 
resolve their dispute and render swiftly an award. A stay o f proceedings is therefore 
something that arbitrators should have recourse to only rarely, when there is a very serious 
and novel competition law issue in the hands of the Commission or of a national competition 
authority the resolution o f which is forthcoming and is expected to have an impact on the 
arbitration proceedings. In all such cases, the arbitrators should first hear the parties and aim 
at ensuring there is consent on their part. Conversely, it is noteworthy that in the past, where 
an EC antitrust issue had arisen before an arbitral tribunal and one of the parties had also filed 
a complaint with the Commission, the latter declined to open an enquiry while the arbitration 
procedure was pending.1538 Such an approach by the Commission deserves approval.
It should be noted that the introduction of the legal exception system has improved the 
position of arbitration. Under the previous system of enforcement, arbitral tribunals were at a
1535 See above on the question of the legality of the arbitration clause itself.
1536 See Dalhuisen, “The Arbitrability of Competition Issues”, 11 Arb.Int'l 151 (1995), p. 160; Idot, supra 
(1996), p. 573. See also Hetsch, “Arbitration in Community Law”, 6(2) ICC Bull. 47 (1995), p. 55, who stressed 
the fact, that under the old system of enforcenment, Art. 9(3) Reg. 17/1962 applied neither to courts nor to 
arbitrators, therefore the latter had jurisdiction, even if there was a parallel proceeding at the Commission. This 
point is still valid today.
1537 Opinion by Marc Blessing, expressed during the discussions at the IAI conference on “Les réformes du 
droit communautaire de la concurrence et l’arbitrage international : un nouveau rôle pour les arbitres ?” on 4 
October 2002 in Paris.
1538 See ICC arbitral award in case n° 7181/1992, published in: XXI YCA 99 (1996). See on that case 
Verbist, “The Application of European Community' Law in ICC Arbitrations, Presentation of Arbitral Aw ards”, 
in: International Commercial Arbitration in Europe - Special Supplement 1994, The International Court of 
Arbitration Bulletin (Paris, 1994), p. 43 et seq.
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vers disadvantageous position when an agreement falling under Article 81(1) EC had been 
notified to but not yet exempted by the Commission. While the arbitrators could still s tay  
proceedings and wait for the Commission’s decision, while possibly seizing - or soliciting the 
parties to seize - the Commission, in order to induce it to reach a timely conclusion, such a  
deviation of the arbitral proceedings, likely to last for very long periods until the Commission 
moved to decide how to proceed w ith the notification, wTas certainly in conflict with the m ost 
fundamental principles of arbitration, namely the principles of privity, confidentiality and  
swiftness. This explains a certain hesitation o f arbitrators to follow this time-consuming route 
in the past.1539 The new system o f enforcement, which is one of fully parallel competences, 
means a welcome departure from these problems.
Proceeding now to the examination of possible corrective measures to remedy conflicts o f  
resolution, when the Commission proceeds and finds that a particular arrangement is contrary 
to the Treaty competition provisions, arbitrators cannot be formally bound by Article 16 o f  
Regulation 1/2003 to avoid a conflicting decision with the Commission. This is so, because 
this rule is a lex specialis o f  the more general provision of Article 10 EC and arbitrators are 
immune from any duties emanating from that provision. Notwithstanding the absence o f  a  
formal duty to that extent, the arbitral tribunal will have to be cautious, particularly when the  
case entails some kind of hard core behaviour. Thus, if  the Commission has taken a decision 
finding an infringement of Article 81 EC in the case of a hard core cartel, in reality tha t 
Commission decision imposes de facto a duty o f vigilance upon the arbitral tribunal. The 
latter remains theoretically empowered to depart completely from the findings of the 
Commission and find that there has been no cartel infringement based on the same facts. The 
arbitral award would still enjoy res judicata as between the parties,1540 but, at the same time, 
it wrould be highly vulnerable to an annulment action, which the losing party would not 
certainly miss to exploit.
Such an award would essentially amount to a truncated award. It is clear that the arbitrators 
cannot and, indeed, should not proceed in such a controversial manner, thus compromising 
the effectiveness of their award and their credibility as arbitrators as w'ell as the credibility o f  
arbitration as a respectable dispute resolution method. If  they do so, the arbitrators may also 
breach the legal or moral principle that they should render an award that is prim a facie  
enforceable. In extreme cases, it could well be argued that the arbitrators would be in breach
1539 See Buirichter, supra (2001), p. 543. Indeed, as mentioned above, there is anecdotal evidence that in the 
past arbitral tribunals chose to hear argument on Art. 81(3) EC and addressed in their awards many of the points 
pertaining to that provision.
1SW See Dalhuisen, supra (1995), p. 161.
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of their contract with their clients, since the latter would have paid for services fundamentally 
flawed and defective.
Of course, even in the case o f a Commission or an antitrust authority decision finding a cartel 
infringement, the above does not mean that the arbitrators should be totally bound by all 
findings in the Commission’s decision. Indeed, there is no reason to deny them the possibility 
to depart from certain findings, if they evaluate the evidence differently or if they have 
additional evidence in their hands. Thus, even in such extreme cases, an arbitrator could find 
a different duration of the cartel or a different degree o f participation in the cartel by a 
specific company. Such an award will not in reality contradict the Commission in its most 
fundamental findings, but would rather depart from them in certain aspects. It is difficult to 
see how such an award would be contrary to public policy, if  it has found that there has been 
in principle a cartel infringement, but has rather arrived at some findings that may contradict 
some secondary findings o f the Commission decision. At most, the award will have 
committed an error, but review of arbitral awards’ errors would amount to révision au fond 
and should therefore be excluded.1541
If the case involves some behaviour that does not amount to a hard core violation of 
competition law, the arbitrators have more liberty to depart from the Commission’s findings, 
since an arbitral award that contradicts such a Commission decision would run less o f a risk 
at the enforcement stage.1542 This does not mean that such an award should be seen as 
perfectly secure. The arbitrators would still have to exercise a certain degree of caution if  
they want to depart from the findings o f the Commission. For example, a blatant refusal to 
follow the Commission in finding illegal a 20-year non-competition clause in a contract that 
has no particular elements that could justify such duration, should not be a step easy to take 
for the arbitrators, who should know that again their award would be highly vulnerable. 
Although the conduct in question does not amount to a hard core violation o f competition 
law, it would still be far-fetched to consider such an award safe.
If, on the other hand, there is different approach between the Commission and an arbitration 
tribunal as to the interpretation of one of the criteria of Article 81(3) EC or as to the 
evaluation of certain conduct in the context of rule o f reason under Article 81 or 82 EC, then 
the fact that Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 and the Masterfoods principles do not apply to 
arbitration must mean that the arbitrators are not bound as such to follow' the Commission’s
1541 See in the same direction, Radicati di Brozolo, “Antitrust A Paradigm of the Relations between 
Mandatory Rules and Arbitration: A Fresh Look at the ‘Second Look’”, 7 IntALR 23 (2004), p. 29, fn. 28.
1542 See below.
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decision.1543 The fact that the conflict of resolution will centre around a non-hard core 
restriction of competition or around a different evaluation of the rule of reason, would m ost 
likely make the arbitral award in this case immune from annulment, since if the more correct 
approach is followed, such an award cannot be said to violate public policy.1544 
In other words, public policy comes into play only with regard to a serious violation o f  
substantive competition law and not with regard to the existence o f a conflicting award, 
which is more a procedural question.1545 The public policy nature of a rule is a different 
matter from the binding effect o f a decision o f an authority or court over the arbitration 
tribunal. Indeed, the Court o f  Justice’s Eco Swiss ruling, which declared the public policy 
nature of the Treaty competition mles, was based on the concern to ensure that no anti­
competitive effects occur on the market. It was not the Court’s concern whether a decision by  
the Commission binds an arbitration tribunal. The fact that an arbitration tribunal has the 
power, if it wishes, to depart from the findings o f a Commission decision does not mean that 
the tribunal will surely violate the competition mles or that its award will surely violate 
public policy. In other words, it is the arbitral award that changes the legal reality and must 
thus be examined whether it violates public policy, and not the decision o f the arbitrators to 
depart from or to follow a Commission decision.
On the contrary the situation is different in case of “over-application” of EC competition law 
by arbitrators,1546 i.e., when arbitrators consider that a  certain agreement infringes the 
antitrust provisions. In those circumstances certainly the arbitral award would a fortiori enjoy 
a res judicata effect inter partes and it would be very unlikely for the Commission to  
intervene with a contradictory inapplicability decision. This could happen in rather special 
circumstances, when the Community public interest would so require.1547 It would also seem 
unlikely for such an award to violate public policy and to consequently be exposed to 
annulment.1548
1543 Neither Regulation 1/2003, nor the Masterfoods principles cover decisions adopted by NCAs in the 
framework of the ECN (see above). At the same time, as discussed above, neither Article 10 EC, nor Article 16 
Reg. 1/2003, nor Masterfoods apply to arbitration. Therefore, a fortiori, decisions by NCAs that act in the 
framework of the ECN do not bind arbitration tribunals as a matter of Community law.
1544 See again below on this question.
1545 Since we deal here w ith conflicts of resolution between arbitration tribunals and the Commission, we do 
not discuss the complete failure of an arbitration tribunal to take into account competition law or its oversight in 
this respect. We rather deal here with the power of arbitrators to depart from Commission decisions, which 
means the arbitrators are already aware of the competition problem. On the former question, see below.
1540 See P. SchOldstrOm, The Arbitrator's Mandate, A Comparative Study o f  Relationships in Commercial 
Arbitration under the Laws o f  England, Sweden and Switzerland (Stockholm, 1998), pp. 303-304.
1547 See Art. 10 Reg. 1/2003.
1548 See SchOldstrom, sitpra (1998), p. 304.
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bb. Direct Intervention by the Commission against Arbitral Proceedings and 
Awards
Apart from the possibility o f judicial review of arbitral awards, competition law is an area 
where there are exceptionally some other tools to deal with eggregious violations of the law 
by arbitrators. The Commission being a public authority with increased powers to compel and 
punish could use such powers directly against arbitration. Indeed, as mentioned above, in its 
Organic Peroxides Decision did not shy away from fining a cartel facilitator which had acted 
as a secretary to the parties and facilitated the implementation o f the agreement. In the 
extreme case where an arbitration tribunal would act merely as an internal structure o f the 
cartel, whose function would be to ensure compliance with the cartel and to discipline cartel 
members that “cheat” on the cartel’s decisions, there is no valid reason why the “arbitrators” 
should not be subject to the full powers o f the Commission as well as to penalties.1549 
Bar these extreme cases, an arbitral award that confirms an anti-competitive agreement 
cannot, however, be itself subject to Article 81 EC.1550 Notwithstanding the contractual basis 
of arbitration, an arbitral award is not an agreement between parties. It is an act of quasi­
judicial nature rendered by one or more independent third persons, who act as private judges. 
The arbitral award’s object or effect is not to restrict competition as such, but rather to 
resolve a dispute that has been submitted to the arbitrators. In other words, what may be the 
subject of prohibition is not the arbitral award, but the agreement itself, as interpreted by the 
arbitration tribunal.1551 Thus, the European Commission does not have the power to directly 
attack the arbitral award or to seek its review before the state courts. Again the principle of 
privity of arbitration advocates against such a solution.1552 Indeed, it is not usually allowed 
for third parties to request the setting aside of an arbitral award {tierce opposition). In 
addition, the principle of separation o f powers should also by analogy stand in the way o f a 
direct review o f the arbitral award by the Commission. If the Commission does not have such 
pow ers vis-à-vis national state courts, there is no reason to depart from that rule in the case of 
arbitration, which is also a dispute resolution mechanism and is recognised as such by 
Member States’ courts and laws.
1549 See above on some early cases.
li5° See above.
1551 See Sucker, Guttuso and Gaster, in: Schröter, Jakob & Mederer (Eds ), Kommentar zum Europäischen 
Wettbewerbsrecht (Baden-Baden, 2003), p. 787.
1552 See Betto, Fry, Henry, Kleiman and Pinsolle, supra (2006), p. 378.
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There are in fact other indirect ways for the Commission to attain the same objective by 
having recourse to less dramatic means that constitute less of an intrusion to national 
procedural autonomy and less of an affront to an institution of global importance, recognised 
as such by international treaties and international custom. Thus, this indirect route has been 
used once in the past by the Commission in the Preflex/Lipski case.1553 The facts were that an 
arbitral award had required that the defendant continue to pay license fees pursuant to a  
patent licensing agreement after the expiry o f the patents. The Commission held that th is 
agreement as interpreted by the arbitral award, which in fact had even been subsequently 
approved by a national court,1554 was incompatible with the Treaty competition rules. It did 
not, o f course, set aside the arbitral award or - obviously - the national court’s judgment, 
since this is not possible under Community law. It did, however, communicate its objections 
to the parties and in essence rejected the construction given by the arbitral tribunal to the 
problematic contractual clause.1555 As a result, the parties complied with the Commission’s 
views and reached a settlement, thus putting an end to the dispute.
Such a Commission practice can have far-reaching consequences in like situations. 
Essentially, it could mean that each party to an agreement can, at least indirectly bring an  
arbitral award before the Commission, by filing a complaint with it, hoping that the 
Commission will in effect enjoin the parties from enforcing the agreement, if  the latter, as 
construed by the award, is found to be incompatible with EC antitrust rules. The result is that 
the res judicata effect of the arbitral award in question will be only nominal.
Admittedly, however, such an - indeed remote - possibility can be a powerful deterrent and 
corrective mechanism for arbitrators in appropriate cases. This may be so, where the arbitral 
award manifestly disregards EC competition law, for example by upholding a per se anti­
competitive conduct, such as a blunt market sharing or price fixing agreement, and when it is 
apparent that the parties had submitted their dispute to arbitration in order to evade the 
application of Community competition law. O f course, it is likely that the Commission will 
intervene only in those cases where the enforcement o f  the arbitral award by the parties can 
be expected to have serious anti-competitive effects on the market. A Commission
lii3 See CommissionXth Report on Competition Policy - 1980, op.cit, para. 126, pp. 87-88. See also above.
1554 Civ. Bruxelles, 15-10-75, PrejlexSA v. Lipski, 91 JdT 493 (1976). The Tribunal de première instance 
of Brussels rejected an action to have the award set aside, because, after dealing with the EC competition issue, 
it concluded that no infringement had taken place.
15i5 See further on that case De Mello, “Arbitrage et droit communautaire”, (1982) Rev.Arb. 349, pp. 373- 
374; Idot, “Judicial Control and Enforcement of the Arbitral Award: Rapport infroductifin: Competition and 
Arbitration Law, Institute of International Business Law and Practice, ICC (Paris, 1993), pp. 280-281; Bos, 
“Panel Discussion: International Arbitration”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy 1994, 
Annual Proceedings o f the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York/The Hague, 1995), p. 425.
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intervention to enjoin the parties from enforcing a final arbitral award, especially after a 
national court has sanctioned an arbitral award, should be a rare course, to be taken only if 
there is at stake a strong Community public interest necessitating intervention, and not just 
the individual interest of the loosing party of the arbitration.1556 The Commission should not, 
therefore, allow itself to be considered as an “appeal tribunal” in such arbitrations but should 
leave this to the initiative o f the losing party and to the courts to remedy pursuant to the 
applicable civil procedures.
b. The ultimum refugium of the Public Policy Nature of EC Competition Law
Quite apart from any other preventive or corrective mechanism for the effective application 
o f  the Treaty' competition provisions by arbitrators, review by state courts constitutes the 
most effective control. EC competition provisions express the fundamental economic system 
o f  the Community and of its Member States and enjoy, therefore, a public policy (ordre 
public) character. Arbitral tribunals must seriously take this into account, or else their awards 
could risk being either set aside or refused recognition and enforcement at least in the EU 
territory. Although there is now a very clear trend to limit any appeal or recourse against 
arbitral awards, the public policy proviso still remains and will remain in the foreseeable 
future a  basis for the non-recognition/non-enforcement or the annulment of awards offending 
against the fundamental principles o f a  legal, social and economic system. It has been called 
an “appeal through the back door”,1557 but it is, we submit, its mere existence and its deterrent 
effect that matters rather than its actual putting in effect by state courts, which is rare in 
practice.
aa. The Notion of Public Policy
The notion o f public policy is connected with generally binding patterns o f social or 
economic behaviour that, up to a considerable extent, form the very' basis of the legal, social, 
political and economic system. A systematic analysis o f that concept lies outside the scope of 
this study but it suffices in this context to say, at the risk of oversimplifying fine theories, that
1556 See Temple Lang, “Panel Discussion: International Arbitration”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust 
Law and Policy ¡994, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York/The Hague, 
1995), p.426. '
1557 See Berger, “The Modem Trend towards Exclusion of Recourse against Transnational Arbitral Awards: 
A European Perspective”, 12 Fordham Int’lLJ 605 (1988-89), p. 638 etseq.
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there are two ways in which legal systems use the technical term public policy or ordre 
public. Firstly, in mostly continental legal systems public policy is used to designate 
internally binding rules that cannot be set aside by private autonomy, i.e. rules that the parties 
cannot contract out of. A specific term used to refer to these rules is ius cogens. This notion 
of public policy is both broad and narrow. Broad, because it covers an extensive spectrum o f  
national legal provisions, which the law itself expressly or implicitly considers mandatory; 
and which the parties to a contract cannot set aside, as opposed to those rules, of which the 
parties can contract out (ius dispositivum). However, it is also narrow, in the sense that it 
cannot necessarily affect the parties’ choice o f  a foreign law, although the application of the 
latter may lead to legal consequences that are incompatible with binding national legal 
provisions o f a ius cogens character. This concept o f public policy which, we stress again, 
functions only internally refers to substantive law. There is however a corresponding notion 
of roughly the same breadth that refers to procedural law. This is basically the public policy 
that refers to the recognition o f  a  domestic legal instrument or of a domestic arbitral award. 
This notion o f public policy is broader than the equivalent one referring to the recognition o f  
foreign judgments and arbitral awrards.
Secondly, public policy or ordre public is used - not only in continental legal systems - in 
order to refer to certain important rules or principles o f the national legal order that cannot be 
set aside by the application of a  foreign law, or by the recognition or enforcement of a foreign 
judgment or arbitral award. This is the private international law (conflict o f laws) concept o f  
public policy and it refers to the most fundamental rules and principles that reflect the 
political, moral, social, and economic structure of a given country at a given time. As such, 
public policy in this sense is narrower than the previous notion, since not all internally 
mandatory rules can claim that they express the fundamental values o f a given state.1558 
There is a further distinction to be made here. Some legal systems distinguish between public 
policy in the stricto sensu conflict o f laws context and public policy in the context o f  
enforcement o f foreign judgments and awards. In such cases, the public policy involved is 
called “international public policy” (ordre public international), which is in reality a 
misnomer because this public policy is anything but international. In reality it is again the 
public policy o f a specific state but functions minimalistically only in those cases where the 
enforcement of a foreign judgment or arbitral aw'ard is sought. It is accepted in theory that 
such a notion is less demanding and restrictive than the conflict of laws public policy. Ordre
1558 The opposite is, however, true. It is very likely that all rules expressing public policy in the private 
international law sense constitute also internally mandatory rules in the ius cogens sense.
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public international refers, in other words, to the recognition and enforcement of a legal 
instrument, which is already in existence according to the rules of a foreign jurisdiction. The 
public policy o f  the state of recognition or enforcement, therefore, is less offended, than it 
would be if that instrument were created in that same state.1559
That a notion o f Community public policy (ordre public communautaire) exists, albeit 
integrated in the respective national notions, is a logical consequence of the autonomy o f  the 
Community legal system but also o f the fact that Community law forms an integral part of 
each national law.1560 The existence o f such notion has been accepted by national courts, 
which have indicated, that, in the examination of an ordre public violation, Community 
mandatory provisions such as Articles 81 and 82 EC have to be taken into account, because 
they form part o f the national public policy notion.1561
bb. Eco Sm ss
The ordre public nature of the EC competition provisions and the duty of EU Member State 
courts to review and set aside arbitral awards that violate those fundamental provisions were 
forcefully pronounced in the Eco Swiss judgment o f the Court o f Justice o f June 1999, 
rendered in a preliminary reference from the Dutch Supreme Court.1562
1559 This is the so-called theory of the “diluted effect of public policy” (or of the diluted effect of the 
exception of public policy, to be terminologically more correctX of the ordre public atténué de la 
reconnaissance or of die effet atténué de I 'ordre public. This theory has French origins, but is also widely 
accepted out of France and, in the Brussels Convention context, it has been endorsed by AG Daimon in case 
145/86, Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v. Adelheid Krieg, [1988] ECR 645 at 668. See, in the general context 
of recognition and enforcement o f  foreign judgments, Kerameus, “Enforcement in the International Context”, 
in: 264 Recueil des Cours (1997) 179, p. 360, and in the context of the old Brussels Convention, R. Geimer and 
R.A. Schütze, Europäisches Zivi ¡Verfahrensrecht. Kommentar zum EuGVÜ und zum Lugano-Übereinkommen 
(München, 1997), pp. 458-459.
1560 This is also accepted in the context o f the 1968Brussels Convention. According to the commentaries, 
the national public policy notions of Art. 27(1) of that Convention include also Community public policy. See 
eg. Geimer and Schütze, supra (1997), p. 464; see also paras. 66-67 and 86 o f AG Alber’s Opinion in case Case 
C-38/98, SA Régie Nationale des Usines Renault v. Maxicar SpA and Orazio Formento, [2000] ECR 1-2973. 
The same must now be accepted with regard to Art. 34(1) Reg. 44/2001. In the context o f the 1980 Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, according to the accompanying Giuliano- 
Lagarde Report, it goes without saying that the public policy notion of Art. 16 of this Convention includes 
Community public policy, which has become an integral part of the ordre public of the Member States (OJ 
[1980] C282, p. 38).
1561 See above. This sensible approach does not seem, on the other hand, to be followed by the 
Commission’s recent “Rome II” regulation proposal on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (cited 
supra), which in Arts. 22 and 23 distinguishes between national and Community public policy exceptions. This 
is probably due to poor drafting rather than to a deliberate decision on this point. In any event, the fact that 
Community public policy is integrated into national public policy is but a direct consequence of the nature of 
Community law, which is not something separate of or foreign to national law, but rather integrated thereto.
1502 Cited supra. For commentaries of that case see inter alia Idot, (1999) Reverb. 639, Radicati di Brozolo, 
supra (1999), p. 665 et seq.\ Komninos, 37 CMLRev. 459 (2000); Wey er, “Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Vorgaben 
für das nationale Zivilverfahren: Verpflichtung der nationalen Zivilgerichte zur Anwendung der Art. 81, 82
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The facts of this case date back to 1986, when a licensing agreement was signed between on 
the one hand Benetton International, a Dutch company established in Amsterdam, and on the 
other hand Eco Swiss China Time, a Hong Kong company, and Bulova Watch, a company 
established in the United States. According to the contract, Benetton granted Eco Swiss the 
right to manufacture and sell watches using the words “Benetton by Bulova”. The agreement 
provided for a complicated market sharing arrangement, the net result of which was that Eco 
Swiss was precluded from selling in Italy, whereas Bulova was precluded from selling in all 
other Member States o f the then EEC. The licensing agreement1563 included an arbitration 
clause, according to which all disputes were to be settled by arbitration in accordance w ith  
the rules of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute and the applicable law was to be Dutch law. 
In 1991, Benetton unilaterally terminated the agreement prematurely and the matter was 
referred to arbitration. As a result of the arbitration, there were tw o arbitral awards rendered: 
an interim (partial final) award in 1993 and a final arbitral award in 1995. The interim award 
found Benetton liable for breach o f contract and the final one awarded Eco Swiss damages as  
a result o f Benetton’s breach. Benetton commenced a  series of proceedings to resist the 
enforcement o f the arbitral awards. Among these proceedings, those o f interest to the present 
case are the application under Article 1065 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (DCCP) to  
the District Court of The Hague seeking an annulment (vemietiging) of both arbitral awards, 
and the connected application under Article 1066 DCCP to suspend enforcement of the final 
arbitral award until a final decision is made on the application for setting aside. In both 
proceedings the main argument of Benetton was that the arbitral awards by upholding and 
seeking to enforce an anti-competitive market-sharing agreement, which was void under 
Article 81(2) EC, were contrary to EC competition law and, thus, to ordre public, the 
violation of which constitutes under Dutch law one o f the grounds for the setting aside of an 
arbitral award. It is in the context of the second proceedings, the suspension proceedings, that 
the case reached the European Court o f Justice.
The Hoge Raad was basically concerned with the following questions: Under Article 
1065(1 )(e) DCCP an arbitral award can be set aside, if  it violates public policy (ordre public). 
That would be the case, where the award is incompatible with fundamental mandatory rules, 
but, according to the Dutch Supreme Court, the simple disregard of Dutch competition lawr, 
as it then stood, would not generally qualify as an ordre public violation. There were though
EGV”, 35 EuR 145 (2000); Poillot-Peruzzetto, supra (2000), p. 299 etseq.; Liebscher, “European Public Policy: 
A Black BoxT, 17(3) Jlnt'lArb 73 (2000).
1563 The agreement was never notified to the European Commission, nor was it covered by a block 
exemption, as it appears from the findings of the Court of Appeal of The Hague.
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some doubts if such also were the conclusion, when EC competition law was at stake.1564 
Another question was that, since none of the parties had raised the EC competition law issue 
during the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal did not deal and could not have dealt with 
it ex officio, because in such a case it would have decided ultra petita and this would have 
consequently rendered its aw ard liable to be set aside by virtue o f Article 1065(I)(c) DCCP. 
These rules, according to the Hoge Raad, were justified by the general interest in the 
effective administration of arbitral proceedings and they were not more unfavourable to the 
application of.Community law, than to the application of national law. However, the referring 
court was still in doubt as to whether these procedural rules, as applied in arbitration, might 
be compatible with Community law. Its doubts were based on the Nordsee ruling, which had 
denied access under Article 234 EC to arbitrators, but, by way of set-off, had entrusted 
national courts, while they exercise their supervision and review powders over arbitration, with 
the task to ensure that a preliminary question on Community law reaches Luxembourg, if  
need be.
The Court's judgment has been criticised for having been decided only from a Community 
lawr angle, without introducing into the debate any examination of the specificity of 
arbitration or o f issues of private international law.1565 This is a valid criticism more with 
regard to the Advocate General’s Opinion.1566 In our view, the Court in Eco Swiss managed 
rather well to tackle the real problems connected with arbitration and EC competition law, 
which basically were the extent of a national court’s control over arbitral awards, the ordre 
public nature o f EC competition provisions and the duty of arbitrators to apply such 
provisions even ex officio.
In dealing with the extent o f  reviewr o f arbitral awards the Court recognised the legitimate 
interest of Member States that such review be limited. However, in view of the fundamental 
importance o f Article 81 EC and having regard to the necessity of a uniform and effective 
application o f Community competition law, something which under Article 10 EC only 
national courts can safeguard, it w'ent on to stress that such national courts were under a duty
1564 The Hoge Raad referred in that respect to Van Schijndel, op.cit. According to that case, national courts 
are under a duty to apply ex officio binding iules of Community law, such as EC competition law, unless 
national procedural principles (such as the passivity of justice in civil litigation) do not allow' this (see above). 
The Dutch Supreme Court’s own interpretation of that case was that EC competition provisions were not to be 
regarded as mandatory rules of such a fundamental nature that could substantiate a public policy violation.
15b5 See Blaise and Idot, “Chronique concurrence (année 1999)”, 36 RTDE 741 (2000), p. 791.
iX6 See Komninos, 37 CMLRev. 459 (2000), pp. 475^176.
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to set aside awards that violate the competition rules.1567 O f particular importance was under 
the Court’s reasoning the inability of arbitrators to address Article 234 EC preliminary 
references on matters o f Community law to the Court o f Justice as a result o f Nordsee.1568 It 
was up to national courts to send such references to Luxembourg, while exercising the ir 
review powers over arbitral awards. Obstructive national procedural rules, such as the rule 
that a  party may not raise for the first time issues at a  setting aside proceeding, should not, 
therefore, be followed.1569 1570
With equal approval one has to see the Court’s recognition that EC competition rules express 
a Community public policy, which is integrated in each national notion o f  ordre public}'10 
To reach that conclusion the Court stressed the competition provisions’ primacy in the  
Treaty, since “Article 81 constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the 
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the  
functioning of the internal market” .1571 Reference was also made to the automatic nullity o f  
all anti-competitive agreements in Article 81(2) EC.1572 It is noteworthy that the Court 
proceeded to the pronouncement as to the public policy nature of the Treaty competition rules 
by choosing to refer to the 1958 United Nations New York Convention on the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, which in Article V(2)(b) includes a public policy
li67 Eco Swiss, op.cit., paras. 35-37. Even before Eco Swiss it was accepted by commentators that a national 
court was bound by Art. 10 EC not to enforce an arbitral award that was contrary to EC law. See e.g. Amull, 
“References to the European Court”, 15 ELRev. 375 (1990), p. 377, Temple Lang, supra (1990), p. 649.
1568 Eco Swiss, op.cit., para. 40.
1569 As mentioned above, the possibility of an A rt 234 EC reference has been used as a criterion for the 
effectiveness of Community law in other cases too, most notably in Peterbroeck, op.cit., paras. 13-21, where it 
was one of the decisive features that rendered a national procedural rule contrary to EC law. See also De Bürca, 
“National Procedural Rules and Remedies: The Changing Approach of the Court of Justice”, in: Lonbay & 
Biondi (Eds.), Remedies fo r  Breach o f  EC Law {C hichester, 1997), p. 43 etseq.\ Prechal, supra (1998), p. 694.
1570 The ordre public character o f EC competition law has also been accepted by national courts, hi the 
context of arbitration, the German Supreme Court has affirmed that Art 81 EC, like German domestic 
competition law, forms an integral part o f German public policy (öffentliche Ordnung), and its violation leads to 
the non-enforcement of an offending arbitral award (BGII, 27.2.69, KZR 3/68 -  Fruchtsäfte, 19 WuW 504 
(1969)). In that case, the arbitration tribunal had awarded damages for breach of contract but the court 
considered that the absolute territorial protection and the non-competition clauses of the contract were 
incompatible with EC competition law and therefore the arbitral award violated German public policy. 
Subsequently, in BGH, 31.5.72, KZR 43/71 -Eiskonfekt, 22 WuW 824 (1972), the same court stressed anew the 
ordre public nature of EC competition law, though this time it raised no objection to an arbitral award that was 
rendered in a case where a French-German exclusive distribution agreement with absolute territorial protection 
clauses w as found not to be appreciable in the sense of Art. 81(1) EC (de minimis). For a recent German case 
see OLG Düsseldrorf, 21.7.04, VI-Sch (Kart) 1/02 -  Regenerative Wärmeaustauscher, 56 WuW 281 (2006). In 
Austria the Oberster Gerichtshof in a judgment preceding Eco Swiss has also stressed that Arts. 81 and 82 EC, 
being fundamental provisions of the single market, also form part o f the Austrian ordre public (OGH, 23-2-98, 3 
Ob 115/95, 40 ZfRV 25 (1999); (1999) RevArb. 385; XXIV YCA 919 (1999)). See also Michaels, 
“Anerkennung internationaler Schiedssprüche und ordre public”, 40 ZfRV 5 (1999); Reiner, “Zur Vollstreckung 
eines Schiedsspruchs nach dem Europäischen Übereinkommen von 1961 trotz Aufhebung im Ursprungsland 
und zum Umfang der ordre public-Kontrolle nach Artt. 81,82 EGV”, 20 IPRax 323 (2000).
15,1 Eco Swiss, op.cit., para. 36.
1512 Ibid.
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for non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign awards.1573 The Court chose to do this, 
although it was not requested about this question by the referring court and indeed the New 
York Convention was not applicable to the case at issue, because the award had been 
rendered domestically and was subject to a setting aside and not to an exequatur procedure in 
a foreign country. This means that the Court intended to give a positive pronouncement as to 
the Community public policy nature of the EC competition rules, also in the international 
context of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.1574 The requirement that 
arbitral awards be submitted to a “communitarised” notion o f public policy deserves 
approval. Any different solution would give rise to an unprecedented fomm shopping inside 
the Community, where parties would opt for the jurisdiction that would be less interposing on 
arbitral proceedings and awards.1575
Before we conclude,1576 however, a question arises whether this Community public policy is 
independent o f its national counter-part, namely, whether it could still lead to the annulment 
or non enforcement of an arbitral award, even if the national law in question did not provide 
for such a ground. Eco Swiss states that an arbitral award contrary to Article 81 EC must be 
annulled by a national court Mwhere its domestic mies of procedure require”1577 the latter to 
safeguard national rules of public policy. However, this should not be read as meaning that 
only if  the national law provides for a comparable remedy will an arbitral awrard be annulled 
for violation o f Community public policy. Even in the case where a national law does not 
provide for a public policy exception, the effectiveness of Community law could still make 
indispensable a review of arbitral awards on Community public policy grounds.1578 
This question may not be purely hypothetical, as one might think at first sight. It is true that 
public policy exceptions can be found in all legal systems and that even the most advanced 
proposals within the European Union to create a European judicial area stop short of 
proposing the abolition of the ordre public exception.1579 However, the greater openness 
towards international arbitration in the last decades and the increasing desire of states to
1573 Eco Swiss, op.cit., paras. 38-39.
1574 In other words, the Court held that even those Member States that follow a restrictive reading of the 
public policy exception in this context (ordre public international) should take into account that in principle EC 
competition law pertains to that ordre public international.
1575 In Eco Swiss the Dutch Supreme Court noted that competition law in general would not fall under the 
Dutch notion of public policy (see supra).
1576 We leave for later the Court’s ruling (or non-ruling) on whether arbitrators have a duty to apply EC 
competition law ex officio.
1577 Eco Swiss, op.cit., para 37.
1578 See above on national procedural autonomy and its Community law limits.
1579 Compare, however, the recent Regulation 805/2004 o f 21 April 2004 Creating a European Enforcement 
Order fo r  Uncontested Claims, OJ [2004] L 143/15, where an ordre public exception is absent and pan- 
European enforcement of the relevant orders is fully guaranteed.
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attract the arbitration business in their territories by enacting arbitration-friendly statutes 
means that there is an increasing trend in some national arbitration laws to give parties the 
possibility to waive their rights to apply for the setting aside of the arbitral award.
The few national laws that have followed this course, provide for such a possibility only w ith  
regard to international arbitration or when there are no direct links o f the arbitration or o f  its 
parties with the territory o f the respective state. In other words, this is merely an incentive to  
foreign parties to arbitrate in an arbitration-friendly site. Switzerland was the first country to  
adopt such a radical pro-arbitration policy, but this was copied up to a certain degree b y  
Belgium and Sweden. The Belgian case is unique in giving the possibility to the parties to  
explicitly agree in the arbitration clause to waive their right to apply for the setting aside o f  
the awrard.1580 This possibility seems to cover annulment actions even for serious public 
policy violation. The Swedish case is different. There, it is possible for the parties with no 
links to Sweden to agree to limit their right to challenge the award before Swedish courts.1581 
According to the Swedish courts, mere reference to the ICC Arbitration Rules and to their 
Article 28(6), as it currently stands, would not suffice, but an express agreement would be 
necessary.1582 However, this right o f the parties to exclude or limit the application o f the 
grounds for setting aside an award does not seem to extend to grounds based on non- 
arbitrability and public policy. Indeed, under Swedish law it is not possible for the parties to  
agree to exclude the setting aside o f an arbitral award when the latter “is clearly incompatible 
with the basic principles o f the Swedish legal system”, a term thought o f as referring to  
public policy.1583
Whether the Belgian provision is incompatible with the principle o f effectiveness o f  
Community law is probably not something that can be answered in abstracto. In our view', 
effectiveness of Community competition law would require a Belgian court to set aside an 
arbitral aw ard on Community public policy grounds, even if the parties to an international 
arbitration with no links to Belgium have excluded the possibility o f setting aside 
proceedings, only in very narrow factual situations, w hen it seems clear that there will be no 
possibility that the forum of enforcement will pay due respect to EC competition law. To give
0 Art. 1717(4) Code Judiciaire,
1581 See s. 51 of the Arbitration Act. On older case law in Sweden in this direction, see Boqvist, “Exécution 
des sentences arbitrales en Suède”, (1991)RDAI/IBLJ 1145, pp. 1164-1165.
1582 Art. 28(6) of the 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules reads: “Every Award shall be binding on the parties. By 
submitting the dispute to arbitration under these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any Award without 
delay and shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly 
be made.”
1583 S. 51 read in conjunction with s. 33(2) of the Arbitration Act.
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a theoretical example, if the Korean and Japanese members o f an export cartel with clear anti­
competitive effects in the EU territory were to arbitrate for some reason in Belgium a dispute 
relating to the function of the cartel, the two parties had excluded the possibility of judicial 
review in Belgium, and the only foreseeable places for the award’s enforcement were Korea 
and Japan, then in those exceptional circumstances if one of the parties were to bring a setting 
aside action in Belgium, the Belgian court should probably admit his action notwithstanding 
the agreement to exclude review o f the award, because otherwise the effectiveness of 
Community competition law would be put at risk.
cc. The Public Policy Nature of the Community Rules on Competition
The Court in Eco Swiss clearly deduces the ordre public character of the competition rules 
from their fundamental standing in the Treaty of Rome, in particular from Article 3(1 )(g) EC. 
It meticulously stresses the EC competition rules’ fundamental significance “for the 
accomplishment o f the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the 
functioning of the internal market.”1584 Some commentators have criticised severely the 
Court’s reasoning for relying upon Article 3(1 )(g) EC.1585 According to this line of argument, 
Articles 2 and 3 EC refer in a general and programmatic way to all Community policies and 
objectives. If they were to signify that these policies and objectives express a fundamental 
Community public policy, nothing would be left outside that public policy notion.1586 1587
However, this aigument fails to recognise the historically “specific” role that the Treaty 
competition provisions have played in the long course towards the creation of the internal 
market. The principle of free competition is not just one of the objectives of the Community, 
but, indeed, one o f ‘the Community’s primary objectives as well as one of the major tools 
through which to maintain and consolidate an integrated and unified European market”.ls87 
EC competition law, in other words, makes up the Union’s economic constitution and this has 
been recognised on numerous occasions by the Community Courts.1588
1564 Eco Swiss, op.ciLy paras. 36 and 37.
1585 Eco Swiss, op.cii., para. 36.
1580 See in particular C. Liebscher, The Healthy Award, Challenge in International Commercial Arbitration 
(The Hague/London/New York, 2003), p. 41 etseq.
1587 Tesauro, supra (2001), p. 259. On the primacy of competition law in the EC Treaty see further 
Basedow, “Zielkonflikte und Zielhierarchien im Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft”, in: Due, Lutter & 
Schwarze (Eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling, Vol. I (Baden-Baden, 1995), p. 49.
1588 See e.g. case 240/83, Procureur de la République v. Association de défense des brûleurs d'huiles 
usagées (ADBHV), [1985] ECR 531, para. 9: “the principles of free movement of goods and freedom of 
competition, together with freedom of trade as a fundamental right, are general principles of Community law of
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Thus, the fact that the Court in Eco Swiss referred to Article 3 EC does not o f course mean 
that almost all Treaty provisions have a public policy nature, but rather that the Treaty 
competition rules have such a standing because of their fundamental status in the Treaty. It 
should also be noted that sometimes this public policy character has been erroneously 
attributed not to the substantive nature of the EC competition rules, but to the supremacy and 
the direct effect of the latter.1589 Such a view would again arrive at the conclusion that almost 
all provisions of Community law pertain to public policy. This, perhaps good-intentioned, 
approach is nevertheless erroneous.1590 The sole fact o f a provision having direct effect, 
vertical or horizontal, is immaterial. It is not the direct effect of a Community provision tha t 
gives it an ordre public character, but rather its normative position in the whole Community 
legal order.1591
Finally, the fact that the Court in Eco Swiss engages in an examination of the EC competition 
provisions in order to declare their public policy character, by also relying on the absolute 
nullity o f Article 81(2) EC, implicitly denies that all provisions of Community law are rules 
of ordre public and should thus be taken into account ex officio by national courts.1592 If the 
Court shared the view that all Community law in general had a public policy character, then 
the Eco Swiss detailed reasoning would have been unnecessary, if not inadequate. In such a  
hypothetical case the Court of Justice could well have proceeded to a general statement on 
the ordre public nature o f EC law, in the national legal orders, which it did not, rightly so.
dd. The Scope of Public Policy Violation
While Eco Swiss clearly stated that the Treaty competition rules pertain to public policy, thus 
disagreeing with the Hoge Raad which had essentially held that if  it was up to itself, 
competition rules should not be considered a public policy matter in the context of review’ o f  
arbitral awards, it left open the question as to the scope o f the public policy exception. In
which the Court ensures observance”; Courage, op.cit., para. 20: “Article [81] of the Treaty constitutes a  
fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, 
in particular, for the functioning of the internal market” (quoting Eco Swiss)-, cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Commission, [2003] ECR 11-435, 
para. 193: “the competition rules, which are fundamental rules...”.
1589 See e.g. Kotsiris, supra (2000), p. 383, who considers the public policy nature of EC competition rules 
from the angle of their supranational and supreme character with regard to national laws.
1390 There have been national judgments that have attributed a public policy character to all Community law 
because of its direct effect (when such an effect exists) and its supremacy over national law. See e.g. OGH, 23- 
2-98, op.cit.
1591 Conversely, the fundamental or public policy character of a Community provision does not make it 
directly effective.
1592 See, in the same sense, Vilaras, supra (2000), p. 40.
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other words, the Court did not give a measure as to what exactly constitutes a violation of 
public policy. It is not clear whether for the Court of Justice any  violation or misapplication 
or ignorance o f  EC competition law would amount to a public policy violation.
In any event, apart from what the Court of Justice thought about this matter, which is at the 
end of the day only an ad hoc issue that national courts are better equipped to deal with, a 
reply as to what constitutes a public policy violation must take into account various 
exigencies. Effectiveness o f Community law is one, efficiency of competition law 
enforcement and deterrence is another, but there are also other conflicting interests and 
principles. Thus, the principle of finality o f arbitral awards, the importance o f arbitration for 
commerce within the EU, but also the broader importance o f arbitration for the international 
trade with developing countries which would use Europe’s own respect for arbitration as an 
example for their own attitudes, and other cultural factors must all be taken into account.
There is in fact a split in post-£co Swiss theory between a minimalist and a maximalist 
approach. According to the first approach, while the EC competition rules pertain to public 
policy, in practice it will be in extreme cases that an arbitral award will have to be annulled or 
refused recognition or enforcement. This would be when the arbitrators have put in effect 
hard core horizontal restrictions of competition that are repugnantly anti-competitive or when 
the arbitrators have completely ignored EC competition law although it was argued 
sufficiently clear by the parties, thus rendering an award that refers to a practice clearly anti­
competitive. In all other cases there should be no public policy violation, especially if the 
arbitrators took into account the competition law question yet decided it erroneously. 
Reviewing arbitral awards for errors, according to this line o f argument, would amount to 
revision au fond. The maximalist approach on the other hand relies on the rather general 
language of Eco Swiss and places more emphasis on the Community principle of 
effectiveness. According to this line o f argument, most violations of EC competition law, 
whose goal is always the protection of public interest, should qualify as public policy 
violation. Only very slight errors should be excusable and the arbitrators should be cautious 
when Community law is at stake, perhaps more so than in other comparable situations of 
national mandatory rules.1593
In our view', the minimalist approach would be preferable for pure policy reasons. These are:
(a) Arbitration is not just a creation o f private autonomy that merely constitutes an irritant 
for EC competition law, but is rather a very important transborder mechanism
1593 The minimalist and maximalist approaches are excellently presented by Radicati di Brozolo, supra 
(2004), p. 23 etseq.
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bringing commerce and persons together; especially in the context o f  Community law, 
arbitration is an important complement of the four freedoms and indeed it is not 
neglected by the Treaty o f  Rome. If we can speak o f a principle o f free movement o f  
judgments, we can also definitely speak o f a free movement o f  arbitral awards.1594
(b) While the exigencies o f Community law must be served, we must not lose sight o f  
the broader picture. In the global context arbitration is one of the most efficient 
mechanisms of trade and ultimately o f  globalisation, but remains always vulnerable 
because it is entirely dependent on all parties’ good will. It is to the interest o f  
industrialised countries to ensure its effectiveness and to “preach” its qualities to 
developing countries. Arbitration has on occasions come under fire by some countries 
as a ‘Western imposition” and there have been many incidents where courts in those 
countries were particularly hostile to it. It would really be regrettable if the courts o f  
more developed countries were to introduce exceptional mles of review of arbitral 
awards for specific fields. A spill-over to other fields is not difficult, besides, 
competition law is not more special than or different from other areas of law with 
increased public interest elements in a specific country’s domestic context.
(c) Finally, aside from the issue of the violation or ignorance of the competition rules by
an arbitration tribunal, competition law, a  mainly effects-oriented law, should bother 
more about actual or potential anti-competitive effects on a  market, produced or 
exacerbated by the validation, recognition or enforcement o f an arbitral award. It 
should only be in those cases where serious anti-competitive effects might be felt in a 
given territory, that an arbitral award should be reviewed in its substance and possibly- 
annulled or denied enforcement. A technical infringement of the mles only on paper, 
on the text of the arbitral award, should not attract attention. *
On the basis of the above, it seems to us that a  public policy violation and a  corresponding 
duty o f  national courts to set aside or refuse to enforce an arbitral award should only ensue in 
cases only o f a prima facie  illegality or conflict, or in cases where the competition law issue 
has been totally neglected by the arbitrators with the manifest aim to evade the competition 
mles.
Starting from the second situation, complete disregard o f EC competition law and failure to 
address the competition law point on the part o f the arbitrators, especially when the 
competition law' infringement is rather obvious and serious, may offend against public
1594 See below.
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policy.1595 1596It may also constitute a presumption of the parties’ (and the arbitrators’) intention 
to evade the law. But in such cases, one must be careful not to reward conduct by parties who 
choose not to raise the competition law issue during the arbitration proceedings and prefer to 
wait and see whether they lose or win, in order to challenge the award.
Then, not every incompatibility between the arbitral award and the competition rules should 
qualify as a public policy violation. The competition law violation must be very serious, 
indeed repugnant, in order for an arbitral award to be refused recognition or enforcement on 
public policy grounds.Iiw> A restriction of competition in a horizontal agreement is likely to be 
more detrimental for competition than a restriction in a vertical agreement.1597 A cartel would 
certainly qualify as a repugnant infringement of the competition rules.1598 Another similar 
distinction can be made between per se rules of prohibition and rule of reason competition 
law violations. It should be only per se violations that should attract attention by state courts 
when reviewing an arbitral award.1599
The simply erroneous application of EC competition law by arbitrators would not qualify as a 
violation of ordre public}600 otherwise the most fundamental principle of the finality of 
arbitral awards (prohibition o f the review on the merits - révision au fond) would be put at 
stake.1601 Errors o f law or fact are not considered a setting-aside ground, at least in the 
international arbitration context,1602 and are not a privilege o f the arbitrators. State courts 
make them and there is no reason to treat arbitral tribunals different than state courts. Then, it 
should also be borne in mind that arbitral awards are confidential in nature and are very rarely 
published. We wonder whether an unpublished award, which has been wrongly decided on 
competition law grounds, will have such a detrimental effect on the consistency of
1595 See Radicati di Brozolo, supra (1999), p. 690.
1596 See idem, pp. 688-691.
1597 See Liebscher, supra (2003), p. 44.
1598 See further idem, pp. 44-47.
1599 See Idem, p. 47.
1900 See Derains, “Specific Issues Arising in the Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules by Arbitration Courts”, 
in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f 
EC Antitrust Law (Oxfoid/Portland, 2003), p. 338.
1601 See Hanotiau, “L’arbitrage et le droit européen de la concurrence”, in: Briner, Derains et a i (Eds.), 
L'arbitrage et le droit européen, Actes du colloque international du CEPAN1 du 25 avril 1997 (Bruxelles, 
1997), pp. 57-58; Idot, “Panel Three Discussion: Arbitration Courts”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC Antitrust Law (Oxfoid/Portland, 2003), p. 
288; Blaise and Idot, supra (2003a), p. 331; Idot, supra (2004b), p. 182.
1602 See Gaitis, “International and Domestic Aibitiation Procedure: The Need for a Rule Providing a 
Limited Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards”, 15 Am.Rev.Int’lArb. 9 (2004), pp. 65- 
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enforcement of EC competition law. Only in very exceptional cases of gross errors made by 
the arbitrators, should such review o f the merits o f the award result in non-recognition.1603 
In the international context, the UNCITRAL Model Law and international conventions make 
it far more difficult, if  not impossible, for foreign arbitral awards to be reviewed in their 
merits by courts.1604 The public policy exception o f the New York Convention cannot also 
accommodate such inroads into the merits o f the case, as decided by the arbitral award. 
Indeed, it is globally accepted that the substantive public policy can mostly cover situations 
o f violation o f human rights, rather than the violation o f every conceivable substantive law 
that the state of enforcement deems important.1605 Thus, this provision has been interpreted in 
practice in a  very restrictive manner and the “unfortunate few”1606 cases o f its application 
have basically had to do either with cases resulting from outdated arbitration laws or with 
exceptional facts that truly warranted a refusal of enforcement.1607 In many continental 
European countries it is accepted that only a violation of the forum’s public policy in the 
international sense, the so-called ordre public international, would be liable to lead to the 
non-recognition and non-enforcement of an arbitral award. Indeed, one commentator points 
out the following:
‘Time has demonstrated ... that the public policy basis for refusing to recognize and 
enforce a foreign award is not only the most difficult ground to establish under Article 
V o f the [New York] Convention but further that the exception itself is rapidly being 
emasculated by an evolving trend toward the application o f ‘international public 
policy’ and a heightened deference to considerations of international comity in 
connection with the enforcement of foreign awards”.1608 
In sum, it seems that in all cases where the arbitrators did apply the EC competition rules, 
having fully considered the arguments of the parties and having provided a substantial
1603 See Komninos, “Assistance to Arbitral Tribunals in the Application of EC Competition Law”, in: 
Ehlcrmann & Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Amtual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement o f EC  
Antitrust Law (Oxfoid/Portland, 2003), p. 371; Radicati di Brozolo, supra (2004), pp. 28-32, in particular, p. 29.
1604 See Gaitis, supra (2004), p. 52 et seq.
1005 See e.g. as to the position in Germany, Sangiovanni, “L’applicazione in Germania della convenzione di 
New York sul riconoscimento e l’esecuzione dei lodi arbitrali stranieri”, 41 Riv.Dir.Int.Priv.Proc. 41 (2005), p. 
64.
1606 See Van den Berg, “Refusals of Enforcement under the New York Convention of 1958: The 
Unfortunate Few ”, in: Arbitration in the Next Decade - Special Supplement 1999, The ICC International Court 
of Arbitration Bulletin (Paris, 1999), p. 75 et seq.
1607 See idem, pp. 85-88.
1008 See Gaitis, supra (2004), p. 71. Compare the US case Parsons & If’hittemore (h>erseas Co. Inc. v. 
Société Générale de I ’Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974), at 974. See also Fouchard, Gaillard, 
Goldman, supra (1999), p. 996; Liebscher, supra (2000), pp. 73-74; Poudret and Besson, supra (2002), p. 907; 
Julian D.M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis and Stefan M. Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(The Hague/London/New York, 2003), p. 721.
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reasoning in their award, review of the award should not be possible, even if the award erred 
in that application.1609 Finally, it must always be realised that in the context of enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, where the scope of the public policy exception is quite narrow, it is 
only the effects o f  the recognition of an award in the territory o f the forum of enforcement 
that matter and not the offending award’s mere existence. Only if  those effects are intolerable 
and would run counter to the most fundamental principles o f law and morality in that 
jurisdiction, should there be a public policy violation.1610
ee. The Parallel of the Brussels Convention
It is noteworthy that the Court of Justice has on some occasions interpreted the concept of 
public policy in the context o f the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement 
o f judgments. It has invariably followed a very restrictive interpretation because it has 
considered free movement of judgments as an important principle for the European
integration.
Indeed, free movement o f judgments has been considered instrumental for the 
accomplishment of the common market. It is also considered to be the cornerstone o f the 
European area of freedom, justice and security.1611 It has been termed a federating 
instrument1612 and reflects more generally the ‘federal” principle of full faith and credit1613 
and more specifically the country of origin principle,1614 which finds particular application in 
the recognition o f judicial decisions Union-wide irrespective o f  the Member States of origin 
and enforcement.
The Court of Justice has held, in particular that the purpose o f  293(d) EC, on the basis o f 
which the Member States concluded the Brussels Convention, is “to facilitate the working of 
the common market through the adoption of rules of jurisdiction for disputes relating thereto
1609 See Radicati di Brozolo, supra (2004), pp. 28-29; Idot, supra (2004b), p. 182, who goes as far as 
accepting that even an arbitral award that is manifestly contrary to EC competition lawr would probably not 
constitute a violation of public policy, as long as the EC competition issue has been raised and debated during 
the arbitration.
l0l° See Liebscher, supra (2000), pp. 83-84.
1011 See Art. 65 EC. See also F. Rigaux and M. Fallon, Droit internationalprivé (Bruxelles, 2005), p. 433; 
Kohler, “Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung in Zivilsachen im europäischen Justizraum”, 124 ZSR II
263 (2005), p. 264 etseq.
1012 See Goldman, “Un traité fédérateur : La convention entre les États membres de la CEE sur la 
reconnaissance et l’éxécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale”, 7 RTDE I (1971 ).
1613 See P. Bravati, Europa e processo civile, Metodi e prospettive (Torino, 2003), p. 11; Wittwer, “Die 
EuGH-Rechtsprechung zum Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht aus den Jahren 2003 und 2004”, 13 ZEuP 868
(2005), p. 869.
1614 See Bariatti, “La futura disciplina delle obbligazioni non contrattuali nel quadro della 
comunitarizzazione del diritto intemazionale privato”, 41 Riv.Dir.IntPriv.Proc. 5 (2005), p. 15 etseq.
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and through the elimination, as far as is possible, of difficulties concerning the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in the territory o f  the Contracting States ... In fact it is not 
disputed that the Brussels Convention helps to ensure the smooth working o f the internal 
market”.1615 The Court has further recognised that
“the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the tmst which the Contracting 
States accord to each other’s legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual 
trust which has enabled a compulsory system o f  jurisdiction to be established, which 
all the courts within the purview of the Convention are required to respect, and as a 
corollary the waiver by those States o f the right to apply their internal rules on 
recognition and enforcement o f foreign judgments in favour o f a  simplified 
mechanism for the recognition and enforcement o f  judgments”.1616 
With regard to the specific question o f the public policy exception, Article 27(1) of that 
Convention provided that “a judgment shall not be recognised if  such recognition is contrary 
to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought”. The Court o f Justice has 
consistently stressed in a series o f cases that the public policy exception in that provision is 
meant to operate only in ‘‘exceptional cases”.1617 In a judgment rendered after Eco Swiss,161* 
the Court o f Justice had to examine whether a French judgment that had allegedly violated 
Community law could be resisted in Italy and thus be refused recognition on public policy 
grounds. This case was the latest episode in a long-standing controversy surrounding 
protective rights in respect o f an ornamental design for automobile bodywork parts.1619 
Renault had sought to enforce in Italy against the Italian defendants a judgment of a French 
court ordering the latter to pay Renault damages for loss incurred as a result o f activities 
found to constitute forgery'. The Italian defendants alleged that the exercise o f these exclusive
1615 Case C-281/02, Andrew Omtsu v. N. B. Jackson, trading as “Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas" et al., 
[2005] ECR1-1383, para. 33. See the comment bv Idot, (2005-5) Europe 29, p. 30.
1616 Case C-l 16/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v.' MISAT Sri, [2003] ECR 1-14693, para. 72. This was a case 
raising very sensitive issues, since the referring Austrian court was implicitly calling into question the judicial 
practices of another Member State (Italy). The particular question was whether Art. 21 of the Brussels 
Convention (lis pendens) fully applied to a case, where the duration of proceedings before the courts of the 
Contracting State, in which the court first seized is established, is excessively long. The Court’s approach was 
one of principle. It relied heavily upon the internal logic and the objectives of the Brussels Convention, in order 
to exclude any possibility of parallel proceedings in Europe. See further the balanced critique of Fentiman, 42 
CMLRev. 241 (2005). See also case C-l 59/02, Gregory Paul Turner v. FelixFareed Ismail Gravit et a i, [2004] 
ECR 1-3565, para. 24.
lt>17 Hoffmann v. Krieg, op.cit., para. 21; case C-78/95, Bemardus Hendrikman and Maria Feyen v. 
Magenta Druck & Verlag GmbH, [1996] ECR 1-4943, para. 23; case C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v. André 
Bamberski, [2000] ECR 1-1935, para. 21.
1618 Case C-38/98, Renault, op.cit.
1019 See already case 53/87, Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ricantbio per Autoveicoli and 





■ rights were contrary to the free movement provisions of the EC Treaty' and to Article 82 EC,
therefore the judgment of the French court could not be declared enforceable in Italy because 
I it was contrary to public policy.
, That the free movement provisions o f the EC Treaty and Article 82 EC pertain to the public
i policy notion o f Article 27(1) o f the Brussels Convention was explicitly stressed by Advocate
j General Alber in his Opinion1620 and implicitly accepted by the Court.1621 The Court,
i however, made it clear that a  public policy violation was to operate in very' exceptional
circumstances and that an alleged violation of fundamental provisions of Community law did 
not suffice as such.1622
The “communitarisation” of the Brussels Convention through the adoption of Regulation 
44/2001 has further reduced the scope o f the public policy exception by adding an important 
qualification to the text of the current Article 34(1) of that Regulation: the recognition of the 
foreign judgment must be “manifestly” contrary to the public policy of the forum. This is 
indicative of the exceptional character of this provision,1623 which has apparently led to the 
non-recognition/non-enforcement of judgments only in a handful of occasions in the past.1624 
On the basis of the above an important argument can be made that surely the function of the 
public policy exception in the context o f arbitration must not be different from its function in 
the context of the enforcement of judgments. Indeed, the necessity o f recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards was mentioned side-by-side in Article 293 EC with the 
necessity of recognition and enforcement o f judgments. That there was no follow-up in the 
European context in the sense of a specific convention on arbitration following the example 
o f the Brussels Convention is not due to the fact that arbitration was seen differently but, as 
we have mentioned above, rather to the fact that there was already a very efficient tool to 
ensure enforcement of arbitral awards worldwide, and thus also within the then EEC, the 
New York Convention. This ‘Treaty parameter” of arbitration must therefore not be missed. 
Exactly' like free movement of judgments, free movement of arbitral awards within the EU
lo2° See paras. 66-67 and 86 of AG Alber’s Opinion.
1621 Renault, op.cit., paras. 31-32.
1622 Ibid, paras. 26 to 32 (emphasis added).
1623 See in this regard Tagaras, “The Revision of the Brussels Convention by Regulation 44/2001”, 52 
Nomiko Vima 1143 (2004) [in Greek], p. 1162, who stresses that this amendment of the Brussels Convention 
text carries only a sy mbolic weight, since, in any event, the European and national courts had interpreted this 
exception very restrictively.
624 For a German example see BGH, 16.9.93, 46 NJW 3269 (1993); for a French one see Cass.civ., 16*3- 
99, Pordea v. Ste Times Newspapers Ltd., 126 JDI (Clunet) 773 (1999), [2000] ILPr. 763; for an English one see 
IE. Maronier v. B. Lam er  (CA), [2002] ILPr. 39.
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furthers European integration and is extremely beneficial to the four freedoms. It should 
therefore be accorded the same degree o f deference.
ff. The National Prodigy of Eco Swiss
It is interesting to note that following Eco Swiss, the national courts that adopted the most 
maximalist approach in subjecting EC competition law-related arbitral awards to a full- 
fledged control on public policy grounds» have proven to be Dutch. It should not be missed 
that the Dutch Supreme Court in its Eco Swiss preliminary reference had conveyed to the 
Court o f Justice that the then applicable national competition rules would not qualify as rules 
o f  public policy, on the basis o f which an arbitral award could be set aside.1625 The new over- 
deferential approach might be due to the particular impact the Eco Swiss ruling had in the 
Dutch judicial context.
MDI represents the first judgment rendered by an EU Member State court whereby an arbitral 
award is not recognised and enforced on public policy grounds because o f  the award's 
violation of EC competition law. The facts o f the case were that an exclusive licensing 
agreement was entered into by Marketing Displays International (MDI) and Van Raalte 
Reclame (VR) in relation to interchangeable aluminium frames for billboards. In particular, 
the agreement granted an exclusive licence to VR for the territory consisting of Belgium, The 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The agreement also provided for a grant-back clause with 
respect to improvements made by VR on technologies licensed to VR by MDI. The contract 
also contained an American Arbitration Association clause and a choice of the law of the 
State o f Michigan and o f the United States.
Further to a dispute as to VR’s obligations to pay royalties to MDI, arbitration proceedings 
were initiated. VR at the outset appeared in the arbitration procedure but withdrew shortly 
before the rendering of the arbitral awards. The arbitration procedure led to three awards: In 
2001 a “partial and interim arbitral award” found VR in breach of contract, in 2002 a “first 
amended partial final arbitral aw ard” confirmed the previous ruling and enjoined VRto pay a 
periodic penalty payment per day of non-compliance, and in 2003 a “second amended partial 
final arbitral award” confirmed the previous rulings and ordered VRto pay damages to MDI. 
MDI petitioned a Dutch lower court to enforce the three US arbitral awards pursuant to 
Article 1075 o f the Dutch Code o f  Civil Procedure and to the New York Convention. VR
1625 Eco Swiss, op.cii., para. 24.
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resisted enforcement of the arbitral awards inter alia on public policy grounds, because in its 
view the exclusive agreement upheld by the awards was contrary to Article 81(1) EC due to 
its market-sharing elements.1626 The agreement was further found ineligible to fall under the 
then applicable block exemption Regulation 240/1996 on technology transfers, because o f the 
grant-back clause which the Regulation did not allow. There was also no possibility o f 
individual exemption because the agreement was never notified to the Commission.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal of The Hague referred to Eco Swiss and considered that 
Article 1 of the agreement was prima facie anti-competitive, because it awarded VR an 
exclusive licence to manufacture and sell products in the countries of the Benelux. It also 
noted that the 2001 award found VR in breach of contract because the latter was offering 
products protected by MDI patents outside its exclusivity territory. The Court then referred to 
the block exemption Regulations applicable at the relevant time and noted that they all 
disapproved o f grant-back clauses. These were, in the Court’s wrords, “intolerable 
restrictions”. In these circumstances, the Dutch court considered that the enforcement o f the 
three US arbitral awards should be denied pursuant to Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention.1627
On the entirely opposite side, following the minimalist approach, lies a recent judgment o f 
the Paris Court o f Appeal, a court particularly experienced both in competition law and 
arbitration.1628 In Thales the Paris Court o f Appeal accepted that, while EC competition law is 
a matter o f public policy, the violation o f public policy in an international arbitration case 
must be “flagrant, effective and concrete”, in order to lead to the setting aside of an arbitral 
award.1629 In this case, an arbitral award awarded damages to Euromissile on the basis o f a 
licensing agreement, which stipulated that Euromissile wrould hold for twenty wars the 
exclusive right to produce and sell a missile in Europe. A dispute arose when Thales decided 
to proceed itself to the production of the missile, through a subsidiary-. Euromissile brought 
the dispute before an ICC arbitration tribunal, which rendered a partial award in 2000 and a 
final one in 2002. The arbitrators awarded € 108 million to Euromissile and Thales applied to 
the Paris Court of Appeal to set the award aside, because the licensing agreement was
1620 Pres. Rechtbank The Hague, Marketing Displays International Inc. v. VR Van Raalte Reclame BV, 27- 
5-04, KG/RK 2002-979 and 2002-1617, in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts.
1627 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Marketing Displays International Inc. v. VR Van Raalte Reclame BV, 
Case No. 04/694 and 04/695, in: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitmst/national_courts.
1<>28 The Paris Court of Appeal is the competent court to hear appeals against the Conseil de la concurrence 
and at the same time it hears numerous setting aside actions against arbitral awards rendered in Paris, seat of the 
ICC and international arbitration site.
1639 CA Paris, 18-11-04, Thales v. Euromissile, (2005) Rev.Arb. 750.
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allegedly incompatible with the EC competition rules and thus null and void. In particular, 
Thales's competition argument was based on the allegedly excessive duration of the 
exclusivity arrangement and on the market-sharing elements therein.1630 
The competition law question had not been raised by any o f the parties (or the arbitrators 
themselves) during the arbitration proceedings, and it was only at the review stage that Thalès 
relied upon it to make the public policy argument. The parties had expert legal advice 
throughout the arbitration proceedings and the arbitrators were experienced, yet the 
competition issue never arose. The Court of Appeal noted this rather inconsistent behaviour 
o f the plaintiff (venire contra factum proprium) and was not impressed by the EC 
competition law point. Although it did accept that the competition law arguments were not 
totally frivolous, it held that they required a detailed examination of the substance, for which 
the court and the setting aside procedure were ill-suited, otherwise this would mean 
reviewing the merits of the case (révision au fond), which French law, like most modem 
arbitration laws, do not allow for. It is evident from the judgment that the court considered 
the competition law7 argument not totally frivolous but, at the same time, not “eye-catching” 
enough to substantiate a violation o f  public policy. The infringement o f the competition rules 
had to be “manifest” for the setting aside action to be successful.
Of the two national judgments, in our view, the most disappointing one is the Dutch 
judgment. It constitutes a dangerous precedent in Europe because it creates an exception to 
the cardinal mle of finality of arbitral awards and prejudices the effectiveness o f the New 
York Convention. It shows also the excesses o f the maximalist approach, which must be 
rejected particularly in cases such as the one at issue where the agreement merely contained a 
clause disapproved by a block exemption Regulation. Such a failure cannot suffice to qualify 
as a violation of Article 81(1) EC1631 and certainly as a public policy violation. It should take 
much more than a mere failure to fall into the ambit o f a block exemption and to notify an 
agreement to an antitrust authority to lead a court to the dramatic option to refuse to recognise 
a foreign arbitral award. Besides, state courts must draw7 the appropriate conclusions from
1630 It should be mentioned that under EC competition law such a horizontal technology transfer agreement 
would have to be examined in its economic and legal context, in order to conclude whether it has an object or 
effect to restrict competition. Then, it must be ascertained whether it benefits from a block exemption 
regulation, and finally w hether, notwithstanding its restrictive character, it has countervailing economic qualities 
that make it lawful.
1631 Under the system of enforcement established by Reg. 1/2003, an agreement that cannot fall under a 
block exemption regulation is not automatically anti-competitive but must be analysed under Art. 81(3) EC. It 
appears that the Dutch court did not consider this, perhaps because it thought that the agreement was not 
temporally covered by the legal exception system and probably had not been notified to the European 
Commission. On the temporal problem see supra. In any event such formalism must be rejected.
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situations where parties elect not to raise the competition law point during the arbitration 
proceedings but only at the belated stage of judicial review.
The French judgment, on the other hand, is an arbitration-friendly application of the Eco 
Swiss principles and deserves to be approved. Although the reasoning may not at times be 
perfect,1632 the policy behind this judgment is very sound. The conclusion to draw from that 
case is that the arbitrators’ failure to apply EC competition law will lead to the annulment or 
non-recognition/non-enforcement of the arbitral award on public policy grounds only in 
exceptional cases o f manifest hard core restrictions o f competition. This would be the case 
when the arbitrators uphold a price-fixing or market-sharing cartel, thus essentially being the 
executive organs thereof, or when they adjudicate upon a dispute over the execution of an 
illegal bid-rigging arrangement. The fact also that the plaintiff in this case, a multinational 
company with access to excellent legal representation and resources, chose not to raise the 
competition law question before the arbitration tribunal but rather to await the result o f the 
arbitration and, if  unfavourable to it, then to raise it in a  setting aside proceeding, is indicative 
o f the problems that would be created for arbitration in general if the maximalist approach 
were to be adopted.
gg, A rbitrators’ “Duty” to Apply EC Competition Law
The Court of Justice’s most ingenious ruling (or non-ruling) in Eco Swiss has to do with the 
referring court’s question concerning the arbitrators’ duty to apply Community competition 
law even ex officio, when no party raises it in the arbitral proceedings. The Court after having 
asserted in a powerful way the public policy nature o f the Treaty competition rules and the 
duties o f national courts to set aside on such grounds an arbitral award that violates Article 81 
EC, contrary to its Advocate General, who had concluded that arbitrators are not bound by 
Article 10 EC and are not under a duty to apply EC competition law ex officio, opted not to 
answer to that particular question, but to refer to its answ er on the other issues.1633 
Indeed, arbitral tribunals are not considered as judicial organs o f the Member States and are, 
therefore, not subject to any o f  the duties resulting from Article 10 EC. Thus, they are not 
directly bound by this provision, as national courts would be under certain circumstances, to
1632 For example, the court Fmds that to annul the award for not having raised the competition law issue and 
for having enforced an anti-competitive agreement would amount to révision au fond. This is incorrect in this 
case because competition law had not been applied at all by the arbitrators. We would speak of révision only in 
case the arbitration tribunal had applied EC competition law erroneously.
1633 Eco Swiss, supra 45, para. 42.
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apply EC competition law ex o f f i c i o However, one may reach a similar result in an 
indirect way. A fundamental concern o f the arbitrators is to render an award that will be 
enforceable.1635 In the most extreme cases, i f  the arbitrators’ award is prima facie non- 
enforceable because of a  manifest violation of EC competition law, it should not be excluded 
that the very performance of the contractual duties o f the arbitrators as against the parties 
might be considered as failed and the former may even have to return their fees.1636 In 
international commercial arbitration regard should also be given to Article 35 of the 1998 
ICC Rules o f Arbitration, according to which “the Arbitral Tribunal ... shall make every 
effort to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law”.1637 The efficiency o f  arbitration as 
an institution would be compromised, if arbitrators were to render awards that would be 
liable to non-enforcement or annulment, because of their incompatibility with mandatory' 
legal provisions, whose infringement surely constitutes a public policy violation. As a former 
Secretary-General of the ICC Court o f Arbitration stresses, referring to that problem in 
international commercial arbitration, “an international arbitrator is bound as regards the 
‘Societas Mercatorum’ to ensure that arbitration docs not become an instrument for fraud 
upon the legitimate interests of the State. If he neglects that duty, international arbitration will 
disappear, at the expense of the development o f international trade”.1638 
Therefore, it is recognised that “in reality’, the attitude and action of an arbitrator faced with 
an EC antitrust issue should be influenced by pragmatism rather than principle”.1639 
Particularly in cases where an infringement o f  EC competition law seems certain1640 and 
where an EU Member State is a likely forum for the enforcement of the award, the arbitrators
1034 See Temple Lang, “Panel Discussion: International Arbitration”, in: Hawk (Ed.), International Antitrust 
Law anti Policy 1994, Annual Proceedings o f  the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (New York/The Hague, 
1995), p. 419. '
m i See Idot, supra (1996), p. 570.
1636 See Burrichter, “Panel Three Discussion: Courts and Judges”, in: Ehlermann & Atanasiu (Eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford/Portland, 2001), p. 
481.
1637 See the opinion of an former Secretary-General of the ICC International Court of Arbitration: Schwartz, 
“The Domain of Arbitration and Issues of Arbitrability: The View from the ICC”, 9 ICSID Rev. 17 (1994), p. 
23, according to whom this Article entails that arbitrators may, if necessary, invoke of their own motion 
mandatory rules of lawr that may have an impact on the validity of the transaction that is the subject of 
arbitration.
1638 See Derains, “Report”, in: Competition anti Arbitration Law, Institute of International Business Law 
and Practice, ICC (Paris, 1993), p. 267. See also the Report Adopted by the Working Party on Arbitration and 
Competition and Approved by the Executive Board o f the ICC on 4-4-84, in: (1984) Rev.Suisse Dr.Int.Conc., n° 
21,37, which stresses that “the arbitrators must avoid any decision incompatible w ith public policy if  they wish 
to ensure the effectiveness of the arbitration. If  they consider that they have jurisdiction, they should apply the 
rules of public policy. And it must be stressed that even when they are ‘amiable compositeurs’ they have to 
respect the rules of public policy” (p. 38).
See Lew, “Determination of Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction and the Public Policy Limitations on that 
Jurisdiction”, in: Lew (Ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (London, 1986), p. 80.
1640 On this question, see above.
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are expected to apply the competition provisions of the Treaty, even if the parties have not 
raised such issues, and, as judges of the contract, they can draw the relevant consequences as 
a result of this illegality and nullity o f the anti-competitive arrangement.1641 The same holds 
true even if the parties have opted for a non-EU Member State law as lex causae and 
regardless of the arbitral tribunal’s EU or extra-EU seat.1642
The Court’s preference not to assign in a direct way a duty to arbitrators to apply Community 
competition law, but rather to point to them towards this direction in an indirect way, i.e., via 
national courts, is to be approved. In other words, the rules of the game are that EU courts 
would strike down or refuse to recognise arbitral awards that manifestly violate EC 
competition law. The arbitrators are called by the Court to be aw are of this possibility and 
accordingly to exercise utmost caution so that they do not offend against the most significant 
principles of Community competition law. At the same time, this approach has as 
consequence that if the arbitrators, having these realities in mind, w ere indeed to take EC 
competition lawr into account ex officio, their aw ard would not be liable to annulment on ultra 
petita grounds, because their decision to raise of their own motion the competition law 
question would be guided by the public policy nature o f Community competition law and the 
concern to ensure compliance with that law and therefore to secure the award’s enforcement. 
Indeed, it can be submitted that a national court would be precluded by the principle o f 
effectiveness of EC law in such a situation from annulling a respectful to the EC antitrust 
rules arbitral award on ultra petita grounds.
Finally, it is important to stress that if  one can speak of an indirect “duty” imposed upon 
arbitrators, this is certainly to give reasons and explain why they have applied EC 
competition law to the facts before them in the way they did. By doing so, arbitrators reduce 
the risk o f annulment or of refusal o f recognition or enforcement, while the state court is 
facilitated in its review of the circumstances and possibly in its public policy control. 
Interestingly, a duty to give reasons in cases affecting Community law rights is also a general
1641 See Grosscn, “Arbitrage et droit de la concurrence”, in: Reymond & Bucher (Eds.), Recueilde travaux 
suisses sur l arbitrage international (Zurich, 1984), p. 42.
1642 See e g. the ICC arbitral award in case n° 8626/1996, published in: 126 JDI (Clunet) 1073 (1999), which 
was decided pre-Eco Swiss. An arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland, notwithstanding the parties’ selection of 
New York lawr to govern the substance of the dispute, proceeded to apply (though in that case not ex officio) Art. 
81 EC and the then block exemption Regulation on know-how licensing agreements (Reg. 556/89) and 
considered illegal a non-competition clause in the main contract. The tribunal recognised that this might not 
have been the case under New York lawf, but nevertheless opted to apply the EC competition provisions to that 
specific issue in view of the effect that the anti-competitive clause had on EU Member States. The tribunal made 
particular reference to the then Art. 26 of the ICC Rules o f Conciliation and Arbitration o f1988, (now Art. 35 of 
the ICC Rules o f Arbitration o f1998).
391
duty imposed by Community law upon national courts and administrative authorities.1643 
Particularly with regard to administrative authorities, a  full-fledged duty to give reasons 
ensures an adequate review by judicial organs, which are the only capable o f submitting a 
preliminary reference to the Court o f Justice under Article 234 EC. It is in fact accepted that 
the above consideration may mean that national administrative authorities are subject to a 
stricter judicial review standard in the Community law sphere than in the national law 
sphere.1644
O f course, such a “hard” duty cannot extend to arbitral tribunals, since Article 10 EC is here 
inapplicable, but certainly gives a feeling as to the importance of reasoning and to its link 
with effective judicial protection o f Community law-based rights and with the effectiveness 
o f  Community law. An adequate reasoning in an arbitral award means that the exigency o f 
increased judicial review at the setting aside or recognition/enforcement stage recedes.
hh. Conclusion
The possibility' o f an arbitral award’s being set aside or being refused recognition and 
enforcement in case of violation o f  ordre public is by far the best corrective mechanism in the 
application of EC competition norms by arbitrators. The mere deterrent effect of this 
possibility is such that it ensures in the best way that due respect will be paid to those norms. 
It also fits well with the nature o f  arbitration and it does not endanger its flexibility' and 
informality. Arbitrators are still the “masters o f  the arbitral proceedings”. The difference is 
that they have the responsibility or the burden to exercise this discretion in an appropriate 
way, so as to render an enforceable award.
This means that the most serious gaps in the enforcement of EC competition law are 
remedied. While arbitration cannot be elevated, contrary' to some expectations, to a forum of 
stricto sensu private antitrust enforcement, since it is merely and foremost a method of 
resolution o f commercial disputes, the public policy nature of the EC competition rules 
indirectly safeguards the effectiveness of those rules and thus transforms arbitration to a 
useful ally in the overall enforcement of competition law and to the creation of a true 
competition culture.
1643 See e.g. case 222/86, Union nationale des entrameurs et cadres techniques professionnels dufootball 
(UnecteJ) v. Georges Heylens et a i, [1987] ECR 4097, para. 15; case C-104/91, Colegio Oficial de Agentes de 
la Propriedad Inmobiliaria v. José Luis Aguirre Botrell et a i, [1992] ECR 1-3003, para. 15.
1644 See Temple Lang, supra (1998), p. 123.
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